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Abstract 
The U.S. agriculture industry is diverse and dynamic, plays a vital role in the nation’s 
economy, and serves as a critical component in providing the global food supply.  Agriculture 
has and always will be susceptible to threats such as pests, disease, and weather, but it is also 
threatened by intentional acts of agroterrorism.   
One specific area of concern is foreign animal diseases (FAD) and the danger these 
diseases create for the U.S. livestock industry.  Whether a disease outbreak is intentional or 
accidental, it could devastate animal agriculture and the food infrastructure and have a lasting 
impact on state, national, and global economies.  One of the most economically devastating 
diseases that raise fear and anxiety in the livestock industry is foot and mouth disease (FMD). 
A number of administrative, regulatory, and legislative actions have been implemented at 
state and federal levels designed to protect the agriculture industry and to prevent, prepare for, 
and respond to an accidental or intentional introduction of an FAD.  However, the consistency, 
clarity, and long-term commitment of these policy approaches remains in question. 
Effective policy decisions require a multidisciplinary approach that consider and balance 
science, economics, social factors, and political realities.  A significant number of policy analysis 
tools exist and have been applied to animal emergency scenarios but few actually address the 
complexity of these policy dilemmas and provide information to policymakers in a format 
designed to help them make better decisions.  Policy development needs to take a more 
multidisciplinary approach and better tools are needed to help decision makers determine the 
best policy choices. 
This dissertation analyzes three FAD policy dilemmas: mass euthanasia and 
depopulation, carcass disposal, and vaccination.  Policy tools are developed to address the 
multidisciplinary nature of these issues while providing the information necessary to decision 
makers in a simple and useful format.   
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Preface 
The majority of the content found in Chapter 3 was originally completed as a part of the 
March 2004 report prepared by the National Agricultural Biosecurity Center Consortium Carcass 
Disposal Working Group for the USDA Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service per 
Cooperative Agreement 02-1001-0355-CA (NABC, 2004).
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Chapter 1 - Understanding Food and Agriculture Biosecurity 
Concerns 
Agricultural biosecurity and agroterrorism are fairly recent terms in the agricultural 
industry vocabulary.  Yet, threats to our agriculture production system and food supply are not 
new.  Farmers and ranchers have been dealing with weather, diseases, and pests since the 
domestication of animals for food and the planting of crops to feed their families.  Efforts have 
long existed to protect our food supply from accidental and intentional threats.  However, the 
events of September 11, 2001, the anthrax postal attacks that followed, and on-going terrorist 
threats have increased attention to the potential of deliberate threats to the safety, integrity, 
viability, and sustainability of our food supply.  More than 50 foreign countries have experienced 
naturally-occurring outbreaks of foot and mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever (CSF), and 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) since 9/11.  The United States has seen four cases of 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), along with chronic wasting disease (CWD) and 
epizootic hemorrhagic disease (EHD) in wild deer and elk populations, low pathogenic avian 
influenza (LPAI H7N2), one incidence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI H5N2), 
exotic Newcastle disease (END), and swine influenza (variant H3N2v).   
The livestock and poultry industries could be devastated by numerous disease agents.  
These concerns, combined with other concerns related to emergency animal disease, emerging 
animal disease, transboundary animal disease, transmissible animal disease, and foreign animal 
disease (FAD) outbreaks around the world, have forced the livestock industry to focus on the 
issues surrounding an accidental or intentional devastating event.  These threats affect farmers 
and ranchers, as well as the entire food infrastructure, and extend to consumers, investors, and 
government policymakers.  
Food and agricultural biosecurity is the protection of the food and fiber industry from 
threats that are intentional, accidental, or natural.  All types of threats are of significant concern, 
especially the potential threat of bioterrorism.  Securing America’s agricultural industry from 
agricultural bioterrorism was identified as an area of concern that needed attention and 
examination by scientists and policymakers long before the events of 2001 and it has received 
increased attention since 2001 (Adams, 1999; Foxell, 2001; Franz, 1999; Franz, 2005a; Horn & 
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Breeze, 1999; Moon, Ascher, et al., 2003; Moon, Kirk-Baer, et al., 2003; National Research 
Council [NRC], 2002).  
 Nature and History of Agricultural Security Risks 
To understand the risks related to agricultural biosecurity, it is important to understand 
the nature and history of the threat.  The risk exists at all levels of the production chain from an 
attack on the livestock and crop sectors to adulteration of the food supply to introduction of a 
vector-borne disease.  According to Hennessy (2008), biosecurity is “the protection of the 
economy, environment, and health of living things from diseases, pests, and bioterrorism” (p. 
66).  The concept of food and agricultural biosecurity encompasses protecting the food and 
agricultural industry from bioterrorism, as well as securing the agricultural system against all 
forms of natural and unnatural threats (Turvey, Mafoua, Schilling, & Onyango, 2003).  
 Defining bioterrorism, biowarfare, and agroterrorism 
Intentional attacks include biowarfare, which is the act of a state government, or 
bioterrorism, which is perpetrated by a non-state actor.  Carus (2001) defined bioterrorism as 
“the threat or use of biological agents by individuals or groups motivated by political, religious, 
ecological or other ideological objectives” (p. 3).  Chalk (2004) defines agroterrorism as “the 
deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock or into the food chain, for 
purposes of undermining socioeconomic stability and/or generating fear” (p. 3).  The World 
Health Organization (WHO) (2002) defines food terrorism as “. . . an act or threat of deliberate 
contamination of food for human consumption with chemical, biological or radio-nuclear agents 
for the purpose of causing death to civilian populations and/or disrupting social, economic or 
political stability” (p.4).  Brown et al. (2005) defined agroterrorism as “the intentional use of a 
CBRNE weapon (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive) against the nation’s 
agricultural or food industries with the intent of destroying these resources and causing serious 
economic harm to the nation” (p. 3).  In 2012, Yeh, Park, Cho, and Cho defined agroterrorism as 
“attacks with a variety of biological agents on commercial crops or livestock populations, either 
as targets in their own right or as vehicles by which to attack humans” (p. 536). 
Bioweapons are a silent enemy because an attack is typically followed by an incubation 
period.  It takes time before clinical signs appear and even longer before the disease is identified 
and mass casualties begin.  The longer it goes undetected, the more devastating it becomes (Jaax, 
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2008).  Numerous pathogens could threaten animal health and weaken or destroy animal 
production and a nation’s economy.  Biological weapons are often referred to as “the poor man’s 
atomic bomb” (Blancou & Pearson, 2003, p. 433), making anti-crop and anti-livestock weapons 
seem “free at curbside” (Foxell, 2001, p. 114).  If intentional, a multi-focal attack is the most 
likely to be devastating (Franz, 2005a).  Multiple, simultaneous outbreaks are technically 
feasible and highly probable in an intentional attack, and this would be an immediate indication 
the disease is not naturally occurring (Elbers & Knuttson, 2013). 
 Historical attacks against agriculture 
Segarra (2001) stated that, “Attacks against agriculture are as old as war itself” (p. 1).  
The use of food and agriculture as a weapon, target, or mode of attack remains a concern.  In 
590-600 B.C., the Athenians contaminated the Amphictyonic League’s drinking water supply in 
the city of Kirrha.  A Carthaginian general contaminated wine he left behind for the enemy 
allowing his army to catch them defenseless (Kennedy, 2007).  In 149 B.C. in the Battle of 
Carthage, Romans poured salt on the Carthaginian crop lands and late in the 6
th
 century a violent 
Jewish sect poisoned granaries (Lawson, 2000). 
The first documented attack of bioterrorism against livestock occurred more than 1,200 
years ago in Bavaria when a poisonous powder was used to kill cattle.  Assyrians used rye ergot 
to poison livestock wells in the 6
th
 century.  Twelve cases of pathogens being used against 
livestock or food have been documented since 1912.  During World War I, German operatives 
attempted to use glanders and anthrax against Romanian sheep, French cavalry horses, and 
Argentinean mules and livestock.  While the overall success of their attacks is questionable, the 
Germans targeted Argentina, France, Mesopotamia, Norway, Romania, Spain, and the United 
States (Blancou & Pearson, 2003; Pearson & Salmon, 2005; Foxell, 2003; Dunn, 1999; Ban, 
2000; Olson, 2012).  The infection of Argentinian, French, and Mesopotamian mules with 
anthrax and b. Mallei leading to their subsequent death appears to be their greatest successes 
(Lawson, 2000).  There is even a case of an American-born German operative living in 
Washington, D.C., who infected horses being shipped from Baltimore, Maryland, to French and 
British armies with glanders and anthrax.  More than 3,500 horses were infected and rendered 
useless to the Allied troops (Foxell, 2001).  The German goal was to infect draft horses, military 
cavalry, and food animals to disrupt transportation and supply lines.  In World War II, despite 
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Hitler’s ban on offensive bioweapons, Germany continued efforts to weaponize FMD.  They 
conducted open-air trials on reindeer and domestic cattle on an island in a lake in northwest 
Russia (Ban, 2000).  
Japan weaponized anthrax and Rinderpest against Russia and Mongolia in World War II.  
In 1944, the UK initiated Operation Vegetarian, a plan to drop 5 million anthrax cattle-cakes in 
enemy territory to wipe out dairy and beef cattle.  More recently, the Rhodesian government 
used anthrax to destroy African cattle in the late 1970s (Ban, 2000; Blancou & Pearson, 2003; 
Dunn, 1999; Foxell, 2003; Pearson & Salmon, 2005).  Mexican contract workers were accused 
by the USDA of deliberately spreading screwworm in livestock (Keremidis et al., 2013).  From 
1985 to 1991, Iraq weaponized anthrax and botulinum toxin, and the United Nations (UN) found 
proof of Iraq’s program to develop camel pox (which may have been a surrogate for smallpox) as 
a weapon in 1995.  In 1997, the Russian army used glanders against the Afghan mujahidin and 
their horses (Ban, 2000; Blancou & Pearson, 2003; Dunn, 1999; Foxell, 2003; Pearson & 
Salmon, 2005; Yeh et al., 2012).  In 2011, a South African man was arrested and prosecuted for 
threatening to spread FMD in the US and Great Britain even though it was never proven he 
actually obtained the virus (Keremidis et al., 2013).   
The crop sector is also susceptible to attack.  During World War II, Germany dumped 
potato beetles in England and experimented with turnip weevils, turnip bugs, antler moths, potato 
stalk rot, potato tuber decay, and various weeds (Ban, 2000).  In 1950, East Germany accused the 
US of scattering potato beetles over their potato crops (Ryan & Glarum, 2008).  The Japanese 
explored the use of fungi, nematodes, and bacteria against grain and vegetable production in 
Siberia and Manchuria and are suspected of aerial dissemination that infected wheat and cotton 
fields.  The US and Britain both had extensive anti-plant programs during World War II.  The 
US even considered using a rice fungus in Japanese rice fields (Ban, 2000).  In 1978, the Arab 
Revolutionary Council used mercury to poison Israeli oranges and jeopardize exports and the 
Israeli economy.  Iraq weaponized wheat smut and experimented with aflatoxin for use against 
Iran in 1988.  Israeli settlers sprayed pesticides on Palestinian grapevines in 1997 (Franz, 2005a; 
Pearson & Salmon, 2005; Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy [CIDRAP], 2008; 
Foxell, 2003; Ban, 2000).  In 2000, Israeli settlers allegedly contaminated Palestinian agricultural 
fields with sewer water with the intent to get them to abandon their land (Keremidis et al., 2013).  
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 Biowarfare programs 
A number of countries have historically documented, agriculture-focused biowarfare 
programs, including Canada, France, Soviet Union, Germany, Iraq, Japan, South Africa, UK, and 
the US.  Egypt, Syria, and North Korea are suspected of having similar programs (see Table 1.1). 
During World War II, the US studied animal diseases in cooperation with Canada and the 
UK.  Mass production was investigated for anthrax, brucellosis, and glanders while defense 
strategies for Rinderpest, END, and fowl plague were also studied (Yeh et al., 2012).  Starting in 
1951, the US developed an anti-animal and anti-plant bioweapons program through the U.S. 
Army at Fort Detrick, Maryland.  The U.S. Air Force also studied anti-plant weapons in Pine 
Bluff, Arkansas.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) later acknowledged efforts in this area 
as well.  Field tests were run with wheat stem rust and rice blast fungus, and anti-animal 
pathogens were tested in feedlots in five states (Ban, 2000).  The US had significant stockpiles of 
agricultural-focused bioweapons until the bioweapons program was disbanded by President 
Nixon in 1969 (CIDRAP, 2008; Franz, 2005a; Jaax, 2008; Monterey Institute of International 
Studies [MIIS], 2008; Pearson & Salmon, 2005).  Cuban government officials have accused the 
US of attacks on animal, plant, and human populations with biological weapons in 21 different 
incidents.  Investigations have shown, however, that the outbreaks and infestations were likely 
the result of a natural occurrence combined with an inadequate government response (MIIS, 
2008; Ryan & Glarum, 2008). 
The Soviet Union’s biological and agricultural weapons development program has been 
documented as weaponizing a number of livestock and crop agents and was likely the most 
innovative and far reaching agricultural weapons program.  The Biological Weapons Convention 
signed in 1975 aimed to end these weapons programs, but it is suspected that many programs 
continued past that time (CIDRAP, 2008; Foxell, 2003; Franz, 2005a; MIIS, 2008; Pearson & 
Salmon, 2005).  Horn and Breeze (1999) stated that, “The Gulf War, the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union, and the end of apartheid revealed some surprising, well established bioweapons 
capabilities in Iraq, Russia and South Africa” (p. 10).  Alibek and Handelmann (1999) noted that 
the Soviet bioweapons program Biopreparat had 32,000 scientists and staff, and 10,000 worked 
on anti-agriculture weapons.  In comparison, the USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) 
had about 7,000 scientists employed in all aspects of agriculture research (Horn & Breeze, 1999; 
Jaax, 2008).  Mass stockpiles of former Soviet Union weapons are likely to still exist and are 
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poorly guarded (Roberts, 2005).  Any country that continues to pursue a secret bioweapons 
program is most likely developing anti-agriculture weapons (Wheelis, 2000).  One Soviet 
program, known as Ecology, was established by the Ministry of Agriculture and was focused on 
development of FMD, Rinderpest, CSF, ornithosis, and psittacosis for use specifically against the 
U.S. livestock industry (Lawson, 2000).  The scientists who worked in these programs, the 
materials they created, and the techniques they developed have since been dispersed around the 
world, building a significant scientific understanding of agriculture bioweapons in rogue regimes 
and terrorist groups (Ban, 2000; Jaax, 2008).  Officials from the former Soviet Union warned the 
U.S. government that Iran and other potential bioterrorists were attempting to recruit 
bioterrorism experts, especially those with experience in animal and plant pathogens.  Finances 
could be influential, because the average Russian scientist made only $1,644 annually as recently 
as 2004 (Jaax, 2008). 
Many smaller countries have also developed anti-agriculture bioweapons programs.  For 
example, South Africa is believed to have developed anthrax as an agricultural weapon during 
the apartheid era (Lawson, 2000).  
 Actions by non-state actors 
Biological, chemical, and vector-based attacks by non-state actors are important 
examples in understanding the ease of such attacks.  As state-supported biowarfare programs 
have declined, non-state actors have shown increased interest in agroterrorism (Keremidis et al., 
2013).   
In 1952, the Mau Mau, a Kikuyu tribesmen terrorist society, used African bush milk to 
kill cattle in the White Highlands of Kenya (Ban, 2000; Foxell, 2003; Pate & Cameron, 2001).  
The Irish Republican Army attempted to intimidate the UK with the threat of an FMD release in 
the 1970s (Yeh et al., 2012).  In 2001, ruling militants in Zimbabwe released FMD-infected 
cattle so they could take 4,600 white-owned farms and redistribute them to black owners.  The 
cattle industry losses in Zimbabwe were estimated to exceed $70 million for the capital city of 
Harare and export markets to South Africa and Europe were halted.  Economic impacts in 
neighboring Botswana were considered equally devastating (Ban, 2000; Foxell, 2003; Pate & 
Cameron, 2001).  In 1970, the Ku Klux Klan poisoned cattle belonging to black farmers in 
Alabama (Kosal & Anderson, 2004).  In New Zealand, a sheep rancher covertly imported rabbit 
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hemorrhagic disease virus to use on the wild rabbit population who were eating his sheep’s 
forage (Center for Domestic Preparedness [CDP], 2004; Jaax, 2008).  
Table 1-1 State Biowarfare Programs  
State Status Date Disease 
Canada Former 1941-1960s Anthrax, Rinderpest 
Egypt Probable 1972-present Anthrax, Brucellosis, Glanders, Psittacosis, Eastern 
equine encephalitis 
France Former 1939-1972 Potato beetle, Rinderpest 
Germany Former 1915-1917, 
1942-1945 
Anthrax, Foot and mouth disease, Glanders, Potato 
beetle, Wheat fungus 
Iraq Known 1980s-present Aflatoxin, Anthrax, Camelpox, Foot and mouth 
disease, Wheat stem rust, Wheat smut 
Japan Former 1937-1945 Anthrax, Glanders 
North Korea Probable ? – present Anthrax 
Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) 
Uncertain/ 
Former 
1978-1980 Anthrax 
South Africa Former 1980s-1993 Anthrax 
Syria Probable ? – present Anthrax 
United Kingdom Former 1937-1960s Anthrax 
United States Former 1943-1969 Anthrax, Brucellosis, Eastern & Western equine 
encephalitis, Foot and mouth disease, Fowl plague, 
Glanders, Late blight of potato, Newcastle disease, 
Psittacosis, Rice blast, Rice brown spot disease, 
Rinderpest, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, Wheat 
blast fungus, Wheat stem rust 
USSR 
(Russia, 
Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan) 
Formerly 
active; 
current 
status 
unclear 
1935-1992 African swine fever, Anthrax, Avian influenza, 
Brown grass mosaic, Brucellosis, Contagious bovine 
pleuropneumonia, Contagious ecthyma (sheep), Foot 
and mouth disease, Glanders, Maize rust, Newcastle 
disease virus, Potato virus, Psittacosis, Rice blast, 
Rinderpest, Rye blast, Tobacco mosaic, Venezuelan 
equine encephalitis, Vesicular stomatitis, Wheat & 
Barley mosaic streak, Wheat stem rust 
Note. Adapted from MIIS (2008), CIDRAP (2008). 
 
This interest in agroterrorism by non-state actors was evident in the Arab Revolutionary 
Council’s attack on Israeli oranges and the Israeli settlers attack on Palestinian grapes (Ban, 
2000; Foxell, 2003; Pate & Cameron, 2001).  In 1977, rebels in Uganda threatened to 
contaminate tea and coffee crops (Lawson, 2000).  In 1985, the U.S. embassy received a threat 
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that Sri Lankan tea exports had been contaminated with cyanide.  Similar threats were made 
regarding Chilean grapes headed into the US being laced with cyanide, resulting in more than 
$333 million in losses to growers and exporters.  In 1989, the Breeders organization claimed they 
bred and released Mediterranean fruit flies to protest pesticide use in California.  Scientists were 
able to detect unusual populations of fruit flies and peculiar patterns of insect behavior, which 
indicated a likely intentional infestation (Ban, 2000; Foxell, 2003; Pate & Cameron, 2001).   
An example where food terrorism was used against humans is the case of the Rajneeshee 
group in Portland, Oregon.  In 1984, they intentionally contaminated salad bars with salmonella 
to influence voting turnout in a local election (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002; Brown et al., 2005; 
Chalk, 2003; Chalk, 2004).  In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese-based organization, used 
anthrax, botulinum toxin, and sarin nerve gas in multiple attacks (Ban, 2000; Foxell, 2003; Pate 
& Cameron, 2001).   
CIA reports confirmed that the September 11 terrorists had received training in 
agriculture and showed interest in crop duster training, which is an excellent way to spread 
biological agents over crops or livestock (Collins, 2003; Roberts, 2005).  During Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military found al Qaeda instruction manuals in terrorist hideouts in 
Afghanistan, and hundreds of pages addressed agricultural terrorism (Kosal & Anderson, 2004; 
Monke, 2007; Jaax, 2008; Olson, 2012).  Many were U.S. agricultural documents translated into 
Arabic (Crutchley, Rodgers, Whiteside, Vanier, & Terndrup, 2007).  The manuals reportedly 
detailed the destruction of crops, livestock, and food processing facilities (Thompson, 2005; 
Olson, 2012).  A recent post to a Jihadist Internet forum discussed the development and use of a 
biological weapon from E. coli (Hoffman, 2011).  In a radical Islamic magazine, Shaykh Anwar 
Al Awlaki stated, “The use of poisons or chemical and biological weapons against population 
centers is allowed and is strongly recommended due to its great effect on the enemy” (Keremidis 
et al., 2013, p. s20).   
On July 28, 2012, the Emergency Management coordinator from the Kansas Department 
of Agriculture received an update from the Counter Agro Terrorism Research Center (CATRC) 
stating that there had been a rise in the discussion of agroterror with a focus on “the tools and 
means to attack the food supply chain, drinking water systems and ventilation systems” on 
Jihadist websites in the second quarter of 2012 (Counter Agro Terrorism Research Center 
[CATRC], 2012, p. 1).  Current trends indicate that agriculture continues to be an attractive 
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target.  Analysts indicated that terrorist groups focus on methods that cause significant economic 
damage.  Olson (2012) concluded that the “evolving strategy of al Qaeda focuses on inexpensive 
but highly disruptive attacks in lieu of monumental ones” (p.1). 
This dissertation will occasionally highlight examples of crop diseases, but the primary 
focus will be on animal agriculture.  Most experts believe that animal agriculture is more 
vulnerable and at greatest risk for an intentional attack (Chalk, 2004; Monke, 2007; Parker, 
2002) because livestock move frequently, have a higher individual value, and are more difficult 
to free from disease (Hennessy, 2008).  
 Animal Disease Outbreaks 
There are a number of naturally or accidentally occurring disease outbreaks that are 
important when considering disease threats to animal agriculture.  Periodic anthrax outbreaks in 
livestock have occurred in North America in the last 50 years including eight sporadic outbreaks 
in Canada from 1962-1991 and U.S. outbreaks in North and South Dakota, Texas, and Minnesota 
resulting in a few thousand livestock fatalities (Ackerman & Giroux, 2006).  FMD was identified 
in Taiwan in 1997 and in Europe, South America, Asia, and Africa in 2001.  HPAI outbreaks 
occurred in Asia, Europe, Canada, and the US beginning in 2003.  A new H5 avian influenza 
strain appeared in Asia in 2011.  Additional outbreaks with major economic impacts include CSF 
in the Netherlands, END in the southwestern US, CWD in Colorado and Wisconsin, Rinderpest 
in Africa, peste des petits ruminant (PPR) in India and Bangladesh, contagious bovine 
pleuropneumonia (CBPP) in Africa, Rift Valley fever (RVF) in the Arabian peninsula, and BSE 
in the UK, Canada, and the US (CIDRAP, 2008; Domenech, Lubroth, Eddi, Martin, & Roger, 
2006; Franz, 2005a; Pearson & Salmon, 2005).  In most of these cases, outbreaks were caused by 
human error, carelessness, or a lapse in security.  The same results could be replicated with an 
intentional disease introduction (Collins, 2003).  In particular, the FMD outbreak in the UK 
provides one of the best case studies for understanding the impact of a disease outbreak on the 
agricultural industry and a national economy.  However, there are many diseases that could be 
catastrophic in an accidental or intentional disease outbreak.   
 Serious disease threats 
The World Organization for Animal Health (also known as OIE, the Office International 
des Epizooties) identifies a number of transmissible diseases with the potential for very serious 
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and rapid spread of serious socioeconomic or public health importance in the international trade 
of animals and animal products (CIDRAP, 2008; Office International des Epizooties [OIE], 
2012a).  Before 2004, the OIE categorized animal diseases in two lists: A and B.  The former A-
list diseases are of most concern.  Since then, the OIE has combined all diseases into one list that 
is more in line with the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  The OIE classifies each disease equally, so they each have the same 
importance in regard to international trade (Monke, 2007).  The OIE list is in Appendix A. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recognizes more than 40 contagious FADs 
as a threat (SES, Inc., 2012).  The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, a subpart of 
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002, identified 
pathogens that are of greatest concern (Federal Register [FR], 2002).  The list has two parts: the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) only list (of concern to animals) and the APHIS and Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
overlap list (of concern to animals and humans) (Monke, 2007). 
The list includes pathogens and toxins that have potential to threaten animal and plant 
health or related products.  The listing of pathogens and toxins is influenced by the effect of 
exposure on health, production, and marketability; pathogenicity/toxicity of the agent; and the 
availability and effectiveness of pharmacotherapies and prophylaxis for treatment and 
prevention.  Fourteen of the 15 diseases listed on the former OIE A-List are included on the 
APHIS list, except for RVF, which is on the APHIS/CDC list (FR, 2002).  
The animal pathogens of greatest concern are highly contagious, infectious diseases that 
result in rapid disease spread and often high animal morbidity and mortality.  They have high 
potential of imposing serious socioeconomic or public health consequences.  In addition, such 
outbreaks would devastate international trade (CIDRAP, 2008; Franz, 2005b; Monke 2006).   
Some pathogens are of greater concern than others.  FMD is most often mentioned as a 
potential tool of an agroterrorist attack.  It is easy to use, spreads rapidly, and can cause severe 
economic damage.  FMD is not transmissible to humans.  BSE is considered a select agent, but is 
not likely to be used in an attack (Jaax, 2008).  Symptoms are slow to manifest and it may even 
go undetected.  It can, though, be passed to humans in the form of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease (vCJD).  Even though it is unlikely to be used in agroterrorism, protecting against this 
disease is a matter of agriculture security.  Diseases such as brucellosis, influenza, or 
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tuberculosis are already widespread and do not receive much attention in the bioterrorism debate.  
In addition to FMD, CSF, and END, there are significant concerns about emerging diseases like 
Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and the H5N1 strain of avian influenza (Monke, 2007).  Rinderpest, 
while it has a history in bioterrorism, was eradicated in 2011 due to the combined efforts of 
scientists, policymakers, veterinarians, and farmers (OIE, 2012a). 
OIE has partnered with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) to collaborate and strengthen efforts to build capacity and develop program strategies for 
dealing with FAD through regional alliances.  Their Global Framework for Transboundary 
Animal Diseases identifies FMD as the greatest risk and highest global priority, followed by 
RVF and HPAI.  PPR, CBPP, African swine fever (ASF), and CSF are recognized as top 
priorities with regional emphasis (Domenech et al., 2006). 
 Types of threats 
A disease threat can be unintentional or intentional.  If unintentional, the disease outbreak 
could be naturally occurring or due to an accidental introduction of a disease agent.  If a disease 
outbreak is intentional, the disease introduction could be an act of terrorism or a criminal act 
depending on the circumstances.  A terrorist attack could be domestic with special interest or 
political motivation or international by state, non-state, or loosely affiliated actors (Gilpen, 
Carabin, Regens, & Burden, 2009). 
If the occurrence can be attributed to a natural outbreak, the disease is more difficult to 
track and trace to the original source.  Simply announcing an infection could cause severe and 
immediate economic impact (Ban, 2000; Blancou & Pearson, 2003; CIDRAP, 2008; Franz, 
2005b; Kelly et al., 2004).  Strategic attacks on agriculture could have a more severe impact than 
accidental or natural disease occurrences (Yeh et al., 2012) and are “increasingly recognized as a 
national security threat” (Yeh et al., 2012, p. 536).  
An unintentional outbreak, accidental infection, or deliberate attack can all have 
significant affects, even if just one farm or one animal is infected.  Consider the single BSE case 
found in Washington in December 2003.  One Holstein cow imported from Canada was 
diagnosed with BSE and it resulted in an export loss of more than $3 billion (Brown et al., 2005; 
Franz, 2005b; Kelly et al., 2004).  This resulted in an immediate export ban and a 90% decline in 
exports.  In 2005, exports were still 71.4% below pre-BSE export levels.  The loss of high-
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quality beef export markets such as Japan and Korea who imported 56% of U.S. beef exports in 
2003 was significant.  The impact on domestic markets, however, was a decline of only 
approximately 1.5% (Lee, Park, Gordon, Moore, & Richardson, 2011).  Interestingly, BSE is an 
example of a situation in which well-thought out policy choices made a positive difference.  In 
2011, only 29 cases of BSE were detected worldwide, which represents a 99% reduction since 
the peak of the disease in 1992.  BSE testing policies developed since 2003 have made the 
industry less economically vulnerable to a BSE case.  A single case of atypical BSE found in 
California in 2012 had little lasting impact on the economy (Clifford, 2012; Hollis, 2012). 
 Factors Related to an Intentional Attack 
There are a number of factors related to the nature and potential of an intentional attack, 
including the motivation of attackers, the simplicity and low risk of an attack to the perpetrator, 
and asymmetry of an intentional attack. 
 Motivation behind an intentional attack 
Perpetrators of agroterrorism could be politically motivated single-issue groups, 
organized crime groups, greedy individuals attempting to manipulate the commodity markets, 
radical ecologists, animal rights activists, religious fanatics, apocalyptic sects, opponents of 
biotechnology, malicious or mischievous copycats, lone wolves, traditional criminals, economic 
opportunists, political extortionists, hostile nations, non-state actors, environmental militants, 
disgruntled employees, industrial saboteurs, or individuals wanting to make a political statement.  
For some perpetrators, an attack may be a means to an end, or, for another, a means and an end.  
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), Earth Liberation Front (ELF), Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF), other animal rights extremist groups, and ecoterrorists may be willing to 
commit an act that devastates the livestock industry while encouraging consumers to rethink 
their food choices.  Arson, animal liberation, assaults, extortion, firebombs, vandalism, and 
sabotage of livestock production and meat processing facilities are tactics used by groups like 
ELF and ALF in the past.  Groups like these are not concerned with the economic impact.  They 
want to dismantle an opponent (Casagrande, 2005; Gilpen et al., 2009; Heath, 2006; Keremidis 
et al., 2013; Olson, 2012; Parker, 2002; Yeh et al., 2012).   
Ingrid Newkirk, PETA co-founder, noted that FMD would not be ghastly for animals 
since they are bound for death anyway, but it would awaken consumers.  She stated she openly 
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hoped FMD comes to the US, acknowledging it would bring economic harm to those who “profit 
from giving people heart attacks and giving animals a concentration camp-like existence.  It 
would be good for animals, good for human health and good for the environment” (Elsner, 2001, 
p. 1).  The British Animal Liberation Front has been accused of poisoning eggs, turkeys, and 
candy bars in order to stop crimes against animals (Yeh et al., 2012).  According to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller, crimes and terrorism committed by 
animal rights and environmental extremists are a top domestic terrorism priority (Jaax, 2008).   
The goals of an attacker may include making money, stopping the planting of genetically 
modified crops, creating a market shift, exacting revenge, causing political upheaval, disrupting 
society, demoralizing a country, scaring consumers into changing their eating habits, 
blackmailing for political concessions, attracting attention to a cause, coercion, playing God, or 
creating an economic disaster.  Their drive may be different, but their motivation is to disrupt the 
agricultural system with the greater goals of creating fear, economic disruption, and public 
distrust in the government (Cameron, Pate, & Vogel, 2001; Casagrande, 2000; Casagrande, 
2005; Foxell, 2001; Hugh-Jones & Brown, 2006; Jaax, 2008; Manning, Baines, & Chadd, 2004).  
The UN, Interpol, and WHO agree that an attack on agriculture can create the meaningful 
psychological impact and government instability desired by extremists (Hugh-Jones & Brown, 
2006).  The Defense Science Board stated in 2002 that biodefense is the “single most significant 
modern challenge to U.S. government” (Jaax, 2011, p. 13). 
 Simplicity and low risk nature of attack 
The skills required for implementing an attack on the food and agriculture system are 
rudimentary (Brown et al., 2005; Foxell, 2003).  The attack can be nearly invisible, and 
symptoms may not be immediately apparent.  It is even possible that an attack would go 
unnoticed for days, be difficult to trace, and may be hard to distinguish from a naturally 
occurring outbreak (Wheelis, 2000; CDP, 2004; Brown et al., 2005; Chalk, 2004; Myers, 2006).  
 In many cases, the diseases identified as the greatest risk have the ability to survive for 
several days or weeks in the environment (depending on temperature), are predictable in disease 
spread, and are easily available and reproducible.  These most feared pathogens are easily 
disseminated, do not require an in-depth understanding of disease and animal health, are 
effective in small amounts, typically have low technology requirements, are easily transported in 
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any type of container, and their use results in a greater moral acceptability than an attack on 
humans (Ban, 2000; Blancou & Pearson, 2003; CIDRAP, 2008; Franz, 2005b; Kelly et al., 
2004).   
Along with the lower moral barrier associated with an attack on the food system, A 
perpetrator faces little to no risk, few disincentives, and has little to lose from intentionally 
introducing disease to the food and agriculture sector.  Few precautions are necessary, the 
technical obstacles are minimal, targets typically have low security, and a small attack can result 
in maximum impact.  Pathogens are easily accessible from diseased livestock and crops around 
the world.  No special process is required to weaponize the pathogens (Wheelis, 2000; CDP, 
2004; Brown et al., 2005; Chalk, 2004).  Because weaponization is considered one of the most 
significant barriers to bioterrorism, agriculture becomes a more effective target (Chalk, 2003).  
Ken Alibek, formerly known as Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, the director of the Soviet bioweapons 
program, noted that many of the anti-agricultural weapons developed by Biopreparat were easy 
to produce, especially in comparison to bioweapons aimed at humans, and involved simple 
techniques that could be easily adopted by terrorists (Casagrande, 2000; Jaax, 2008).  Not all 
anti-agricultural weapons would be easy to produce and distribute, but many such as FMD, 
anthrax, and wheat stem rust could be simple to prepare. 
Biological agents are typically simple and inexpensive to obtain or produce.  Infectious 
agents could be obtained from field clinical specimens and mass produced by multiplication 
using in vivo or in vitro methods.  While the most likely biological attack is one that is relatively 
low tech in nature, scientific advances may open the door to more complex methods of assault.  
New techniques in biotechnology could allow for production of new microorganisms or 
transgenic pathogens with new characteristics.  Some current production methods designed to 
increase volume, quality, and quantity, may increase stress levels in animals, which lowers their 
disease resistance and makes animals more susceptible to infection.  Only health care has 
benefited more than the agricultural industry from genomic research and biotechnology.  The 
same technologies used for the good of humanity can also be used to create destruction (Blancou 
& Pearson, 2003; Parker, 2002; Pellerin, 2000; NRC, 2002; Moon, Ascher, et al., 2003; Moon, 
Kirk-Baer, et al., 2003; Jaax, 2008; Crutchley et al., 2007). 
Brown noted that agroterror constituted an overlooked threat to America (1999).  As the 
US becomes better protected from traditional, biological, or chemical attacks against the human 
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population or infrastructure, agriculture and food systems become more vulnerable as terrorists 
shift their focus.  There is also a greater potential for deniability by the perpetrator, and the likely 
response or retribution will be less vigorous (Noah, Noah, & Crowder, 2002). 
Many FADs can be transmitted by animate or inanimate objects.  The challenge increases 
when considering the magnitude and value of international travelers, mail, and products coming 
into the US.  Nearly 500 million people arrived at American ports in fiscal year 2001, about 100 
million were inspected by USDA, and more than 30% of items seized upon inspection are 
prohibited animal products or byproducts (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2002a).  Increased 
international travel, the global marketplace, and increased imports result in more pathways for 
pests and diseases (SES, Inc., 2012). 
Many experts have discussed that FMD could be easily gathered by contact with a sick or 
dead animal in South America or another country and smuggled into the US as manure stuck on 
the bottom of a shoe or fluid on a handkerchief (Brown et al., 2005: Jaax, 2008; Wheelis, 2000).  
It is possible FMD has been accidently brought into the US multiple times but has not come into 
contact with livestock (Swallow, 2012).  Some experts have questioned whether the outbreak of 
FMD in Taiwan was intentional or accidental.  A diseased pig was imported from China and it is 
difficult to determine if it was intentionally imported but accidently infected, or intentionally 
infected with the goal of disrupting the Taiwanese economy (Casagrande, 2005). 
 Asymmetric threat 
An intentionally introduced agriculture disease is considered an asymmetric threat to 
America, intended to create instability of a social, political, and economic nature (Brown et al., 
2005; Myers, 2006).  Asymmetric threats are non-frontal attacks specifically defined by the 
Department of Defense Joint Staff as “unanticipated or non-traditional approaches to circumvent 
or undermine an adversary’s strengths while exploiting his vulnerabilities through unexpected 
technologies or innovative means” (Brown et al., 2005, p. 12).  Asymmetry also implies an 
imbalance between the often minimal levels of effort needed by a terrorist in order for them to be 
effective compared to the massive effort needed to protect a nearly immeasurable number of 
targets (Hugh-Jones & Brown, 2006). 
Stefan Wagner, a microbiologist, commented “the ingredients and recipes for an 
agroattack are already in place; the willingness and realization to actually use them is bound to 
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increase sooner or later” (Chalk, 2000, p. 12).  Agriculture has been called a bioterrorist’s bull’s-
eye; a combination of the perfect weapon and the perfect target (McGinn, 2003a; Alibeck & 
Handelmann, 1999).  The threat of an attack on agriculture deserves a factual approach, not just a 
hypothetical discussion.  Congressman Rob Simmons (2005) remarked that the 9/11 Commission 
concluded the intelligence community suffered from a “failure of imagination” (p. 1) and noted 
that just because U.S. agriculture has not seen an attack in the past does not mean it cannot 
happen in the future. 
During his resignation in December 2004, U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary 
Tommy Thompson highlighted the risks for agriculture by saying, “For the life of me, I cannot 
understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do…I 
worry every single night about it” (Brown et al., 2005, p. 76). 
As world population expands to 9 billion in 2050, the demand for food will grow 
exponentially with significant increases in the demand for milk, meat, and animal-based proteins.  
The demand for meat is estimated by the OIE to expand by 76%, dairy by 62%, and eggs by 
65%.  Such growth will continually increase the industry’s susceptibility (OIE, 2012, June 29).  
 Impact on U.S. Agriculture and the Economy 
The security of the food and agricultural industry is critical to national economic security.  
Agriculture is the largest industry and employer in the US.  More than one in six (18%) U.S. 
workers work in a job directly supported by the agricultural industry, 15% of the U.S. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) stems from agriculture, and the value of livestock commodities 
exceeds $105 billion annually (Franz, 2005a; Cupp, Walker, & Hillison, 2004; Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2005; Economic Research Service [ERS], 2008; SES, Inc., 2012).  
The industry is valued at greater than $300 billion, generates more than $1.25 trillion in 
agriculture-related activities, and employs 25 million Americans (CDP, 2004; Brown et al., 
2005; Chalk, 2004; ERS, 2008).  In 2011, cash receipts in agriculture increased by more than 
15% to nearly $363 billion (ERS, 2013).  These statistics account for only a fraction of 
agriculture’s impact, because allied industries such as transporters, restaurants, and distributors 
are not included (Chalk, 2004).  Roughly one fifth of America’s economic activity is accounted 
for by food and agriculture when measured from inputs to consumer tables (National 
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Infrastructure Protection Plan [NIPP], 2007).  The value of agriculture and the need to secure 
these resources cannot be overestimated (Ban, 2000; Connor, 2005).   
The U.S. agriculture industry produces more food and exports more agriculture products 
than any other country in the world.  Agriculture exports are predicted to exceed $65 billion per 
year in the next decade.  More than 20% of U.S. agricultural production is exported (10.5% of 
livestock and 22% of crops) and nearly a million jobs are created by agricultural exports.  There 
are only two areas of trade where the US exports more than it imports – agriculture and 
airplanes.  The food and agricultural sector is the largest positive contributor to the U.S trade 
balance (Brown et al., 2005; Parker, 2002; Chalk, 2004; Cupp et al., 2004; Logan-Henfrey, 2000; 
Monke, 2007; CDP, 2004; ; Myers, 2006; ERS, 2008; ERS, 2013).  Due to the increased cost of 
food, the value of agricultural exports in 2012 was more than $141 billion, which was a 100% 
increase from 2006.  The positive value of the agricultural trade balance has increased by nearly 
10 times from 2005 to 2012 (ERS, 2013).  The food and agriculture sector creates “a positive 
trade balance of roughly $35 billion and thereby fueling the US economy” (NIPP, 2010, p.10).  
Horn and Breeze (1999) noted that, “It [agriculture] is an unequaled ‘jewel in the crown’ of this 
great nation” (p. 11). 
 Vulnerability of agriculture 
While an attack on the food and agriculture systems may not be considered highly 
probable by some, the combination of the ease of an attack with agriculture’s significance to the 
national economy makes it a significant concern.  David Franz (2005b), former Director of the 
National Agriculture Biosecurity Center, stated that, “The likelihood of a bioterrorist attack, on 
humans or agriculture is probably very low – and risk is almost impossible to measure – but the 
potential impact is enormous: we cannot just look the other way” (p. 1).  The agriculture industry 
would be one of the easiest industries in the US to disrupt and is highly susceptible to economic 
sabotage (Foxell, 2003; Brown et al., 2005).  
The Gilmore Commission (2000), an advisory panel established by the RAND National 
Defense Research Institute under contract for the U.S. Secretary of Defense, found that, “... a 
biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form of 
assault, which has a high probability of success and which also has the prospect of obtaining 
political objectives, such as undermining confidence in the ability of government or giving the 
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terrorists an improved bargaining position” (p. 199).  An attack could be focused on livestock, 
crops, processing facilities, food in the distribution chain, wholesalers, retailers, storage 
facilities, transportation systems, and agriculture and food research laboratories (GAO, 2003; 
Monke, 2007).  Agriculture is a soft target with poor security and multiple entry points (Kohnen, 
2000). 
Yeh et al. (2012) summarized the vulnerability of the livestock industry to a biological 
attack into the following three reasons: 
 “The majority of lethal and contagious biological agents are environmentally 
resilient, endemic in foreign countries and harmless to humans, making it easier 
for terrorists to acquire, handle and deploy these pathogens; 
 With animals concentrated in fewer production facilities and frequently 
transported between these facilities, a single pathogen introduction may cause 
widespread infection; and 
 The extent of human travel around the globe makes it difficult to exclude exotic 
animal diseases as possible biological agents” (p. 536). 
 Concentration of production agriculture 
Animal agriculture’s continuously changing structure to higher production concentration 
increases the industry’s vulnerability to high death losses due to disease or disaster.  A large 
percentage of commodity sales come from a relatively small proportion of production units and 
limited geographic areas (Foxell, 2001; Brown et al., 2005; Cupp et al., 2004; Chalk, 2004).  A 
few geographic areas are especially vulnerable: cattle feeding in the High Plains region, 
including portions of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado; swine operations in 
North Carolina, Minnesota, and Iowa; and poultry production facilities throughout the Southeast 
and on the East Coast.  In these cases, infecting a small number of animals can cause a large 
disease footprint, which could wipe out production and sales at a high level.  As an example, 
more than 70% of beef cattle are produced within a 200-mi circle within the High Plains, and 80-
90% of grain-fed cattle are found in less than 5% of the country’s feedlots and located in the 
Midwest and Southeast.  More than 75% of hogs are in the Midwest (Foxell, 2001; Brown et al., 
2005; GAO, 2005; Monke, 2007; Breeze, 2006).  Ninety percent of poultry are in the Southeast 
(Jin, McCarl, & Elbakidze, 2009).   
19 
 
Overall, the Midwest is home to more than 24% of total agricultural production and is 
easily recognizable to potential agroterrorists as a prime target (Dykes, 2010).  The First 
Congressional District of Kansas that is comprised of the western half of the state is the number 
one congressional district in the nation in the value of agricultural products marketed.  There is 
significant interaction between the top three commodities of beef, dairy, and corn and the 
production sectors are highly integrated around animal feed consumption.  A disruption in one 
production sector will quickly impact other sectors due to the high integration.  In addition, 
agromovement, the routine transportation of livestock, grains, and processed food products, is 
rapid and expansive, adding to the industry vulnerability and potential economic impact of a 
disease outbreak (Dykes, 2010).  It is estimated that 1,000,000 pigs are in transit every day in the 
US (Center for Food Security and Public Health [CFSPH], 2013a). 
As of January 1, 2013, the US had nearly 90 million cattle, 66 million pigs, 6 million 
sheep (National Agricultural Statistics Service [NASS], 2013), and an estimated 40 million wild, 
cloven-hoofed animals all susceptible to a disease, such as FMD (Parker, 2002).  The top four 
meatpacking firms in the US account for more than 65% of animal slaughter.  In Canada, the top 
four firms account for more than 75% of livestock slaughter and more than 60% of poultry 
processing.  But in the UK, the top 10 plants account for less than 40% of cattle slaughter, 
slightly more than 40% of sheep slaughter, and 60% of swine slaughter (Jin et al., 2009).   
One infected animal introduced to a confined animal feeding operation (CAFO) can 
affect thousands of animals in a short time, resulting in a potentially devastating economic 
impact on producers and local, state, and national economies.  There are livestock operations that 
own several hundred thousand head of cattle or hogs with thousands housed together in 
individual facilities and poultry operations with millions of chickens housed by the thousands in 
multiple facilities.  Concentration in the slaughter and processing industry also makes the system 
vulnerable.  These factors allow for fast and efficient spread of disease, will likely result in high 
number of animals to be destroyed, and make it challenging to secure entry points.  However, 
concentration and scale allow a planned defense strategy that is focused on limited geographic 
areas and for the industry to be more resilient and responsive (Chalk, 2004; Crutchley et al., 
2007; Monke, 2006; Zink, 2004). 
Olson (2012) stated that, “The same factors that yield inexpensive and plentiful food by 
promoting maximum production efficiency also make American agricultural systems inherently 
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vulnerable” (p.1).  Vertical integration results in fewer, larger farms and centralized ownership.  
In the pork industry, the 40 top producers control 90% of production.  It estimated that the 30 
largest cattle feeding operations generate 50% of all beef products.  Integrated production 
systems result in multiple entry points in the food chain for infiltration.  The most likely targets 
would be intensive farming operations or feedlots, or a large number of small farms in close 
proximity.  The infection of wildlife in agricultural areas is also a concern (Blancou & Pearson, 
2003; Brown et al., 2005; Casagrande, 2002; Chalk, 2004; CIDRAP, 2008; Cupp et al., 2004; 
Foxell, 2001; Franz, 1999; Franz, 2005b; GAO, 2003; Kelly et al., 2004; Monke, 2007; Parker, 
2002; Yeh, Lee, Park, Cho, & Cho, 2013). 
In many developing countries or regions where agriculture is less concentrated, 
traditional, small-farming operations keep different species in close proximity which can lead to 
new outbreaks and pathogenic mutations across the species barrier.  Thus, the combination of 
structures within the industry allows for the possibility that new pathogens can be created in 
areas with more traditional farming practices and more intensive production can lead to faster 
disease spread (Ackerman, 2006).  
 Additional factors adding to vulnerability 
In addition to risks associated with high-density production, the vulnerability of animal 
agriculture is impacted by other factors.  Open access production in low population isolated areas 
typically leads to insufficient biosecurity and surveillance, and few farms and ranches practice 
effective security measures.  Agriculture utilizes large expanses of land that are difficult or 
impossible to secure.  The limited genetic diversity of crops and food animals, the focus on the 
collection of aggregate livestock statistics rather than individual head data, and the extensive 
transportation system for livestock and food products add to the industry’s vulnerability.  As 
animals are marketed, they are often comingled with stock from other farms, which increases the 
potential for disease spread.  The risk is also enhanced by livestock sales practices and 
centralized feed supplies.  In addition, there is a shortfall in the training of producers and 
veterinarians to identify an FAD and weaknesses in disease detection systems.  Because the US 
has been historically free of major FADs, vaccines are not routinely used.  Producers are 
typically hesitant to report disease outbreaks for fear of income ramifications, and these passive 
reporting methods are accentuated by a lack of trust between producers and the government.  
Many Americans underestimate the economic and social importance of the rural and agriculture 
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sectors which makes investing in agricultural biosecurity and defense less likely to be a priority 
to them (Blancou & Pearson, 2003; Brown et al., 2005; Casagrande, 2002; Chalk, 2004; 
CIDRAP, 2008; Crutchley et al., 2007; Cupp et al., 2004; Foxell, 2001; Franz, 1999; Franz, 
2005b; GAO, 2003; Kelly et al., 2004; Monke, 2007; Parker, 2002; Yeh et al., 2013).  Wade 
Moser, a North Dakota livestock producer, noted, “The livestock industry must overcome its 
distrust of government, and the government must understand the livestock industry better” (Koo 
& Mattson, 2002, p. 5).   
Another factor that adds to the vulnerability of the livestock industry is the limited 
number of practicing large animal veterinarians and the decreasing number of veterinary students 
preparing for careers in the livestock industry (Crutchley et al., 2007; Swallow, 2012).  Only 
25% of veterinarians who belong to the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) 
work with large animals and few have experience with FAD (Crutchley et al., 2007). 
 Consequences of an attack 
The consequences of a large-scale animal disease outbreak would be far reaching.  When 
an epidemic is introduced into a previously disease-free country, the effects on livestock 
productivity are dramatic.  Direct and indirect costs for control and eradication will be 
significant.  The entire agricultural industry and national economy will be affected, especially the 
import-export sector (Blancou & Pearson, 2003; Casagrande, 2000; Foxell, 2003; Monke, 2007). 
 Direct and indirect economic impacts 
Consequences would include losses due to disease, efforts to contain the outbreaks, trade 
restrictions, and indirect effects to market and related industries, including demand shifts due to 
changes in consumer confidence.  Direct costs would include expenses related to direct losses of 
crops and livestock, mortality, morbidity, loss of production, cost of diagnosis and diagnostic 
procedures, treatment, depopulation, disposal, welfare slaughter, market supports, surveillance, 
breeding restrictions, emergency vaccination, tracing of infected animals, establishment of short- 
and long-term quarantines and movement restrictions, and producer compensation.  Further 
losses would result from idle production stages, damage to consumer confidence, land-value 
changes, disruption of markets, impacts on tourism and travel, trade disruption, and long-term 
loss of market share (Blancou & Pearson, 2003; Chalk, 2004; Monke, 2007; Moon, Ascher, et 
22 
 
al., 2003; Moon, Kirk-Baer, et al., 2003; NRC, 2002; Parker, 2002; Wheelis, 2000).  Actual and 
perceived risks are likely to increase financial losses (Kohnen, 2000).   
In addition, an attack on any one segment of the industry would impact other economic 
segments.  For example, an FMD outbreak would affect the grain industry where every other 
bushel of U.S. grain is used for animal feed (Segarra, 2001).  Approximately 70% of the world’s 
feed grains are grown in the US and U.S. grain producers serve as the major supplier for the 
domestic and Canadian livestock industry.  A North American FMD outbreak resulting in 
reduced demand for feed grains due to stamping out or lower consumption by diseased and 
recovering animals will result in a significant oversupply of feed grains in the global markets, 
destabilize grain markets for a long period of time, and disproportionately disrupt the economies 
of many developing countries who depend on imports (Heath, 2008).  
An attack on just one farm would instigate movement stoppage, trade restrictions, and 
quarantines.  The damage would be disproportionate to the size of the attack (Casagrande, 2005).  
An intentional attack designed to cause significant damage will involve simultaneous 
introductions at multiple production sites, creating even greater disruption (Pendell, Leatherman, 
Schroeder, & Alward, 2007).  Even a blundered attack or a hoax would undermine government 
and consumer confidence (Ban, 2000; Foxell, 2001).  Misleading or inaccurate information can 
also have an impact.  A false report of FMD in Mexico attracted worldwide attention after a local 
newspaper claimed the disease had been identified and cattle were to be destroyed (Tabascohoy, 
2011).  When a false rumor of an FMD outbreak at a sale barn in Holton, Kan. hit the media in 
2002, the cost to the national markets exceeded $50 million (Jaax, 2006; Jin et al., 2009).  In 
New Zealand, government officials received a letter stating that a vial of FMD virus was poured 
over hay and fed to cattle and sheep on Waiheke Island.  The letter threatened further releases 
and officials implemented their response plan.  Direct costs exceeded $2 million (Mackereth & 
Stone, 2006).  
The U.S. economic impact of an intentional or accidental FAD outbreak would be 
significant.  The domestic impact, combined with the impact on international trade, would be 
devastating (Blancou & Pearson, 2003; Casagrande, 2002; Foxell, 2003; Franz, 2005b; Kelly et 
al., 2004).  Agroterrorism is designed to cause economic destruction though diseases that damage 
a nation’s ability to conduct international agricultural commerce (CDP, 2004; Wilson, Logan-
Henfrey, Weller, & Kellman, 2000).  In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce found that 
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the economic multiplier of exported agricultural products is 20 to 1.  Because the economic loss 
would be so significant, some have designated such acts as econoterrorism (Parker, 2002). 
Recovery from such events can take years as producers and the government work to 
regain domestic and international consumer confidence (Foxell, 2001).  Recovery costs can 
actually be more than the costs of the outbreak itself (Keremidis et al., 2013).  Such a method of 
economic destruction can be defined as low-cost/high-yield (Chalk, 2004) and should never be 
considered as low-probability or low-consequence (Yeh et al., 2013). 
 FMD as an example 
According to Peter Chalk (2003), Taiwan’s gross domestic product dropped by 2% nearly 
overnight due to trade embargoes implemented following the FMD outbreak in 1997.  Total loss 
exceeded $5 billion.  Long-term impacts show the overall loss may have reached $15 billion 
(Logan-Henfrey, 2000; OIE, 2012a; Owens, 2002).  Current annual production losses from FMD 
worldwide and prevention costs from vaccination are estimated to exceed $5 billion (OIE, 2012, 
June 27).  The FMD outbreak in the UK resulted in a $12-billion loss (GAO, 2003).  In 2012, 
OIE estimated that the actual direct and indirect costs may have reached $30 billion (OIE, 2012, 
June 27).   
Based on the U.K. outbreak of FMD, the cost of a similar outbreak in the US is estimated 
to exceed $24 billion in direct costs and up to $10 billion annually in the export market.  This 
estimate does not include indirect costs (GAO, 2003).  Price Waterhouse Coopers applied their 
estimated loss ratios derived from the U.K. FMD outbreak to predict a loss of up to $33.6 billion 
in the US based on a conservative estimate of animals being destroyed (Brown, 1999; Lautner & 
Meyer, 2003).  Monke, 2007; In a study done using the National Interstate Economic Model, 
economic loss was projected to equal $23 to $34 billion primarily just in the reduction of 
domestic and international demand (Lee et al., 2011).  A USDA study estimated the potential 
economic impact of an FMD outbreak as more than $60 billion (Knowles et al., 2005).  The 
impact on individual producers would be significant while the aggregate impact on agriculture is 
less extensive due to shifts in economic welfare among different industry sectors.  Closure of 
international markets and an adverse domestic consumer response would lead to the most 
devastating overall economic damage (Paarlberg, Lee, & Seitzinger, 2002).   
A simulated outbreak in California was estimated to result in national agriculture 
economic welfare losses of up to $69 billion.  In this case, every additional hour delay in 
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detecting FMD was projected to result in 2,000 more cattle slaughtered and an estimated 
increased loss of $65 million (Carpenter, O’Brien, Hagerman, & McCarl, 2011).  The economic 
and societal impacts of an intentional outbreak are expected to exceed those of an accidental 
outbreak (Jin et al., 2009).  If an intentional FMD outbreak were introduced into five feedlots 
simultaneously, the economic damages are anticipated to be substantially greater than a single 
site introduction.  In a 14-county region of Kansas, an FMD outbreak is projected to lead to the 
depopulation of 1.2 million cattle and the destruction of more than 987 million pounds of beef 
(Pendell et al., 2007).  In another study based on a single Kansas county, a potential FMD 
outbreak that infected 60 farms resulted in projected operational costs of $1.4 million a week and 
an estimated $6.4 million loss to the county along with the expected loss of more than 4,000 jobs 
in manufacturing, retail, hospitality, and other jobs (Heath, 2013). 
A study by the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development Food and Policy Research 
Institute estimated losses over 10 years due to an FMD outbreak in each agriculture sector.  They 
estimated that the pork industry would lose $57 billion, beef would lose $71 billion, poultry 
would lose $1 billion, corn would lose $44 billion, soybeans would lose $25 billion, and wheat 
would lose $1.8 billion.  Just in the pork and beef sector alone, job losses were estimated to 
exceed 58,000 jobs per year (Hayes, Fabiosa, Elobied, & Carriquiry, 2011).  Other studies have 
estimated that the loss in trade would exceed $27 billion (Brown, 1999).  The smallest outbreak 
can cause international trade damage.  The National Defense University exercise predicted that 
an FMD outbreak that impacted only 10 farms would have an economic impact of more than $2 
billion (Collins, 2003).  A trade ban can have a larger and more long-lasting economic impact 
than the actual disease production losses.  A disease outbreak will negatively impact a previously 
disease-free country’s export reputation, and even after bans are lifted, it will be difficult to 
regain market shares (Junker, Komorowska, & van Tongeren, 2009).  Canada spent $2 million in 
1951 and 1952 to slaughter 2,000 animals to eradicate FMD, but the resulting embargoes cost $2 
billion to Canadian farmers alone (1987 dollars) (Guterman, 2001; Kohnen, 2000).   
In 2011 and 2012, the OIE reports there were 10 reported FMD outbreaks in previously 
disease-free zones or countries.  Many of these were small outbreaks and did not result in 
extreme economic losses relative to a major outbreak, but the impact was still significant.  In the 
last 15 years, more than $25 billion (based on 2011 US$) has been lost due to FMD outbreaks in 
countries that had been FMD free.  This is combined with an annual estimated impact of $11 
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billon (range of $6 billion - $21 billion) in direct losses and vaccination costs in endemic 
countries.  These estimates do not include losses due to trade restrictions, production losses when 
disease is present, or other FMD control and surveillance costs (Knight-Jones & Rushton, 2013). 
FMD is not the only disease that will have a devastating economic impact.  The CSF 
outbreak in the Netherlands in 1997 resulted in a loss of more than $3 billion (Logan-Henfrey, 
2000; OIE, 2012a; Owens, 2002).  The END outbreak in California from 1971-1973 resulted in 
the depopulation of 12 million poultry and direct costs of $56 million (Ackerman & Giroux, 
2006).  The 2002-2003 END outbreak in California resulted in an estimated loss of $1 billion 
(GAO, 2003) and depopulation of 2 million birds in California and Nevada (Ackerman & 
Giroux, 2006).  Additional losses were incurred in Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas 
during the same outbreak (Gilpen et al., 2009).  Disease control is expensive but critical to 
minimizing loss as is evident with other disease incidents.  The outbreak of HPAI in 
Pennsylvania in the mid-1980s cost $63 million for depopulation and decontamination and $200 
million in indirect costs, but an economic analysis showed that without the eradication, the costs 
would have exceeded $5 billion and a significant portion would have been passed on to 
consumers (Ackerman & Giroux, 2006; Brown, 1999).  Nearly five million birds were destroyed 
in response to the 2004 LPAI outbreak in Virginia (Ackerman & Giroux, 2006).  When karnal 
bunt infected wheat crops in the southwestern US, it cost more than $250 million in lost wheat 
exports in 1996.  Thirty-two countries banned U.S. wheat imports within one day (Owens, 2002).   
 Impact on consumer costs 
The health of the livestock industry, specifically the lack of disease, results in higher 
productivity, increased profits for producers, and decreased consumer costs (Brown, 1999).  
Consumers typically spend less than 9.8% of their disposable income on food (including only 
5.7% at home), which is one third to one quarter of the percentage many consumers pay around 
the world, and less than in any other nation.  The percentage of disposable income dedicated to 
food purchases has decreased by 62% since 1933 (ERS, 2013).  Efficient food production leads 
to inexpensive food policies, which allows funds to be invested in other areas, which creates a 
robust and vibrant economy (Brown et al., 2005; CDP, 2004; Cupp et al., 2004; ERS, 2013; 
Kohnen, 2000; Monke, 2007; Myers, 2006; Parker, 2002).  As noted by former Kansas State 
University President Jon Wefald (1999), the true engine of America’s prosperity is driven by the 
discretionary spending created by our nation’s “ability to produce safe, plentiful, and inexpensive 
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food” (Jaax, 2002, p. 50).  The economic vitality of agriculture depends on being primarily free 
of disease.  Any change in disease status would have devastating results (Brown, 1999).  Jaax 
(2002) summarized that, “The very strengths that make our food production industry the envy of 
the world, also contribute to our vulnerability” (p. 53).   
 Economic, political, and social instability 
An intentional disease introduction or other form of attack would create economic, 
political, and social instability.  Mass panic would occur.  The lifestyle and welfare of those 
involved in the agriculture industry would be immediately disrupted.  Farms and ranches would 
be quarantined.  Commerce within the industry would come to a dramatic stop (Chalk, 2000).   
“Disease outbreaks in the past, both in animals and humans, have not only damaged 
people’s health and livelihoods, on occasion they have wrought irreparable damage on entire 
societies, undermining long-held social beliefs and overturning stable political systems” 
(Ackerman, 2006, p. 358).  Animals and human populations will recover but the cost and long-
term impacts are significant (Ackerman, 2006). 
An attack on the agricultural sector would impact more than just farms and ranches.  
Response exercises have demonstrated that no such event would be local – it would immediately 
become a homeland security event (Cupp et al., 2004; Dupont, 2003).  The entire food supply 
chain would be affected, including retailers, consumers, and their checkbooks.  Parker (2002) 
said an attack would “jeopardize consumer confidence, disrupt commodity markets and wreak 
economic havoc” (p. X).  The effect would be felt across the country as consumers filled their 
regular grocery needs, “stretching from America’s farm belts to its supermarket counters” 
(Foxell, 2003, p.101).  Grocery stores in major U.S. cities typically stock a 7-day supply of food, 
so supply disruptions could quickly result in food shortages (Olson, 2012).  In The Turner 
Diaries, a novel with violent and racist themes that has been associated with real-life militia 
violence, the author writes that the characters “began appealing to things they [the public] can 
understand, fear and hunger.  We will take food off their tables and empty their refrigerators…” 
(Casagrande, 2000, p. 99).   
Americans depend on a safe, affordable, and accessible food supply.  Any change in 
those expectations would lower public confidence in the food supply, which would lead to a lack 
of trust and support for government.  The U.S. agriculture industry’s ability to consistently 
provide wholesome, inexpensive, and abundant food is a significant factor in the well-being of 
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the citizenry and general prosperity of the nation (Chalk, 2004; Dunn, 1999; Franz, 2005b; Kelly 
et al., 2004).  The agricultural industry has demonstrated its ability to manage and resolve a 
number of unintentional threats, including natural disasters, temporary shortages, infestations, 
disease, and food safety concerns.  The resilience and responsiveness have earned the agriculture 
industry substantial consumer confidence (Moon, Ascher, et al., 2003; Moon, Kirk-Baer, et al., 
2003; NRC, 2002).  As President George W. Bush noted, “Agriculture ranks among the most 
crucial of our nation’s industries, yet its reliability and productivity are often taken for granted” 
(Cheviron, 2005, p. 35). 
U.S. citizens cannot imagine a scenario in which their food is scarce, expensive, or 
dangerous to consume.  The U.S. agriculture industry is considered the most productive and 
efficient in the world.  It reached this success even though relatively few people are connected to 
production agriculture (less than 2% of the workforce is employed in farming and ranching), 
which makes it relatively invisible to the public.  While the move from an agrarian society to the 
industrial and information age has created a disconnection between consumers and their food 
sources, food still remains a necessary element of everyone’s daily routine (Chalk, 2004; Monke, 
2007; Parker, 2002).   
The average U.S. city has no more than a 5- to 7-day supply of meat, grain-based foods, 
fruits, and vegetables.  On average, most food product travels more than 1,500 mi and most meat 
travels more than 1,000 mi before it reaches the supermarket.  An agroterrorist attack or an 
unintentional disease outbreak would raise the cost of food, impact family and individual 
budgets, and undermine confidence in government in ways that few other disruptions could 
(Brown et al., 2005; Chalk, 2004; Cupp et al., 2004; Foxell, 2001; Hennessy, 2008; Myers, 
2006).  Such events would impact the public’s trust in government to protect the food supply and 
could change the relationship between government and its citizens.  The public will likely blame 
an attack on the failure of the government rather than the vulnerability of the industry (Chalk, 
2001; Chalk, 2004; Cupp et al., 2004).  Just the claim of an attack can result in recalls, trade 
restrictions, economic loss, and negative publicity (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002). 
A loss of consumer confidence in meat and milk products would add to already 
devastating economic impacts of a disease outbreak (Heath, 2013).  Consumers demand safe 
food products backed by a guarantee and increased government action without additional costs 
(Domenech et al., 2006).  “Consumer demands will be for livestock products that are reasonably 
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priced (food security), have little risk of disease (food safety), and are from systems that treat 
animals humanely (animal welfare)” (Rushton & Upton, 2006, p. 381).  A survey completed in 
2012 of 1,000 consumers of meat and milk products indicate 85% have heard of FMD, but 49% 
think small children can have FMD.  Confusion with hand, foot, and mouth disease may indicate 
FMD should be referred to as hoof-and-mouth disease (Ahlem, 2013).  Studies indicate that just 
the threat of agroterrorism would have a negative impact on food consumption behavior, and it is 
likely that it will take time for consumption to rebound following a threat.  A bioterrorist threat 
will likely result in a more severe decrease in consumption than a naturally occurring threat will 
create.  Any threat will reduce consumption, but is unlikely to completely eliminate consumption 
for most people (Just, Wansink, & Turvey, 2009).  In general, educational efforts designed to 
allay consumer and public fears are poorly developed in regard to catastrophic events and in the 
case of an agroterrorist attack, the perpetrator can use anxiety and fear to their benefit (Crutchley 
et al., 2007).   
A terrorist knows that a series of attacks against livestock, crop, and food products will 
undermine the public’s belief in the government’s ability to provide a safe food supply.  The 
attacker does not have to cause devastation.  If consumers question the government and its ability 
to protect and secure its citizens and the food supply, attackers will create panic, get publicity, 
destabilize the government, and affect the politics of democracy (Blancou & Pearson, 2003; 
Casagrande, 2002; Foxell, 2003; GAO, 2003).  The response to such an attack can also cause the 
public to question the government.  The mass depopulation and disposal of hundreds or 
thousands animals will create confusion, anger, anguish, and disbelief, especially because we 
have not seen massive disease outbreaks since the advent of television and the US public has 
limited visual points of reference for such a disaster (Brown et al., 2005; Chalk, 2001; Hennessy, 
2008; Horn & Breeze, 1999).   
 Is the threat overstated? 
While the majority of experts agree an attack on agriculture would be possible or even 
simple, Cameron et al. (2001) believe an “agricultural Armageddon” would face serious 
technical hurdles and require scientific knowledge and skills (p. 6).  They claimed the threats of 
agricultural bioterrorism have been exaggerated and that an attack is unlikely.  Amy Smithson, 
the director of the chemical and biological weapons project at the Henry L. Stimson Center noted 
in 2001 that terrorists have shown little interest in agriculture and “… have been interested in 
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killing people” (Guterman, 2001, p. A20).  In 853 cases of chemical or biological terrorism 
worldwide over 25 years, only 21 attacks were on agriculture (Guterman, 2001).  Carus (2001) 
found 222 bioterrorism cases over 100 years with only 14 confirmed cases related to food or 
agriculture, but he did find that the attacks with a food or agriculture focus had steadily increased 
(Parker, 2002).  One reason there have not been more attacks is because some terrorists may 
consider these types of attacks mundane and not as dramatic as other terrorist methods (Chalk, 
2000; Chalk, 2004).  It is also possible that an agroterrorism attack could be used in conjunction 
with a traditional terrorist attack to create greater disruption and dilute response efforts (Chalk, 
2003). 
In 2003, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that the nation’s economic loss 
due to an agroterrorism attack would be small due to the industry’s strong tradition of responding 
to weather, pests, and health events and the existence of commodity support programs.  
However, this estimate failed to account for the fact that farm products that account for two 
thirds of gross farms sales (meat, fruits, and vegetables) are not covered by commodity support 
programs (Monke, 2007).  Cameron et al. (2001) believe the diversity of U.S. agriculture and the 
economy would make an attack insignificant and that discussing agricultural terrorism is 
sensationalist and could promote attacks.  This highlights another debate about how freely 
methods of bioterrorism are discussed.  James Stack, director of the Great Plains Diagnostic 
Center at Kansas State University, refers to this issue as the “transparency paradox” (Nelson, 
2004, p. 2).  It is a balance between informing and alerting the public for the purpose of 
preparedness and providing information that may aid in an attack or exaggerate fears (Jaax, 
2008; Nelson, 2004).  Pate and Cameron (2001) concluded that an agroterrorist attack would be 
too difficult because of too many technical hurdles, lack of concentration in crop and livestock 
production, extraordinarily sophisticated surveillance of crop and animal disease, and no 
evidence of motivation amongst terrorist groups to attack agriculture.   
 In reference to agroterrorism, Stephen Cunnion (2002) noted that, “Some have 
downplayed this type of bioterrorism, saying that since it has never happened and since it would 
take a concerted effort, it would be unlikely to occur.  This may have been a safe supposition 
before the World Trade Center disappeared from the New York skyline.  The same coordinated 
long-term planning necessary for the 11 September attack makes this type of terrorism a real 
possibility” (p. 2).  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, combined with unintentional 
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disease outbreaks and their significant impacts have proven that these claims are naïve and 
limited in perspective.  Most experts conclude that the economic and political threats call for 
more research, a more accurate economic assessment, and a more complete and coordinated 
policy approach that informs the public and policymakers about potential risks (Cameron & Pate, 
2001; Pate & Cameron, 2001).  In his testimony to Congress, Dr. Jerry Jaax quoted U.S. 
Representative Chris Shays, “Better to be scared by the improbable possibility, than be 
unprepared for the catastrophic reality” (Jaax, 2002, p. 52).  
Robert P. Kadlec (1995), a professor of military strategy and operations at the National 
War College, said, “Using [biological weapons] to attack livestock, crops, or ecosystems offers 
an adversary the means to wage a potentially subtle yet devastating form of warfare, one which 
would impact the political, social, and economic sectors of a society…” (Madden & Wheelis, 
2003, p. 155) and “potentially threaten national survival itself” (Chalk, 2001, p.9).  The ripple 
effect of an animal disease outbreak would be wide and multi-faceted.  The availability of 
disease agents and the simplicity of dissemination make this risk a distinct possibility.  Such an 
attack is difficult to prevent and even more difficult to attribute and trace (Brown et al., 2005; 
Casagrande, 2002; Pearson & Salmon, 2005). 
An attack on agriculture is not about killing animals.  It’s about striking at the heart of the 
economy and creating an economic assault (Franz, 2005a; Jaax, 2002; Jaax, 2008; Nelson, 2004).  
It is not about “imperiling our food supplies” (Breeze, 2004, p. 251).  It is about terror, financial 
losses, and “mass slaughter and funeral pyres all day and every day on CNN and al Jazeera” 
(Breeze, 2004, p. 251).  According to Breeze (2004), terrorists want to see “sweeping 
quarantines, mass slaughter and burning or burial of millions of carcasses under the ceaseless eye 
of television – together with staggering financial losses triggered by international trade 
embargoes” (p. 251).  Horn and Breeze (1999) said an attack on agriculture is an attack on the 
entirety of America – “on all civil society, on our economy, our way of life, our values, and our 
course and choices as a nation” (p. 12).  
 Efforts to secure agriculture 
While the US has strengthened its efforts to detect, prevent, and respond to bioterrorist 
attacks, “Agriculture is one area that has received comparatively little attention in this regard.  In 
terms of accurate threat assessments and consequence procedures, the general farming sector 
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exists somewhat as a latecomer” (Chalk, 2004, p. 1).  The federal government has been seen by 
many as slow to recognize the vulnerability and significance of agriculture and to take 
appropriate steps of protection and preparedness (Monke, 2007; Nipp, 2004).  The best method 
of preparation is prevention, and a government’s willingness and ability to fund and provide 
necessary resources is a critical factor of preparedness (Yeh et al., 2012).  According to historical 
experience, terrorists and other attackers will rely on a lack of preparation to help accomplish 
their goals (Appel, 2013; Keremidis et al., 2013).  
Although it is clear that the impact would be significant from any level of attack, it is 
nearly impossible to protect all animals and plants.  With the constant movement of animals and 
food products across borders, it is not feasible to examine and track all content.  International 
preventative measures combined with national strategies and contingency plans will reduce the 
risk and limit the impact of an intentional or accidental introduction (Blancou & Pearson, 2003; 
Kelly et al., 2004).   
Whether an agricultural disease emergency is intentional, natural, or accidental, the 
strategies for prevention, mitigation, management, and recovery are common to all scenarios.  
When preparing for the normal, emergency managers are also preparing for the abnormal.  
Emergency response should be seen as dual purpose in planning for both attacks and natural 
outbreaks (Hugh-Jones & Brown, 2006). 
 Limited historical governmental response 
While the threat to agriculture is clear and well-documented, the threat of agroterrorism 
has not always been recognized in the U.S. federal budget, laws, or policy directives.  For years, 
the government response to these threats was not a priority.  As fears and discussion increased in 
the late 1990s, “little progress was made in preparing to either prevent or respond to attack” 
(Madden & Wheelis, 2003, p. 157).  Horn and Breeze (1999), administrators at ARS, noted that 
America’s vulnerability to a bioterrorist or biological warfare attack on agriculture had been 
“almost totally overlooked” (p. 9).  As Dr. Randall Murch, Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Agricultural Crime Laboratory, said “the U.S. government has not yet fully 
embraced the threat of agroterrorism” (Foxell, 2001, p. 127) and when referring to an attack on 
U.S. agriculture “it is not a question of if but when” (Foxell, 2001, p. 126).  In 2005, FBI 
Director Robert Mueller said agroterrorism was “just starting to enter our collective 
consciousness” while acknowledging it as a real threat (Baker, 2005, p. 1).  
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 Agroterrorism was not mentioned in President Clinton’s 1998 Presidential Decision 
Directives 39, 62, or 63, which set counterterrorism policy and prescribed the protection of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure (Casagrande, 2000; Gilpen et al., 2009; Horn & Breeze, 1999; 
Monke, 2007).  Biological weapons used against livestock and crops were not included in the 
U.S. Code (Title 50, Chapter 40) definition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Cameron & 
Pate, 2001).  
Agriculture was incorporated into national anti-terrorist strategy after September 11, 
2001, but less than $500 million was committed to the cause (Kelly et al., 2004).  The threat of 
agroterrorism took on a new urgency because of the importance of agriculture to economic, 
political, and social stability.  However, little attention was immediately given to the threat of 
agricultural biowarfare and bioterrorism.  Nine days after the September 11 attacks, the General 
Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on combating terrorism that did not address 
agricultural or food threats, and minimally involved the USDA.  The GAO explained this by 
stating that agriculture was not designated a critical infrastructure of the US.  If policymakers 
continue to believe the risk to American agriculture is small, they are putting the industry and 
nation at peril (Monke, 2007; Parker, 2002).  
 Congressional hearings and actions 
 1999 – Senate Subcommittee Hearing on Emerging Threats 
The first Congressional hearing on agroterrorism was held in October 1999 before the 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats in the Senate Committee on Armed Services chaired by 
Senator Pat Roberts (Monke, 2007).  During the hearing, Roger Horn, ARS Administrator, 
discussed the USDA’s recently developed six-part approach to dealing with threats against 
agriculture, including terrorism prevention and deterrence, international cooperation, emergency 
management planning, counterterrorism research, protection of critical infrastructure, and 
protection of the food supply (Cameron & Pate, 2001; Horn, 1999).  The next Congressional 
hearing was not held until 2003 (Monke, 2007). 
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 2000 - Congressional Budget  
In the 2000 Congressional Budget, $10 billion were appropriated to combat terrorism, 
and less than $5 million were appropriated for agroterrorism prevention, which was significantly 
lower than requested (Cameron & Pate, 2001). 
 2001 - Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act 
The Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 was introduced in the fall of 
2001.  The legislation called for expanding agricultural research to protect domestic food 
supplies and established a coordinated program of agroterrorism countermeasures.  The 
Agroterrorism Prevention Act of 2001 was designed to establish and strengthen the criminal 
code related to animal- and plant-related terrorism, and the Agricultural Terrorism Prevention 
Response Act of 2001 was focused on establishing better interagency and industry cooperation, 
communication, and training related to agroterrorism preparation and response.  By December 
2001, six different pieces of legislation had been introduced in Congress.  While the introduction 
of these bills indicated increased interest, hearings were not held and the bills never left 
committee.  The same fate awaited the Protecting the Food Supply from Bioterrorism Act and 
similar stand-alone legislation that was introduced in 2002 (Crutchley et al., 2007; Manning et 
al., 2004; Leviten & Olexa, 2003; Segarra, 2001).  
 2002 – Defense Appropriations, Homeland Security, Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act 
In January 2002, the USDA received emergency funding through the Defense 
Appropriations Act which was the first time Congress allocated any funds specifically focused 
on agroterrorism after repeated USDA budgetary requests (Horn & Breeze, 2003; Leviten & 
Olexa, 2003; Manning et al., 2004; Monke, 2006).   
The Homeland Security Act was enacted in 2002 in direct response to the September 11 
attacks creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and resulting in one of the largest 
governmental reorganizations in history.  The overarching goals of the new cabinet level agency 
were to reduce U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, prevent terrorist attacks, and minimize damage 
and enhance recovery from terrorist attacks.  Responsibility for agricultural border inspection 
and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center was moved to DHS (Crutchley et al., 2007).  
In June 2002, both the U.S. House and Senate passed the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188).  This act incorporated 
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many agricultural security objectives and one of its goals was to help protect the nation’s 
agriculture from biological threats and enhance the safety of the nation’s food supply.  In subtitle 
B, known as the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act, the Secretary of Agriculture was 
directed to develop a list of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe 
threat to animal or plant health, or to animal or plant products.  The USDA received increased 
budget appropriations, and was directed to work in coordination with DHS to protect agriculture.  
Appropriations and user fees for homeland security related to agricultural and food security in 
USDA and DHS more than tripled since 2001 and agriculture received about 2% of the total non-
defense homeland security budget (Leviten & Olexa, 2003; Manning et al., 2004; Monke, 2006).  
Section 333 of this legislation was the first step toward the building of the new National Bio and 
Agro-defense Facility (Gilpen et al., 2009).  In addition, this legislation made intentionally 
introduced anti-agriculture diseases to now be considered a WMD (CDP, 2004).   
 2003 – Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Agroterrorism Hearing 
In November 2003, the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held the second 
hearing devoted to the issue of agricultural security entitled, Agroterrorism: The Threat to 
America’s Breadbasket.  Committee Chair, Senator Susan Collins, noted that nothing is more at 
the heart of the U.S. economy than agriculture.  While initial reviews might have made it seem 
that agriculture had nothing in common with the World Trade Center, they are both 
manifestations of a critical target – the economy.  Collins noted at the time that agriculture was 
still virtually unprotected (Collins, 2003).  Senator Daniel Akaka, known for his efforts to 
improve agricultural security, called for the passage of his two bills related to coordinating and 
confronting threats to agricultural security (Akaka, 2003). 
 2005 – Congressional Hearings 
Congress held two hearings focused on agroterrorism in 2005.  One was in the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and one was in the U.S. House 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and 
Terrorism Risk Assessment.  Testifiers noted significant progress in preparing U.S. agriculture 
for an attack, but concerns were expressed as well (Cox, 2005).  Dr. James Roth (2005) stated 
that the nation continued to have “inadequate infrastructure for prevention, detection, response, 
and recovery from foreign animal and zoonotic diseases” (p. 32).  He noted concerns on slow 
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vaccine development, shortages of laboratory capacity, and human resource deficiencies (Roth, 
2005).  James Lane (2005), undersheriff from Ford County, Kan., agreed there was more work to 
be done, especially in the area of prevention.  He called for a coordinated homeland security 
strategy against agroterrorism.  Other testimony encouraged greater attention to other aspects of 
food supply in addition to animal and plant diseases (Reardon, 2005).  
 2006 – Congressional Field Hearings on Agricultural Biosecurity 
In January 2006, the Senate Agriculture Committee held a subcommittee field hearing in 
Pennsylvania on the subject of agricultural biosecurity.  In June 2006, the House Committee on 
Homeland Security held its second hearing on agroterrorism, this time in the Subcommittee on 
Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, in a field hearing in Athens, Georgia.  The hearing 
focused more on the threat of zoonotic disease than previous hearings (Linder, 2006).  During 
that hearing, Dr. Corrie Brown identified three gaps in response efforts.  First, Dr. Brown 
identified a need for a national strategy on food and agricultural defense.  Second, food and 
agriculture still needed to be recognized as a national priority by DHS.  Federal efforts and 
presidential directives were a good start, but follow up especially with state and local 
government was strongly needed.  Third, funding at the state level was inconsistent and 
regionalization should be considered for funding and potential partnerships (Brown, 2006).  
Nearly 80% of food defense activities are at the state level, but only 5% of the bioterrorism-
related funding allocated to states is related to food and agriculture (Brown, 2006).  While many 
related pieces of legislation were debated in 2006, the only successful bill was the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act.  The law expanded criminal consequences for damaging or interfering 
with an animal enterprise and applies to foreign or domestic bioterrorism (Monke, 2007). 
 2007 – House Hearings on Agriculture and Homeland Security 
In July 2007, the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security held an 
Emerging Threats, Cyber Security, and Science and Technology subcommittee hearing on the 
federal efforts to mitigate vulnerabilities in the food supply chain.  Testimony focused on the 
performance of federal agencies in protecting the food and agriculture industry, and the 
committee heard from agency and industry representatives.  Questions focused on perceived 
short-falls of agency preparation and response strategies (Langevin, 2007).  The Management, 
Investigations, and Oversight subcommittee of the same congressional committee held a field 
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hearing in Pennsylvania on partnerships to protect food and agriculture.  Many of the questions 
focused on confusion over agency roles and responsibilities (McGinn, 2007). 
 2009 – Senate Hearing on Veterinary Profession  
A U.S. Senate hearing in 2009 focused on the shortage of veterinarians in the federal 
workforce, the insufficient amount of large animal and FAD veterinarian expertise, and the 
impact these deficiencies have on animal health efforts (Sherman, 2010).   
 2010 – House Hearing on Biological Threats 
In 2010, the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the U.S. House of Representatives held a 
hearing on National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats: Diplomacy and International 
Programs.  In that hearing, agriculture received two mentions and neither was emphasized 
(Sherman, 2010).  
 2011 – Senate Hearings on September 11th Anniversary 
In recognition of the 10
th
 anniversary of September 11, the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a number of hearings related to homeland 
security.  One subcommittee hearing focused on agro-defense and response capabilities against 
threats to the agriculture and food system from natural disasters and intentional attacks.  Dr. 
Doug Meckes, Director of Food, Agricultural, and Veterinary Defense Division in the DHS 
Office of Health Affairs provided an update on DHS efforts to meet the objectives of HSPD-9 
and their progress in coordinating with other federal agencies and state governments (Meckes, 
2011).  Senator Akaka (2011) made it clear that he was concerned about the ability of federal 
agencies to work with states and tribal entities, federal veterinarian workforce shortages, and 
general readiness of the country to “effectively respond and recover from an agricultural food 
event” (p. 2).  A month later, a hearing was held before the full committee on the issue of 
biological threats, but there was little mention of agriculture threats (Lieberman, 2011).  
 2011– Food Safety Modernization Act 
Congress overhauled the FDA statutory tools when it passed the Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA) in 2011.  The focus is on preventing foodborne illness, but also 
increases the agency’s ability to address all food safety issues, including intentional threats to the 
food supply.  Specifically, the legislation addresses hazard analysis and preventive controls in 
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food facilities, protection against intentional adulteration in primarily post-harvest operations, 
standards for produce safety, and national agriculture and food defense strategy.  The FSMA 
directs the FDA and USDA to work with DHS to develop a new National Agriculture and 
Defense Strategy, which identifies goals related to preparedness, detection, emergency response, 
and recovery.  The agencies are to articulate processes to achieve the goals, an implementation 
plan, a coordinated research agenda, and an approach consistent with existing strategies.  This 
coordination is intended to address the concerns of federal agency ineffectiveness.  The strategy 
was to be completed one year after enactment, but the agencies missed the statutory deadline 
and, as of the time of this work, have not yet produced a strategy.  The agencies failure to 
produce the strategy has been blamed by some on Congressional funding (Woodlee, 2012).  
 Federal agency roles and presidential directives 
The DHS was established in 2002 with responsibilities that included coordinating U.S. 
efforts to protect the country from agroterrorism.  This role included border and transportation 
security, emergency preparedness and response, and science and technology (including animal 
disease research and development).  While the USDA and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) maintained primary responsibility for protecting the nation’s food supply and received 
expanded responsibilities, DHS took over border inspections and the Plum Island Animal 
Disease Center.  The National Security Council now recognizes agriculture and food safety in 
the preparedness framework against WMD (Brown et al., 2005; GAO, 2005; Parker, 2002).   
 HSPD–5 Incident Command System 
Several Presidential Directives have brought attention to the threat of agroterrorism.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), issued in February 2003, called for a 
protocol of incident management and for all entities and individuals to work together in one 
response plan known as an Incident Command System (ICS).  HSPD-5 also called for the 
creation of a National Response Plan (NRP) that was adopted in December 2004 and renamed 
the National Response Framework (NRF) (Brown et al., 2005; Dykes, 2010; Monke, 2007). 
 Science and Technology Blue Ribbon Panel 
A Blue Ribbon Panel of international experts was convened in 2003 by the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President to identify priorities and 
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research and development needs for FADs and biological terrorism aimed at livestock.  They 
specifically focused on surveillance, epidemiology, vaccination and protection technologies, and 
detection, diagnosis, and forensic capabilities (Marburger, 2007).  
 HSPD-7 Critical Infrastructure  
Parker (2002) noted in the National Defense University report that agriculture is a critical 
national infrastructure.  Horn and Breeze (1999), representing ARS, made the same argument.  
On December 17, 2003, the President issued HSPD-7 which addressed Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.  This time, when critical infrastructure was 
identified, agriculture and food were at the top of the list and called for additional infrastructure 
protection measures (Brown et al., 2005; Dykes, 2010; Gilpen et al., 2009; HSPD-7, 2003; 
Monke, 2007). 
 HSPD-8 DHS support of Local and State Government Preparedness  
 Also in December 2003, HSPD-8 instructed the DHS to develop a national preparedness 
system and work more with local and state governments to help them prepare.  Five mission 
areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery were identified as a part of the 
National Preparedness Goals.  The preparedness goals included agriculture with emphasis on 
food contamination, FAD, and general agriculture and food target capabilities (Brown et al., 
2005; Dykes, 2010; Monke, 2007; National Response Framework [NRF], 2013b).   
 HSPD-9 Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food 
On February 3, 2004, the President issued HSPD-9, entitled Defense of U.S. Agriculture 
and Food.  The directive identified the food and agriculture systems as “vulnerable to disease, 
pest, or poisonous agents that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced, or are intentionally 
delivered by acts of terrorism” (HSPD-9, 2004, p. 1).  HSPD-9 (2004) established a national 
policy approach to “defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major 
disasters and other emergencies” (p. 1) because an attack on U.S. agriculture could cause a health 
and economic catastrophe.  The directive called for interagency cooperation and attempted to 
ensure DHS, USDA, Department of Health and Human Service (HHS), Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence work 
together in their plans to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from an 
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agroterrorism event.  It encouraged planning and policy efforts designed to keep the agriculture 
industry protected and viable.  The directive outlined responsibilities in seven areas: awareness 
and warning, vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies, response planning and recovery, 
outreach and professional development, research, and development (Brown et al., 2005; Dykes, 
2010; GAO, 2005; HSPD-9, 2004; Monke, 2007).   
USDA APHIS, in conjunction with Iowa State University, established The Institute for 
International Cooperation in Animal Biologics (IICAB) (an OIE collaboration center) in 1995 to 
study the efficacy, availability, and use of veterinary biologics.  In 2002, the CDC established the 
Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) at Iowa State University.  The 
development of resources and training materials, such as the Foreign Animal Disease 
Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) documents, for the preparation for, response to, 
and recovery from animal health emergencies is a key component of their mission.  IICAB and 
CFSPH are co-located (CFSPH, 2013b).  HSPD-9 called for the establishment of university-
based Centers of Excellence in agriculture and food security to provide scientific and technical 
expertise in meeting related research needs.  In 2004, the Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease 
Defense (FAZD) Center was established at Texas A&M University and the National Center for 
Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) at the University of Minnesota.  In 2010, a Center of 
Excellence for Emerging and Zoonotic Animal Diseases (CEEZAD) was established at Kansas 
State University.  FAZD and CEZAAD are co-leads for the DHS Program on Zoonotic and 
Animal Disease Defense (Kennedy, 2007; Zoonotic and Animal Disease Defense [ZADD], 
2010).   
Under HSPD-9, USDA and HHS, in coordination with EPA and DHS, are responsible for 
improving recovery procedures to stabilize agriculture and remove and dispose of contaminated 
animals, plants, and food products in coordination with state and local governments.  The 
Directive also called for a National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) of vaccines, antivirals, and 
therapeutics to be deployed within 24 hr of an outbreak, and a National Plant Disease Recovery 
System that calls for the development of resistant varieties within one growing season (Brown et 
al., 2005; Dykes, 2010; GAO, 2005; HSPD-9, 2004; Monke, 2007).  Monke (2007) noted that 
presidential directives are not enforceable laws and can be changed without Congressional 
consent.  Statutory parameters for an agroterrorism preparedness plan can only be established 
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with Congressional action and the creation of public law.  However, such actions may increase 
oversight and follow-through (Monke, 2007). 
 White House Science and Technology Council 
In response to HSPD-9, the Foreign Animal Disease Threats (FADT) subcommittee was 
established under the umbrella of the White House National Science and Technology Council 
(NSTC) Committee on Homeland and National Security with agriculture biosecurity experts and 
policymakers from 13 federal agencies.  The FADT subcommittee published their 
recommendations in January 2007.  They identified FMD, RVF, HPAI, and END as the top 
priority diseases for research and development efforts.  The need for the US to better understand 
disease spread and economic models when formulating policy, preparedness strategies, and 
response plans led the subcommittee to call for the development of an animal disease Modeling 
Operations Center and Modeling Research Center.  An interagency Joint Agroterror Defense 
Office with the goal of directing interagency cooperation and strategic planning was also 
proposed in the President’s 2007 budget request.  The FADT subcommittee specifically 
identified vaccination and immunomodulation technologies as well as disposal and 
decontamination as priorities for research (Marburger, 2007).  The GAO reported in 2011 that 
USDA APHIS and DHS continued to co-lead this interagency effort.  The NSTC also includes a 
Decontamination and Disposal Working Group (Miller, 2012a).  As of December 2013, the 
Office of Science and Technology no longer includes an FADT subcommittee as a part of the 
NSTC and agriculture is minimally discussed in the National Biosurveillance Science and 
Technology Roadmap published by the NSTC in June 2013 (National Science and Technology 
Council [NSTC], 2013).  
 DHS Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council 
DHS has the responsibility for coordinating U.S. efforts to protect national key resources 
and critical infrastructure (Runge, 2006).  DHS considers threats to agriculture in the 
catastrophic category, which indicates significant economic and social disruption (McCarthy, 
2005).  As a part of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the DHS created a Food 
and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council (FASCC) to facilitate communications with the 
food and agricultural industries (Brown et al., 2005; GAO, 2005; Manning et al., 2004).  The 
FASCC is comprised of key stakeholders and includes subcouncils of agriculture production 
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inputs and services, animal producers, plant producers, processors and manufacturers, restaurants 
and food service, retail and warehousing, and logistics.  This council and other sector 
coordinating councils are to work with their government counterparts to coordinate and enhance 
the protection of national infrastructures.  The FASCC has been successful and used as a model 
for other councils (Monke, 2007).   
 USDA 
The USDA considers food and agriculture security central to their mission.  In testimony 
before the U.S. Senate, Deputy Agriculture Secretary Chuck Connor (2005) stated, “We seek to 
provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues founded on sound 
public policy, the best available science, and efficient management” (p. 5).  He noted the critical 
nature of USDA partnerships with other federal agencies and state and local governments 
(Connor, 2005).  
The USDA and other federal agencies are charged with developing management plans 
and protocols for responding to terrorism, including agroterrorism.  The USDA structures its 
animal disease response into seven segments:  
 Prepare (training, intergovernmental coordination, equipment development and 
acquisition); 
 Prevent (surveillance, examinations, high activity); 
 Detect/Identify (clinical symptoms, field tests, disease confirmation); 
 Contain (movement restrictions, quarantines, seizure of animals); 
 Depopulate (humane destruction of conformed inspected animals);  
 Dispose (removal of infected carcasses); and 
 Recover (reparation, close outs, follow up, monitoring, surveillance) (CDP, 2004; GAO, 
2005). 
Each of these segments is critically important and requires significant coordination, 
effort, and resources.  The 2004 Center for Domestic Preparedness report notes “animal carcass 
disposal and upstream euthanasia activities are very problematic at best” (p. 18).  The larger the 
incident, the more difficult the containment, eradication, and disposal will be (CDP, 2004).  In 
the case of a disease outbreak, like FMD, the USDA is responsible for leading overall incident 
management but may ask for support from other federal agencies.  If the outbreak leads to a 
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Presidential emergency or disaster declaration, or if the USDA Secretary requests it, DHS will 
take over coordination of federal resources (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
[APHIS], 2012c). 
USDA established a formal USDA Biosecurity Committee in 1999 and worked with the 
National Security Council (NSC) to establish a NSC subcommittee on the risk to agriculture and 
the food supply (Horn & Breeze, 2003).  In response to September 11, the USDA established a 
Homeland Security Council, Office of Food Security and Emergency Preparedness, and a sub-
council for the Protection of the Food Supply and Agriculture.  This subcouncil was directed to 
establish policy, monitor progress, provide border surveillance, and address threats, rapid 
response, and other issues related to protection, safety, and security of the food supply.  This 
office has evolved into the Emergency Management and Homeland Security Branch of APHIS’ 
Emergency Management, Safety and Security Division.  Their 2005 budget request targeted 
funds for the Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative.  The Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS) established a Food Security Action Team to manage all activities related to biosecurity, 
food terrorism, and emergency preparedness (APHIS, 2012c).   
Under 7 USC §8306, known as the Animal Health Protection Act and part of the 2002 
Farm Bill, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the USDA have the responsibility to detect, 
control, and eradicate any pest or disease of livestock and poultry.  The Act increased the 
penalties for threats and attacks against agriculture and moved agricultural security and defense 
laws in a positive direction (Noah et al., 2002).  In addition, the Secretary was given the 
authority to declare an extraordinary emergency in the case of an FAD, seize, quarantine, 
destroy, and dispose of infected or exposed livestock to prevent disease spread (Monke, 2007; 
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2006; Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
2013b).  The Secretary can stop interstate livestock movement and take any measures to identify, 
control, or eradicate any disease or pest (GAO, 2002a).  In addition, the Act increased the 
penalties for threats and attacks against agriculture and moved agricultural security and defense 
laws in a positive direction (Noah et al., 2002).  Specifics of these activities will be determined 
cooperatively through the Incident Command System (ICS) in cooperation with state and local 
authorities (Brown et al., 2005).   
The USDA also established the Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) 
initiative, a public-private partnership program with DHS, FDA, and the FBI to assess security 
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vulnerabilities in the food and agricultural industry.  It was designed to create collaboration with 
state governments and private industry for the purposes of identifying sector-wide vulnerabilities 
to an agroterrorist attack and developing mitigation strategies (Crutchley et al., 2007; APHIS, 
2012c). 
In 2004, the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA) 
developed a cooperative agreement with USDA, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
DHS with the intent to integrate federal and state response plans for agriculture and food 
emergencies, develop response plan templates, conduct emergency exercises, and develop 
guidelines for coordination between state and federal authorities (Crutchley et al., 2007). 
 Other agencies involved 
The law enforcement and intelligence communities developed two programs related to 
agriculture: the Food and Agriculture Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and AgGard.  
These programs encourage information sharing between industry, law enforcement, and the 
intelligence community (Manning et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2005, GAO, 2005; Monke, 2007).  
The U.S. government has expanded research efforts by opening new federal laboratories, 
enhancing existing facilities, expanding laboratory networks, and planning the replacement of 
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center with a new National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility 
(NBAF) (Monke, 2007).  In 2009, DHS announced the selection of Manhattan, Kansas, as the 
location for the NBAF.  It is expected to be operational by 2018 (Jaax, 2011). 
The increased growth in agricultural security and extended responsibility to multiple 
entities has led to more than 200 different government offices, seven cabinet-level departments, 
and hundreds of state and local agencies involved with animal and plant health.  This led the 
National Academy of Science’s National Research Council in 2005 to call for the creation of an 
animal health czar and program consolidation (Fabi, 2005).  While such consolidation has not 
occurred, this situation highlights the need for well-organized policy efforts.  Consumers and 
agricultural producers need government agencies at all levels to speak with one voice (McGinn, 
2003b).  
 Federal budget 
While additional consideration and concern about protecting the food supply and 
agricultural industry from intentional and accidental threats continued to grow, these areas did 
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not receive prioritization in federal funding and budget appropriations.  “Despite the immediate 
flurry of attention [to protect the food and agricultural industry] following Secretary Thompson’s 
warning [in 2004], federal funding designated specifically for agriculture and food defense has 
remained limited” (Myers, 2006, p. 175).  In 2006, actual spending on civilian biodefense neared 
$5.4 billion, and $249 million (4.8%) was spent by the USDA (Hennessy, 2008).  From 2001 to 
2007, USDA and DHS agriculture homeland security appropriations tripled (Monke, 2006).  
In 2008, the federal budget proposal for 2009 included $8.01 billion in federal funding 
for civilian biodefense.  The largest increase was in the HHS budget, which included a 
significant increase for food defense initiatives for the FDA.  The second largest increase was for 
the USDA Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative, bringing the USDA share to 3% of non-
military biodefense funding and increasing funding specifically targeted to food and agriculture 
defense by 47% from the previous year (Franco, 2008).  However, when the budget passed 
Congress, funds dedicated to the Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative were not included, but 
USDA APHIS, FDA, and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate Agriculture Thrust Area 
received new budget line items (Franco & Sell, 2012). 
The federal government has moved toward funding all-hazards preparedness rather than 
threat-specific programs over the last several years and funding for some critical programs has 
declined.  The USDA fiscal year 2012 budget for biodefense had declined by 63% to $92 million 
or 2% of all civilian biodefense funding (Franco & Sell, 2012).  In fiscal year 2013 and the 
proposed budget for fiscal year 2014, USDA biodefense funding remained constant, but the 
percentage of overall funding fell to less than 1% in 2014 due to an overall increase in 
biodefense funding almost all credited to the construction of NBAF, which is part of the DHS 
budget (Sell & Watson, 2013). 
Overall, in comparing funding over the last 10 years, the percentage of Homeland 
Security funding allocated to the Food and Agriculture Sector declined from 1.2% to 0.8%, 
which reflects a decline in actual dollars by $2 million, while overall funding increased by $25 
billion (Painter, 2012). 
 Preparedness and response plans and guidelines 
Several tools have been developed to aid in preparedness, response, and recovery from an 
emergency situation.  These resources can prove helpful in understanding the appropriate 
response to a food and agriculture biosecurity emergency situation. 
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 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
The food and agriculture sector was defined as critical to U.S. security because it 
provides “essential goods and services Americans need to survive” (NIPP, 2007, p.11).  
Government and private industry share responsibility for protecting U.S. food and agriculture 
critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR).  CIKR includes systems, assets, and networks.  
An attack targeting using food and agriculture infrastructure and resources would be devastating.  
Traditional security measures will not be sufficient, and a protection plan must focus on planning 
and preparedness.  The NIPP provides the structure for integrating existing and future CIKR 
protection efforts into one program.  The cornerstone of NIPP is the risk management 
framework, and risk is defined as potential loss, damage, or disruption to CIKR due to 
intentional or natural destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation (NIPP, 2007; NIPP, 2010). 
The 2007 version of the NIPP was comprised of Sector-Specific Plans (SSP) that are 
focused on individual industries, but they were combined into one comprehensive SSP in 2010 
(NIPP, 2010).  The Food and Agricultural (FA) Sector is defined as the supply chain for food, 
animals, and animal products; crop production and seed, fertilizer, and related supply chains; and 
the post-harvest components of the supply chain from processing, production, and packaging 
through storage, distribution, retail sales, food service, and restaurant or home consumption.  The 
USDA and HHS/FDA were identified in HSPD-7 as the Sector-Specific Agencies for the FA 
sector.  The sector provides unique challenges in its protection because of the extensive, open, 
interconnected, diverse, and complex nature of the industry.  The mission of the sector is to: 
protect the food supply from any attack that would threaten public health, safety, welfare, or the 
national economy; and provide a central focus to this dynamic sector while emphasizing 
protection and strengthening the U.S. capacity to supply safe, nutritious, and affordable food 
(NIPP, 2007; NIPP, 2010).  The objective of the FA sector is to ensure the security, resiliency, 
and rapid restoration of U.S. agriculture and food systems in the case of an all-hazards event.  
“The sector will provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues 
based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management” (NIPP, 
2010, p. 2). 
 National Response Framework (NRF) 
The NRF provides guidance to how the US conducts all hazard responses.  It prescribes 
best practices for local to large-scale events that are natural, accidental, or intentional, and it 
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builds on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which outlines templates for 
managing incidents.  NIMS provides guidance to all levels of government, the private sector, and 
non-governmental organizations in working together to deal with incidents.  The NRF was 
published in January 2008, and replaced the previous 2004 and 2006 versions of NRP and the 
Federal Response Plan developed in 1992.  The NRF is an integrated part of the larger National 
Strategy for Homeland Security.  It provides a framework for prevention and disruption of 
terrorist attacks, identifies response and recovery plans, strengthens the nation’s foundation to 
ensure long-term success, and protects the American people, critical infrastructure, and key 
resources.  The NRF focuses on the goals of response and recovery from incidents (DHS, 2008b; 
DHS, 2013b; APHIS, 2012c). 
The NRF establishes the process needed to meet the National Preparedness Goals (the 
Goal): 
 Prevention – To have the capabilities to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or 
actual act of terrorism; 
 Protection – To have the capabilities to secure the country against intentional acts 
of terrorism and natural or manmade disasters; 
 Mitigation – To have the capabilities required to reduce loss of life and property; 
 Response – To have the capabilities to save lives, protect property and the 
environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident; and 
 Recovery – To have the capabilities to assist communities to recover effectively 
that have been affected by an incident (DHS, 2013b). 
In the NRF, the USDA is identified as the lead federal agency in managing a large-scale 
animal disease emergency.  The NRF includes an Emergency Support Function (ESF #11) of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Brown et al., 2005; Monke, 2007; EPA, 2006; DHS, 2013a).  
ESF #11 provides for nutrition assistance in disaster areas, control and eradication of animal and 
plant pests and diseases (specifically highly contagious or economically significant diseases), 
assurance of food safety and security, protection of natural and cultural resources and historic 
properties, and provision for the safety and well-being of household pets during an emergency 
response or evacuation.  ESF #11 must be activated by the Homeland Security Secretary in the 
case of a food- or agriculture-related event that requires a federal response.  It calls for an 
integrated federal, state, tribal, and local response (DHS, 2008b; DHS, 2013b). 
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In the area of disease response, ESF #11 provides for response efforts to be conducted in 
collaboration with state and private industries to ensure human nutrition; animal, plant and 
environmental security; and the security of American economy and trade.  Animal disease 
response efforts dictate that animal depopulation efforts should be as humane as possible, stop 
disease spread, and limit the number of animals euthanized.  The disposal of infected or exposed 
carcasses should use the methods most effective in stopping disease spread and least 
environmentally damaging.  Economic and cost considerations are not addressed.  The USDA 
Secretary has authority to appropriate the funds necessary to aid in disease control.  If states do 
not adequately address disease outbreaks within their borders, the USDA may take action in 
those states (DHS, 2013a). 
The NRF also includes incident annexes to address specific hazards and describe relevant 
policies and procedures.  While the NRF was approved and annexes were identified in 2004, the 
Food and Agriculture Incident Annex was the last annex published (Monke, 2007) and was not 
published until late 2006.  The Food and Agriculture Incident Annex describes the role of 
USDA, HHS, DHS, EPA, and other cooperating agencies in responding to incidents involving 
food and agricultural systems.  It outlines the actions, roles, and responsibilities of a response 
effort.  A food and agriculture incident may threaten public health, animal nutrition, food and 
livestock production, wildlife, aquaculture, soils, rangelands, and water supplies (DHS, 2008a). 
A food and agriculture disease outbreak would cross jurisdictions and ignore state 
borders.  The consequences would be severe; overwhelm state, local, and tribal responses; and 
may significantly challenge federal response capabilities.  No single entity can act unilaterally in 
the case of a food and agriculture incident.  The primary functions of the Food and Agriculture 
Incident Annex are to: 
 Support effective and coordinated communication between all levels of 
government and responders, 
 Minimize public health and economic impacts of an incident, 
 Specify roles and responsibilities of all federal agencies and departments, and 
 Provide transition efforts from response to rapid discovery (DHS, 2008a). 
The annex identifies key elements of an effective response including control, 
containment, decontamination, and disposal.  It provides HHS and USDA with direction to 
embargo, detain, seize, recall, or condemn affected food, animals, or plants (the control 
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function).  These agencies, in conjunction with the EPA, will provide technical assistance to state 
and local authorities in the coordination of animal carcass, food, and plant disposal (the 
decontamination and disposal function) (DHS, 2008a).   
In March 2012, as a result of the emphasis in PPD-8, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) released working documents for comment including the National Prevention 
Framework, the National Protection Framework, the National Mitigation Framework and the 
National Response Framework.  These followed the release of the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework in late 2011 (Caudle, 2012).  These documents were finalized by May 2013 and 
supersede the 2008 NRF (NRF, 2013b). 
A response that deters, mitigates, or neutralizes the effect of an attack reduces the appeal 
of agriculture and food as a target and helps protect the food and agriculture sector.  The NIPP 
provides the pre-event state of the preparedness and response continuum and the NRF provides 
the post-event state activity coordination.  Protection efforts must make agriculture a less 
attractive target (NIPP, 2007; NIPP, 2010).  
 National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) 
The USDA APHIS has developed National Animal Health Emergency Management 
System (NAHEMS) guidelines to deal with highly contagious diseases, disease spread, return to 
normalcy in the agriculture industry, and returning the US to disease-free status.   
NAHEMS was developed from the lessons learned from previous outbreaks.  
Specifically, the following components were considered vital to be incorporated into a successful 
response: 
 A state-federal-tribal unified response with a focus on local leadership; 
 Clear and realistic goals set by unified command; 
 A quick and certain response from unified command; 
 Clear communication to and understanding from stakeholders and responders on 
guidelines, strategies, and procedures;  
 Acknowledgement that a timely and successful outcome will require a rapid up-
scale of resources and capability to manage competing interests; 
 Rapid diagnosis and FAD traceback is critical; 
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 A science-based and risk-management approach that “protects public health and 
animal health, stabilizes animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy” 
(National Animal Health Emergency Management System [NAHEMS], 2012, p. 
ii). 
In response to these concerns, the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 
Plan (FAD PReP) was developed.  Its mission is to “raise awareness, expectations, and develop 
capabilities” related to FAD response (NAHEMS, 2012, p. iii).  Goals of FAD PReP are focused 
on integration, synchronization, and conflict minimization in preparedness and response 
capabilities through clear and specific goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures.  It is based 
on the principles and systems of the NRF and NIMS, which should work in conjunction with 
NAHEMS.  FAD PReP is considered a comprehensive strategy for preparedness and response 
for local, state, federal and tribal response efforts (NAHEMS, 2012; APHIS, 2012b).   
Three key response goals in the event of an FAD are to: 
1. Detect, control, and contain the disease; 
2. Eradicate the disease while stabilizing the agriculture industry, food supply, and 
economy, and protecting public health; and 
3. Provide science- and risk-based approaches to disease response (NAHEMS, 2012; 
APHIS, 2012a). 
The type of federal-state-tribal intervention in a disease outbreak could follow under 
several situational examples, including: 
 Emergency eradication lasting 12 months or less, 
 Extended emergency eradication lasting more than 12 months, 
 National animal disease control programs for long term disease situations, 
 Individual state or tribal disease control programs, and 
 Animal disease monitoring that requires no intervention (APHIS, 2012a). 
The target of the NAHEMS strategy is to eliminate the disease in four months or less.  If 
the disease remains for more than 12 months, response strategies change from regional disease 
eradication to a national disease eradication program.  Control of animal disease is based on 
three principles: 
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 Preventing contact between susceptible animals and the disease agent (requiring 
quarantine, movement control, biosecurity, risk assessment, epidemiologic 
investigation, animal tracing, and accelerated slaughter); 
 Stopping the production of the disease agent by infected and exposed animals 
(requiring euthanasia and disposal); and 
 Increasing animal resistance to disease (including strategic vaccination and 
antiviral prophylaxis) (NAHEMS, 2005b). 
The principles and related goals are best achieved by a control and eradication strategy.  
The selection of the appropriate strategy depends on: 
 Disease transmission characteristics, 
 Consequences of a disease outbreak (national security, food security, public 
health, animal health, environment, economics, regulatory impacts), 
 Social and political acceptance of strategy, 
 Scale of disease outbreak, 
 Rate of disease spread,  
 Accessible veterinary countermeasures, 
 Available resources, and 
 Domestic animal and wildlife disease management capabilities (APHIS, 2012a). 
If a foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD) classifies a premises as highly likely to 
have a highly contagious FAD (versus unlikely or possible), local response measures begin.  
Once the disease has been designated a presumptive positive or confirmed positive case, state 
and national efforts begin.  The designated zone areas will be determined by the disease in 
question.  An infected zone is designated around all presumptive and confirmed cases with the 
boundary extended at least 3 km (approximately1.86 mi) beyond the infected premises.  A buffer 
zone of at least an additional 7 km (approximately 4.35 mi) should also be identified.  The 
infected zone and the buffer zone make up the control area, which should be an area no smaller 
than 10 km (approximately 6.2 mi) beyond the infected premises and may be larger, especially 
initially.  These zone boundaries apply to FMD and most other FADs.  Boundaries will be 
modified based on agent characteristics, livestock movements, animal concentration, weather, 
prevailing winds, wild animal populations, processing options, and other commodities (APHIS, 
2012a; NAHEMS, 2005b).  Some research has indicated that doubling the radius of designated 
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infected and surveillance zones could reduce the disease outbreak by 48% and, if vaccination is 
used, will yield a significantly smaller epidemic (Bates, Thurmond, & Carpenter, 2003a; Dykes, 
2010). 
The NAHEMS/FAD PReP companion documents included specific guidelines addressing 
euthanasia, disposal, quarantine and movement control, and cleaning and disinfection 
(NAHEMS, 2005b).  NAHEMS documents were updated beginning in 2011 and industry 
response plan manuals have been developed (NAHEMS, 2011a). 
 Critique of federal efforts 
The effectiveness of the structure of agricultural security and defense efforts has received 
critical reviews.  Even though the US has taken steps to improve the nation’s ability to respond 
to intentional disease threats, the agriculture and food industry remains highly vulnerable 
(Crutchley et al., 2007). 
In 2005, the GAO identified that the DHS role in agroterrorism was confusing and they 
failed to take the lead in executing HSPD-9.  In 2007, this theme continued as the DHS Office of 
the Inspector General indicated the size of the food and agriculture industry, combined with the 
complexity of government agency oversight, created significant challenges in protecting food 
and agriculture critical infrastructure.  They further noted that DHS, USDA, and HHS all failed 
to meet their obligations to develop an integrated food and agriculture defense plan.  This led the 
GAO to designate the Federal oversight of food and agriculture safety and defense as high risk.  
The structure of 15 agencies with more than 30 laws results in a number of management 
problems that reduces efficiencies, creates inconsistencies in oversight, and leads to ineffective 
coordination and inefficient resource use (Langevin, 2007).  
The Bi-Partisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Proliferation, and Terrorism evaluated U.S. government performance in 17 areas and gave the 
White House and Congress an F in December 2009 for its efforts in developing response 
capabilities against a biological attack and emerging disease outbreaks.  They concluded in their 
report that the margin of safety was shrinking rather than growing.  In addition, the commission 
noted that any future attack was more likely to be biological than nuclear (Sherman, 2010; Jaax, 
2011; States News Service, 2013). 
The presidential administrative change in 2008 led to refined homeland security efforts.  
In May 2009, the president merged the Homeland Security Council and the National Security 
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Council into one national security staff based on the concept that all homeland security issues 
were national security issues (GAO, 2011).  A DHS review in February 2010 resulted in the 
issuance of Presidential Policy Directive 8 – National Preparedness (PPD-8).  PPD-8 reaffirmed 
previous policy and called for an increased focus on preparation at all levels of citizenry with 
attention to greatest risks and capability-based approaches.  The goals listed natural animal 
disease outbreaks, human-caused biological attacks, and food contamination as national-level 
threats.  The greatest threats were defined as known threats with a distinct beginning and end, 
which left agriculture with less emphasis (Caudle, 2012). 
The National Research Council (NRC) found that the nation has inadequate plans to deal 
with agricultural bioterrorism and that greater coordination between agencies is needed.  The 
NRC acknowledges that a rapid, timely, well-organized response is critical to controlling an 
outbreak.  They called for a national, comprehensive plan involving all potential partners that 
integrates deterrence, prevention, detection, response, and recovery (NRC, 2002; Moon, Ascher, 
et al., 2003; Moon, Kirk-Baer, et al., 2003; Monke, 2007).  Interagency cooperation amongst 
state, federal, and international health, food, and agricultural entities is necessary and critical.  In 
most emergency and emergency table-top exercises after-action reports, one of the most noted 
shortcomings is lack of interagency coordination.  Failures to work together increase costs and 
delay or dismantle effective response efforts (Hugh-Jones & Brown, 2006).  Major James P. 
Dykes evaluated current government laws and policy and found that they do not adequately 
address agroterrorism (Dykes, 2010). 
In a U.S. Senate hearing in 2011, Colonel John Hoffman from the National Center for 
Food Protection and Defense identified gaps between agency authorities and capabilities, and the 
variability between all levels of government as barriers to an effective food defense system.  He 
noted that the lack of a “single, coherent, clearly delineated line of authority over our Nation’s 
food defense efforts” continues to be a significant concern (Hoffman, 2011, p. 4).  Dr. Paul 
Williams (2011) noted that animal health management had found its leadership at the state level 
and there was reluctance to provide the support and commitment at the federal level for 
agriculture defense that had been provided to general food safety efforts.  He highlighted the six 
years it took to get any agriculture sites on the critical infrastructure list and that about 1% of 
State Homeland Security Grant funds go to the agriculture and food sector (Williams, 2011). 
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State departments of agriculture hold primary responsibility for initial protection, 
response, and recovery to animal and plant diseases and pests, and state regulatory and 
laboratory resources are critical to the US.  One of the most underfunded aspects of the U.S. 
agriculture and food defense strategy is the states (Kennedy, 2007).  According to interviews 
with multiple homeland security officials from state departments of agriculture, funding from 
Homeland Security for food and agriculture sector defense was declining and inconsistent and 
state agriculture agencies were typically not a funding priority (Blackwood, 2010).  Nearly 80% 
of homeland security grants that are distributed to states are funneled to the local level where 
there is no authority for agriculture as there is with public health, fire, and emergency services 
(Blackwood, 2010; Kennedy, 2007).  Overall, State Homeland Security Grant Program funds 
have declined from $863 million in 2008 to $355 million in 2013, a decrease of 59% (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2013).  In Kansas, the largest annual allocation 
designated to agriculture was in 2005 for $370,000 and the lowest was $30,000 in 2012 (personal 
communication with Sandy Johnson, Kansas Department of Agriculture Emergency 
Coordinator).  Regional partnerships that have been created by states to respond to the lack of 
coordination on the federal level have provided some success (Williams, 2011).  Another 
funding shortage lies with actual farmers and ranchers.  While federal agencies are better staffed, 
equipped, exercised, and trained, few funds and efforts have made it to the farm level for safety, 
biosecurity, and defense (Filson, 2007) and it is unlikely that federal funds would be used for 
these purposes.  
The GAO found similar program deficiencies in 2011.  The lack of centralized 
coordination in the implementation of the nation’s food and agriculture defense policy under 
HSPD-9 was a significant concern.  This could lead to more vulnerability and less confidence in 
the agriculture industry’s ability to respond to a major animal health or crop disaster.  The GAO 
found that since the 2009 merger of the Homeland Security Council and the National Security 
Council, there was no longer any effort by the Council or DHS to collect information about the 
coordination of HSPD-9 and that interest in the food and agriculture defense policy had 
decreased from agencies and the Council.  No department-wide strategy for implementing 
HSPD-9 exists at the USDA level.  Moreover, the GAO noted that specific agency 
responsibilities regarding critical response activities such as depopulation and disposal were 
unclear, and problems exist with the implementation of NVS (GAO, 2011).  This lack of 
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coordination has caused some analysts to call for a complete reorganization of the system and 
creation of a single entity with responsibility for food safety and agriculture defense (Elliot, 
2009).  “The United States faces complex challenges that limit the nation's ability to respond 
effectively to an agroterror attack, including management problems in federal agencies that 
inhibit the effectiveness of protections against agroterrorism” (Myers, 2006, p. 191). 
Senators Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), Jerry Moran (R-Kan.), Roy Blunt (R-Mo.), and Claire 
McCaskill (D-Mo.) introduced a resolution in February 2013 to remind their colleagues that 
protecting the safety, security, and health of U.S. livestock and commodities cannot be forgotten 
and that addressing the critical vulnerabilities in the food and agricultural industry needs to be a 
priority.  They specifically call for the necessary resources to advance laboratory capabilities, 
vaccine development, research infrastructure, and achieving goals related to biosecurity and 
agrodefense (States News Service, 2013). 
It is interesting to note that the European Union (EU) has more than 400 individual 
animal health related legislative acts.  EU officials have announced the intent to develop a single, 
comprehensive, animal health law to replace the highly complicated collections of laws and 
regulations.  The goal is to have one, coordinated policy in place by 2016 that will reduce the 
risk of negative economic, social, and environmental impacts of animal disease outbreaks or 
animal health events (European Commission [EC], 2013a). 
 FMD as an example 
FMD is a “perfect” example of a disease that could be easily introduced to create havoc.  
The US has been FMD free since 1929 (GAO, 2003; GAO, 2002a).  The biggest outbreak 
occurred in 1914 when it started at the Chicago Stockyards, spread to a national dairy show, and 
infected 22 states, more than 3,500 herds, and 172,720 animals.  The stockyards were closed for 
seven months (Hullinger, 2013).  FMD exists in 60% of the world’s nations and is endemic 
throughout much of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and South America.  North America, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the Caribbean are considered disease free (GAO, 2002a).   
FMD is caused by a small RNA virus and exists in seven serotypes.  While it does not 
directly threaten human health, FMD is the most contagious disease of cloven-hoofed mammals 
such as cattle, sheep, and swine, and often results in severe economic losses.  The disease is 
characterized by vesicular lesions on the tongues and lips, and between the hooves, and is shed in 
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large quantities from these lesions and the upper respiratory tract of infected animals.  Clinical 
signs range from mild to severe with possible fatalities among young animals.  While most adult 
animals recover, they are left debilitated and with severe losses in regard to milk and meat 
production.  It is easy to intentionally spread because the virus is extremely stable.  It can survive 
on clothing, manure, soil, or straw for up to a month, can spread over 60 mi on the wind, and has 
an incubation period of 2 to 14 days.  FMD spreads easily by direct contact between animals and 
through indirect transmission by fomites.  It is considered 20 times more infectious than 
smallpox.  An outbreak of FMD would require mass slaughter and disposal of millions of 
animals.  Confirmation of the disease would immediately halt trade (Knowles et al., 2005; 
APHIS, 2002; GAO, 2002a).  In addition, vaccination has not previously been considered an 
effective deterrent (APHIS, 2002; Wheelis, Casagrande, and Madden, 2002; Casagrande, 2002).   
Virus transmission and response to vaccination differs between species.  Cattle are highly 
susceptible to infection and are likely to show clinical signs but can also serve as potential 
disease carriers.  Sheep can also serve as carriers and are less likely to show clinical symptoms.  
Swine are less likely to become infected but exhibit the most significant virus excretion.  
Vaccination is more likely to be effective on cattle and sheep than on swine (Backer, Bergevoet, 
et al., 2009). 
FMD is “the most dangerous foreign disease” that could occur either inadvertently or 
intentionally in the US (Breeze, 2004, p. 251).  Because meat and dairy products can also be 
infected, movement restrictions would apply to food products as well (McGinn, 2003b). 
 United Kingdom 
Though the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK was not caused by intentional introduction, it 
still serves as an example of the impact of a large-scale animal disease outbreak.  The U.K. 
epidemic lasted 32 weeks, affected 44 counties, and infected more than 2,000 premises.  The 
sheep, swine, and cattle industries were affected.  More than six million animals were 
slaughtered, and the extent of the fiscal burden exceeded $14.5 billion (National Audit Office 
[NAO], 2002; Thomas, 2002).  The government was shaken, national elections were postponed, 
and the food and agriculture governance system was restructured (Owens, 2002; Manning et al., 
2002). 
The UK found their contingency plans were not sufficient.  The lessons learned from this 
experience called for increased surveillance, contingency plans with training, crisis management 
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exercises, and decreased livestock vulnerability to minimize the impact of an outbreak.  Post-
outbreak evaluation found that decision-making analysis should be applied, policy decisions 
should be based on sound science, and an appropriate legislative and regulatory framework 
needed to be in place.  If the policies and procedures are explained to all stakeholders before an 
outbreak, all players would be able to respond with greater certainty and speed to lower the 
negative impact of disease (Anderson, 2002; NAO, 2002). 
In August 2007, the presence of FMD in Surrey was confirmed and the DEFRA response 
plan was initiated.  An immediate national livestock stop-movement ban was implemented and 
infected and surveillance zones were established.  It was determined the disease was caused 
through a leak from drainage pipes at the Pirbright Institute for Animal Health.  Only two cases 
occurred (both within 10-km zone) in the 36 days before control measures were removed.  Four 
days later another case was reported and control measures were re-established.  In this period, six 
cases occurred before the restrictions were removed 3 months and three weeks later.  DEFRA 
reacted with more speed and certainty, but confusion still existed over some aspects of the policy 
response (Anderson, 2008). 
 Taiwan 
In Taiwan’s most recent outbreak, the first two cases of FMD were reported on March 
14, 1997.  Within two weeks, 1,300 pigs in 15 western prefectures were infected, demonstrating 
how rapidly this disease can spread.  This outbreak resulted in the loss of principal export 
markets, the elimination of 65,000 jobs, and a decrease in price of more than 60% in one week.  
Four million pigs accounting for 40% of the swine population were slaughtered, and direct costs 
were estimated at $379 million with an additional economic loss of more than $1.5 billion in lost 
trade (Ban, 2000; Carpenter, 2011).  
 Japan 
An FMD outbreak occurred in Japan in 2000.  In that case, culling and movement control 
strategies were implemented and Japan regained FMD-free status later the same year (Sugiura et 
al., 2001).  FMD was detected again in 2010 in Miyazaki, Japan.  Nearly 300,000 animals were 
infected and depopulated (Ontario Livestock and Poultry Council [OLPC], 2012; Muroga et al., 
2012).  A publicly owned seed bull farm that provided 90% of sperm used for cattle production 
in the prefecture was infected resulting in at least 5 years damage to the cattle industry (Nishiura 
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& Omori, 2010).  The infection was believed to have occurred due to accidental introduction 
though contaminated people or goods from a nearby country.  A combination of culling and 
vaccination-to-cull was utilized as burial locations were difficult to identify (OLPC, 2012; 
Muroga et al., 2012).   
Movement controls were not taken seriously by local governments and individuals.  As 
an example, unemployed workers spread the disease by traveling from the infected zone to other 
farms in new areas.  Animals were transported over significant distances, which also spread the 
disease.  The trucking and tourism industry were significantly impacted (OLPC, 2012).  Officials 
estimated that recovery will take five years and the economic impact will exceed $3.5 billion.  
Japan did not receive FMD-free status until late summer 2012 (SES, Inc., 2012).   
 Paraguay 
The Paraguay outbreak of FMD in 2011, the first outbreak in that country since 2002, 
caused significant concern for this region that is famous for their beef industry, especially due to 
the immediate trade restrictions implemented by countries such as Brazil.  Officials quickly 
moved to destroy all exposed cattle so trading partners would see that the government was 
committed to ending the outbreak (Olazar, 2011). 
 South Korea 
In late 2010, there was a significant outbreak of FMD in South Korea that extended into 
2011.  It is hypothesized that the disease was introduced by a Chinese or Mongolian laborer who 
was given a package of work clothes infected with FMD.  More than 3.5 million cows and pigs 
were slaughtered, which represented 20% of the nation’s livestock.  Production economic losses 
neared $3 billion (SES, Inc., 2012; Glionna, 2011; Ahn, 2012).  Estimates indicate that costs 
exceeded $1.25 million per hour in outbreak response in South Korea, a country about the same 
size as the state of Indiana (Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program [WARRP], 2012).   
 U.S. FMD Response 
Because of its large agricultural industries, the US is vulnerable to a disease outbreak or 
bioterrorist attack introducing an FAD, especially FMD.  Such a situation would result in severe 
consequences.  An intentional attack or accidental introduction of FMD in the US would have 
far-reaching effects and would extend to multiple sectors of society.  The response to FMD must 
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be well-thought out and highly coordinated amongst all stakeholders.  Adequate infrastructure 
must be in place.  Quick identification, control, slaughter, disposal, and indemnification policies 
must be in place (GAO, 2002a). 
Historic U.S. FMD federal response policies called for prompt animal depopulation and 
disposal, and many states’ regulations continue to dictate that all carcasses be buried within 24 
hr.  Such approaches create more mortalities than can be handled and indicates the need to 
consider vaccination.  A balanced FMD response strategy would detect, contain, and control the 
disease quickly; stamp out FMD while stabilizing and protecting the economy, food supply, and 
public health; and provide science-based, risk-based approaches and systems that allow the 
continuation of commerce (Styles, 2011; Miller, 2012b; APHIS, 2012c).   
For example, the traditional response to FMD requires immediate slaughter of all 
infected, exposed, and potentially exposed animals of susceptible species.  A timely approach 
can stop the spread of disease, but the outbreak may have already spread over multiple states if 
not quickly identified.  USDA officials estimated that an FMD epidemic in the US could spread 
to 25 states in five days or 35 states in 10 days.  A National Defense University exercise 
predicted that FMD could spread to more than one third of the nation’s cattle herds.  Dr. Tom 
McGinn (2003a) projected the spread to 23 states before disease identification and 29 states by 
day eight.  His projections called for the estimated destruction of 23 million animals.  Another 
government table-top exercise resulted in 38 million cattle depopulated.  These estimates 
emphasize the critical importance of rapid identification (GAO, 2003; Foxell, 2003; Dupont, 
2003; Reardon, 2005). 
Until recently, vaccination was not considered a part of a likely response plan.  USDA 
APHIS now recognizes effective and appropriate disposal procedures, mass depopulation and 
euthanasia, and emergency vaccination as critical activities and tools for disease containment, 
control measures, and eradication.  Efforts should focus on preventing contact between infected 
and susceptible animals, stopping virus production and reducing virus shedding in infected or 
exposed animals, which increases disease resistance of susceptible animals.  Current strategies 
include both stamping out and vaccination protocols (APHIS, 2012c; Zack, 2013). 
It would be difficult to meet disease containment goals in the defined timelines, which 
indicates that the modern challenges dictated by FMD require a new approach and further policy 
research.  Minimizing depopulation and disposal will allow greater protection for the 
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environment and food supply.  It has been suggested a more sustainable approach would be to 
reduce stamping out, reuse animal products after vaccination, and recycle through rendering, 
landfilling, and composting (Styles, 2011; Miller, 2012b). 
 Policy Needs 
Agroterrorism and FAD incidents pose significant, diverse, and complex problems.  The 
size and breadth of U.S. agriculture, the simplicity of perpetrating an attack, and the diversity of 
the potential threats and perpetrators make complete prevention of an agroterrorism attack 
unlikely.  Many unintentional events would have similar economic, social, and political effects.  
Therefore, policy responses to an agroterrorist event should be designed to limit the damage 
efficiently and effectively (Casagrande, 2000).  The policies and procedures designed to guard 
against deliberate or incidental harm to an agricultural or food facility are known as food and 
agricultural biosecurity, agrosecurity, or agricultural defense (Brown et al., 2005, p. 4). 
 U.S. plans and policies 
The ability of the US to quickly and effectively respond to an attack is a serious, 
continuing challenge.  There are four areas where challenges remain:  
 the need for rapid disease identification and reporting;  
 effective communication, coordination, and cooperation;  
 adequate response infrastructure and capacity;  
 and a clear animal identification, indemnification, and disposal policy (GAO, 
2002a).   
The US can no longer consider an attack on the agricultural system as hypothetical; 
“hoping and complacency” cannot be considered an option (Applebaum, 2004, p. 49).  The NRC 
(2002) acknowledged there are no easy answers (Moon, Ascher, et al., 2003; Moon, Kirk-Baer, 
et al., 2003).  Being prepared for an attack provides the foundation needed to be prepared for an 
accidental occurrence (Brown, 2006).  These are complex situations that call for 
multidisciplinary responses.  
The current decision-making system is ambiguous.  According to Franz (2005a), the US 
does “not have the validated intervention strategies that could be applied to our food production, 
processing, and distribution systems once an event has occurred.  Existing strategies could make 
the problems worse” (p. 1).  Government responses or policies that are short-sighted or 
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obstructionist, such as limited surveillance or animal identification, can increase the negative 
impact of an FAD outbreak (Ackerman, 2006).  Day-to-day decisions would be made using 
decision-trees that may be cumbersome and complicated (Segarra, 2001; Monke, 2007).  
Kastner, Sargeant, and Kastner (2005) concluded that such food and agriculture security 
strategies “must blend insights from multiple academic disciplines” and “by sewing together 
research from the fields of microbiology, sociology, economics, et cetera – indeed the list does 
and should go on” (p. 1).  
For example, the WHO developed policy recommendations for dealing with an attack on 
food and calls for member nations to have systems in place for preparation, alert, and response 
that minimize public health risks from real or suspected agroterrorism.  Their recommendations 
are focused strictly on public health and post-harvest food products.  The WHO does not address 
an attack on livestock or crops (World Health Organization [WHO], 2002). 
A working group on governance dilemmas identified the challenges faced by leaders and 
decision makers in dealing with a bioterrorism attack.  While their focus was not on food and 
agricultural biosecurity, their findings still apply.  The issues identified as high-stakes decisions 
are the inability to plan for every contingency; a pervasive uncertainty about the situation and 
response; unpredictable, rapid, and far-reaching impacts; scarcity of resources; practical 
difficulties of disease containment; and the impulse to avoid, stigmatize, and blame others 
triggered by fear and loss.  Additional dilemmas relate to social trust, mutual confidence, and 
obligations amongst decision makers and other players.  These factors are further complicated by 
instituting quarantine and movement orders while respecting individual freedoms, stabilizing the 
economy while disrupting commerce, restoring social confidence in the food supply, 
communicating in a crisis with creating chaos, using scarce resources fairly, maintaining 
credibility when decisions have to be made with limited information, and managing the situation 
with multiple jurisdictions involved (Schoch-Spana, 2004). 
In order to meet these challenges, decision makers responsible for the development of 
food and agricultural security policy must integrate animal health, disease control, animal 
welfare, public health, economic impact, environmental impact, regulatory issues, logistical 
issues, physical security, geography, trade and border issues, public perception, risk 
communication, social and psychological impacts, emergency management, historical 
perspectives, and political realities. 
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 Multidisciplinary policy approach and decision making 
Government agencies and legislative bodies are faced with multiple policy questions 
related to threats against livestock and crops.  The issues range from prevention to emergency 
response to producer compensation.  To be sound and effective, the policy approach must be 
inter- and multidisciplinary.  The goal in policy development should be to represent the entirety 
of the agricultural industry while providing useful information to policymakers.  Policy decisions 
need to be made “quickly under challenging and changing circumstances” (Hayes, 2010, p. 3).   
The OIE member countries have recognized that animal-related defense and protection is 
a “complex, multi-faceted public policy issue which includes important scientific, ethical, 
economic and political dimensions” and requires detailed vision and strategy that balances these 
issues (OIE, 2002, p. 1).  It is also important to note that diseases that impact plants and animals 
result in significant reductions in food production that result in a threat to global food security 
(National Science Foundation [NSF], 2012).   
Policies should focus on characterizing the biological and physical factors leading to 
disease spread, defining the likely scope, identifying economic and geophysical factors 
contributing to the spread, and developing a specific strategy for the outbreak.  This approach 
allows emergency responders to “balance competing resources within a sound framework for 
decision making” (Heath, 2012, p. 61).  This philosophy, combined with research focused on 
disease control strategies that are humane, economical, and that protect the environment and 
trade, will create better responses and more rapid decision making.  For example, this may lead 
decision makers to determine when to depopulate, when to vaccinate, and when to let the disease 
become endemic.  A “scorched earth” approach may not always be the most economical or the 
most humane (Heath, 2012, p. 61).   
“The time has come for the animal and public health professions to enter into a debate on 
the socio-political impacts of the regulations and standards of disease control and to pursue 
policies that apply biological sciences to overcome the predicament of the 21
st
 Century” (Heath, 
2006, p. 417).  Policy and decision makers need knowledge and communication to understand 
the situation and the resource needs in order to develop response strategies (Crnic, 2010).  The 
public expects leaders to make decisions and take immediate action to address emergency 
situations (Myers, 2006). 
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The challenge is in balancing science and policy.  Disease outbreaks should be scientific 
events rather than political stories, which is a lesson that can be learned from the U.K. FMD 
publicity.  There is a natural conflict between science-based problem solving and policy 
development.  If recommendations can integrate disciplines, then the policy will be more 
effective.  Sound policy should be interdependent between economic, scientific, social, and 
political issues.  As noted in a white paper published by the Council for Agriculture Science and 
Technology (CAST), scientific knowledge, political values, and cultural values are “imperfectly 
known and imperfectly separable” (Pearson & Salmon, 2005, p. 10).  Moreover, the “decision 
making is often undertaken under the dim light of new and still-unfolding science” (Kastner, 
2011, p. 2). 
Many of the agrosecurity policy prescriptions in place – such as mass euthanasia, 
depopulation, and emergency vaccination – are expensive, resource-intensive, cumbersome, and 
time-consuming to implement.  A coordinated strategy and strong leadership is needed to address 
all policies and procedures from prevention to casualty management.  These policies require 
producers, consumers, government officials, processors, law enforcement, regulators, 
transporters, and others to reach consensus (Foxell, 2003).  Policymakers must be attuned to 
these and other issues related to dealing with an FAD.  Horn and Breeze (1999) stated that, 
“Current policies, procedures, and practices for epidemic pest and pathogen control must be 
reviewed paying special attention to changed public and media attitudes toward animal welfare, 
environmental quality, federal and state regulation, and the scientific bases for public policy” (p. 
15).  Policies must deal with the response and recovery while preserving freedom and an open 
society (Koo & Mattson, 2002).  Policy and decision makers should be trained in economic 
analysis in order to understand the tradeoffs between strategies.  Decision-making frameworks 
should be based on economic and risk-related principles (Jin et al., 2009).  The dynamic nature 
of these decision processes and the globalization of the food and agriculture industry require 
leaders to take a multidisciplinary approach to policy development (Kastner, 2011). 
Scientific, epidemiological, environmental, societal, international, and economic 
considerations, as well as agriculture’s interdependence with society, should influence policy 
development (Evans, 2007).  Policymakers need to understand the economic importance of 
agricultural security as they decide how to allocate efforts and resources.  The US must 
understand the economic costs and benefits of interventions that allow the production system to 
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return to normalcy (McGinn, 2003a).  It is critical to have policies and procedures that allow for 
a quick and effective response that protects the agricultural industry and the U.S. economy (Huff, 
Meilke, & Turvey, 2003).  However, these policy decisions are not simple or clear. 
Policy development exists in a context of uncertainty and results are evaluated with 
scrutiny.  Policymakers must base decisions on imperfect knowledge in complex situations.  
Science-based information and economic efficiency can narrow the scope of those decisions, but 
other factors must be considered.  Decision makers must evaluate outcomes and choose policies 
to achieve the most desired outcome (Spradlin, 1997; Cahn, 2002; National Center for 
Environmental Decision Making Research [NCEDR], 2002).  Decisions must be made rapidly 
based on available information and those decisions must be conveyed quickly and accurately to 
those who will implement the decisions (Geering, Roeder, & Obi, 1999).  Uncertainty must not 
result in a lack of action or decision.  Decision processes must be robust enough to function 
under these demands with sufficient timeliness (Dunn, Pollard, & Castinel, 2010). 
Some believe that current procedures of mass depopulation and disposal during an FAD 
outbreak are archaic and outdated.  In fact, some experts believe that the methods for containing 
an FAD – highly visible and expensive slaughter and disposal –increase the incentive for 
terrorists (GAO, 2005).  As the world becomes more epidemiologically globalized, social values 
change regarding management of animal populations, and environmental concerns grow, new 
socially accepted responses must be considered (Evans, 2007).  Breeze (2004) stated: “It will be 
the U.S. government, not a terrorist gang that is killing, burning, filling mass graves, and 
wreaking economic havoc nationwide” (p. 251).  Damage can come from the government 
response, not just the disease itself.  Poorly developed policies and procedures can be harmful, 
even causing the harm they were designed to prevent (Nipp, 2004).   
“Whether a biological emergency turns into a disaster depends on how the government 
and the private sectors of the livestock industry react with regard to control and possible 
eradication of the disease outbreak” (Rushton & Upton, 2006, p. 375).  The policy priorities 
range from minimizing economic impact while eliminating mass slaughter, to stamping out the 
disease and protecting international trade agreements.  The US cannot choose if there is an 
unintentional or deliberate FMD outbreak, but the government can choose how to respond, 
which depends on national policy, preparedness, and the actions of first responders (Breeze, 
2004).  An underreaction can expand and extend the impact of the emergency and overreaction 
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can lead to greater damage than the disease and control measures alone (Rushton & Upton, 
2006). 
The policy response will have a direct influence on the long-term impact of an attack or 
unintentional outbreak.  Policy actions and resulting investments may lower industry 
vulnerability (Carpenter, 2011).  Government policy should allocate resources with the goal of 
minimizing the overall cost to society (Hennessy, 2008).  Any delays in action allow for disease 
spread, greater economic damage, and decreased public confidence (NRC, 2002; Moon, Ascher, 
et al., 2003; Moon, Kirk-Baer, et al., 2003).  Myers (2006) argued that the ability to respond 
quickly will be “directly proportional to the economic loss for the specific agricultural 
commodity” (p.191).  Mitigation response strategies for an attack or unintentional outbreak need 
to be refined and developed (Jaax, 2002).   
The existing challenges related to preparing for and responding to food and agricultural 
biosecurity threats are not due to a “lack of technology, but a failure of public policy” (Breeze, 
2006, p. 272).  The most devastating impacts in the case of an outbreak are likely to come as a 
result of the policy response.  The policy response should not be focused solely on the domestic 
agricultural impact, but the international impact on trade, economic development, poverty, 
environment, public health, animal welfare, and wildlife conservation.  The potential 
consequences will continue to grow as the food and agricultural industry increases in complexity 
and globalization.  Yet, stakeholders and policymakers have little motivation to truly prepare for 
uncertain events that do not have political constituencies when current policy issues do.  Policy 
must not only be driven by science-based information, but policy must be led by bold visions and 
must drive science and research.  Strong policy and preparedness efforts will eliminate the 
vulnerability of agriculture and lessen the likelihood of an intentional attack or naturally-
occurring outbreak (Breeze, 2006). 
 Planning and preparedness efforts 
Policies, procedures, and regulations should ensure that the livestock industry is well-
prepared to resist or minimize the effect of an attack.  Effective policy and programs, along with 
a prepared society, are the best deterrents to an intentional attack (Kelly et al., 2004; Franz, 
2005b).  It is critical that all response plans encourage cooperation between state, local, and 
federal authorities, and that all levels of government are prepared.  If the industry and 
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government are prepared, terrorists are less likely to attack because their success becomes less 
likely (Leviten & Olexa, 2003; Brown et al., 2005).   
Planning for a response and allocating scarce resources is more difficult when the 
probability of an incident remains controversial.  Risk may be over emphasized or too much 
weight may be placed on past occurrences or lack of past history.  Government policymakers can 
make systematic failures individually and collectively.  In the case of food and agricultural 
defense, a conflict also arises because biosecurity is provided at many levels of government, but 
has centralized decision making.  Agriculture, however, is decentralized and centralized decision 
making is difficult or impossible.  Significant resources are needed to respond effectively.  
Quickly mobilizing resources can be difficult in a free society when tradeoffs are being made 
between individual rights and social good.  Sacrifices will be necessary.  A disease response is a 
“classic case of a public good” clarifying the critical role of government to take responsibility for 
the response efforts (Hennessy, 2008, p. 69).  The 5
th
 and Final Report of the Gilmore 
Commission (2003) called for clear processes that engage academics, business, all levels of 
government, and other stakeholders to develop and implement research to develop standards 
across many areas, including public policy.  The American political cycle focuses decision 
makers on the near future, but policies to combat bioterrorism need to be institutionalized 
(Gilmore, 2003).  This is also true of policies related to accidental and natural outbreaks.   
Policies designed to respond to an FAD require “careful planning and diligent 
preparedness efforts” (APHIS, 2012b, p. v).  Because interstate commerce and international trade 
will both be disrupted, the policies must ensure that the processes are rapidly deployable, 
scalable, and flexible.  Conflicting interests and competing priorities that exist between 
stakeholders must be addressed.  Science-based and risk-management approaches that are 
intended to protect food supply, stabilize the US economy, ensure public and animal health, and 
safeguard animal agriculture are necessary (APHIS, 2012b).   
Federal, state, and local statutory authorities and responsibilities must be complementary 
in order for policy to be implemented effectively.  Often, this may be complicated in cases where 
federal and state interests do not coincide.  Stop-movement orders require the cooperation of 
multiple states.  Local and state resources will be quickly exhausted on quarantine and 
remediation efforts, and a timely, synergistic response requires multi-agency exercises (Dykes, 
2010).  
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 Industry role 
This situation is especially difficult for the agricultural industry to understand.  Pearson 
and Salmon (2005) observed that, “Although some people may wish to avoid the world of 
politics – it needs to be appreciated and mastered by animal agriculture because it often reflects 
public opinion and human behavior….The animal agriculture industry needs to be better 
connected to the world around it and acquire a new cultural competence and political acumen to 
continue to be successful” (p. 10). 
Industry collaboration is critical to the successful implementation of any policy response.  
Joint decision making and cost-sharing between government and industry representatives may 
need to be considered (Hayes, 2010).  In addition, industry leaders need to balance all factors 
when responding to government policy proposals and government leaders need to better 
communicate policy alternatives and consequences to stakeholders.  For example, policy 
proposals such as animal identification and traceability could aid in critical bioterrorism 
prevention and response mechanisms, but industry debate on these types of policies has 
traditionally focused on government overreach and concern over privacy of information, not the 
potential of a disease response tool.  Government leaders and industry representatives have failed 
to reach agreement and farmers and ranchers have resisted implementation of such tools (Breeze, 
2006; Gilpen et al., 2009).   
In emergency situations, industry leaders should serve as potential consultants to the 
decision process and communication partners when dealing with farmers, ranchers, and the 
general public.  However, clarification needs to exist in the role industry leaders play in advising 
policy decisions but not necessarily making the final policy decisions. 
 Expectations of the public 
Policymakers and the agricultural industry may now better realize the importance of food 
and agricultural defense, but little is known about how consumers view agricultural biosecurity.  
A 2005 study conducted by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense indicated that 
consumers believe terrorism against the food supply is less likely than other threats, but that it 
deserves greater consideration.  When asked to prioritize protecting the food supply, it was the 
number one priority on their list.  It ranked above airlines, power grids, public transportation, and 
monuments.  More than two thirds of respondents were confident or very confident their food 
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supply was safe, but 62% were either not very or not at all confident the food supply was safe 
from terrorism (Stinson, Kinsey, Degeneffe, & Ghosh, 2007).  Seventy-seven percent of 
consumers thought an act of food-related terrorism will occur in their lifetime (Dettmann & 
Stinson, 2006).  Consumers consider the government to be the most responsible for protecting 
the food supply and funding food defense activities (Lorenzen et al., 2009). 
The mechanics of dealing with an outbreak could also generate significant criticism from 
the public.  Developing a response that is politically acceptable will be challenging when plans 
include culling and disposal.  Even though depopulation is scientifically justifiable, the culling of 
a large number of animals, especially those not showing disease, will be controversial and will 
likely draw severe opposition.  Mass burial or burning is likely to be just as contentious as mass 
euthanasia of exposed animals (Chalk, 2003; Chalk, 2004).  Consumer reaction and public 
confidence in the government will be tested depending on the size of the outbreak and the 
eradication and destruction methods.  As noted by Monke (2006), “The need to slaughter perhaps 
hundreds or thousands of cattle (or tens of millions of poultry) could generate public criticism if 
depopulation methods are considered inhumane or the destruction of carcasses is questioned 
environmentally” (p. 9).  Of all response activities, mass eradication will be the most challenging 
and politically sensitive.   
Public opposition has been a factor in previous cases, such as the mass slaughter and 
disposal during the FMD outbreak in the UK; the removal of millions of chicken carcasses in 
British Columbia, Canada, in 2004; and the use of wood chippers to dispatch chickens in 
California.  In a case in Florida, the public debate and complaints from residents brought a 
judicial ruling that halted the removal of trees within a certain perimeter to stop the spread of 
citrus canker.  It took 18 months and passage of a new state law before the injunction was lifted.  
By then, the infection was rampant (Monke, 2007; Hennessy, 2008).  If the public is that upset 
about trees, the reaction to the destruction of live, uninfected animals may be more disruptive 
than previously considered. 
Societal reaction to disease control, specifically mass depopulation, will likely fall into 
one of six categories: 
 Waste of animal proteins when global food insecurity exists, 
 Environmental damage due to carcass disposal, 
 Natural aversion to mass animal killing of potentially healthy animals, 
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 Ability to depopulate large numbers of animals humanely, 
 Animal suffering due to movement restrictions (Whiting, 2003; Swallow, 2012), 
and 
 Psychological impact on farmers and ranchers (Swallow, 2012). 
All alternatives need to be considered in the development of mass slaughter and carcass 
disposal policies (Monke, 2007).  
 Policy analysis 
There are multiple approaches to policy analysis.  Possible tools include: 
 Cost-benefit analysis – a systematic means to enumerate all costs and benefits that 
applies dollar values to indirect and direct costs; 
 Risk-based analysis – considers all related risks;  
 Cost-effectiveness analysis – attempts to meet goals and objectives at the lowest 
costs;  
 Decision analysis – structured consideration of alternatives typically using 
constructed models;  
 Matrix analysis – uses a scoring system to compare alternatives;  
 Case study analysis – use real life situations to compare possible policy alternatives;  
 Focus group analysis – gather opinions and reactions to policy options; and 
 Panel/rule-making approach – balance expertise to determine best policy (Spradlin, 
1997; Cahn, 2002; NCEDR, 2002). 
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate these agricultural security policy 
development challenges and apply various policy evaluation tools to three agricultural 
biosecurity dilemmas: euthanasia and welfare conditions in a large-scale animal disease 
outbreak, carcass disposal in a large-scale animal disease outbreak, and use of vaccination in a 
large-scale animal disease outbreak. 
 Euthanasia and Welfare Dilemma 
Chalk (2004) said that containing a major animal disease outbreak would “necessitate the 
slaughter of hundreds of thousands of animals” (p. 8).  Depopulation has been “a fundamental 
approach of veterinary and regulatory interventions for the effective biological containment and 
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eradication of contagious diseases since the science and art of veterinary medicine began” 
(Evans, 2007, p. 201).  However, a stamping-out approach, while typically effective at disease 
control and eradication, can lead to significant animal destruction, economic losses, 
environmental impacts, farmer and rancher psychological distress, negative societal reaction, 
waste of valuable protein, and animal welfare concerns (Willis, 2007). 
In the case of FMD, current U.S. policy identifies an infected zone with a 3-km 
(approximately 1.86 mi) radius from the infected premises.  It is expected that all infected and 
exposed animals within that zone will be slaughtered and disposed of by approved methods.  
Previously, it was required that all animals within a 6-mi zone would be depopulated (APHIS, 
2010; APHIS, 2012c).  State animal health officials and/or the USDA would wait for disease 
confirmation before beginning the slaughter process to avoid unnecessary panic (Knowles, 
2005).  If the disease spreads beyond the initial zone, quarantine and slaughter would continue 
until the disease is eliminated.  This approach, when tested in the USDA’s Crimson Sky test 
exercise, necessitated the slaughter of 38 million animals (GAO, 2005; Breeze, 2004).  Many 
concerns were realized in the Crimson Sky exercise.  The entire National Guard and the military 
were engaged in the response and ran out of ammunition in their depopulation efforts.  PETA 
appeared on television to oppose the mass slaughter.  All consequences had policymakers 
questioning mass depopulation and vaccine policies (Roberts, 2005). 
The OIE notes that mass culling and destruction of animals often produce vehement 
public reactions.  Owners of animals, other producers fearful of disease spread, animal welfare 
advocates, general public influenced by media photos and coverage, environmental 
organizations, and human rights advocates who see culling as a waste of edible food can all be 
expected to express their concerns (OIE, 2005).  Problems that could lead to an animal welfare 
crisis within a crisis need to be identified.  The emergency response should not be seen by 
stakeholders as more harmful than the disease outbreak itself (Zack, 2013).   
If mass depopulation strategies are implemented, animals should be destroyed effectively 
and rapidly with as much emphasis given to animal welfare as the extenuating circumstances 
make practical (APHIS, 2012c).  Slaughter, culling, and euthanasia policies will have significant 
welfare implications in an FAD outbreak or disaster.  In an FAD outbreak, the eradication of the 
disease itself has welfare benefits by preventing suffering to potentially infected animals.  
Euthanasia alleviates suffering of affected animals, but may cause additional stress and suffering 
70 
 
to potentially infected animals (Williams & Sheesley, 2002).  The euthanization of large 
numbers of animals is likely to generate vigorous opposition from the public, as well as 
producers and animal rights activists.  This opposition is likely to be even stronger when 
susceptible but non-symptomatic herds are depopulated (Chalk, 2004). 
Some states, such as Illinois, cannot euthanize or dispose of animals without a 
cumbersome, lengthy process.  They would need the federal government to declare an 
emergency to implement expected disease eradication efforts (O’Keefe, 2003).  Compensation 
for destroyed animals, while originally implemented to encourage disease reporting, may also 
lead to a reduced incentive to farmers and ranchers to engage in disease control practices 
(Breeze, 2006). 
The depopulation of animals for disease control or animal welfare is a complex issue and 
deserves significant investigation.  The differences between a disease outbreak and a natural 
disaster add to the complexity and the need for further consideration of depopulation methods.  
Animal dispatch for welfare and disease control in the U.K. FMD outbreak caused great concern 
and has been vigorously discussed.  The FAWC (2002) stated that “A balance must be struck 
between disease control and welfare, but welfare must not be set aside even in an emergency” (p. 
9).  
Animal welfare is often evaluated by the well-established Five Freedoms, a series of 
propositions encompassing an animal’s basic needs.  These freedoms are: 
 Freedom from hunger and thirst by access to fresh water and diet to maintain full 
health; 
 Freedom from discomfort by provision of an appropriate environment, shelter, and a 
resting area; 
 Freedom from pain, injury, and disease by rapid diagnosis and treatment (or 
euthanasia); 
 Freedom to express normal behavior by provision of sufficient space, facilities, and 
fellow species; and 
 Freedom from fear and distress by ensuring conditions which avoid suffering (Farm 
Animal Welfare Council [FAWC], 2002).   
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These freedoms can guide the evaluation of animal welfare conditions during a large 
animal disease outbreak or disaster.  Specific animal welfare issues that deserve future discussion 
include: 
 Current policies and regulations related to depopulation and euthanasia at local, state, 
and federal levels; 
 Technologies available for the euthanasia of animals for disease control or animal 
welfare; 
 Current emergency vaccination policies and their relationship to the destruction of 
animals for animal disease control and welfare; 
 Impact of different euthanasia technologies on animal welfare and animal behavior; 
 Primary issues related to these technologies and their relationship to transportation 
and movement, disposal, economic impact, environmental effect, public relations, 
public health, and related industries; and 
 Impact of certain mass destruction methods, laws, and policies on animal producers 
or caretakers. 
In the case of a large-scale animal disease outbreak, when producers and consumers are 
already shaken, the mass depopulation of animals will be scrutinized by the public and the press.  
This has been evident in every major case of animal disease, from groups opposing mass 
slaughter to farmers fearing the loss of livelihood (Segarra, 2001). 
Media coverage of any outbreak, especially a deliberate attack, will be substantial.  
Americans will see firsthand the impact of mass depopulation procedures and are likely to react 
negatively (Chalk, 2004).  Previous mass euthanasia incidents, such as in the case of AI in 
California poultry flocks, received little coverage until there was evidence of wood chippers 
being used for animal depopulation (United Poultry Concerns [UPC], 2003).  In South Korea, 
multiple news sources obtained photos and videos of live pigs being piled in trucks and buried 
alive in mass graves.  Reports indicated that the government ran out of the neuromuscular drug 
used for euthanasia (Glionna, 2011; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals [PETA], 2011). 
The mass eradication techniques used in the UK to deal with the FMD outbreak received 
significant criticism.  Many believed the government overreacted.  One commentator, Simon 
Jenkins, exemplified the view of many in the public with his article, “This Wretched Cult of 
Blood and Money,” in The Times newspaper: “…Nothing in the entire history of the common 
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agriculture policy has been so crazy.  The slaughter is not declining but running at 80,000 a 
day…At the last estimate, 95% of three to four million animals dead or awaiting death…The 
obscenity of the policy is said to be irrelevant because of its success” (Chalk, 2004, p. 24).  The 
image of a National Guardsman, government marksmen, or local law enforcement officer armed 
with high velocity rifles depopulating thousands of animals will not be a comforting sight 
(Wefald, 1999; Chalk, 2000).  
Current approaches to an animal disease outbreak create animal welfare concerns related 
to animal movement, disruption of feed supply transportation, delay of slaughter at the 
appropriate production time, and mass slaughter.  Animal depopulation as a welfare issue needs 
further consideration and review (Evans, 2007).  The issues surrounding welfare are not just 
based on the method of euthanasia, but also the process of the response.   
In addition to animal welfare, when apparently healthy or vaccinated animals are 
depopulated, ethical concerns linked to social values, environmental impacts, and global food 
security are also raised (Barnett, Geale, Clarke, Davis, & Kasari, 2013).  Policy alternatives must 
be evaluated with all consequences in mind. 
 Carcass Disposal Problem 
During a large-scale animal health emergency, the slaughter and disposal of infected and 
exposed animals is an instrumental part of controlling and eradicating the disease.  Available 
technologies offer multiple options for disposal, including rendering, burial, incineration, 
burning, composting, chemical digestion, and other emerging concepts.  Selecting the 
appropriate technology will depend on the cause of death, availability of necessary technology 
and resources, public health, environmental concerns, public perception, transportation needs, 
location, climate, regulatory issues, and economic concerns.  
A complete and multidimensional policy strategy is necessary when planning for the 
disposal of livestock and poultry in the event of high death losses resulting from an intentional 
bioterrorism attack, an accidental introduction of dangerous pathogens, or a natural disaster.  An 
important part of that strategy is the ability to dispose of large numbers of animal carcasses in a 
cost-effective and socially and environmentally effective manner (Adams, 1999; Casagrande, 
2002; Deen, 1999, Parker, 2002).  According to Nutsch and Kastner (2008), if the challenge of 
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carcass disposal is not met successfully it will “spiral into major food agricultural security 
problems and result in devastating economic losses” (p. 1959) and environmental consequences.  
The disposal of carcasses can be challenging.  The easiest and quickest methods for 
disposal are burying in landfills and burning – both of which can draw public opposition.  
However, leaving carcasses out in the open can lead to increased disease spread and additional 
public discourse (Chalk, 2004).   
As Segarra (2001) noted in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to 
Congress, “the last line of defense and the costliest, is the isolation, control and eradication of an 
epidemic” (p. 8), which would include mass depopulation and disposal.  Current USDA policy 
prescribes incineration, burial, or rendering as the preferred disposal method (GAO, 2005).  Each 
of these disposal methods have challenges to their implementation, including disease spread, 
environmental impact, and public perception.  In addition, producers may not be willing to 
cooperate.  The USDA identifies burial as the fastest, easiest, and most economical method of 
disposal when it is feasible (GAO, 2002a). 
The method of carcass disposal can impose heavy costs on society.  Some methods could 
result in costs incurred by producers and society through environmental degradation, elimination 
of tourism opportunities, contamination of water supply, or the spreading of disease.  The 
environmental impact of certain disposal methods could be permanent.  Burial of carcasses will 
likely cause land used for pits to be lost for production for several years, which would affect 
producers’ future economic well-being.  Tourism can be affected by the images shown to the 
public of carcass disposal occurrences.  If landfills are used, the county will be financially 
affected because landfills may reach capacity before expected.  Estimating this impact requires a 
deeper look into the future use of land.  These are significant costs that must be considered.  The 
costs on producers, processors, and local communities for each disposal method should be 
considered.  Regulations requiring contingency plans for rapid depopulation of livestock 
premises should be developed (Casagrande, 2002; Deen, 1999).  
At times, location and technology availability may give producers and animal health 
officials little or no choice of disposal technology.  Public health should always be a priority if an 
infective disease is involved.  Biosecurity risks related to the livestock industry are also an 
important consideration.  Short-term and long-term impact on the environment should also play a 
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key role in the technology selection process.  Economic considerations, including direct costs of 
the disposal methods must also be a part of the decision-making process. 
Policy analysis must go beyond the direct costs of disposal (technology, equipment, 
transportation, storage, site acquisition, fuel, facilities, and labor) and must include other 
considerations, such as the impact on the environment, tourism, future land values, and other 
social costs.  Direct costs should not be the only factor in a disposal policy evaluation.  
Economically attractive disposal methods may not meet regulatory requirements.  The most cost-
effective method may contradict regulations in place at the local, state, or federal level.  
Additional efforts are necessary to assess state-by-state regulations, investigate opportunities for 
states and the federal government to work together, have disposal plans in place before an 
emergency, and delineate clear decision making responsibilities.  For example, to minimize 
direct costs, contracts with technology providers should be negotiated in advance.  It must be 
clear who takes on this responsibility (Casagrande, 2002; Deen, 1999).   
Timely disposal may be difficult with a large-scale death loss or depopulation.  Resources 
may not be available for the actual disposal or the related costs.  In the U.K. FMD outbreak, 
contingency planning should have considered additional issues, including the logistical problems 
related to the location of disposal facilities, size and species of animals, and access to farms.  The 
UK could have planned to vaccinate healthy animals within the depopulation zone to postpone 
slaughter, or freezing carcasses to allow disposal to keep pace with animal deaths (Anderson, 
2002). 
The decision to implement a mass depopulation and disposal effort will have to be made 
in a short time and the execution must take place without delay.  Success will depend on 
contingency plans and the related structures, policies, and infrastructures.  Decision processes 
and partnerships must be pre-established (OIE, 2005).  
To understand the dilemma, consider the development of an action plan for fighting FMD 
in California.  The California Department of Food and Agriculture action plan states that all 
precautions should be taken to prevent disease spread and comply with environmental 
regulations during disposal of infected and exposed animals.  While the state allows the governor 
to overrule environmental regulations in the case of an emergency, uncertainty over the long-
term environmental impacts and public concern will likely delay even proven disposal methods 
(Ekboir, 1999). 
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The greatest logistical problem found in the California research is the disposal of 
carcasses.  USDA APHIS states that burial is the preferred method of disposal when practical, 
and considers burning as an alternative.  However, burial would require the digging of miles of 
trench pits that could not be disturbed for years.  This alone imposes a major future cost for 
producers.  Carcass burning would require more wood or other fuel than is available in a timely 
manner.  The ability to use an air-curtain incinerator would be limited to equipment availability 
and could increase disposal time.  Landfill use would be limited because of the need to mix with 
waste in a fixed portion and the cost imposed on the local communities of filling the landfill.  
Limited disposal ability and capacity will affect the spread of disease (Ekboir, 1999). 
In the case of FMD, the virus can survive for long periods, so disposal must be done with 
in a manner that stops disease spread, minimizes negative environmental effects, and preserves 
animal protein when possible.  On-site burial may be the least expensive and biosecure, but may 
be limited by environmental and geographical characteristics and regulations.  Off-site burial, 
rendering, composting, incineration, and digestion may all be utilized in dealing with FMD 
(APHIS, 2012c).  
The disposal of carcasses presents a number of unexpected challenges.  To effectively 
meet the challenge of carcass disposal, public and private partners need to develop response 
plans well in advance.  Multiple disposal methods may be utilized.  Decision trees or action plan 
models need to be designed for local conditions and circumstances (Harper, DeRouchey, 
Glanville, Meeker, & Straw, 2008).  Existing decision-trees used to guide policymakers do not 
always account for all circumstances and situations.  In the UK, the media images of burning 
pyres caused a negative public reaction, burial had to be eliminated because of water tables and 
long-term land values, and, yet, an urgent decision was necessary because huge piles of dead 
animals were creating additional concerns (Foxell, 2003).  The USDA APHIS and state animal 
health agencies have been charged with disposing of exposed animals in a sanitary and humane 
method (Dunn, 1999).  The perspective also exists that the policy focus needs to move from one 
focused on disposal alternatives to one focused on an alternative to disposal (Evans, 2007).  
There is no perfect disposal method nor is there an alternative that would eliminate all disposal 
needs, so decision makers need to be armed with effective policies, procedures, and tools to 
make timely and effective decisions. 
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 Vaccination 
According to Roger Breeze (2004), the traditional response plan in the case of an 
epidemic animal disease began in 1711 when Pope Clement XI’s physician, Dr. Lancisi, 
proposed quarantine and mass slaughter to deal with an outbreak of Rinderpest in the region’s 
cattle.  It is not until recently that vaccination has seriously been considered as a policy 
alternative in the case of a large-scale animal disease outbreak. 
According to the OIE, eradication policies have existed to defend export interests and are 
economically motivated.  In some countries, the public and policymakers have expressed 
opposition against economics being the top priority in implementing this strategy.  Many 
producers may not be concerned about export markets, and animals may represent a more 
differentiated value than pure economics.  To farmers, animals may represent the professional 
achievements passed on by their ancestors or personal, daily companions.  Animals may also 
serve as beasts of burden, exist for ceremonial reasons, or represent a sign of wealth.  In many of 
these cases, the export argument is not convincing, especially when animals that have not been 
infected are selected for culling.  Prescribed compensation packages may not be able to replace 
the animals depopulated (OIE, 2005).   
Trade bans implemented at just the mention of a disease outbreak make it challenging for 
policymakers to choose any approach other than stamping out (Willis, 2007).  International trade 
rules do not reflect contemporary technology by penalizing vaccination, encouraging mass 
slaughter, and imposing antiquated standards to meet trade requirements (Breeze, 2004).  Roth 
(2005) noted that animal vaccine development is much less expensive than human vaccines and 
can be approved for usage much quicker.  Better technology in vaccine development needs to be 
used to expand vaccine capabilities (McGinn, 2003a).   
The OIE indicates vaccination with or without eradication policy is preferred over mass 
destruction to contain a disease outbreak.  According to the OIE (2005), the decision to conduct 
mass depopulation must be “carefully evaluated against available alternatives, environmental, 
socio-political and socio-economic concerns, trade implications as well as prevailing ethical and 
ethnic beliefs and preferences” (p. 1). 
Vaccines can be used in a vaccinate-to-live policy, vaccinate-to-slaughter, or a vaccinate-
to-cull policy.  In a vaccinate-to-cull policy, vaccine would be used to limit infection and 
potential disease spread amongst animals that will eventually be depopulated (Kohnen, 2000).  In 
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a vaccinate-to-live policy, vaccinated animals would continue in the normal husbandry and 
marketing processes.  This use of vaccines in the case of FMD would further jeopardize a 
nation’s ability to reopen export markets.  The OIE differentiates between countries that are 
FMD-free with and without vaccination.  Most countries that are FMD-free without vaccination 
use a stamping out policy to guarantee the earlier opportunity to restore trade (GAO, 2005).   
The USDA has traditionally preferred slaughter versus vaccination policies for FMD in 
the US because of international trade restrictions.  Therefore, the US has not historically 
stockpiled vaccines or maintained a significant supply (GAO, 2005; Breeze, 2004).  Breeze 
(2004) noted that, “In the past, US and other FMD-free countries have rightly calculated that 
their greatest profit could be obtained by not vaccinating their herds against FMD, because this 
allows producers free access to world markets with their most profitable products and handicaps 
other countries that use vaccine…..the most profitable option is not to vaccinate but to eradicate 
the disease by killing as many animals as it takes.  This allows producers to reenter world 
markets much more quickly than if vaccine had been used” (p. 253).  The number of animals 
involved, the size of the geographic region, and the spread of the disease will also change the 
economic impacts of vaccination versus depopulation. 
In some parts of the world, vaccination has been used, but not always with success.  In 
the case of the South Korea FMD outbreak, questions arose about vaccine effectiveness.  The 
serotype O that infected hogs at the initial farm was the same serotype that the government had 
been vaccinating against for several months, and all the animals at the farm were vaccinated.  
One official noted that perhaps farmers could have vaccinated incorrectly or animals could have 
had immunity against the vaccine (Smith, 2011).  
Even though vaccination has been proposed as a possible solution, it may be difficult to 
deploy vaccines in a timely manner.  The process to get USDA approval to vaccinate is complex 
and difficult to implement during an FAD emergency.  Officials have indicated a willingness to 
design a more rapid-decision making process, but they caution that there are many variables 
(including location, vaccine efficacy, and trade restrictions) and the complexity is ingrained in 
the policy (GAO, 2005).   
In response to a GAO study, the USDA said that the NVS should be one potential 
component of the response.  There are a limited number of diseases that can be treated by 
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vaccines.  Vaccinations may limit disease spread in areas adjacent to the outbreak or help reduce 
the shedding from infected animals (DeHaven, 2005).  
By presidential directive HSPD-9, the NVS was authorized to enable vaccines to be 
deployed in 24 hr, but current vaccines stored for FMD would not be available for days as they 
would have to be sent to the UK for activation due to US regulations (GAO, 2005).  There are 
seven serotypes of FMD virus and more than 70 subtypes.  No single vaccine can counter all the 
serotypes, and current vaccines are designed for use prior to exposure.  Vaccines can keep 
animals from acquiring disease, but not from being carriers.  A vaccinated cow can carry disease 
agents in the throat for years after exposure (Kohnen, 2000).  
In response to the presidential directive, the USDA has contracted with manufacturers for 
the development of strain specific vaccines in the case of FMD.  The stockpiled vaccine 
materials and the contract agreements could result in strain identification and a tailored vaccine 
being developed in a few days.  However, vaccines are only one part of the control strategy, and 
the USDA is likely to depend on a combination of vaccination and depopulation (Connor, 2005; 
APHIS, 2011d; APHIS, 2012a). 
According to APHIS, a number of factors will be considered when selecting the 
appropriate strategy including disruptions to interstate commerce and international trade, 
acceptance of response strategies, scale of outbreak, rate of spread, vaccine availability, and 
resource availability.  For example, a larger scale outbreak may quickly cause traditional 
depopulation and disposal efforts to get behind and exhaust resources, and vaccination may be 
used as either an alternative or delay tactic.  The use of an emergency vaccination response will 
be determined by the incident commander, state animal health officials, and the U.S. Chief 
Veterinarian.  The three epidemiological response principles defined by APHIS are to:  
1. Prevent contact between FMD virus and susceptible animals,  
2. Stop the production of FMD virus in infected or exposed animals and dispose of the 
carcasses immediately (as the disease will remain present on the carcasses for a long 
period of time), and 
3. Increase the disease resistance of susceptible animals to the FMD virus or reduce the 
shedding of the FMD virus in infected or exposed animals (APHIS, 2011d; APHIS, 
2012a). 
APHIS has also identified five strategies for control and eradication: 
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 Stamping out (depopulation of infected and in-contact susceptible animals) with no 
vaccination, 
 Stamping out modified with emergency vaccination-to-kill/cull (delayed depopulation 
and disposal), 
 Stamping out modified with emergency vaccination-to-slaughter (delayed slaughter 
of eligible animals under USDA FSIS rules), 
 Stamping out modified with emergency vaccination-to-live, and 
 Emergency vaccination-to-live without stamping out (APHIS, 2011d; APHIS, 
2012a). 
USDA APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) personnel have indicated the two modified 
stamping out strategies or a combination of the two are the highly likely responses.  Stamping 
out alone was characterized as a likely response and vaccination-to-live with no stamping out as 
a less likely response.  No response action at all is considered highly unlikely (Zack, 2013). 
NAHEMS guidelines note that vaccination-to-live, if all other factors are equal, would 
create the greatest benefit for animal survival and business continuity, but would have a 
detrimental impact on exports (NAHEMS, 2011d). 
In July 2012, USDA and DHS announced the development of a novel vaccine for one of 
the seven strains of FMD.  This vaccine does not use a live FMD vaccine for vaccine 
manufacture and can be used to differentiate an infected animal from a vaccinated one using 
common diagnostic tests.  This was the biggest FMD research accomplishment in half a century.  
It can be produced safely in the US and becomes effective within seven days.  This development 
created optimism in the industry about the ability to discover and produce additional vaccine 
(DHS, 2012, July 2).  
This announcement immediately influences the policy making process and has the 
potential to lead to a complete paradigm shift in national and international policy response plans 
and policy development.  Since a live vaccine is not used in the manufacturing process, then it 
can be legally manufactured in the US which can speed up the response process and more 
quickly stop disease spread.  Because animals that have been vaccinated can be differentiated 
from those that have been infected, they can be identified as they are slaughtered, which allows 
trade restrictions to be lifted more quickly.  It is important to note that as of December 2013, 
according to USDA APHIS official, no contracts have been signed by USDA for manufacturing 
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of this vaccine and vaccine manufacturing in an emergency would still occur internationally 
(personal communication). 
 Summary and Next Steps 
Agricultural biosecurity is a complex policy dilemma and deserves additional discussion 
in order to develop sound policy options.  The next three chapters (2-4) will address these three 
policy areas – euthanasia, disposal, and vaccination – in greater detail.  Chapter 5 will consider 
policy evaluation tools.  Chapter 6 will outline and evaluate policy alternatives and 
considerations.  Chapter 7 will provide a summary and conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 - Euthanasia and Welfare Implications 
The destruction of animals for disease control is necessary in cases of suspicious or 
confirmed outbreaks of emergency diseases or diseases with considerable public health or 
economic impacts.  The purpose of depopulation is to avoid the spread of the infectious agents 
and their products.  Depopulation of a species in a certain geographic area should only occur 
when no other options are available, because many questions regarding stamping out policies 
exist.  The impact on animal welfare of these options can be significant.   
Euthanasia and depopulation, which can also be referred to as culling, dispatch, and 
destruction, are defined differently by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) and the American Veterinary Medicine 
Association (AVMA).  Euthanasia is the transition of an animal from life to death with as little 
pain and stress as possible.  Mass depopulation deals with the destruction of animals quickly and 
efficiently while giving practical consideration to animal welfare (NAHEMS, 2011b; American 
Veterinary Medicine Association [AVMA], 2013a).  However, for the purpose of discussion, the 
National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) guidelines and this 
document use these terms interchangeably. 
Depopulation is used during a disease outbreak to prevent or limit disease spread by 
euthanizing infected and at-risk livestock and reducing the susceptible population.  Therefore, 
depopulation policies help to protect the economic viability of the industry as well as protect 
animal and human health depending on the disease agent (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).   
 Historical Experience 
 United Kingdom – Foot and mouth disease (FMD) 
In 2001, the UK experienced a catastrophic outbreak of FMD.  This outbreak is one of 
the best historical examples of a large-scale animal disease outbreak that led to the killing of the 
largest number of animals for disease control in more than 40 years.  In June of 2002, the 
National Audit Office (NAO) published a summary on the 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth 
Disease as reported by the Comptroller and Auditor General and as ordered by the House of 
Commons.  In the UK, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA; 
formerly the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods [MAFF]) maintained lead 
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responsibility for the FMD outbreak and policies related to infected or exposed animals.  
DEFRA’s organizational structure in regards to Animal Health is comprised of a policy-making 
wing and an operational wing, the State Veterinary Service (SVS) (NAO, 2002; Anderson, 
2002).  The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBRA) was eventually given authority to make 
policy decisions related to disease control under the advisement of the Science Group and the 
Chief Scientific Advisor to the Government (Kitching, Thrusfield, & Taylor, 2006).  
DEFRA’s veterinary officers initially directed the operations.  About a month after the 
outbreak was detected, it was determined that the SVS could not handle all aspects of the 
epidemic and additional organizational structures were created.  Broadening the cooperative 
structure gave state veterinarians more time for veterinary work, including supervision of animal 
dispatch and disposal.  Increasing the role of other agencies and departments took time, but other 
government entities, local authorities, voluntary organizations, and stakeholders made critical 
contributions to stopping the spread of FMD.  The military was not immediately involved, but 
within a month they played a key role in assisting with the organization and logistics for 
slaughter, transportation, and disposal (NAO, 2002; Anderson, 2002). 
The epidemic began in late January, lasted 32 weeks, impacted 44 counties, and affected 
more than 2,000 premises.  FMD impacted the sheep, swine, and cattle industries.  An average of 
100,000 animals were destroyed and disposed of each day in a large and complex operation.  
More than 6 million animals were slaughtered over the course of the outbreak, including 4.2 
million animals culled for disease control and 2.3 million destroyed for welfare (See Table 2.1).  
This data does not include newborn lambs and calves, because those numbers were difficult to 
estimate accurately (NAO, 2002; Anderson, 2002). 
 Killing and slaughter policy 
The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) supported the 
slaughter of infected animals “to control the epidemic and therefore prevent the suffering of 
other animals” (Laurence, 2002, p. 864).  In addition, the Farm Animal Welfare Council 
(FAWC), an independent advisory board established by the Government in 1979, does not 
consider the killing of animals to be a welfare problem if euthanasia is carried out humanely.  
However, the slaughter of large numbers of healthy animals did create ethical concerns.  Killing 
animals that were likely to be infected was accepted, but the killing of animals unlikely to be 
infected was questioned.  According to RSPCA, risk assessments reflecting the chance of 
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infection should have been done to determine the need for destruction of the animals (Laurence, 
2002).  Scudamore, Pritchard, & Whitmore (2002) have argued that careful veterinary risk 
assessments were completed based on dispersal methods, geography, and weather patterns in 
order to inform contiguous cull policy. 
Table 2-1 Livestock Slaughter Figures Associated With the FMD Epidemic of 2001  
Animal Total animals slaughtered Additional information Source 
Sheep 5.5 million total 
 3.4 million (disease 
control) 
 1.6 million (LWDS) 
 525,000 Light Lambs 
Additional culling of 3-4 
million lambs estimated 
DEFRA 
MLC 
RPA 
 
Cattle 759,000 total 
 590,000 (disease control) 
 169,000 (LWDS) 
Additional culling of up 
to 100,000 calves 
estimated 
DEFRA 
MLC 
Pigs 432,000 total 
 145,000 (disease control) 
 287,000 (LWDS) 
Additional culling of 
piglets not estimated 
because most pigs 
slaughtered were 
fattening pigs 
DEFRA 
MLC 
Others (includes 
goats and deer) 
7,000 total 
 4,000 (disease control) 
 3,000 (LWDS)  
 DEFRA 
MLC 
DEFRA: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
MLC: Meat and Livestock Commission 
RPA: Rural Payments Agency 
LWDS: Livestock Welfare (Disposal) Scheme 
Note. Adapted from Crispin, Roger, O’Hare, & Binns (2002). 
 
FAWC believes the scale of slaughter should be the minimum necessary for effective 
disease control.  Moreover, “it is essential to separate the implications of the disease itself from 
those arising out of the conditions imposed to control the disease” (FAWC, 2002, p. 6).  
Timely slaughter is critical to disease control.  In the case of FMD, risk of disease 
transmission from carcasses is possible, but relatively low because the virus is not produced after 
death.  This is not the case with prion disease outbreaks.  DEFRA officials found themselves 
unable to keep up with slaughter needs and delays caused numerous problems.  “The speed with 
which slaughter was necessary to control the disease and its impact on animal welfare raised 
84 
 
concerns from a number of animal welfare organizations” (NAO, 2002, p. 69).  Carcass disposal 
efforts need to be efficient to allow depopulation efforts to continue to move without delay or 
hindrance (Galvin, Blokhuis, Chimbombi, Jong, & Wotton, 2005).  The public was also upset by 
poor welfare conditions that were blamed on DEFRA and their policies.  The large numbers of 
animals to be destroyed placed a strain on resources for slaughter procedures and quality of the 
dispatch efforts (Laurence, 2002).  Scudamore, Pritchard, et al. (2002) noted that all livestock 
depopulation was done under veterinary supervision and all complaints were handled 
expeditiously.  
Various policy decisions were made during the crisis that impacted animal welfare.  
Because mass killing often occurred in the field, severe welfare challenges existed that do not 
exist in slaughter facilities.  Field killing teams lacked proper training, experience, and 
supervision (NAO, 2002).  Slaughter personnel were paid on a per animal basis (piece rate), 
instead of by the hour (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2002; 
NAO, 2002; Crispin et al., 2002).  This policy was identified as “not consistent with welfare-
friendly handing and accuracy” (FAWC, 2002, p. 12) by the FAWC.  The RSPCA also found 
this payment policy to be detrimental, as it encouraged operators to cut corners and use poor 
slaughter procedures (NAO, 2002). 
A 24-hr target was established for the destruction of all livestock on infected premises, 
and a 48-hr target was established for livestock slaughter on contiguous premises (NAO, 2002; 
Anderson, 2002).  While diagnosis, culling, and disposal of infected livestock should occur as 
soon as possible, it is not clear that livestock on contiguous farms must be disposed of within 48 
hr in order to delay disease spread (NAO, 2002; Anderson, 2002; Crispin et al., 2002).  In fact, 
substantial delays occurred which resulted in some animals being destroyed after the incubation 
period for FMD had already passed (Crispin et al., 2002).   
Most of the animals slaughtered were killed on farms.  The location, conditions on the 
farm, age of the animals, and species all impacted the methods used.  The three most common 
techniques were: captive bolt weapon followed by pithing or bleeding, free bullet weapon, and 
chemical (Crispin et al., 2002).  Killing teams were neither well equipped nor well prepared at 
the onset of the outbreak.  Bolt guns broke down regularly due to overheating, making it 
necessary to keep extra guns and ammunition on site.  The effectiveness of captive bolts on 
sheep was also questioned, and recognized standards for equipment used for killing and slaughter 
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still needed to be developed (FAWC, 2002).  Large numbers of animals were culled and killed 
using methods that were not approved by statutory regulations.  Several well-documented reports 
detailed illegal slaughtering and animal abuse at the time of depopulation (Crispin et al., 2002; 
Thomas, 2002).  For most farming families, on-farm killing was traumatic, especially when the 
animals were not infected or directly exposed to FMD.  This became a bigger issue to individual 
families when the 3-km kill-zones were not consistently implemented (Thomas, 2002).  Welfare 
concerns were the result of “reduced killing options, inappropriate killing methods, and 
personnel not accustomed to working in disease control/field situations” (FAWC, 2002, p. 9).  In 
addition, many uninfected animals were killed at slaughterhouses and their carcasses rendered 
(Laurence, 2002).   
According to Scudamore, Pritchard, et al. (2002), analysis of the stamping out policy 
showed it to be most effective at reducing the number of livestock to be depopulated and 
determined that fewer animals were killed with a contagious cull than if vaccination-to-cull had 
been used as a response strategy.  They argued that those who opposed the stamping out policy, 
such as RSPCA, did not understand the scale of the outbreak and the importance of a speedy and 
effective response.  The killing of animals with any possible risk of infection is projected to lead 
to more rapid disease control and create a significant welfare benefit (Scudamore, Pritchard, et 
al., 2002). 
The Welfare of Animals (Slaughtering or Killing) Regulations (WASK) provided the key 
controls for attempting to ensure humane slaughter.  The regulations required the use of only 
licensed slaughtermen and audits by DEFRA’s veterinarians.  DEFRA stated that qualified 
veterinary inspectors maintained welfare standards at slaughter locations.  However, one of the 
greatest factors leading to delays in slaughter and inappropriate slaughter methods was a 
shortage of veterinarians.  RSPCA felt the veterinarians were stretched too thin and were 
required to cover too many slaughter facilities, too far apart.  RSPCA also criticized the time 
taken by DEFRA to clarify instructions regarding pithing animals in addition to stunning, which 
resulted in animals regaining consciousness after stunning and experiencing pain and suffering 
(NAO, 2002; Crispin et al., 2002; Laurence, 2002).  RSPCA was offered the opportunity to 
access slaughter sites and view slaughter techniques by reporting to the appropriate locations at 
infected sites for the necessary licensing and biosecurity protocols, but they did not choose to 
participate (Scudamore, Pritchard, et al., 2002).  Little consideration was given to the logistics of 
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killing large numbers of animals, especially young and late-term unborn animals.  Some methods 
were also not acceptable because of the potential of disease spread, such as the use of 
exsanguination after stunning.  Numerous reports of improper and inappropriate slaughter were 
documented by members of the public and the media, including broadcast television.  Examples 
ranged from failing to sedate cattle prior to slaughter to shooting lambs with free bullets in an 
open field (Crispin et al., 2002).  Other cases have been cited where cattle showed signs of 
consciousness hours after being stunned by a captive bolt pistol.  No prosecution took place in 
regard to animal welfare, primarily because of the lack of forensic evidence (Laurence, 2002).  
Scudamore, Pritchard, et al. (2002) contended RSPCA showed no evidence of animals regaining 
consciousness and that their claims were based on unproven anecdotes rather than facts. 
Methods of euthanasia were selected based on health and safety of all humans and 
animals on the premise to be depopulated, the availability of handling facilities, the type and 
behavior or tractability of livestock, and the plans and logistics of carcass disposal by a 
supervisory veterinary inspector.  Concerns were expressed about some methods based on a lack 
of understanding about legality of use, but all methods were legal.  The use of rifles and free 
bullets were seen as inhumane by some but actually required less handling and stress on animals, 
especially those not comfortable with close human contact (Scudamore, Pritchard, et al., 2002). 
The slaughter of young lambs drew additional criticism.  The most common process of 
euthanasia was the use of pentobarbital via the intracardiac route.  While this technique does 
appear appropriate, further research is needed to evaluate the welfare impact.  Another area of 
concern was that the epidemic began at the height of the gestation period in sheep.  Many of the 
sheep killed were in late-term pregnancy and concerns existed regarding the stress level of 
unborn lambs when the ewes were destroyed.  The RSPCA recommended that heavily pregnant 
animals should first be sedated with an agent that crosses the placenta prior to euthanasia 
(FAWC, 2002; Laurence, 2002).  Views on the impact of euthanasia methods on animals in utero 
are divergent, but it has been found that death occurs shortly after the dam and that traditional 
methods are humane (Scudamore, Pritchard, et al., 2002). 
While many animals were slaughtered on farms, hundreds of sheep were transported to 
another location for killing and mass burial.  This created welfare implications when pregnant 
animals, post-parturient ewes, and neonatal lambs were transported.  The Welfare of Animals 
87 
 
Transport Order establishes transport guidelines to reduce unnecessary suffering (Crispin et al., 
2002), but the guidelines were not always followed.   
FAWC offered a variety of recommendations on several topics related to kill and 
slaughter policy and animal welfare.  They recommended that detailed strategies for on-farm 
killing in all species need further research and should be included an all contingency plans.  
Specifically, the use of captive bolt stunners in sheep needs further investigation as does the 
establishment of recognized standards for slaughter and killing equipment.  The Government 
should establish a trained reserve of field slaughtermen to be rapidly deployed, complete with 
military issued “Green Cards,” in disease situations.  Members of these slaughter teams should 
be specifically licensed and should not be paid piece rates.  Operational guidelines and 
organizational principles in a large-scale dispatch need to be more clearly defined (FAWC, 2002; 
FAWC, 2003a; FAWC, 2003b).  
The legality of the government’s decision to cull was questioned during and after the 
outbreak.  In 2002, the Animal Health Act was passed establishing a legal basis for contiguous 
culling to respond to an animal disease outbreak (Anderson, 2008). 
 Movement restrictions and overstocking 
Livestock production in Britain involves significant movement of livestock.  At the onset 
of the epidemic, all movement transporting animals to and from wintering areas, between 
pastures, and to market were halted.  As infected farms were identified, movement restrictions 
were placed on all farms within a 3-km radius.  These widespread restrictions created additional 
animal welfare implications.  Later, a licensure program was established to allow movement, but 
the process to receive a movement license was slow and bureaucratic (Crispin et al., 2002; 
Laurence, 2002).  Any policy decisions regarding movement restrictions should include an 
assessment of animal welfare implications and provide for animal health experts to be available 
to producers subject to movement restriction (FAWC, 2002; FAWC, 2003a). 
The welfare of animals was also impacted when they become overcrowded.  For 
example, pigs in fattening pens became overcrowded because they could not be sent to market.  
This led to numerous welfare problems, including cannibalism.  Examples included lambs 
covered in mud and cattle marooned on waterlogged ground.  Animals were denied the 
opportunity to move from an overly grazed pasture to neighboring ungrazed fields, even when 
disease transmission was highly unlikely (Crispin et al., 2002; Laurence, 2002).  Feed and fodder 
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supplies were limited, and animals were in unsuitable, overcrowded locations with a lack of 
appropriate nutrition and resources (Royal, 2002).  It became apparent that producers needed 
assistance from the government in alleviating the welfare problems resulting from the movement 
restrictions (Whitmore, 2002). 
The Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme (LWDS) was introduced to alleviate the worst 
animal welfare problems due to movement restriction and overstocking.  This program involved 
the government reimbursing producers for stock and taking them away to slaughter.  It was 
modeled after a disposal program designed to help deal with a classic swine fever outbreak in 
2000 (Anderson, 2002).  It was designed to be a last resort when the welfare of animals could not 
be maintained in any other manner and all reasonable farm management options has been 
exhausted (Whitmore, 2002).  In some areas, killing for welfare far exceeded killing for disease 
control (Anderson, 2002).  Because the initial financial values were overly generous, the demand 
for the LWDS exceeded its capacity and significant delays occurred in removing animals from 
poor welfare situations.  Moreover, there was no effective priority system to determine which 
animals were actually in the worst welfare state (Laurence, 2002).  It has also been claimed that 
some farmers intentionally made no effort to address animal welfare issues with the intent to get 
higher priority access to the LWDS.  Basically, the compensation concept may have led to 
development of a moral hazard approach by some livestock owners (Whiting, 2003).  
Government programs, such as the LWDS, should address other avenues to support animal 
welfare, rather than simply disposal.  The destruction of healthy breeding stock and unfinished 
animals should be a last resort.  A government system utilizing “welfare vouchers” could be 
considered as well (FAWC, 2002, p. 15). 
Crispin et al. (2002) summarized the welfare problems related to movement restrictions 
and overstocking.  The issues included: 
 inability to move periparturient animals, so that animals gave birth under unsuitable 
conditions with high maternal and perinatal mortality as a consequence; 
 farms became seriously overstocked and there was a lack of feed, bedding, and 
shelter; 
 conditions for hill pastured sheep deteriorated because of movement restrictions; 
 the usual levels of husbandry could not be maintained and many farmers were placed 
under extreme stress as they could not look after their animals properly, and the stress 
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was exacerbated if welfare problems became so acute that the LWDS became the 
only option; 
 the bureaucratic nature of licensing arrangements allowed little flexibility for 
veterinary-based decisions and often led to unacceptable delays (delays in issuing 
movement licenses resulted in many animals becoming eligible for the LWDS only); 
and 
 LWDS became oversubscribed, resulting in further delays and animal welfare 
problems (cattle exceeding 30 months of age and mature males being kept under 
unsuitable conditions) (Crispin et al., 2002).  
While movement licenses and restrictions were believed by some to be effectively 
managed and average turnaround time for a license was five days, it was a huge logistical 
endeavor.  One of the most important lessons learned from the implementation of the LWDS and 
the management of movement restrictions was the need for all livestock businesses to maintain 
supplies to care for all their livestock for at least six weeks (Scudamore, Pritchard, et al., 2002). 
 Social impacts 
The U.K. outbreak illustrates the significance of the psychological damage caused by the 
disease and the response.  A number of psychological symptoms were prevalent from lack of 
sleep and appetite, to general depression and marital discord.  Some practitioners have estimated 
that 50% of patients affected during the FMD outbreak required antidepressants.  Many sent their 
children away so they did not witness the euthanasia and disposal.  Normal daily life was 
severely disrupted.  Quarantines and limited movement added to the stress, as did the loss of 
income and the need to cut back on household expenses and renegotiate loans (GAO, 2002a).  
 Vaccination policy 
The policy in the European Union (EU) for controlling FMD allows for the use of 
emergency vaccination as a part of a stamping out policy when FMD has been confirmed on an 
extensive level and vaccination would help eradicate the disease.  In the Netherlands, where the 
outbreak was much smaller, emergency suppressive ring vaccination was used in conjunction 
with later slaughter of the animals.  It allowed slaughter and disposal to be managed better.  
However, it is not expected that a vaccinate-to-kill policy would have been effective in Britain 
and likely would have resulted in a larger number of animals being slaughtered.  Some 
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consideration was given for a vaccinate-to-live policy in Britain during the outbreak, but it was 
controversial (NAO, 2002).  Specifically, vaccination was considered during the first two weeks 
of the outbreak, but it was determined that the outbreak was too wide spread for vaccination 
protocols to be implemented.  It was subsequently considered at least 10 more times during the 
outbreak, and was eventually approved for use in Cumbria and Devon.  However, key 
stakeholders, including farmers, veterinarians, consumers, retailers, and food manufacturers, 
were not sufficiently supportive, so vaccination was never used.  It was not feasible to obtain 
their support at the height of the outbreak (Scudamore, 2007).  Emergency vaccination should 
have been discussed as a part of contingency plans before the outbreak (NAO, 2002).   
A vaccination policy may have significant welfare implications.  It could be possible to 
depopulate an infected premise and ring vaccinate to stop the spread of disease.  This type of 
policy could be effective in preventing and reducing the spread of disease, while culling fewer 
healthy animals.   
 Trade and usage restrictions 
FMD had a significant economic impact on the U.K. livestock sector.  Restrictions on the 
potential usage of infected and at-risk animals lowered the value of livestock.  RSPCA 
contended that reduced value of livestock negatively impacted the care they received from their 
owners.  Thus, any event that reduces the fiscal value of livestock could potentially reduce their 
welfare and create a link between the loss of domestic and international markets and the welfare 
of livestock (Laurence, 2002).   
 Summary of welfare concerns from U.K. inquiries 
Concern for animal welfare needs to be at the center of contingency planning for any 
future disease outbreak.  The plan needs to establish procedures that maintain animal welfare 
standards even during an emergency situation.  There is no alternative to culling animals that are 
infected or directly exposed, but limiting the number of non-infected animals depopulated should 
be a goal.  Culling can have a positive welfare impact if it shortens the disease outbreak and 
limits movement restrictions.  However, culling practices should not cause increased stress and 
anxiety to animals.  This includes the recognition that keeping animals alive, simply for the sake 
of keeping them alive, is unacceptable if they are denied access to food or acceptable living 
conditions (Royal, 2002; Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [DEFRA], 2002).  
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A vaccinate-to-live policy means fewer animals will need to be culled, but the welfare cost 
associated with increased movement restrictions needs to be considered.  Animals should be kept 
on the farm, and farmers need to maintain responsibility for their care and welfare.  A welfare 
disposal scheme should be a last resort, and a compensation program may actually work opposite 
animal welfare.  Farmers faced with compensation schemes can “provide a disincentive for them 
to take responsibility for looking after their animals and may also create a false market” 
(DEFRA, 2002, p. 45).  All future contingency plans must address the welfare problems 
summarized in the following paragraph (DEFRA, 2002).   
Local inquires in Cumbria, Devon, and Northumberland combined with the lessons 
learned identified by Iain Anderson and the Royal Society included the recognition of a variety 
of significant animal welfare issues (Anderson, 2002; NAO, 2002; Thomas, 2002).  This list of 
problems was summarized by Crispin et al. (2002) to include: 
 delays in the slaughter of infected animals; 
 unsuitable on-farm and off-farm conditions for slaughter (poor handling and 
restraint facilities); 
 animals awaiting slaughter were kept close to and in sight of those being 
slaughtered; 
 incompetent animal handling and inhumane slaughter (inexperienced handlers, 
unskilled slaughter teams, lack of training, lack of compassion, failure to pith 
slaughtered animals); 
 policy of paying slaughtermen for each animal they destroyed (piece-rate basis) 
led to a lack of care; 
 inadequate veterinary supervision;  
 failure to kill animals effectively (particularly associated with use of barbiturates 
and stunning procedures) resulting in animals that subsequently regained 
consciousness; 
 unsuitable slaughter methods, failure to follow the DEFRA guidelines on 
facilities, handling, equipment, and use of sedatives (the most frequent problem 
was the selection of unsuitable weapons and ammunition that failed to kill the 
animal at the first attempt);  
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 animals escaping, being chased and wounded by slaughtermen using free bullets 
(examples shown on television of ewes and lambs in Monmouth, South Wales, 
and cattle at Knowstone in Devon, England); 
 transport of unfit animals (heavily pregnant animals being transported to 
slaughter, some giving birth en route or whilst being slaughtered); and 
 late-term and full-term fetuses dying of anoxia and circulatory collapse because 
the mother was dead (Crispin et al., 2002). 
 Future contingency plans 
On December 1, 2003, DEFRA released the Foot and Mouth Disease Contingency Plan 
for public comment.  This plan followed the release of an interim report in 2002, and responded 
to the issues raised in the FMD inquiry reports.  The purpose of the plan was to guide the actions 
of the government in dealing with another foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak or emergency 
(DEFRA, 2003).   
The plan calls for the use of an emergency vaccination strategy to control the spread of 
FMD, with a focus on vaccinate-to-live policies when possible, even for use as the key control 
strategy (DEFRA, 2003).  DEFRA states that protective vaccination (vaccinate-to-live) should be 
used when veterinarians believe the disease can be contained by stamping out infected and 
exposed premises, a defined group of animals can be protected, or rare breeds need protection.  It 
would also be advantageous if the population density of susceptible animals is high, swine are 
the main species involved, a high risk of airborne spread exists, the disease origin is unknown, 
the disease is spreading rapidly, and the outbreak distribution is widespread.  Suppressive 
vaccination (vaccinate-to-kill) should be considered as a method of delay when the number of 
animals to be destroyed exceeds the disposal capacity (DEFRA, 2003). 
The contingency plan creates an animal welfare forum to address specific areas of animal 
welfare concerns during an outbreak.  The plan calls for ensuring the welfare of all animals when 
movement restrictions are established and that all emergency on-farm slaughter follows WASK 
regulations.  Animal owners will receive more advice and instructions in dealing with welfare 
issues, and animal welfare issues will be addressed early in the event of a disease or outbreak.  
DEFRA recommends that animals should be kept alive and healthy if possible.  While animal 
health is the responsibility of the farmer, the government could offer assistance in movement 
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licensure or in a fodder scheme.  However, DEFRA called for the Government to not offer any 
compensation for animals destroyed, although they would pay for collection and disposal.  “Any 
animal welfare disposal scheme would be an option of very last resort as it is clearly undesirable 
to slaughter animals unless absolutely necessary” (DEFRA, 2003, p. 38).  
In the case of an FMD outbreak, the EU “requires slaughter of all susceptible animals on 
infected premises, and provides for culling of susceptible animals on epidemiologically linked 
holdings, as well as culling of susceptible animals on holdings where FMD is suspected” 
(DEFRA, 2003, p. 90).  In the UK, law allows for slaughter of “animals affected or suspected of 
being affected with FMD, animals which are believed to have been exposed to FMD infection, 
and animals to prevent the spread of FMD, e.g. a ‘firebreak’ cull” (DEFRA, 2003, p. 90).  In 
regard to the prevention cull, dispatch may be required to protect geographic areas of high 
livestock density.  The power to assess such situations is defined by the Disease Control 
Protocol.  “The Government is committed to using the new slaughter powers only where this is 
justified by the level of risk of the disease spreading and on the basis of sound veterinary, 
epidemiological, and scientific advice” (DEFRA, 2003, p. 92).  Vaccination should be 
considered before slaughter powers are used (DEFRA, 2003). 
A 2005 report from the NAO reviewed plan changes and discussed the application of 
lessons from the outbreak.  The U.K. contingency plan is considered one of the most thorough 
and complete available.  The current plan calls for the explicit consideration of emergency 
vaccination.  The European Directive on FMD requires all exposed and infected animals be 
culled and emergency vaccination be used as an additional measure.  The decision to vaccinate is 
complex and would have to be made in the face of uncertainty.  The FMD contingency plan 
includes a vaccination decision tree.  The supply of vaccines has been substantially increased, 
and vaccination will most likely serve in a much more prominent role in a future outbreak (NAO, 
2005).   
DEFRA commissioned development of a decision support tool on alternative disease 
control strategies to help with future policy decisions.  A cost-benefit analysis based on an 
epidemiological model and a spreadsheet calculation model was completed to examine four 
FMD control strategies, including a base strategy comprised of culling of infected premises and 
dangerous contacts and the addition of a contiguous cull, vaccination-to-live of cattle, and 
vaccination-to-live of cattle and sheep.  The location of the initial outbreak, virus strains, and 
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resource constraints were used as variables in the analysis.  Researchers concluded that due to 
the influence of a large number of parameters on size and costs of an outbreak that there is no 
clear, always applicable lowest cost alternative.  Culling was concluded to be more cost effective 
in low- or medium-density livestock populations, with low virus infectivity, under nationwide 
trade restrictions, with necessary resources allowing for timely depopulation and disposal, or 
when effective traceback systems exist.  In opposite scenarios, vaccination was estimated to be 
more cost beneficial in high density areas (Risk Solutions, 2005).   
 Other countries – FAD outbreaks 
Nearly 300,000 animals were culled in the 2012 FMD outbreak in Japan, including more 
than 125,000 that had been vaccinated but were still considered at risk (Hagerman, McCarl, 
Carpenter, Ward, & O’Brien, 2012; OLPC, 2012).  The primary euthanasia method was 
tranquilization and injection, but electrocution and CO2 methods were also used.  These methods 
were time consuming and labor intensive, and, when combined with a shortage of individuals 
trained to administer injections, slowed the process (OLPC, 2012).  Large numbers of animals 
were culled in FMD outbreaks in Taiwan, the Netherlands, and Korea.  In these cases, 
depopulation was used for disease control method, combined with movement restrictions 
(Hagerman et al., 2012).  Taiwanese farmers and meat processors supported a culling approach, 
while the Taiwan’s Council of Agriculture favored vaccination due to the related social, 
economic, and political ramifications of mass depopulation.  Since farmers’ indemnity payments 
were higher than the market value they would have received for healthy animals, it is believed 
some farmers intentionally introduced FMD at their farms (Crnic, 2010). 
In South Korea, an FMD outbreak in 2010-2011 led to the culling of large numbers of 
animals amid several animal welfare concerns.  Some cattle and farm-raised deer were injected 
with small doses of succinylcholine, a neuromuscular blocking drug used for euthanasia, at 
levels that caused paralysis but did not render them unconscious before being buried in large 
mass graves.  A number of incidents of pigs being buried alive were reported by the public, 
farmers, and the media.  Government officials did admit there was a shortage of drugs that led to 
live burials, but denied any animal cruelty.  The emotional impact on farmers and the public was 
substantial leading Buddhist prayer monks to hold prayer sessions for the animals.  Workers 
were treated for post-traumatic stress, tourism to affected areas declined substantially, and online 
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petitions declaring South Korea in violation of their agreement with the World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) earned thousands of signatures (Glionna, 2011; Mesmer, 2011).  Animal 
rights groups reported that more than 1.2 million head of animals were buried alive, not 
including an estimated 2.7 million chickens exposed to avian flu during the same time 
(Vegan.com, 2011; Huffington Post, 2011). 
During an FMD outbreak in Paraguay in 2011, government officials ordered the 
depopulation of 1,000 head of cattle to stop the disease.  Beef is their second largest export 
product and accounts for nearly $650 million in the small, rural country.  Officials decided to 
destroy the exposed animals in public view in the community of Sargento Loma to send a clear 
message to their trading partners that the animals had been eliminated and that the government 
was serious about stopping the disease.  Officials also denied farmers’ requests to consider 
compensating the producers for the animals destroyed (Olazar, 2011). 
In the 1997 outbreak of classical swine fever (CSF) in the Netherlands, 10 million pigs 
were depopulated.  Nearly 75% (7.3 million head) were culled for animal welfare reasons rather 
than disease control (Garner et al., 2007).  
 United States – Disasters and disease outbreaks 
While the US has not experienced a disease outbreak proportional to the FMD outbreak 
in the UK, there are situations that offer similar animal welfare learning experiences.  Hurricane 
Floyd in North Carolina led to animal emergency and welfare implications, as did the outbreaks 
of avian influenza (AI) in Virginia, exotic Newcastle disease (END) on the West Coast, and 
chronic wasting disease (CWD) in the deer populations of Wisconsin and Colorado.   
 Avian influenza 
In 1983, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N2 led to the destruction of 17 
million birds in Pennsylvania with costs exceeding $61 million (Benson et al., 2007).  In 2002, 
the low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H7N2 outbreak in Virginia resulted in the 
depopulation of 4,743,560 turkeys and chickens at 197 facilities and cost $160 million (Benson 
et al., 2007; Kingston et al., 2005).  More than 900,000 additional birds were slaughtered for 
disease control (Kingston et al., 2005).  Any flock with clinical evidence of infection (positive 
results on one or more screening tests) was considered a positive flock and was depopulated.  
Any negative flock with a clear epidemiological link to a positive flock was also depopulated.  
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The goal was to depopulate all birds on quarantined farms within 24 hr of a positive declaration 
(Kingston et al., 2005).  Carbon dioxide gas was the primary method of euthanasia.  Birds were 
confined in tight pens and covered with black plastic.  Gas was then released under the plastic.  
Smaller pens were used to decrease volume of gas and chance of birds escaping.  In some cases, 
young live birds were double stacked on top of dead birds (Puffenbarger, 2003).  LPAI H7N2 
resulted in the destruction of 328,000 chickens in the Delmarva region in 2004 (Benson et al., 
2007).   
In these cases, considerations and challenges in the euthanasia method selection process 
included variations in the size of birds, diversity in types and sizes of poultry houses, minimal 
number of personnel with mass depopulation experience, staff emotional and physical fatigue, 
use of temporary employees, providing temporary and permanent staff appropriate training, 
communication with personnel who were not native English speakers, worker safety, morale of 
employees and others, biosecurity, time restrictions, and no “proven method of humane and 
efficient mass euthanasia, given the constraints of the outbreak control policies” (Kingston et al., 
2005, p. 730). 
 California – Exotic Newcastle disease 
END is a contagious and fatal disease that can affect all bird species.  It is one of the most 
infectious diseases that can affect the poultry industry and affects the respiratory, nervous, and 
digestive systems.  END spreads through direct contact and contact with bodily fluids.  The only 
way to destroy the disease is by rapid depopulation of all infected flocks and establishing strict 
quarantine policies.  END threatens not only commercial operations, but pet bird and backyard 
poultry operations as well.  The USDA APHIS fact sheet on END offers no recommendations on 
the euthanasia methods that should be used (APHIS, 2003; California Department of Food and 
Agriculture [CDFA], 2003).   
California experienced an outbreak of END in October 2002.  It first affected backyard 
poultry farms in California and expanded to commercial operations and into the state of Nevada.  
More than 600 veterinarians were involved in dealing with the outbreak (CDFA, 2003; Singer & 
Dawn, 2003).  Birds in positive flocks as well as negative flocks with a proven epidemiological 
link to a positive flock were quarantined and depopulated.  Negative flocks in neighborhoods 
where disease infection was believed to be imminent were also destroyed.  All quarantined birds 
were to be euthanized within 24 hr after positive declaration.  A successful mass depopulation 
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effort was one in which all birds were handled humanely, euthanasia agents were delivered in 
quantities sufficient for rapid anesthesia, and anesthetic induction promptly resulted in 100% 
mortality rates (Kingston et al., 2005). 
It became obvious that the euthanasia of these animals was a concern.  The California 
poultry industry was criticized for breaking anticruelty measures in animal dispatch and disposal.  
Poultry producers were accused of ineffective use of gassing methods, live burial, and putting 
live chickens in wood chippers (UPC, 2003; Singer & Dawn, 2003). 
In one case during the END outbreak, a veterinarian is accused of telling a large poultry 
farm that it would be appropriate to throw 30,000 live hens into industrial wood-chipping 
machines in February 2003 (UPC, 2003; Singer & Dawn, 2003).  According to a complaint by 
the San Diego County Department of Animal Services, hens (dead and alive) were loaded into a 
front-end loader, dumped into the receiving hopper of the chipper, pushed into feed wheels 
which crushed them by a hydraulic ram, fed into pulverizing device, and destroyed by rapidly 
rotating metal hammers (UPC, 2003).  
These types of practices are clearly working against the welfare of the animals and 
certainly do not set well with the public.  In a Gallup survey in May 2003, 62% of Americans 
supported strict laws concerning treatment of farm animals (Singer & Dawn, 2003).  The 
California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) has developed guidelines and training 
programs for emergency euthanasia and is assisting in the development of protocols to ensure the 
safety of animals in disaster situations (CDFA, 2003).   
These are just a few examples of emergency situations that can affect the livestock 
industry and welfare of large populations of animals.  Other natural disasters, such as floods, 
droughts, and blizzards, can all have devastating impacts on animals and may result in welfare 
implications beyond the disaster itself.  In addition, other disease outbreaks, including bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), CSF, and CWD, create welfare implications and the need for 
contingency planning.  Many of these disasters will require mass euthanasia efforts.  In the 
following sections, euthanasia polices and methods of euthanasia are described with a focus on 
the animal welfare impact.   
 North Carolina – Hurricane Floyd 
Hurricane Floyd devastated North Carolina late in the summer of 1999.  The disaster had 
significant impacts on all areas of North Carolina, including the livestock industry.  Major 
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animal welfare issues were related to companion animals, farm animals, and wildlife.  The public 
was called upon to rescue, feed, and dispose of many endangered or killed animals.  Farmers 
were left with questions when being evacuated from their farms.  They did not know if they 
should take their animals or leave them, leave barn doors open or closed, or ask for help.  More 
than 750,000 turkeys, 2,107,000 chickens, 28,000 pigs, and 1,180 beef cattle were killed.  
Hundreds of dogs and cats were rescued and about 30 were reported killed.  Closed roads and 
limited access to highly populated animal locations made rescues difficult.  While owners could 
take reasonable steps to protect their animals, the animal population still needed attention as it 
would in any emergency response.  North Carolina organized the State Animal Response Team 
(SART) to help manage and deal with future animal emergencies (McGinn, 2003b).   
One major lesson learned in the Hurricane Floyd disaster was the need for contracts to be 
used in depopulation and disposal efforts.  North Carolina calls for all animals to be disposed of 
in 24 hr, and contracts can help insure all equipment, personnel, and supplies are available.  
North Carolina calls for bid-pricing to be done on a per animal basis (Wilson, 2003a).  Others 
have argued that pricing should be done by the hour, so that individuals are not motivated to 
move through animals quickly without focusing on their welfare. 
 Current Policies and Guidelines 
As a member of the OIE, the US agrees to follow standards established and approved by 
member countries.  The OIE standard for disease eradication in dealing with FMD, HPAI, and 
CSF is stamping out.  OIE defines stamping out as the killing of affected animals, animals in the 
herd suspected of being affected, and animals in other herds that have been exposed by direct or 
indirect transmission.  All susceptible animals, both vaccinated and unvaccinated, on infected 
premises would be depopulated under the OIE policy.  If the outbreak cannot be contained in the 
Containment Zone, the OIE recognizes other response strategies may be implemented.  The OIE 
should be notified if a modified stamping out policy that includes the use of vaccination without 
subsequent culling is used (NAHEMS, 2005b; APHIS, 2012a).  
The goal of the U.S. stamping out policy is to euthanize all infected and susceptible 
animals on infected premises within 24 hr of exotic or emergency disease identification.  In 
many cases, animals on contact premises (animals have been directly or indirectly exposed) will 
also be euthanized in the same time frame.  The species most likely to shed the disease will be 
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the first to be euthanized.  Public concerns over the policy will need to be given appropriate 
attention and response (NAHEMS, 2005b; APHIS, 2012a).  Lori Miller with USDA APHIS 
noted in May 2012 that “if euthanasia is required, improved, more humane methods are being 
developed” (Miller, 2012b, p. 13). 
APHIS intends to comply with all recommendations for depopulation outlined by the 
American Veterinary Medicine Association (AVMA) and by OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 
Code Chapter 7.6 (NAHEMS, 2011b).  OIE and APHIS response goals include the 
implementation of strategies to spare animal lives if appropriate and legal, but, otherwise, call for 
optimized depopulation which focuses on animals that are suffering, aesthetically acceptable 
euthanasia methods that fit the needs of the situation, and an attempt to minimize the emotional 
and psychological impacts on farmers, ranchers, and the public (APHIS, 2012a). 
 National Animal Health Emergency Management System  
The USDA APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) Unit has established mass depopulation and 
euthanasia guidelines and standard operating procedures as a part of the NAHEMS.  The 
NAHEMS guidelines for euthanasia are designed for use in a major animal health emergency.  
They are considered guidelines and can be used by other agencies at different levels of 
government to develop policies and deviations may be possible depending on circumstances 
(NAHEMS, 2004). 
The goals of euthanasia in an animal disease emergency are to: 
 provide humane treatment of animals at all times from disease identification 
through destruction; 
 select an acceptable form of euthanasia that can be administered quickly, 
effectively, and humanely;  
 minimize the emotional and psychological effect on animal owners, caretakers, 
families, and the public;  
 prevent adulterated food products from entering the food chain;  
 prevent or mitigate disease spread; and 
 provide aesthetically acceptable humane euthanasia to affected animals as quickly 
and efficiently as possible (NAHEMS, 2011b). 
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As the goals have been revised, greater emphasis has been placed on mitigation of 
disease spread and protection of the food supply, with less emphasis on providing aesthetically 
acceptable humane euthanasia (NAHEMS, 2005b; NAHEMS, 2011b). 
Depopulation should be performed by qualified and trained professionals in a speedy, 
safe, and most humane way possible (NAHEMS, 2004).  In order to provide humane treatment, 
lactating cows must be milked or dried off if they are not immediately destroyed.  Sick or injured 
animals must receive appropriate care, comfort, and medical treatment following veterinary 
guidelines prior to depopulation (NAHEMS, 2005b). 
 Incident Command System 
All of the NAHEMS guidelines are developed to be used at three levels: a local/limited 
response, a regional response, and a national response.  In all cases, animal health personnel 
must be prepared to work with the entirety of the emergency management community.  The 
state-based or nationally coordinated model created to outline this response effort is referred to 
as the Animal Emergency Response Organization (AERO) model, based on the emergency 
management ICS (NAHEMS, 2004). 
The euthanasia unit is a part of the AERO Operations Section and coordinates all 
euthanasia activities, including communication with producers, appraisers, incident command, 
and the disposal unit.  The unit leader takes the lead in managing euthanasia protocols and 
procedures, humane animal handling methods, and safety precautions.  The unit leader will 
assign team members and team leaders and will work closely with the animal welfare unit.  The 
animal welfare unit is also located in the operations section and includes veterinarians and 
animal care inspectors who serve in an advisory capacity and ensure all animals are treated and 
euthanized humanely (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).   
 Policy considerations 
In the case of a highly contagious animal disease, immediate large-scale euthanasia 
efforts are necessary to control the production and transmission of pathogens.  Because 
eradication efforts must be timely, clear policies and familiarity with procedures are essential.  
There are several factors critical to successful depopulation efforts, including humane 
considerations, documentation, gaining public support, and minimizing owner and personnel 
stress.  All affected animals should be euthanized in a manner that minimizes pain and stress, and 
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should be rendered unconscious as soon as possible.  To meet this objective, the skilled use of 
the most humane, quickest methods is necessary (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).  Timely 
and effective depopulation will reduce disease transmission and the at-risk susceptible 
population.  The dilemma occurs because the goal of rapid depopulation may not be compatible 
with animal welfare and elimination of animal distress (McReynolds, 2013). 
Economic factors may also play a role in determining the appropriate depopulation 
strategy.  As an example, Paarlberg, Seitzinger, Lee, and Mathews (2008) considered the 
economic impacts of an FAD with an emphasis on depopulation control strategies.  They used a 
combination of epidemiological and economic models to assess the impact of an FMD outbreak 
originating on a small hog farm in the U.S. Midwest.  Disease control strategies that were 
predicted to reduce the duration of the outbreak were considered the most effective.  
Depopulation of infected herds and those herds with direct contact within 1 km of the infected 
herd, depopulation of infected and direct contact herds and herds with indirect contact within 1 
km, and depopulation of all herds within 1km of infected herds were compared.  Depopulation of 
all animals within 1 km was estimated to consistently reduce the outbreak to less than a quarter 
and was considered the most effective.  Radii of 3 and 5 km were also considered but results did 
not vary significantly from 1 km (Paarlberg et al., 2008).  Chapter 4 includes discussion of 
several comparison studies that evaluate the impact of multiple disease control strategies, 
including depopulation and vaccination. 
 For a stamping-out approach to be effective, a number of prerequisites exist, including 
clearly defined infected zones, capabilities to quarantine and implement movement control, 
political and community support, well-trained personnel, legal authority, ability to slaughter 
humanely and dispose of carcasses appropriately, interagency cooperation and assistance, fair 
and timely compensation to farmers and ranchers, and community rehabilitation programs 
(Geering & Lubroth, 2002).   
In the case of a large-scale outbreak, the veterinary workforce available in the US would 
be insufficient to meet the needs of a stamping-out approach.  The logistical and environmental 
concerns combined with the workforce shortage make USDA and DHS consider such an 
approach potentially infeasible (GAO, 2009).  Environmental contamination and exposure of 
other animals or humans should be considered when methods and substances are being selected 
(McReynolds, 2013). 
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A major animal health emergency will attract significant media attention.  Personnel must 
work with the public and the media to gain their support.  Efforts must be made to raise public 
awareness of the necessity of euthanasia for disease eradication.  The humane aspects of the 
procedures must be emphasized.  The media can be asked to document the presence of animal 
care experts and animal welfare group representatives to reassure the public.  Experts and groups 
must be included at the beginning of the response and educated about the policies and 
procedures.  Any use of controlled substances must be documented (NAHEMS, 2004; 
NAHEMS, 2011b).  Information should be provided to animal welfare and animal rights groups 
simultaneously with the general public, and no one other than official personnel should be 
allowed on site (NAHEMS, 2011b). 
Even if euthanasia is indisputably necessary, it does not make the extinguishing of animal 
life easy or less stressful.  Personnel should be selected for the team only if they have the 
necessary experience and skills.  Team members should be observed for signs of stress and be 
offered breaks, duty shifts, and counseling.  Regular meals, adequate sleep, and frequent breaks 
are highly encouraged.  Psychological counselors should be made available to all staff assisting 
in the process.  APHIS noted the potential of compassion fatigue, a form of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), and other PTSD cases in individuals working in an emergency situation.  It is 
recommended that veterinarians likely to be involved in emergency response be trained in 
psychological first aid (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).   
Critical incident stress debriefing should be offered and possibly even mandated.  It is 
advised that livestock owners and their families not be present for the euthanasia procedures, 
especially if there are children or others with strong emotional bonds with the animals.  
Quarantine procedures may limit the family’s ability to leave the premise, but every effort should 
be made to move them if possible.  The owners should receive complete information and 
explanations about policies and procedures and have all their questions answered without 
exception.  Community mental health professionals and religious leaders may need to be on site 
to assist with problems as they arise (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b). 
 Guidelines, Methods, and Welfare Implications 
Animal welfare must be a consideration in development of animal disease control 
response plans, in regard to depopulation as well as transportation and general care (Galvin et al., 
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2005).  “Generally, the less handling, movement, transport and similar interference with the 
animals to be killed, and the shorter the time this process takes, the better for the animals” 
(Scientific Veterinary Committee [SVC], 1997, p. 4).   
Euthanasia methods must be administered in such a way as to minimize stress, pain, 
anxiety, and fear in the animal (American Association of Swine Practitioners [AASP], 1997).  
Producers and government representatives have an “ethical and moral responsibility” to provide 
animals a humane death without additional pain or suffering (Rietveld, 2003, p. 1).  When 
selecting a method of euthanasia, decision makers must consider human safety, animal welfare, 
restraint requirements, practicality, operator skill requirements, cost, aesthetics, location 
limitations, and tissue diagnostics (AASP, 1997; Rietveld, 2003; Center for Animal Welfare 
[CAW], 2003; American Association of Bovine Practitioners [AABP], 2000).  The method of 
euthanasia selected must be appropriate for the species involved and meet professional standards 
(NAHEMS, 2004).  Public perception must also be considered, especially in the case of mass 
euthanasia. 
 World Organization for Animal Health  
The OIE identifies 10 general principles to consider when killing animals for disease 
control: 
1. Personnel must be trained and competent in the humane killing of animals. 
2. Operation procedures should be considered to adjust for welfare, aesthetics, costs, 
operator safety, biosecurity, and environmental impacts. 
3. Killing should occur as soon as possible, and normal care and husbandry should be 
continued until time of death. 
4. Animal handling and movement should be minimized and follow welfare guidelines for 
such movement. 
5. Restraint of animals should be minimized before killing, but sufficient to provide for 
effective application of the method and safety of the operator. 
6. Methods selected should result in immediate death or loss of consciousness, which lasts 
until death. 
7. Young animals should be killed first for welfare purposes, and infected animals first for 
biosecurity purposes. 
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8. Animal welfare, operator safety, and biosecurity should be continuously monitored. 
9. A written report must be completed detailing all procedures implemented. 
10. These principles should also be applied in the case of a disaster or mass culling for 
reasons other than disease (OIE, 2007b; OIE, 2012c). 
 American Veterinary Medicine Association 
In the 2013 Edition of the AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia, techniques are defined as 
either acceptable, acceptable with conditions, adjunctive (should not be the sole method used), or 
unacceptable (Shearer, Griffin, Reynolds, & Johnson, 2013; AVMA, 2013a).  Acceptable 
indicates the method, when used independently of any other method, will consistently produce a 
humane death.  Acceptable with conditions indicates that a method may require certain 
conditions in order to consistently result in humane death, can create greater opportunity for 
operator error or safety hazard, is not scientifically well-documented, or requires a secondary 
method to be used in combination.  These methods are considered equivalent to acceptable 
methods when all criteria are met.  Unacceptable methods are seen as inhumane in all situations 
or pose a substantial human safety risk (AVMA, 2013a). 
Specifically in the case of mass euthanasia during an animal health emergency, the 
AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia acknowledge euthanasia options are limited (Alphin, Rankin, 
Johnson, & Benson, 2010).  “Under unusual conditions, such as disease eradication and natural 
disasters, euthanasia options may be limited.  In these situations, the most appropriate technique 
that minimizes human and animal health concerns must be used” (APHIS, 2012c, p. 5-37).  
Previous AVMA Panels on Euthanasia noted the need for additional research and guidance on 
euthanasia methods for animal emergencies and mass depopulation efforts.  While some 
acceptable euthanasia techniques may be appropriate for mass depopulation, not all depopulation 
methods may be appropriate for daily euthanasia activities, such as the use of water-based foam 
as a tool for depopulation of chickens.  When the updated AVMA guidelines were released in 
2013, the decision was made to create separate documents on Mass Depopulation and Humane 
Slaughter because applicable methods may not always fit under the traditional euthanasia 
technology guidelines (Shearer et al., 2013; AVMA, 2013a).  At the time of this dissertation, a 
draft of the mass depopulation document was not available. 
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The most appropriate depopulation technique needs to minimize human and animal 
health concerns.  The most likely options include CO2, gunshot, penetrating captive bolt, and 
cervical dislocation.  Any method considered should be on the AVMAs acceptable or, at 
minimum, acceptable with conditions lists.  Acceptable with conditions (previously referred to as 
conditionally acceptable) methods may not produce humane death, so those methods should only 
be used when all acceptable options have been considered and determined to be infeasible.  
There may be viable methods that have not been reviewed by the AVMA.  Some AVMA-
approved methods are not practical in a mass euthanasia situation.  The role of proper training in 
minimizing animal pain and stress cannot be overemphasized with any method (NAHEMS, 
2004; NAHEMS, 2011b; AVMA, 2013a).   
 Considerations for method selection 
In addition to the general considerations for method selection, other aspects need to be 
considered in a mass euthanasia situation.  In regard to personnel, the availability of sufficiently 
trained professionals with the necessary experience and skill must be considered.  The attitude of 
the personnel is also critical; they have to take personal responsibility for handling all animals in 
the most humane manner possible.  Personnel safety must also be considered.  The emotional 
impact of the method on personnel, owners, and observers should also be considered.  
Euthanasia should be conducted in a location that ensures public safety and is removed from 
public view.  The site of euthanasia will also be influenced by the desire to limit potential disease 
spread, protection of property and other animals, and availability of facilities and equipment.  
Proper handling and restraint is critical to minimizing animal pain and distress, as well as 
personnel safety (NAHEMS, 2004). 
The AVMA Guidelines identified a number of considerations as important when 
evaluating methods of euthanasia in any scenario.  The NAHEMS guidelines and the OIE 
guidelines specifically note important considerations in the case of mass euthanasia and the 
selection of depopulation methods.  These considerations are listed in Table 2.2 
The sequence of euthanasia should take into consideration the risk the animals have for 
continuing to spread disease.  The priority for euthanasia should be: (1) animals with greatest 
chance to spread disease (swine shed FMD in a greater concentration than cattle), (2) animals 
showing clinical disease signs, (3) animals having been in contact with diseased animals, (4) 
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animals in areas determined to be of high risk, and (5) animals susceptible to the disease of 
concern.  The sequence will be influenced by humane and handling issues.  Before euthanasia, 
animals must be appraised for eventual compensation (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).   
 
Table 2-2 Considerations for Selection of Euthanasia Method  
AVMA OIE NAHEMS 
 Ability to induce loss of 
consciousness and death with 
minimal pain and distress 
(previously stated as without 
causing pain, distress, 
anxiety, or apprehension); 
 Time required to induce loss 
of consciousness; 
 Reliability; 
 Safety of personnel; 
 Irreversibility; 
 Compatibility with intended 
animal use and purpose; 
 Documented emotional effect 
on observers operators; 
 Compatibility with 
subsequent evaluation, 
examination, or use of tissue; 
 Drug availability and human 
abuse potential; 
 Compatibility with species, 
age, and health status; 
 Legal requirements; 
 Environmental impacts of the 
method or disposition of 
animal remains; 
 Ability to maintain equipment 
in proper working order; and 
 Safety for 
predators/scavengers should 
the carcass be consumed 
(AVMA, 2001; AVMA 2007; 
AVMA, 2013a). 
 
 Minimal handling and 
movement of animals; 
 Ability to stay on infected 
premises for depopulation 
purposes; 
 Species, number, age, size 
and order of depopulation; 
 Methods and costs; 
 Housing, husbandry 
practices, location of 
animals, and accessibility to 
farm or ranch; 
 Training of personnel; 
 Availability and 
effectiveness of necessary 
equipment’s; 
 Time needed to complete 
depopulation; 
 Access to necessary 
facilities; 
 Biosecurity and 
environmental concerns; 
 Health and safety of 
personnel; 
 Legal issues;  
 Location of nearby premises 
with animals;  
 Ability to remove, dispose 
and destroy carcasses; and 
 Minimize negative welfare 
impacts on the animals. 
(OIE, 2012c). 
 
 Ability of method to quickly 
induce consciousness and death 
with minimal pain, stress, or 
anxiety; 
 The number of steps required in 
the process, or economy of 
manipulation; 
 Availability, reliability and 
irreversibility of method; 
 Training and expertise available; 
 Disease virulence and risk of 
spread;  
 Personnel safety; 
 Biosecurity; 
 Legality in the jurisdiction;  
 Ability to implement with 
appropriate professional 
standards; 
 Species, size, and weight of 
animals; 
 Number of animals;  
 Premise location; 
 Housing, facilities, and location 
of animals;  
 Need for specialized equipment;  
 Public acceptance;  
 Weather conditions; 
 Environmental concerns and 
hazards; 
 Animal restraint requirements;  
 Sample contamination; 
 Disposal plans; 
 Compatibility with plans for 
carcasses (evaluation, disposal, or 
utilization); 
 Other considerations to meet the 
unique characteristics of the 
situation (NAHEMS, 2004; 
NAHEMS, 2011b). 
Note. Adapted from AVMA (2001), AVMA (2007), AVMA (2013a), OIE (2012c), NAHEMS (2004), NAHEMS 
(2011b). 
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 General welfare implications 
Dr. Temple Grandin identified five basic causes of animal welfare problems in slaughter 
plants.  These can be applied to any emergency euthanasia experience as well.  They are: 
 Stressful equipment and methods, 
 Distractions that impeded animal movement, 
 Lack of operator training, 
 Poor equipment maintenance, and  
 Poor condition of animals (Grandin, 1994; Grandin, 1996). 
Grandin also notes that the single greatest factor in maintaining good animal welfare is 
the attitude of the handler and decision maker.  Therefore, all animal emergency plans must 
consider animal welfare in the decision and policy process.  Ethical considerations must be 
included, especially when dealing with healthy animals.  In addition to the killing itself, handling 
should be as stress free as possible.  The degree of restraint, handling methods, and level of 
human activity necessitated by the euthanasia method will all impact the animal.  The animals’ 
previous experience with human handling, tolerance of humans, and degree of domestication will 
have an influence on the welfare effect of the method used and should be considered in method 
selection.  All handling and killing policies must follow animal welfare regulations at the local, 
state, and federal levels (AVMA, 2001; Grandin, 1994; Grandin, 1996; AVMA, 2013a).  
“Judicious use of euthanasia is essential to achieving appropriate welfare” (Department of 
Animal Welfare [DAW], 2002a). 
Euthanasia methods must result in immediate death.  A short period (no longer than 20 
seconds) of muscle contraction may occur.  It is essential that death be confirmed by absence of 
breathing, heartbeat, and blinking response (corneal reflex) before disposal.  Animals should be 
monitored for several minutes following dispatch (CAW, 2003; AVMA; 2001; DAW, 2002a).   
“The need to minimize animal distress, including fear, anxiety, and apprehension, must 
be considered when determining the method of euthanasia” (AVMA, 2001, p. 674).  Even in the 
case of a disease outbreak and imminent mass euthanasia, livestock should receive humane 
handling.  They should be provided appropriate shelter from the weather, feed and water at least 
once every 24 hr, and facilities should be clean and safe.  Transportation should be humane, safe, 
and low stress.  Animals should be moved at normal speeds with limited use of prodding 
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equipment.  No methods to move animals that increase pain or stress should be utilized (Emory, 
2003). 
It should be the goal of mass depopulation efforts to provide humane handling throughout 
the process.  The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) defines a systematic approach to 
humane handling as “a focus on treating livestock in such a manner as to minimize excitement, 
discomfort, and accidental injury the entire time they hold livestock in connection with 
slaughter” (Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), 2013, p. 4).   
 Types of Euthanasia 
Euthanasia can occur in one of three ways: 
 Hypoxia, direct or indirect; 
 Direct depression of neurons necessary for life function; and 
 Physical disruption of brain activity and destruction of neurons necessary for life 
(AVMA, 2001). 
The first group of agents utilized for direct or indirect hypoxia cause loss of 
consciousness at various rates.  Loss of consciousness should occur before loss of motor activity 
to ensure a painless and distress-free death.  Agents that cause muscle paralysis before loss of 
consciousness are not considered acceptable.  Some muscle activity can occur as a reflex and is 
not perceived by the animal.  The second group of agents induces loss of consciousness by 
depressing nerve cells of the brain.  Vocalization and muscle contraction may occur during the 
first stage of anesthesia.  Loss of consciousness is followed by death, attributable to cardiac 
arrest or hypoxemia.  With the third group of agents, rapid loss of consciousness is induced by 
physical disruption of brain activity.  This disruption can occur as a result of concussion, direct 
brain destruction, or electrical depolarization of neurons.  Death is a result of killing the animal 
by an adjunctive method or the destruction of the mid-brain centers controlling cardiac and 
respiratory functions.  Loss of consciousness can be followed by muscle movements in the 
animal, of which it is unaware (AVMA, 2001).   
 Physical methods 
While most physical methods of euthanasia are aesthetically displeasing, they may be the 
most appropriate and humane methods available and may provide the most rapid relief of pain 
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and suffering.  The most humane methods may be in direct conflict with the most aesthetic 
methods (AVMA, 2013a). 
Mechanical devices may stun or kill by laceration, crushing, shock waves, or temporary 
cavitation.  Personnel must be well trained and sensitive to aesthetic implications.  Most physical 
methods are considered conditionally acceptable (AVMA, 2001).  Physical methods, such as 
neck dislocation or decapitation, should only be applied to poultry species (SVC, 1997).  
Penetrating captive bolt and gunshot are the most practical methods in mass euthanasia of 
animals 200 pounds or larger (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).   
According to the AVMA, “When properly used by skilled personnel with well-
maintained equipment, physical methods of euthanasia may result in less fear and anxiety and be 
more rapid, painless, humane, and practical than other forms of euthanasia” (2013a, p. 34-35). 
 Penetrating captive bolt   
A captive bolt gun is powered by gunpowder or compressed air and penetrates the skull 
causing concussion and trauma to the cerebral hemisphere and brainstem.  Adequate restraint (or 
an animal that is incapacitated by injury) and accurate placement are critical to achieving 
sufficient brain disruption to cause sudden loss of consciousness and subsequent death.  The 
welfare implications of the restraint process, shooting position, and feasibility warrant greater 
consideration of animal welfare.  Effective euthanasia is dependent on both the concussive force 
and brain penetration (SVC, 1997; AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a; DAW, 2002a; DAW, 2002b).  
Multiple projectiles are recommended for large ruminants.  A device that delivers some 
compressed air unto the skull after the bolt will increase efficiency (AVMA, 2013a).   
Penetrating captive bolt is an acceptable and practical method for cattle, horses, sheep, 
swine, and poultry when followed by pithing or bleeding.  It is an effective method for slaughter 
houses, research facilities, and farms.  Its advantages are that it induces immediate 
unconsciousness and reduces the need to move livestock if a mobile process is used.  However, 
the disadvantages are that it is aesthetically displeasing, problems may occur if equipment is not 
maintained or used properly, post-stun convulsions can be dangerous in large animals, it is 
difficult to use with agitated animals, the guns can overheat, and damage to brain tissue may 
limit diagnostic capability.  Air-injection captive bolt may not be used on animals entering the 
food chain because of the concern that specified risk material will contaminate the meats (OIE, 
2012c; AVMA, 2013a).  An adjunct measure (exsanguination) is recommended for use to 
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guarantee rapid death and eliminate the possibility the animal could regain consciousness.  
Hiring individuals who use captive bolt methods at local slaughter plants would ensure the 
necessary experience and handling (NAHEMS, 2004).  
USDA APHIS has invested in research at Iowa State University on a portable pneumatic 
captive bolt device to be used for mass depopulation of beef and dairy cattle.  It includes auto-
pithing by air injection, ensures a high fatality rate, removes carcasses through a side-drop 
stanchion, and is being designed to work with a center-line conveyer system.  At Oklahoma State 
University, researchers funded by USDA APHIS have evaluated the use of the Cash (pistol grip) 
Special Extended Captive Bolt for use in depopulation of small cattle herds in remote locations.  
This system has also been explored for use with swine with both penetrating and non-penetrating 
heads (Styles, 2012).  
 Gunshot  
If properly placed and performed by highly skilled personnel, a gunshot can provide a 
humane and immediate death.  Fire-use regulation and the safety of nearby public, personnel, 
and other animals need to be considered.  The use of a firearm may be the most humane choice if 
the animal is only partially mobile and movement to a restraining chute would cause additional 
suffering (AVMA, 2013a; DAW, 2002b).  The firearm should be aimed such that the projectile 
enters the brain.  If the projectile destroys most of the brain, loss of consciousness and death is 
immediate.  Occasionally, the brain may not be destroyed, and the unconscious animal will need 
to be bled immediately.  However, bleeding animals is not likely possible in a disease control 
situation.  Using hollow point or soft nose bullets enhances the expansion on impact and results 
in greater tissue destruction (SVC, 1997; DAW, 2002a; DAW, 2002b; AVMA, 2013a). 
Depending on the situation, gunshot may be the most practical and logical euthanasia 
method.  It is considered suitable for cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs.  The advantages of gunshot 
include that it is quick, effective, requires minimal restraint, can be used from a distance, and can 
be implemented with agitated animals in open spaces (OIE, 2012c).  Disadvantages include 
danger to personnel, unpleasant aesthetic impact, difficulty to perform, legal barriers, limited 
availability of trained personnel, potential for non-lethal wounding, and non-availability of brain 
tissue for future research (OIE, 2012c; AVMA, 2013a).  If animals can be restrained, penetrating 
captive bolt is a preferred method.  Gunshot should not be used for routine euthanasia (AVMA, 
2013a).   
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In the case of both gunshot and captive bolt, the presence of a uniformed law 
enforcement officer on location where firearms are being used will help allay public concerns.  
All individuals using firearms must be approved in writing by the incident commander.  If 
gunshot is the approved method, the NAHEMS guidelines dictate appropriate caliber of firearms, 
type and weight of projectiles, velocity, muzzle energy, and other specific recommendations 
(NAHEMS, 2004).  Military and law enforcement professionals may be designated to assist with 
gunshot euthanasia upon Governor’s request.  Most state highway patrols would have the 
necessary equipment and training.  Public perception is likely to be of concern, as will be the 
noise level.  The use of silencers may be advantageous for animal stress, public relations, and 
personnel emotional response.  In cases where open range euthanasia must occur, it may be 
possible to use anesthetic darts followed by euthanasia (Jones, 2003).  Canadian researchers have 
noted that .22 caliber bullets may result in poor penetration, deflection, and bullet fragmentation 
at a distance of 82 ft (25 m) (Shearer et al., 2013).  Researchers at Kansas State University have 
studied appropriate caliber and ammunition to be used at a distance of 30 ft.  Further research is 
anticipated on live animals and in noise suppression (Styles, 2012). 
 Stunning (blunt force trauma)  
Stunning can be performed by a blow to the head, non-penetrating captive bolt, or electric 
current.  It must be followed immediately by a process that ensures death (SVC, 1997; DAW, 
2002a).   
Non-penetrating captive bolt induces immediate onset of unconsciousness and will cause 
death in neonates and poultry.  The mobility of the equipment is an advantage.  However, 
disadvantages include that consciousness can be regained quickly in non-neonates, birds need to 
be moved from cages and restrained, poor gun maintenance can lead to issues in use, post stun 
convulsions can create difficulties, agitated animals create additional challenges, the gun may 
overheat, and bleeding may be a security risk (OIE, 2012c).  While some sources indicate non-
penetrating captive bolt is acceptable and will induce an unconscious state in ruminants, horses, 
and swine (SVC, 1997; DAW, 2002a), the OIE recommends it be used only for poultry, and 
neonate sheep, goats and pigs weighing up to 10 kg (22-23 lbs) (OIE, 2012c).   
To stun, an animal must be immobile, incapacitated by injury, or restrained in a chute.  
The process involves using a heavy hammer or maul to impose a stout blow along the front of 
the skull between the eyes and ears.  It should only be used if a single blow delivered to the skull 
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can cause immediate depression of the central nervous system and destruction of brain tissue, 
including stoppage of all life processes, especially heartbeat and respiration (AVMA, 2001; 
DAW, 2002b).  A blow to the head with a blunt object is an acceptable method of euthanasia for 
neonatal animals with thin craniums (young pigs).  The anatomic features of the specie 
determine if a blow to the head is acceptable.  Personnel must be properly trained and aware of 
the aesthetic implications (AVMA, 2001; DAW, 2002a).  Blunt trauma has been found 
conditionally acceptable by AVMA for pigs less than 3 weeks of age, but it is not recommended 
by the OIE (NAHEMS, 2011b).  Electrical stunning has been used for stunning dogs, cattle, 
sheep, goats, hogs, fish, and chickens.  It involves applying an electrical current across the head 
of the animal to induce a temporary loss of consciousness (SVC, 1997; DAW, 2002a). 
 Cervical dislocation 
This technique is often used for small animals, especially poultry, and is believed to be 
humane if performed by well-trained operators.  The goal is to separate the cervical vertebrae 
from the skull.  It is commonly done by hand with a stretching process that causes concussion in 
the brain leading to loss of consciousness.  Loss of consciousness may not be immediate, but 
does occur rapidly.  Neck stretching results in death by cerebral ischemia, and neck crushing 
results in death by asphyxia.  It is a quick process to perform, and the remaining tissue is not 
contaminated.  Cervical dislocation is not an aesthetically pleasing method, and rapid induction 
of unconsciousness requires that personnel have mastered the necessary technical skills.  Even 
with proper application, the animals will convulse for several seconds to minutes after death.  
The welfare concerns are due to questions regarding its effectiveness and consistency, and the 
use of pliers must be avoided.  Little scientific research has been done to confirm the 
humaneness of this method (SVC, 1997; AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a; Gullett, 1987).  Cervical 
dislocation is non-invasive and can be performed manually.  Personnel need to be well trained, 
will become fatigued, and will face health and safety concerns.  It is also more difficult with 
larger birds and creates greater stress on animals from handling (OIE, 2012c). 
 Electrocution 
Death by electrocution occurs by using alternating current to induce cardiac fibrillation 
and cerebral hypoxia.  Because animals may not lose consciousness for 30 seconds, operators 
should first render the animals unconscious by an acceptable process, such as electrical stunning.  
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In some cases, an effective one-step process is used for sheep and hogs.  Euthanasia by 
electrocution is economical, does not contaminate the tissues, and is humane (if the animal is 
unconscious) (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a).  There is little biosecurity risk, but a reliable 
supply of electricity is necessary, electrodes must be applied correctly to be effective, and it is 
physically demanding (OIE, 2012c).  
There are a number of disadvantages to euthanasia by electrocution, including the fact it 
is dangerous to operators, time-consuming per animal, aesthetically unfavorable, and often 
ineffective in small animals.  Restraint may be challenging and purpose-built equipment and 
trained personnel are necessary (AVMA, 2013a; OIE, 2012c).  Often in field conditions, a 
considerable number of animals are not effectively stunned and require a second stun.  This 
process is not appropriate for animals under 1 week of age (SVC, 1997).  OIE considers 
electrocution suitable for calves, sheep, goats, and pigs over 1 week of age (OIE, 2012c).  
Appropriate equipment and personnel training are required, and electrocution techniques that 
apply electrical currents to the head first are unacceptable (AVMA, 2001).  An electrified water 
bath can be used for poultry species if the strength of electric current is high enough to kill 
animals immediately.  Each bird in the bath must receive the minimum required current and pre-
kill shocks must be non-existent (SVC, 1997).  There are cases where birds hanging from 
shackle lines were flapping their wings and missed the electrical water bath and death was not 
induced (Raj, 2008).  Mobile equipment to be used in the mass euthanasia of poultry has been 
developed and should be considered in the case of a large scale poultry disease (NAHEMS, 
2004).  Meat Processing Systems, Inc. has developed a mobile electrocution unit for swine mass 
depopulation that can process 600 head of swine per hour.  It was used in Poland in 2011 and 
USDA AHPIS National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) is planning to acquire units retrofitted for 
the U.S. market (OIE, 2012c). 
 Water-based/fire suppression foam 
This method has been developed for mass emergency poultry depopulation.  USDA 
APHIS conditionally approved its use with floor-reared birds infected with a potential zoonotic 
disease or rapidly spreading infectious disease in 2006 (Benson, Alphin, Dawson, & Malone, 
2009).  The advantages of the foam method are its speed, minimal animal handling requirements, 
and low personnel needs.  In the 2007 AI outbreak in Virginia and West Virginia, foam was 
utilized as a method of depopulation by both a large, skid mounted system as well as hand held 
114 
 
foam generating system connected by hose and nozzle to a water and foam supply.  It was an 
effective method, and especially successful when combined with composting as a disposal 
method (Flory & Peer, 2009).  Foam physically induces hypoxia rather than hypoxia being 
induced through a reaction to a chemical gas.  Several firefighting foams meet biodegradability 
requirements and may be suitable for use.  The foam process also adds water to the remains, thus 
aiding in composting (Benson et al., 2007).   
Foam is generated by medium or high expansion generation equipment to create a 
blanket of foam over the birds.  Foam leads to a rapid onset of airway occlusion which brings 
about cessation of heart and brain activity.  Its use reduces the number of personnel needed and 
limits human exposure to the disease.  Water-based foam has been proven effective on turkeys, 
broilers, quail, chukar, and ducks.  Because waterfowl are capable of holding their breath, 
additional exposure time is required.  Exposure time remains fairly consistent with foam, unlike 
gassing where the number of birds increases time needed for exposure until cessation of activity.  
Foam requires significantly less time to cessation than CO2 with similar stress effects (Benson et 
al., 2009).  
Dry foam has also been developed that includes an inert gas (Benson et al., 2009).  Some 
research has indicated that dry foam with an inert gas that causes unconsciousness prior to death 
may be more humane than water-based foam.  Water-based foam can create welfare concerns as 
it can be seen as a form of suffocation.  Because time to unconsciousness indicates the length of 
time an animal may suffer, methods have been compared to determine if there are significant 
differences between gas and foam.  Researchers have found that there is no need to add CO2 or 
inert gas to the foam because either method still results in the bird being killed by the foam 
consistently (Alphin et al., 2010).  However, in comparing foam to the traditional use of CO2 gas, 
researchers found that with ducks 5 to 9 weeks of age, onset of unconsciousness, brain death, 
termination of cardiac activity, duration of bradycardia, and time from bradycardia to 
unconsciousness were all shorter with CO2 than foam.  When tested with ducks 8 to 14 weeks of 
age, there were no significant differences except with brain death and duration of bradycardia, 
which were faster with CO2.  When atropine injections were used with foam, all observed 
physiological responses were faster (Caputo et al., 2012).  Foam is no more stressful than gas 
when comparing corticosterone levels and foam becomes faster than gas as number of birds 
increase (Benson et al., 2007).  Animal rights activists continue to express concern over the 
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humaneness of foam as a depopulation method and refer to researchers who have indicated that 
birds show escape behavior, are difficult to observe when enveloped in the foam, and may just 
eventually get worn out and suffocate (Davis, 2006).  USDA APHIS has concluded, when 
comparing gas and foam, there are comparable times to death with similar behavioral responses 
and cortisol concentrations (Styles, 2012).   
There are currently two types of foam systems, a high expansion foam system developed 
by the University of Delaware, and a medium expansion foam system developed by the North 
Carolina Department of Agriculture.  A third type, a compressed air foaming system, is under 
development at Texas A&M University that uses less water, acts as a disinfectant, and could be 
used with caged birds (Styles, 2012).  While not listed in the AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia, 
AVMA issued a policy document in 2013 supporting the use of water-based foam if appropriate 
conditions are met.  It can be used in cases of floor-reared poultry, HPAI infected poultry, 
animals infected with a rapidly spreading disease that cannot be contained by traditional means, 
or poultry housed in structurally unsound buildings that are unsafe for humans to enter.  The 
policy clarifies that while water-based foam is an acceptable method of mass depopulation, it is 
not an acceptable form of traditional euthanasia (APHIS, 2012d; AVMA, 2013b). 
 Decapitation 
Severing the head from the body induces immediate central nervous system depression.  
It can be used for poultry that are too large for cervical dislocation.  The equipment used (heavy 
knife, machete, hatchet, or bolt cutters) must ensure the spinal cord is severed.  This method is 
considered acceptable with conditions if used in appropriate settings and performed correctly.  It 
induces rapid loss of consciousness and does not chemically contaminate the brain tissue.  The 
necessary handling and restraint can be distressful, and the guillotine process is aesthetically 
displeasing.  In addition, questions regarding the electrical activity in the brain following 
decapitation remain controversial (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a).  Decapitation can occur 
inadvertently if neck dislocation is carried out with force (SVC, 1997).  The NAHEMS 
guidelines do not include decapitation (NAHEMS, 2004).  OIE does include decapitation and 
identifies the advantage as being effective without required monitoring.  Biosecurity risks are 
created by contamination of working area with bodily fluids and the animals feel pain if 
consciousness if not immediately lost (OIE, 2012c). 
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 Microwave irradiation 
Focused beam microwave irradiation is a humane euthanasia method for small research 
animals if appropriate instruments are used.  The process rapidly halts brain enzyme activity 
while maintaining the anatomic integrity of the brain.  Loss of consciousness occurs quickly, but 
instrumentation is expensive and only appropriate for small animals (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 
2013a).  The NAHEMS guidelines do not include microwave irradiation (NAHEMS, 2004). 
 Thoracic (cardiopulmonary, cardiac) compression 
Thoracic compression is applicable to avian euthanasia when other methods are not 
practical.  It can also be used with small wild animals.  The method involves stopping the heart 
and lungs by pressure from the operator’s hands.  The technique is rapid and does not 
contaminate the carcass.  Some research indicates it can cause substantial pain and distress, but 
field biologists have used it and have argued it to be apparently painless.  Thus, the level of 
distress is questionable, and it is not aesthetically pleasant.  It is considered unacceptable unless 
animals are deeply anesthetized or insentient (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a).  The NAHEMS 
guidelines do not include thoracic compression (NAHEMS, 2004). 
 Kill traps 
In many cases, kill traps do not meet effective euthanasia criteria.  They are often used 
for the collection and killing of small, free-ranging mammals for commercial, scientific, property 
protection, or human safety purposes.  They are considered controversial, because they do not 
always provide a rapid loss of consciousness or stress-free death.  New technologies being used 
in kill traps result in a faster loss of consciousness.  Live traps combined with another euthanasia 
method may be more preferable, but the human contact associated with live traps may actually 
be a more stressful experience (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a).  The NAHEMS guidelines do 
not include kill traps (NAHEMS, 2004). 
 Maceration 
The use of a mechanical apparatus with rotating blades or projections that causes 
immediate fragmentation is known as maceration.  It results in immediate death and can handle 
large numbers quickly.  It requires specialized equipment, the tissues may create a biosecurity 
risk, and cleaning the equipment can lead to contamination.  OIE indicates it can be used for day-
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old poultry and embryonated eggs (OIE, 2012c).  AVMA indicates maceration can be used on 
poultry up to 72 hr old (AVMA, 2013a).  In addition, according to the Center for Animal 
Welfare at UC-Davis, maceration in a high-speed grinder imposes a rapid death and is 
considered humane for disposing of young chicks and embryonated eggs.  Only grinders 
designed for poultry disposal should be used, and they must be properly maintained and loaded 
(CAW, 2003).  
Advantages include instantaneous death, limited risk to workers, and ability to kill large 
numbers quickly.  Disadvantages include that special equipment is needed, equipment must be 
kept in excellent condition, personnel must be well trained, macerated tissue could create a 
biosecurity risk, and public reaction is likely negative.  A backlog of chicks must be avoided as 
suffocation, injury, and distress will occur if birds pile up prior to maceration (AVMA, 2013a). 
 Adjunctive methods 
Exsanguination and pithing are used in combination with other methods to ensure death, 
but these methods should not be used independently from other methods.  Exsanguination 
involves bleeding out the animal by puncturing the vena cava or cutting the brachial or carotid 
arteries and should be used in combination with stunning or on unconscious animals.  Pithing is 
done by inserting a pithing rod or tool into the entry site created by penetrating captive bolt or 
bullet.  It should not be used for ruminants due to the concern that specified risk material may 
contaminate meat.  Adjunct measures can be used in combination with stunning or other methods 
that render the animal unconscious, but should never be used as the sole method (AVMA, 2001; 
AVMA, 2013a; DAW, 2002a).   
 Chemical methods – Inhalants 
In order to be effective, any gases inhaled by an animal much reach a certain 
concentration in the alveoli.  The AVMA (2013a) notes that the suitability of an agent depends 
on whether an animal experiences distress between the time it begins to inhale the agent and the 
time it loses consciousness. 
A few considerations apply to all inhalant agents.  The considerations include: 
 Exposing the animal to a high concentration of the inhalant is more humane and loss 
of consciousness is more rapid. 
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 The equipment used for delivery of inhalant must be working properly and in 
regulatory compliance. 
 Most inhalants are hazardous to humans. 
 Agitation is more likely in cases where the animal has decreased ventilation and 
alveolar concentration rises slowly. 
 Neonatal animals are resistant to hypoxia and take longer to die than adults. 
 Equipment with rapid gas flows can make noises that cause animals to experience 
distress. 
 Time to unconsciousness depends on displacement rate, container volume, and 
concentration. 
 Inhalants must be in pure form with no contaminants or adulterants and should be 
produced with an effective displacement rate and concentration. 
 Chambers need to be leak free, and layering and loss of agent must be avoided. 
 Animals should be penned with similar species, safely restrained, and kept in 
chambers that are clean and not over-populated.  Every effort should be made to 
reduce any distress felt by the animals prior to euthanasia. 
 Reptiles, amphibians, and diving birds and mammals can prolong the time between 
taking in the inhalant and losing consciousness, because of their ability to hold their 
breath. 
 Death must be verified (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a). 
While the use of chemical methods seems more humane than most physical technologies, 
it is effectively limited to intravenous administration because broadcast application endangers 
humans, the environment, wildlife, and other animals.  In the case of mass euthanasia, chemical 
methods also create additional dilemmas with carcass disposal (NAHEMS, 2011b). 
 Inhalant anesthetics 
Anesthetic vapor is inhaled causing the cessation of respiration followed by death.  A few 
of the most common inhalant anesthetics are ether, halothane, methoxyflurane, isoflurane, 
sevoflurane, desflurane, and enflurane.  Because it works rapidly, halothane is the most effective 
inhalant for euthanasia.  Factors impacting the choice of an inhalant include blood solubility, 
potency, vapor pressure, odor (animals may hold their breath), and speed of induction.  Each 
119 
 
characteristic varies per inhalant.  The animal should be exposed to the inhalant in vapor form in 
a closed chamber.  Nitrous oxide (N2O) can be used in conjunction with an inhalant to speed 
anesthesia, but should not be used independently.  One advantage of these inhalants is their 
appropriateness for small animals.  In addition, most of them are nonflammable and 
nonexplosive under normal conditions.  There are several methods for administration, and they 
can be used independently or in a two-step process.  The disadvantages are that the animals may 
struggle or become anxious during inhalation, ether is both flammable and explosive, inhalants 
can often be dangerous to humans, and it creates tissue residue in food-producing animals 
(AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a).  It is possible for animals to go through an excitement phase 
with vocalization and appearance of struggling or to seizure as the anesthesia takes effect.  This 
can be disturbing to personnel (Gullett, 1987).  
 Carbon dioxide 
Inhalation of carbon dioxide (CO2) at high rates induces a rapid anesthetic effect.  It can 
be an effective method for small or young animals (piglets, poultry).  Effective CO2 anesthesia 
results in the same signs as those associated with surgical anesthesia (loss of withdrawal and 
palpebral reflexes) and cause an abrupt loss of consciousness and subsequent death due to 
respiratory arrest (AVMA, 2013a; DAW, 2002a).  CO2 can be administered through multiple 
methods, including placing animals in a gas-filled container, use of a containerized gassing unit, 
and introducing gas into an existing structure, such as a poultry house (OIE, 2012c). 
Use of a gassing container means birds will have to be caught and carried by their legs to 
the container, which creates an additional welfare concern.  It is also important that birds do not 
die due to compression or suffocation because too many live birds have been dropped into the 
container without adequate intervals in between loads (Raj, 2008).   
  The time between inhalation and loss of consciousness will decrease with higher 
concentrations of CO2 or if the animal is immersed in the full concentration of CO2 immediately 
(AVMA, 2001).  Practical experience with poultry indicates that animals should be immersed in 
a maximum concentration of CO2 as rapidly as possible to reduce reaction to the gas and time to 
loss of consciousness.  However, some research indicates that inhalation of CO2 at high 
concentrations can be distressing to animals by creating carbonic acid on the nasal mucosa, so 
more research is necessary regarding the welfare aspects of the induction phase (SVC, 1997; 
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AVMA, 2013a).  For welfare purposes, it is important for systems to be operated so that birds are 
not directly hit by the cold gas being delivered at high pressures into a facility (Raj, 2008). 
Advantages of carbon dioxide include that its rapid, analgesic, and anesthetic effects are 
well documented; it is readily available, inexpensive, nonflammable, non explosive, and poses 
minimal hazard to personnel; there is no accumulation of tissue residues; and it does not distort 
corticosterone concentrations.  However, because CO2 is heavier than air, animals may climb 
above the exposed area if the chamber if not completely filled.  Some animals (fish and 
burrowing and diving mammals) are extremely tolerant to CO2.  Some species may experience 
significant distress.  In addition, exposure to CO2 may take longer to induce euthanasia than 
other methods and is more appropriate for some species than others (SVC, 1997; AVMA, 2001; 
AVMA, 2013a).  Swine, as an example, demonstrate transient muscle spasms prior to death, 
which is likely a physiologic response rather than a sign of stress.  Stress gene negative pigs 
exhibit less intense spasms than stress gene positive pigs (AASP, 1997).   
In the case of mass euthanasia, the limitation is usually in the existence of chamber or 
troughs that allow for animals to be totally submerged.  In no case, should dry ice, fire 
extinguishers, or chemically generated CO2 be used (NAHEMS, 2004).  Liquid CO2 was used in 
an AI outbreak in British Columbia in 2002, but that action was criticized for delivery method, 
efficiency, and humaneness.  Since then, there have been improvements in gas delivery 
manifold, and whole-barn gassing is considered more humane and biosecure than methods that 
require significant handling such as mobile chambers (Turner et al., 2012).  OIE identifies CO2 
as acceptable for use with poultry and neonatal sheep, goats, and pigs, depending on method 
selected (OIE, 2012c). 
It is difficult to reach a rapid and consistent CO2 concentration in field conditions (Alphin 
et al., 2010).  USDA APHIS has invested in the development of a modified atmosphere killing 
(MAK) trailer for portable gassing of small flocks of chickens, and they have funded the 
development of on-farm and mobile gassing units for swine at North Carolina State University 
(Styles, 2012).  
 Carbon monoxide 
Carbon monoxide (CO) is also a colorless and odorless gas.  CO induces unconsciousness 
and death through cerebral anoxia (SVC, 1997).  It is nonflammable and only explosive in 
concentrations greater than 10%.  Exposure to CO leads to fatal hypoxemia by combining with 
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hemoglobin and blocking the uptake of oxygen.  The recommended CO source for euthanasia 
purposes is commercially compressed CO in cylinders, while CO from chemical interaction or 
exhaust fumed from gasoline combustion engines are not considered acceptable.  In research 
with dogs, some agitation and vocalization occurs prior to loss of consciousness, but 
tranquilization with acepromazine decreases these types of responses.  CO leads to an 
unconscious state without pain or extensive discomfort.  The animal appears to be unaware of the 
onset of hypoxemia, and death occurs rapidly if concentrations of 4 to 6% are used.  However, 
CO is highly toxic and difficult to detect, causing significant hazard to personnel (AVMA, 2001; 
AVMA, 2013a). 
CO is considered acceptable for individual or mass small animal euthanasia if 
compressed CO is used and guidelines are closely followed (AVMA, 2001).  The chamber where 
animals are exposed should be designed, constructed, and maintained to ensure animals can be 
supervised and will not be at risk of injury (SVC, 1997).  In the case of mass euthanasia, CO 
would be effective if large, air-tight chambers are available.  Due to the human hazards, use of 
CO must be closely monitored and no delivery method other than industrial CO cylinders should 
be considered (NAHEMS, 2004).   
 Nitrogen and argon 
Both nitrogen (N2) and argon (Ar) are colorless, odorless, nonflammable, and 
nonexplosive, and they can be used with swine and poultry in an oxygen-excluding manner 
(SVC, 1997; AVMA, 2013a).  They are used for euthanasia by placing the animal in a closed 
container that is either pre-filled or filled rapidly with gas that induces death by hypoxemia.  
Dogs exposed to N2 lose consciousness within 76 seconds if N2 concentration of 98.5% is 
achieved within 1 min.  They have a tendency to hyperventilate before losing consciousness, and 
they experienced vocalizations, gasping, convulsions, and muscular tremors following loss of 
consciousness.  Researchers concluded the method induced death without pain.  However, in a 
study conducted with rats, they showed signs of stress and panic prior to becoming unconscious 
and insensitivity to pain was questioned.  Researchers exposed swine and poultry to Ar and 
found that the exposure did not appear to cause distress.  In fact, it was found to be humane for 
chickens.  Both Ar and N2 are readily available, and the hazards to personnel are minimal.  
However, the level of stress experienced by the animal is in question, and exposing the animals 
to a low concentration of oxygen before death can cause recovery.  Ar and N2 should only be 
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used if low concentrations of oxygen are reached quickly, animals are heavily sedated, and the 
chamber poses no possibility for injury (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a).  Typically, birds are 
unable to detect the presence of N2 or Ar (Alphin et al., 2010). 
These gases are suitable for use with poultry and neonatal sheep, goats, and pigs.  N2 or 
inert gas such as Ar can also be mixed with CO2 and used in a gas-filled container or 
containerized gassing unit on the same species (OIE, 2012c).  This combination is seen as a more 
humane gassing procedure and causes less bird reaction when compared to CO2, but requires an 
airtight container and is impractical in large poultry houses (Alphin et al., 2010). 
 Hydrogen cyanide 
In research done in Europe, hydrogen cyanide was tested and found to result in rapid 
death for poultry.  However, there are clearly worker safety and human health risks (Raj, 2008).  
There are considerable welfare concerns related to the use of hydrogen cyanide, because it 
causes violent convulsions prior to loss of consciousness and death, and it blocks the oxygen 
uptake causing respiratory difficulties.  Birds also develop rapid rigor making for difficulty in 
removing carcasses from cages (Raj, 2008; SVC, 1997).  It is used in certain member states in 
the European community (SVC, 1997).   
 Chemical methods – Lethal injections 
The most rapid, desirable, and reliable euthanasia method is the use of intravenous 
injections that do not cause fear or distress in the animal.  Death, unconsciousness, or central 
nervous system depression is caused by anesthetic or sedative drugs.  These injections cause 
either a narcotic overdose or paralyze life functions with the use of a pharmaceutical agent.  The 
animals should be restrained prior to injection and may require sedation (AVMA, 2001; DAW, 
2002b; OIE, 2012c).  The use of a syringe and needle is perceived as more refined and humane 
than some of the other methods (NAHEMS, 2004).  If the injection process or necessary 
restraints cause the animals distress or put the operator in danger, then sedation, anesthesia, or 
other methods would be preferred.  If intravenous injection is not a feasible choice, 
intraperitoneal administration is acceptable if the agent is nonirritating and does not contain 
neuromuscular blocking agents.  If the animal is heavily sedated and insensible, intracardiac 
injection is also acceptable (SVC, 1997; AVMA, 2001).  All other injection methods (e.g., 
intramuscular, subcutaneous, etc.) are considered unacceptable (AVMA, 2001).  These methods 
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are most commonly used in small species, although they could be used in all species (SVC, 
1997).   
Any product used for lethal injection must be recognized as humane and effective 
(NAHEMS, 2004).  Injection euthanasia can be the most precise and provides the best public 
image.  It does require a veterinarian for administration as well as drug availability in a timely 
manner (Meyer, 2003).  The carcasses should never enter the food chain and must be disposed of 
in accordance with local, state, and federal laws and regulations (AVMA, 2013a).  Contaminated 
carcasses create a risk for wild animals or other domestic animals.  Lethal injection may be used 
with small numbers of any species, including cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, and poultry (OIE, 2012c).  
It should especially be considered with pet livestock (equine, pot belly pigs, goats, llamas, etc.), 
young animals, and pets (Meyer, 2003).  In poultry houses, anesthetic or poisonous agents can 
also be mixed with poultry feed or water, but the feed must be palatable and not bitter to taste.  
To get birds to eat adulterated feed may require forcing them to fast for a period of time beyond 
appropriate from an animal welfare perspective.  Killing may need to follow for birds that are 
anesthetized, but not killed (Alphin et al., 2010; OIE, 2012c; Raj, 2008). 
 Barbituric acid derivatives 
Barbiturates are acceptable for euthanasia if administered intravenously, and they are 
desirable if they are potent, long-acting, stable, and inexpensive.  They depress the central 
nervous system in descending order, and unconsciousness is reached rapidly with minimal pain.  
The advantages of barbiturates include speed of action, minimal discomfort for the animals, and 
less expense than other agents.  Intravenous injection is preferred and requires animals be 
restrained.  Personnel must be well-trained and registered with the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA).  It is possible that a terminal gasp will occur in unconscious animals or 
animals may experience an excitatory phase.  Both reactions may be objectionable to human 
observers.  In addition, the drugs will remain in the carcass and could cause sedation or death to 
any animal that consumes part of the carcass (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a). 
 Pentobarbital combinations 
Pentobarbital metabolizes from a combination of a barbituric acid derivative, such as 
sodium pentobarbital and a local anesthetic agent, such as lidocaine or phenytoin.  These drugs 
are listed on a different schedule by the DEA than barbituric acid derivatives and are simpler to 
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obtain and administer.  It is not acceptable to combine pentobarbital with a neuromuscular 
blocking agent (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a). 
 Chloral hydrate 
Chloral hydrate causes death by hypoxemia.  Its use requires animal restraint because 
chloral hydrate depresses the cerebrum slowly and death may be preceded by gasping, muscle 
spasms, and vocalizations.  It is only considered acceptable for large animals when administered 
intravenously to sedated animals.  Chloral hydrate is not acceptable for small animals because 
the aforementioned side effects may be severe and objectionable to observers.  Chloral hydrate in 
combination with magnesium sulfate and sodium pentobarbital was a common, economical, and 
inexpensive agent for large animals, but is now rarely used.  It must be compounded from bulk 
drugs as it is not available as an FDA-approved drug (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a).   
 T-61 
This three-drug combination is an injectable, no-barbiturate, non-narcotic mixture that 
provides general anesthetic, coraciiform, and local anesthetic actions.  T-61 is no longer 
available in the US, but it is available in Canada and other countries.  It should only be 
administered intravenously (AVMA, 2001).  The agent must be administered slowly because fast 
administration is shown to cause pain.  With agents such as T-61 that include neuromuscular 
blocking agents, the animal must be fully anesthetized to prevent animal distress (SVC, 1997). 
 Tributame 
This is a combination of embutramide, chloroquine phosphate, and lidocaine.  The 
addition of lidocaine eliminated stressful responses to injections and the combination leads to a 
speedier death than embutramide alone.  Death is caused by a combination of severe CNS 
depression, hypoxia, and circulatory collapse.  The result is rapid onset of activity with minimal 
discomfort.  While approved for dogs in 2005, it is not currently manufactured (AVMA, 2013a).   
 Potassium chloride 
Potassium chloride is only acceptable when used in a supersaturated solution that is 
injected intravenously or intracardially into an animal already under general anesthesia.  All use 
in unanesthetized animals is condemned.  The potassium ion is cardiotoxic, and when injected 
rapidly, results in cardiac arrest and death.  Muscle spasms or ripples may occur shortly after 
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injection.  Potassium chloride is easily obtained, transported, mixed, and not a controlled 
substance.  The resulting carcass is potentially less toxic to scavengers and predators if carcass 
disposal location is a concern (AVMA, 2001; AVMA, 2013a). 
 Other acceptable methods 
AVMA also lists tricaine methane sulfonate (MS 222, TMS), ultrapotent opoids, 
dissociative agents, α2-adrenergic receptor agents, magnesium salts, chloral hydrate, alcohols, 
benzocaine, hydrochloride, clove oil, isoeugenol, eugenol, phenoxyethanol, quinaldine, 
metomidate, sodium hypochorite, and formaldehyde as acceptable methods (AVMA, 20013a). 
 Unacceptable injectable agents 
The following injectable agents are considered unacceptable when used alone for 
euthanasia purposes: strychnine, nicotine, caffeine, magnesium sulfate, potassium chloride, 
cleaning agents, solvents, disinfectants, other toxins, salts, and all neuromuscular blocking agents 
(AVMA, 2001).  There are some agents, such as xylazine, ketamine, succinycholine, and 
phencyclidine that are not appropriate for euthanasia, but may be used for chemical restraint 
(NAHEMS, 2004). 
 General considerations 
The NAHEMS guidelines list two specific examples of brand-name injectable agents: 
Fatal-Plus® by VorTech Pharmaceuticals and Somlethol by J.A. Webster Inc.  The costs of these 
two agents for euthanizing a 1,100-lb cow was $23.36 and $17.57, respectively (NAHEMS, 
2004).  Animals euthanized with chemical methods must be closely monitored to ensure that 
death rather than a deep anesthesia has occurred.  Chemical adjunct measures, such as potassium 
chloride, may be appropriate (NAHEMS, 2004).   
If animals are to be used for human or animal consumption, the chemical agent used must 
be approved by the FDA.  Only carbon dioxide can be used as a chemical agent without leaving 
chemical residue in the tissue.  If other chemical means are used, carcasses must be disposed of 
in such a way that prevents them from being consumed by other animals.  Proper carcass 
disposal techniques must be selected in conjunction with the selection of the method of 
euthanasia (AVMA, 2001). 
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Each of these methods offers various advantages and disadvantages.  In the case of mass 
euthanasia due to natural disasters or disease outbreak, euthanasia options may be limited to 
those methods that minimize human and animal health concerns.  Primary methods may include 
carbon dioxide, gunshot, penetrating captive bolt, and cervical dislocation (AVMA, 2001). 
 Species specific considerations 
The NAHEMS guidelines discuss specific considerations for different species in the case 
of mass euthanasia.   
 Cattle 
The Humane Slaughter of Livestock Act in Part 313 of 9 Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) specifies captive bolt, gunshot, and electrical stunning as humane methods of cattle 
euthanasia (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).  In the 2013 guidelines, AVMA specifically 
mentions barbiturates as acceptable, and it lists gunshot and penetrating captive bolt with 
adjunctive methods as acceptable with conditions.  Penetrating and non-penetrating captive bolt 
are acceptable for calves (Shearer et al., 2013).  AVMA also lists injectable agents (Styles, 
2012).  All of these methods could be practical in mass euthanasia operations.  Injectable agents 
may be impractical in large numbers, but should be considered when euthanizing hand-raised 
animals, such as 4-H or FFA projects especially if owners are present (NAHEMS, 2011b).  In a 
survey of feedlot managers, McReynolds (2013) found toxins in the feed supply to be an option 
for cattle euthanasia in large feedlots.  While administration may be very feasible, concerns over 
animal welfare and the environmental impact of carcass disposal need to be considered.   
Cattle should not be moved at faster than a normal walk and the use of electrical prods or 
slappers should be minimized.  Animals should be restrained in a way that does not cause pain, 
injury, or unnecessary stress.  Downed or disabled animals should be euthanized in their current 
location.  If gunshot is used at long distances, experts should be used to guarantee death by 
single shot.  Electrocution would be difficult to use in the field, but could be done if appropriate 
equipment is available (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).  In general, there is significant 
shortage of peer-reviewed research on euthanasia in all livestock (Styles, 2012). 
 Sheep and goats 
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The Humane Slaughter of Livestock Act identifies captive bolt, gunshot, and electrical 
stunning for both sheep and goats as humane methods of euthanasia.  For sheep, euthanasia by 
CO2 is also considered a humane method (NAHEMS, 2011b).  AVMA specifically mentions 
barbiturates as acceptable, and it lists gunshot and penetrating captive bolt with adjunctive 
methods as acceptable with conditions.  Electrocution is also an acceptable option, but is unlikely 
to be practical in a mass depopulation effort (AVMA, 2103a).  All of these methods could, with 
proper planning and preparation, be used in the field for mass euthanasia.  Injectable anesthetics 
could also be practical and should be used with hand-raised animals, as discussed with cattle.  
The same humane handling expectations also apply to sheep and goats (NAHEMS, 2004; 
NAHEMS, 2011b). 
 Swine 
The Humane Slaughter of Livestock Act specifies CO2, captive bolt, gunshot, and 
electrical stunning as humane euthanasia techniques (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).  
AVMA also lists Ar, N, gas mixtures, injectable agents, and electrocution.  Blunt force trauma 
may be considered an option with piglets (Styles, 2012; AVMA, 2013a).  All methods could be 
adapted in a mass euthanasia incident.  Injectable agents can be used more easily with hand-
raised pigs.  Humane handling considerations should apply.  CO2 will be difficult to use in the 
field unless animals could be safely transported to a central location (NAHEMS, 2004; 
NAHEMS, 2011b).  The estimated cost of CO2 for swine euthanasia is 15 to 20 cents per pound 
(Morrow & Meyer, 2003). 
 Equine 
The Humane Slaughter of Livestock Act defines captive bolt and gunshot as humane 
methods of euthanasia for horses and mules.  Electrical stunning is also acceptable in U.S. Code.  
AVMA guidelines limit acceptable use to penetrating captive bolt and barbiturates, and list 
gunshot and captive bolts as acceptable with conditions.  Gunshot is conditional only due to the 
human safety hazards.  Injectable agents could be used, but would be very slow.  All equine 
should be sedated, if possible, before being euthanized.  Again, humane handling expectations 
apply.  With horses, many owners consider them as pets, and their loss may be particularly 
difficult (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).  
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 Poultry 
The Humane Slaughter of Livestock Act and U.S. Code provide no guidance on the 
humane euthanasia of poultry (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 2011b).  AVMA lists cervical 
dislocation, decapitation, gas inhalation, injectable agents, blunt force trauma, electrocution, 
gunshot, and captive bolt as acceptable or acceptable with conditions methods (Styles, 2012; 
AVMA, 2013a).  Identifying the best method for the depopulation of large numbers of birds is 
challenging.  Methods need to be rapid, safe for personnel, humane, available, easy to 
implement, and applicable to a number of housing options (Turner et al., 2012).  It is not 
acceptable to use a method resulting in death by suffocation or heat stress.  Because poultry are 
easily bruised or fractured and see humans as predators, handling of birds should be minimized 
and personnel must be trained in handling techniques (Kingston et al., 2005; Raj, 2008).  For 
example, the bones of laying hens are fragile and they must be handled humanely (Kingston et 
al., 2005). 
CO2 has been used in previous mass euthanasia situations and can be done in covered 
containers or dumpsters.  Water-based foam is a recently developed method of euthanasia, has 
been used for mass depopulation of poultry, and has proven to be effective and faster-acting than 
other methods.  N or Ar gas can also be used if completely airtight structures are available.  
Electrocution may be a humane and feasible choice, but only if the proper equipment is available 
and birds are consistently killed.  Chemical injection may be appropriate if a limited number of 
birds require euthanasia.  Cervical dislocation can be used if trained personnel are available, but 
may be impractical with large numbers of birds.  Percussive stunning through the use of the Cash 
Poultry Killer renders birds immediately unconscious and can be used on chickens, turkeys, 
ducks, and geese.  Decapitation is not recommended because of the mess, brutal appearance to 
observers, and inefficiency.  Ventilation shutdown, while approved in the UK, creates significant 
welfare concerns and is not a recommended method in the US.  Gunshot could be used in 
extreme circumstances, but is not suitable with large populations (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 
2011b).   
 Wild and exotic animals 
The American Association of Zoo Veterinarians (AAZV) has developed guidelines for 
euthanasia of nondomestic animals.  For captive ruminants in a zoo or game park, expert 
handlers should be consulted to determine appropriate methods.  When the animals closely 
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resemble domestic species, the identified methods for those species should be used.  If animals 
cannot be captured or restrained, gunshot is likely the only humane option for mass euthanasia.  
Projectile equipment with powerful injectable agents can also be utilized, but should be done so 
by veterinarians with expertise or training with exotic animals (NAHEMS, 2004; NAHEMS, 
2011b).  The stamping out of susceptible wildlife in the case of an FAD is difficult and will 
require a number of partnerships and solutions to eradicate the disease and protect wildlife 
populations (Tickle, 2003).  
 Aquatic species 
Traditionally, electrical or percussive stunning followed by exsanguination is used when 
fish are harvested.  They may also be euthanized by tricaine methane sulfonate solution or 
overdoses of immersion or injectable euthanasia agents.  Again, the AAZV guidelines should be 
considered and experts should be consulted (NAHEMS, 2011b). 
 Overall Welfare and Depopulation Considerations 
Blancou and Pearson (2003) note many times in history, dating back as far as 1499, that 
leaders called for notification and destruction of diseased or exposed livestock for the purposes 
of keeping the disease from spreading, even if it appeared cruel (Rubira, 2007).  Over time, 
animal welfare has improved due to eradication and treatment of disease and improved 
husbandry practices.  Yet, the primary drivers behind controlling major FAD are market access, 
public health, and the increasing public expectations for quality animal welfare (Rubira, 2007).  
While previous cost-benefit analysis have indicated stamping-out policies to be more 
advantageous, the “value that society now attaches to animal welfare and the environment have 
each altered the balance of the equation” (Yeh et al., 2013, p. 295).  
 Comparative study 
Researchers at Kansas State University studied the possibility of humanely depopulating 
cattle in a large feedlot in a timely and efficient manner while minimizing human and animal 
health concerns in response to an FMD outbreak.  An online Delphi survey and a roundtable 
discussion were used to gather expert opinions on mass depopulation from food animal 
pharmacologists, toxicologists, animal welfare specialists, feedlot veterinarians, and feedlot 
managers.  Depopulation methods, including toxicological agents, pharmacological agents, and 
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physical methods, were identified and evaluated based on time requirements, effectiveness of 
euthanasia, human health risk, animal welfare concerns, carcass disposal concerns, and supply 
availability (McReynolds, 2013). 
The only pharmacological agent considered highly effective for euthanasia was 
pentobarbital sodium IV.  Concerns did exist over cost, access to adequate supplies, and methods 
of carcass disposal.  Animal welfare concerns were minimal.  Veterinary consultants and feedlot 
managers saw captive bolt as minimally effective for mass depopulation.  However, captive bolt 
did offer minimal animal welfare concerns.  Gunshot was identified as moderately effective by 
veterinary consultants but feedlot managers considered this method as non-effective.  The use of 
sharpshooters to depopulate unrestrained and unsedated cattle resulted in high animal welfare, 
human safety, and public perception concerns.  Animal welfare concerns would also be extended 
to cattle within the vicinity of those being depopulated.  Overall, the panel did not find captive 
bolt and gunshot as effective means of mass depopulation in a large feedlot (McReynolds, 2013). 
Application of depopulation methods such as injection or captive bolt was a concern.  
Any method that required animals to move through a chute would limit the average feedlot to 
euthanizing about 1,000 animals per day.  In addition, removal of euthanized animals from 
chutes would slow down the process considerably.  Sedation was considered an option that 
allowed animals to be treated in a chute and then released for gunshot or captive bolt 
depopulation after sedation.  The only agent considered as an option for sedation was xylazine 
combined with ketamine.  Concerns do exist over the residue remains in dealing with carcass 
disposal (McReynolds, 2013). 
The only method considered highly effective by veterinary consultants and feedlot 
managers and considered most effective by all panelists was feeding a toxic agent, such as 
organophosphates, to cattle in feed bunks.  Depending on the compound used only a small 
amount of organophosphates would be necessary to cause acute death with minimal clinical 
signs.  The challenge would be to achieve consistent and adequate dosages through feed 
consumption.  The panel toxicologist estimated that 95% of cattle would die acutely from feed 
toxin and a secondary depopulation method would be needed for other 5%.  High or moderate 
welfare concerns were identified.  This method would be seen as mass depopulation, but not 
considered acceptable as a euthanasia method.  Questions do exist over the ability to dispose of 
carcasses and the impact disposal may have on the environment and the risks created for wildlife, 
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scavengers, and other animals.  These concerns kept this method from being considered 
acceptable (McReynolds, 2013). 
No consensus was reached on a clearly acceptable method that was considered safe, 
humane, and able to rapidly depopulate large numbers of cattle.  Panelists did agree that the most 
convenient and least costly method of depopulation would be sedation via intramuscular 
injection followed by euthanasia by captive bolt or gunshot after released from the working 
alley.  General consensus was reached that it would be difficult to depopulate a large feedlot 
quickly and humanely and further research is needed on alternatives for FMD control.  In 
addition, even though challenges exist with depopulation, it was also noted that timely and 
appropriate carcass disposal may actually be a more significant challenge (McReynolds, 2013). 
 Specific welfare issues 
Any method selected must be able to withstand professional and public scrutiny.  “It is 
imperative that animal welfare is the utmost concern and the process is humane” (Kingston et al., 
2005, p. 738).  Mass depopulation can best be minimized and animal welfare can best be 
protected by high levels of biosecurity, well-designed surveillance, and rapid alert systems.  
While killing a large number of animals may be the best option for disease control, it must be 
done quickly, without risking human safety, and without unduly compromising animal welfare 
(Berg, 2012).  The public is more likely to accept the depopulation of non-diseased animals 
when the disease is zoonotic, as proven by the reaction to mass destruction of the cattle 
population due to FMD in the UK, versus the depopulation of the entire poultry population in 
Hong Kong for HPAI (Rubira, 2007). 
Animal welfare in the case of an emergency will be optimized if proven principles of 
emergency preparedness and response are utilized.  While the optimal animal welfare solution is 
to prevent an animal disease outbreak, response strategies need to be developed that protect 
animal welfare in the case of an outbreak (Heath, 2012).  EU Regulation 1099/2009 states that in 
any depopulation operation an action plan must be created to ensure compliance with animal 
welfare regulations and to safeguard animal welfare in compliance with the OIE.  This applies to 
all countries in the EU and any country wanting to export to the EU (Berg, 2012). 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) identified Animal Emergency 
Responder credentials based on five states of animals: susceptible and infected, susceptible with 
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unknown exposure/disease status, susceptible but not infected or exposed, susceptible and dead, 
and not susceptible (Heath, 2012).  The incident commander should assign a safety officer with a 
focus on animal welfare concerns (Brown et al., 2005). 
There are a number of issues that complicate the welfare status of livestock impacted in a 
mass depopulation effort.  A delay in the euthanasia operation can create a number of welfare 
concerns.  Any method that causes delay is inhumane, because it may lead to increased spread of 
disease and ultimately increase unnecessary animal death (Lewis, 2003). 
Stocking density becomes a problem as animals nearing or passing their slaughter time 
are not allowed to be transported.  Welfare issues may also arise because feed may not be able to 
be delivered (Berg, 2012).  These issues could be compounded if vaccination-to-live or 
vaccination-to-die policies are implemented and animals are allowed to live longer but cannot be 
transported.  It is possible the vaccination may result in a slight increase in welfare depopulation, 
as animals live beyond their normal sale age and weight, or feed is not available (McLeod & 
Rushton, 2007).  The number of animals culled will increase with delays in disease diagnosis and 
if a vaccination-to-kill policy is implemented (Hagerman et al., 2012).  In addition, the 
destruction of animals without the intent to use the meat when it is safe for consumption leads to 
ethical debates and greater societal concerns (Berg, 2012). 
Audit systems or animal welfare assurance schemes do not exist for mass on-farm 
depopulation, and these events are unpredictable and not typically standardized.  Government 
contingency planning and emergency management must incorporate animal welfare 
considerations.  If the decision is made to depopulate, unnecessary animal suffering and stress 
should be avoided.  The entire process should be monitored from an animal welfare perspective 
to create a level of trust with the public.  Monitoring efforts should focus on animal handling 
prior to killing, the stun quality, and confirmation of death prior to disposal.  All personnel 
should be monitoring for these concerns and corrective actions must be taken if problems are 
identified.  In addition, a veterinarian with training in animal behavior, physiology, and 
identification of animal pain and suffering must be present with overall monitoring 
responsibility.  If handled correctly, there does not have be a contradiction between disease 
control through depopulation and acceptable animal welfare (Berg, 2012). 
As noted by Sebastian Heath, a division chief in the Department of Homeland Security, a 
delay in response due to uncertainty about the approach to take in an emergency (cull, treat, 
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vaccinate, or leave to recover) is the most likely situation to result in animal welfare concerns.  
Often the inability to decide is based on conflicting values over trade and animals lives.  In most 
cases, welfare can be managed if prioritized appropriately (Heath, 2012). 
Differing ethical theoretical approaches will influence perspectives on the welfare 
impacts of disease control policy alternatives.  The utilitarian theory is based on the idea that the 
most ethical choice maximizes good and minimizes bad.  A mass depopulation policy likely 
follows a utilitarian approach because the death of a prescribed number of animals reduces 
economic losses and protects the remainder of the animal population.  Rights-based theory 
(prescribed to by most animal rights groups) considers actions as either right or wrong based on 
moral rules.  Followers are likely to oppose mass depopulation because they see animals as 
having the right to live and do not believe decision makers have the moral authority to engage in 
mass depopulation.  Reactions from stakeholders will also be influenced by the stress and 
pressure created in an emergency and conflicts will occur internally and externally.  
Veterinarians will want to protect animal health, eliminate disease spread, and relieve animal 
suffering; farmers and ranchers will be concerned about the welfare of their animals and their 
own livelihoods; businesses will be focused on continuity and the long-term impacts; and the 
public will be concerned about their own health and the health of the animals and the 
environment (Hueston, 2007).   
The traditional tools of zoning and movement controls add to the welfare implications, as 
does the lack of rapid detection tools (Breeze, 2004).  The majority of animals in an outbreak has 
an unknown disease or exposure status and is most at risk for their welfare to be compromised 
(Heath, 2012).  Limiting animal movement that disrupts natural animal flows between facilities 
at different life stages will also lead to welfare concerns (Knight-Jones & Rushton, 2013).  In 
both cases, the creation of a geometric shape with a predefined radius and jurisdictional 
boundaries lead to the definition of the at-risk population of animals with unknown disease 
status.  These delineations do not necessarily reflect industry realities, weather, geography, or 
other environmental factors.  By considering more environmental and economic factors in 
defining the at-risk population, animal welfare situations can be more appropriately handled.  In 
addition, standard slaughter methods that have been monitored for humaneness should be 
adapted and used for depopulation (Heath, 2012).  Breeze (2004) noted that by utilizing 
computer modeling systems that consider weather and other factors, new zones can be created 
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that allow animals in the 3-km area to be monitored, but not necessarily destroyed.  In addition, 
on-site diagnosis could allow for animals to be slaughtered based on infection rather than 
proximity (GAO, 2005).  “Every effort should be made to minimize animal destruction” (Rubira, 
2007, p.333). 
 An example exercise 
In 2007, USDA APHIS and the Texas Animal Health Commission conducted a table-top 
exercise, known as Operation Palo Duro, dealing with an FMD outbreak in the Texas Panhandle.  
Two of the exercise focus areas were euthanasia and disposal in a mass depopulation event and 
the use of mass vaccination as a response strategy.  The high concentration of cattle in the region 
made exercise participants aware of the significant challenges to depopulation and disposal.  
Objectives developed during the exercise to depopulate within 72 hr and dispose of carcasses 
within 96 hr were not found to be feasible.  The plan before the exercise began was to euthanize 
cattle by captive bolt followed by exsanguination and rumenal opening for gas release.  Front-
end loaders would then be used to move carcasses to on-site burial locations.  When exercise 
participants realized they could not keep up with depopulation needs, they requested of the 
policy group that only cattle showing clinical signs would be depopulated and others would be 
vaccinated.  Their request was denied.  A few hours later, they requested gunshot be allowed as a 
depopulation method and were approved as long as sharpshooters were available and proper 
precautions were taken.  No prior planning of gunshot protocols for mass depopulation had 
occurred.  Participants concluded resource limitations, lack of trained professionals, realistic time 
assumptions, prioritization of resource use, detailed procedures for euthanasia methods, and 
resource lists needed to be considered and addressed (Giovachino, Speers, Morgan, Catarious, & 
Myrus, 2007).  There was general agreement that it was not feasible under any situation to 
complete depopulation and disposal on-site in 72 and 96 hr, respectively, due to the high 
livestock density (McReynolds, 2013).  Six years later, Palo Duro is still frequently cited by 
USDA APHIS officials as the reason stamping-out is unlikely to work and that we may not even 
have enough ammunition.  However, the same officials indicate stamping-out is still the first 
response that will be implemented (personal communication). 
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 Resource shortages 
Emergency depopulation will require significant resources (NAHEMS, 2011a).  Axelsen 
(2012) simulated the disease spread of FMD in California with the intent of evaluating 
alternative policy choices.  Two factors that were consistently significant in their analysis were 
the size and availability of depopulation resources and the amount of time necessary to ramp up 
to full implementation of depopulation protocols.  Depopulation was only used on infected 
premises and was critical to limiting disease.  If preemptive depopulation is used, the resources 
and personnel needed would be significant and, if they were not available in a timely fashion, 
would lead to increased disease spread (Axelsen, 2012).  In tabletop exercises conducted in 
Texas, they found the shortage of resources and personnel made the depopulation of 55,000 and 
70,000 head of cattle in two infected feedlots logistically impossible (NAHEMS, 2011a). 
APHIS and industry officials have expressed concern over the lack of a sufficient 
workforce to depopulate animals in the case of a large-scale animal disease outbreak.  As an 
example, APHIS officials indicated that it could take as long as 80 days to depopulate a 100,000 
head feedlot.  These concerns have also surfaced when discussing the shortage of large animal 
veterinarians in the workforce prepared to help protect animal and public health.  APHIS and 
DHS, through the NSTC Committee on Homeland and National Security subcommittee on 
Foreign Animal Disease Threats (FADT) identified the need to outline research gaps related to 
depopulation, disposal, and decontamination of diseased animals during a disease outbreak 
(GAO, 2009; GAO, 2011). 
Current U.S. policy would likely result in substantial stamping out, potentially leading to 
a shift in the national supply and restrictions on international trade (Hagerman et al., 2012).  The 
complexity of the impact and related analysis will increase with the use of a vaccination policy. 
 Vaccination consideration  
Depopulation as a disease response is well-founded in the veterinary field as the primary 
consideration for disease control.  While stamping out is the standard response, logistical, 
economic, societal, environmental, and animal welfare factors drive decision makers to consider 
other alternatives (Willis, 2003).  A paradigm shift will be required in the field of animal disease 
control that brings alternative response options to the table (Willis, 2003).  Vaccination as a 
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substitute for stamping out will help avoid the animal welfare issues caused by significant on-
farm depopulation (Morton, 2007).  
The policy of mass depopulation creates a number of factors for consideration including 
waste of animal protein, environmental impacts, economic impacts, and psychological effects in 
addition to animal welfare concerns.  “There is a growing trend in society to reject the excessive 
waste of valuable animal products, the negative environmental and animal welfare outcomes, and 
the devastating economic impacts on agricultural industries as well as on national economies.  
This is creating pressure for alternatives to mass animal slaughter and carcass disposal, and 
ultimately for a philosophical change in the approach to animal disease control, depopulation, 
and animal carcass disposal” (Willis, 2003, p. 149).   
If stamping out is not considered effective in regard to disease control, containment, and 
eradication, modified stamping out approaches will likely be considered.  But, according to 
APHIS, “it is not possible to delineate a priori the specific factors that might signal the need to 
modify the response to an FAD outbreak…the response will use a science- and risk-based 
approach  that protects public health and animal health, and stabilizes animal agriculture, the 
food supply, and the economy” (APHIS, 2012a, p. 22).  
Horn and Breeze (2003) noted it was obvious in the 1980s that traditional measures of 
quarantine, depopulation, and disposal would not be adequate to deal with an FAD especially in 
light of changing public opinion on animal welfare and the environment.  Alternatives to mass 
depopulation and disposal should be considered, and one alternative is vaccination. 
 Summary: Policy Implications 
Animal welfare deserves greater consideration in FAD policy development in regard to 
mass depopulation policy choices, euthanasia method selection, a potentially significant fall in 
livestock value, and overstocking and other implications of movement restrictions and trade ban 
implementation (Whiting, 2003).   
The decision to implement mass depopulation as a disease control strategy may be based 
on the protection of public health, elimination of animal suffering, prevention of suffering in 
susceptible animals, maintenance of a health national herd/flock and agricultural economy, and 
access to disease-free trading status and affiliated global economic advantages (Raj, 2008).  “An 
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ethical, socially integrated, and acceptable policy for the control of infectious disease in food-
producing animals needs to be developed” (Crispin et al., 2002, p. 881).   
Any contingency plan for dealing with animal emergencies must give serious 
consideration to animal welfare concerns, including the appropriate methods of euthanasia.  
Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food officials have indicated they believe human safety and 
animal welfare must outweigh economic considerations (Rietveld, 2003).  AVMA indicates 
guidelines must represent solid science and not be influenced by political pressure (Lewis, 2003). 
“Selection of the best method of emergency mass depopulation involves maximizing 
human health and safety while minimizing disease spread and animal welfare concerns” (Alphin 
et al., 2010, p. 1).  Humane depopulation methods must be considered an expectation in any 
animal disaster (CDFA, 2003).  Animal welfare concerns may be overridden, however, if human 
health and safety is at significant risk (Raj, 2008).  Euthanizing an animal is never a welcomed 
task, but every attempt needs to be made to avoid adding stress and suffering to the animals 
experience (CDFA, 2003).  “Treating animals in a humane manner is the right thing to do” 
(Grandin, 1996, p. 25).  Other ethical and social issues also may be considered when considering 
policy alternatives, including cultural or religious issues, environmental impacts, and global food 
security (Barnett et al., 2013). 
All current policies and regulations related to animal depopulation deserve further 
research, especially related to a large-scale animal disease outbreak or natural disaster.  Our 
livestock industry is more at risk then it has ever been.  Any emergency response plans that do 
not consider animal welfare are inadequate.  All methods of euthanasia need further review to 
determine which technologies are most appropriate in animal disasters of all types and to 
determine their overall effect on animal welfare and behavior.   
Related issues, such as transportation and movement restrictions, must be evaluated for 
their impact on animal welfare, and issues related to the euthanasia technologies, such as 
economics, environmental effects, public health, and public relations, need to be reviewed.  In 
addition, the impact of large-scale depopulation methods and policies will create an impact on 
producers that deserves attention. 
Vaccination policy alternatives in the case of an FAD outbreak are also worthy of 
additional discussion.  As noted by DeOtte and DeOtte (2009), depopulation with disposal may 
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simply not be feasible in regard to cost and logistics when dealing with a large number of 
animals. 
Clearly, a large number of issues surround animal welfare and euthanasia in a large-scale 
animal depopulation.  Any policies developed to deal with such disasters need to pay careful 
consideration to the issues discussed.  As the National Research Council (NRC) noted, there is a 
“pressing need” to understand the social and psychological impact of an attack on our food 
system and policy prescriptions must consider these concerns (NRC, 2002; Moon, Ascher, et al., 
2003; Moon, Kirk-Baer, et al., 2003).  This type of policy development requires a 
multidisciplinary approach that brings all players to the table.   
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Chapter 3 - Carcass Disposal Considerations 
The greatest logistical problem in any large-scale animal death loss is carcass disposal.  
While many technologies exist, the best method for carcass disposal remains an issue of 
uncertainty and matter of circumstance.  A number of factors must be considered in evaluating 
disposal alternatives.  Contingency plans must consider the economic costs and the availability 
of resources for the actual disposal, as well as the numerous related costs.  To develop a 
decision-making framework, policymakers must balance the scientific, economic, and social 
ramifications of disposal technologies (Ekboir, 1999).  The World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE), in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012b), notes that mass destruction and 
disposal typically result in “intense public and media scrutiny” (p. 1).  Carcass disposal 
operations must be conducted within acceptable scientific considerations that ensure pathogen 
destruction while satisfying animal welfare, public, and environmental concerns (OIE, 2005; 
OIE, 2012b).  For a response to be successful, disposal methods must be available, 
implementation must be feasible, resources accessible, sites pre-identified for development, 
appropriate interests engaged, biosecurity issues resolved, the public informed, and the response 
timely. 
A complete analysis of alternative methods of disposal for various situations is a 
necessity to determine the optimal alternative (Ekboir, 1999).  Balancing economic 
considerations with regulatory options to determine the best options for carcass disposal should 
be the policy goal (Adams, 1999). 
 Historical Background 
Historical carcass disposal events indicate that a multitude of issues must be considered 
when determining the appropriate process for disposing of infected and exposed carcasses.  The 
following summary of historical incidents justifies the need for effective and efficient carcass 
disposal policy in the US. 
 United Kingdom – Foot and mouth disease (FMD) 
The 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak provides the best historical example of large-scale carcass 
disposal.  The government faced the challenge of disposing of approximately 6 million carcasses 
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with limited disposal resources in a short time.  The large scale of the epidemic made carcass 
disposal a major problem.   
The 2002 U.K. National Audit Office (NAO) report summarizes the governmental issues 
related to the disease outbreak, including carcass disposal.  During the height of the outbreak, an 
average of 100,000 animals were slaughtered and disposed of each day in a large and complex 
operation.  In total, more than 6 million animals were slaughtered during the outbreak for disease 
control and welfare reasons; these totals do not include new born lambs and calves (NAO, 2002; 
Thomas, 2002).  In the areas where less infection occurred, authorities were able to keep up with 
the disposal needs.  However, in the worst hit areas, there were long delays in the slaughter and 
disposal of infected and exposed animals.  The existing contingency plan simply did not allow 
for sufficient handling of a situation of that scale (NAO, 2002; Hickman & Hughes, 2002). 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA; formerly the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods [MAFF]) maintained lead responsibility for the 
disposal of all animals (NAO, 2002; Thomas, 2002).  DEFRA’s veterinary officers initially 
directed the disposal operations.  The military was not immediately involved but within a month 
was playing a key role in assisting with the organization and logistics for slaughter, 
transportation, and disposal (NAO, 2002). 
Timely slaughter is critical to disease control, so disposal of infected and exposed 
carcasses is crucial in controlling the spread of some diseases if it holds up the slaughter process.  
Risk of disease transmission from carcasses is relatively low because the virus is not produced 
after death.  Carcasses awaiting disposal are at risk of attack from scavengers, which 
theoretically may spread the disease (NAO, 2002). 
The massive scale of disposal required by destroying livestock on infected and exposed 
farms led to problems in disease control, communication, and public perception (Thomas, 2002).  
By mid-April, a back log of 200,000 carcasses awaiting disposal existed.  During the first seven 
weeks of the epidemic, it was commonplace for dead animals to remain on the ground awaiting 
disposal for four days or more.  The scale of the epidemic combined with resource shortages in 
both animal health officers and leak-proof transport for off-farm disposal contributed to the 
problem.  The risk of disease spread resulting from off-farm disposal and the need for robust 
biosecurity protocols to minimize virus spread during transport and subsequent disposal was of 
141 
 
major concern.  The shortage of environmentally suitable and safe disposal sites also led to the 
delay (NAO, 2002; Hickman & Hughes, 2002). 
The legal and environmental framework for disposal of carcasses and animal byproducts 
had changed significantly since the UK’s last outbreak in 1967-68.  Disposal plans recognized 
that disposal methods needed to be acceptable to the Environment Agency and local authorities.  
Slaughter at a location close to the infected premises was critical to slowing the spread of the 
disease.  At that time, on-farm burial was initially considered the preferred method followed by 
on-farm burning.  However, on-farm disposal proved to be impractical because of environmental 
constraints and high water tables.  In mid-March 2001, the Environment Agency began 
conducting a rapid (within 3 hr) groundwater site assessment and advised on appropriate 
disposal.  The Environment Agency also approved a disposal hierarchy for different species and 
age of stock (see Table 3-1).  In addition, the Department of Public Health issued guides on how 
the risks to public health could be minimized.  The stakeholders then agreed on a disposal 
hierarchy that attempted to protect public health, safeguard the environment, and ensure FMD 
control.  Cost was a material, but much less important factor.  This new focus on environment 
and public health was substantially different from the initial approach based on animal health 
risks and logistics (NAO, 2002; Hickman & Hughes, 2002). 
 
Table 3-1 National Audit Office Report: Approved Disposal Routes for Different Species and 
Age of Stock  
Preferred Method of Disposal Permitted Animals 
Rendering All 
High-temperature incineration All 
Landfill, on approved sites Sheep, pigs of any age & cattle younger than 5 
years of age (due to BSE concerns) 
Burning All (with a limit of 1,000 cattle per pyre) 
Mass burial or approved on-farm 
burial 
Sheep, pigs of any age & cattle younger than 5 
years of age (due to BSE concerns) 
Note. Adapted from NAO (2002, p. 73). 
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Rendering and fixed plant incineration methods were preferred, but the necessary 
resources were not immediately available and the capacity would only cover a portion of the 
disposal needs.  Disposal in commercial landfills was seen as the next best environmental 
solution, but legal, commercial, and local community problems limited landfill use.  With these 
limitations in mind, pyre burning was the initial method used, but was eliminated as a preferred 
method following the increasing public, scientific, and political concerns.  Mass burial and on-
farm burial was last on the preferred method list due to the bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) complications and the risk to the groundwater (Hickman & Hughes, 2002).  The hierarchy 
and individual case characteristics determined the methods utilized.  Decisions were impacted by 
the availability of nearby rendering capacity, the relative risks of transporting carcasses, and 
suitability of sites for burial and burning.  Even with the new hierarchy in place, burial, and 
burning remained a common choice because of the need to slaughter expeditiously and limit 
transportation of carcasses.  Overall, burning was the most common method of carcass disposal 
(29%), followed by rendering (28%), landfill (22%), and burial (18%) (NAO, 2002; Thomas, 
2002). 
The disposal of millions of slaughtered animals created huge logistical problems.  
DEFRA cited problems with all disposal methods.  Rendering was unavailable until rendering 
plants complied with necessary biosecurity protocols and transportation vehicles were adequately 
sealed.  In March 2001, protocols for biosecurity of rendering plants and vehicles were approved.  
However, until late in the epidemic when numbers of animals began to diminish, the rendering 
plants could not handle the volume.  High-temperature incineration was also difficult to utilize 
because the facilities were committed to the disposal of BSE-affected cattle.  Air-curtain 
incinerators were used on occasion.  Landfill operators and local communities were resistant to 
the use of landfills for disposal because they were often located near large population centers.  
While 111 suitable facilities were identified, only 29 were utilized.  More than 950 locations 
were used for burning, with most located on farms.  However, the use of mass pyres generated a 
negative response from the media and profoundly affected the tourism industry.  These mass 
burnings ended in two months because of the public opposition.  Mass burial was the selected 
alternative when carcasses began to stack up.  Public protests and technical problems such as 
carcass liquid seepage resulted when 1.3 million carcasses were disposed of in mass burial sites.  
Despite the public concerns about the disposal process, DEFRA, the Environment Agency, 
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military and local organizations eventually improved disposal efficiency and eliminated the 
backlog of carcasses (NAO, 2002). 
Carcass disposal was a highly controversial issue.  Public backlash, especially in response 
to burning and mass burial, was significant and long-term economic impacts remain in question 
(NAO, 2002).  Burning of carcasses on open pyres was an enormous task requiring substantial 
materials and generating significant amounts of ash for disposal.  These pyres were viewed 
unfavorably by local residents and producers.  The images of burning carcasses were broadcast 
via television around the world and likely contributed to the wider economic damage, especially 
to the tourism industry.  Local residents disliked mass burial as well.  The general public reacted 
most positively to the rendering alternative (Rossides, 2002).  At the beginning of the outbreak, 
the priority was to eradicate the disease.  While DEFRA realized cost control was important, it 
was also clear that all steps to stop the disease needed to be taken regardless of expense 
(Hickman & Hughes, 2002).   
NAO offered multiple recommendations for future contingency plans.  One example of 
their recommendations is to develop a clear chain of command with defined roles and 
responsibilities, reporting lines, and accountabilities.  They also recommended researching the 
effectiveness and efficiency of disposal methods of slaughtered animals and continually 
inspecting and monitoring the environmental impact of disposal sites (NAO, 2002). 
In response to the government-commissioned inquiries, the U.K. government noted the 
need for multiple strategies for different disease situations.  They are committed to reviewing 
preventive culling and vaccination policies.  The government also noted that the disposal 
hierarchy in its current contingency plan differs, due to lessons learned, from the hierarchy 
agreed upon during the actual FMD outbreak by the Environment Agency and Department of 
Health.  The new hierarchy indicates the first preference will be commercial incineration 
followed by rendering and disposal in licensed landfills.  The need for pre-determined 
agreements ensuring minimum rendering capacity and use of national landfill sites was also 
identified.  Mass burn pyres are not advised and on-farm burial will only be used if demand 
exceeds capacity of the preferred options (Veterinary Record, 2002; NAO, 2002).  The 2005 
NAO report also states that on-farm burial and open pyres are environmentally undesirable and 
concludes that they should only be used when no other alternatives are available or in remote 
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areas.  In a small outbreak, disposal should occur through incineration or rendering.  In larger 
outbreaks, commercial landfill sites may be used (NAO, 2005).   
Further review of the environmental impact by the Environment Agency found 212 
reported water pollution incidents, mostly minor.  Forty-four percent were caused by slurry, 24% 
by carcass disposal during burial, 18% by disinfection, and 13% by runoff from culling and 
carcasses prior to disposal.  None of the pollution problems were on-going problems in private or 
public water supplies.  Additional monitoring has not shown any ongoing air quality 
deterioration, and concentrations of dioxins in soil samples near pyres are the same as before the 
outbreak (Harman, 2001). 
One portion of disposal efforts was the Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme (LWDS), a 
voluntary program for farmers to dispose of animals that were not directly affected by FMD, but 
could not be moved to alternative accommodations or markets.  Because transportation of 
animals was restricted, it made it difficult and, in some cases, impossible to move market-ready 
animals to open markets.  The Rural Payments Agency paid farmers £205 million (U.S. $295 
million) for the slaughter of 2 million animals from 18,000 farms.  The program cost £164 
million (U.S. $236 million), including operating costs, disposal charges, slaughter fees, 
transportation of animals, and administration (NAO, 2002).  The FMD Inquiry commissioned by 
the House of Commons lists specific costs expended by the government, as noted in Table 3-2.  
Direct and indirect costs are identified in many areas of disease control (farmer compensation, 
vaccination, cleaning and disinfecting, staff time, etc.), including costs resulting from the 
slaughter and disposal of livestock, either to control the disease or deal with animal welfare.  
Total expenditures by the government were estimated to be more than £2.8 billion (U.S. $4.32 
billion), with more than £1 billion related to direct costs of control measures.  This included £252 
million (U.S. $317 million) for haulage and disposal (Anderson, 2002; NAO, 2002).  
In addition to the LWDS, the cost of disposal of infected and exposed carcasses was 
significant.  Goods and services were purchased from a range of private and public sector 
businesses, including transportation and construction services, materials required for burn pyres, 
and slaughter services.  Landfill operators received substantial sums for receiving slaughtered 
animals and landowners were paid several million pounds for allowing their land to be used as 
mass burial sites.  DEFRA was forced to pay premium fees to get the work done in the necessary 
time frame.  For example, in order to build the burial pits, crews worked 24 hr a day, seven days 
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a week and were paid substantial amounts of overtime, nighttime, and weekend wages.  Similar 
construction would have taken two years if tight deadlines did not exist.  Because many small 
local firms were fearful of becoming involved with the crisis, shortages of goods and services 
existed and, thus, increased costs.  Work with infected carcasses was also considered hazardous 
duty, which caused contracting firms to charge premium rates.  DEFRA purchased coal and old 
discarded wooden railway sleepers to be used for pyres at prices five to 10 times higher than 
normal (Anderson, 2002; NAO, 2002). 
Substantial costs were also incurred in protecting the environment and public health from 
carcass disposal risks; this included costs related to preparing safe locations and transporting to 
these locations.  Construction costs for burial pits, for example, were substantial with DEFRA 
acquiring land for seven mass burial pits.  These pits had to be designed from scratch to be 
environmentally acceptable and required heavy investment to stop the release of leachate (animal 
body fluids) into watercourses, protect surface water, and allow for disposal of contaminants.  
The total cost of the pits was £79 million (U.S. $114 million) of the disposal costs, not including 
restoration, monitoring, and maintenance.  In one case, after the site had been partially filled, it 
was found to be unacceptable.  The 18,000 carcasses buried were exhumed and burnt at a cost of 
more than £2 million (U.S. $2.9 million) (NAO, 2002). 
High temperature incineration was costly at more than £500 (U.S. $720) per ton.  Dealing 
with the ash from incineration and mass pyres was expensive because of the difficulties in 
disposal.  In dealing with all expenses, DEFRA often found itself in a weak position for 
negotiating contracts and fee rates.  This position forced the department to pay higher prices for 
almost all goods and services.  Purchase controls were also weak.  Because purchases were often 
made quickly, DEFRA did not benefit from bulk or surplus purchase prices.  Normal procedures 
for authorization of department expenses were bypassed and contracts were not awarded 
competitively.  Many contracts, amounting to millions of pounds, were agreed to in a few hours 
instead of the normal period of several weeks.  The rates charged by contractors for labor, 
materials, and services varied greatly from one to another.  By April 2001, DEFRA began to 
impose some cost controls, but was still unable to be cost effective and efficient (NAO, 2002; de 
Klerk, 2002). 
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Table 3-2 Expenditures by the Government During the 2001 Outbreak of FMD in the UK  
Activity 
Actual Expenditures 
to 24 May 2002 (£ 
million/US$ million) 
Payments to farmers  
Compensation paid to farmers for animals culled and items seized or 
destroyed 
1,130 (1627) 
Payments to farmers for animals slaughtered for welfare reasons 
(Livestock welfare disposal scheme - £205.4 million (US$295.8 
million); Light lambs scheme - £5.3 million (US$7.6 million) 
211 (304) 
Total payments to farmers 1,341 (1931) 
Direct costs of measures to deal with the epidemic  
Haulage, disposal, and additional building work 252 (363) 
Cleansing and disinfection 295 (425) 
Extra human resource costs 217 (313) 
Administration of the Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme including 
operating costs, disposal charges, and slaughter fees 
164 (236) 
Payments to other Government departments, local authorities, agencies 
and others 
73 (105) 
Miscellaneous, including serology, slaughterers, animal value 
appraisers, equipment and vaccine 
68 (98) 
Legal claims against the Department 5 (7) 
Total direct costs of measures to deal with the epidemic 1,074 (1547) 
Other Costs  
Cost of government departments’ staff time 100 (144) 
Support measures for businesses affected by the outbreak (includes EU 
funds) 
282 (406) 
Total other costs 382 (550) 
TOTAL COSTS 2,797 (4028) 
Note. Adapted from NAO (2002, p. 82), Anderson (2002). 
 
At the time of the 2007 outbreak, incineration remained at the top of the disposal 
hierarchy.  Apparently, however, no planning exercises had covered contingency planning down 
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to the details of carcass disposal.  The incineration company located near the outbreak and used 
for disposal, Wessex Incineration, is one of the most advanced in the country, but no pre-existing 
contract was in place and they had not been previously briefed regarding biosecurity measures or 
involved in any contingency planning (Anderson, 2008).  
 Taiwan – FMD 
In 1997, Taiwan experienced an outbreak of FMD that resulted in slaughter and disposal 
of about 5 million animals.  Carcass disposal methods included burying, rendering, and 
incineration/burning.  With the disposal choice dependent on farm locations, burial in landfills 
was the most common method.  Swine producers were allowed to send hogs to nearby rendering 
plants.  High water tables and complex environmental regulations complicated disposal.  In areas 
where water resources were endangered, incineration with portable incinerators and open 
burning were the only approved methods.  Army personnel completed the majority of the 
disposal work.  At the peak of the crisis, disposal capacity reached 200,000 pigs, which caused 
many farms to wait for one to four weeks before animals could be slaughtered.  The delay was 
blamed on lack of manpower and equipment, and there were large-scale death losses during the 
waiting periods.  The manpower shortage was alleviated with military assistance.  The disposal 
method depended on the availability of landfill sites, level of the water table, proximity to 
residences, availability of equipment, and other environmental factors.  Major issues related to 
carcass disposal included the number of animals involved, biosecurity concerns over movement 
of infected and exposed animals, people and equipment, environmental concerns, and extreme 
psychological distress and anxiety of emergency workers (Ekboir, 1999; Ellis, 2001; Yang, Chu, 
Chung, & Sung, 1999).   
The costs borne by the government associated with the epidemic were estimated at 
$187.5 million, with expenses for carcass disposal comprising approximately $24.6 million of 
the total (Yang et al., 1999).  A comparative cost analysis showed that burying was the least 
expensive and easiest form of disposal, with 32.5% of total disposal costs covering 80% of the 
carcasses.  Rendering was more costly, with only 15% of the carcasses being rendered for 26.1% 
of the costs.  The most expensive method was burning or incineration with 41.4% of disposal 
expenses being used to dispose of 5% of the carcasses.  In addition to direct costs, the Taiwanese 
swine industry faced an estimated loss of $1.6 billion as a result of production and export loss.  
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Related agribusinesses such as feed mills, pharmaceutical companies, equipment manufacturers, 
meat packers, auction markets and the transportation industry all suffered economic losses (Yang 
et al., 1999). 
The use of mass vaccination in Taiwan could have impacted disposal costs, by either 
delaying the urgency of large-scale disposal efforts or by reducing the number of animals in need 
of disposal.  Additional analysis implies mass vaccination was the cheapest way to eliminate the 
spread of the disease and future consideration should be given to cost-benefit analysis of 
vaccination and limited depopulation versus total depopulation (Ekboir, 1999; Ellis, 2001).   
 South Korea – FMD 
In South Korea, after the burial of about 3 million carcasses during the 2010 FMD 
outbreak, the environment ministry became concerned about the public health repercussions.  
Some cattle were buried alive because of limited euthanasia drugs.  Limited precautions were 
taken in carcass burial because of the inability to keep up with the demand for disposal.  Animals 
were buried in more than 4,000 locations and, in some cases, were buried no more than 5 m deep 
in pits lined only with one layer of plastic sheeting.  Due to rainfall leaching through the pits, 
rivers and aquifers were subject to contamination, making drinking water potentially hazardous 
(Mesmer, 2011; Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011).  The outbreak and disposal 
response resulted in contamination of some underground water resources, leachate reaching 
residential homes, and the public was critical of government for their slow response because 
carcasses continued to threaten the water supply (Miller, 2011).  In one case, water mixed with 
blood was seen in faucets in a village infected by FMD (Bryant, 2011).  During the outbreak, 
leaders called for measures to prevent water pollution, including the possibility of installing 
blocking walls in disposal sites and removing waste with pumps.  Local governments were 
encouraged to consider building incinerators to burn carcasses instead of burial as a method of 
disposal (Miller, 2012b).  In several cases, water near public schools was determined unfit for 
use (GAO, 2011).  Government officials responded by committing to expert site surveys of the 
4,632 disposal sites and the installation of automatic sensors to monitor leakage (OLPC, 2012). 
 Virginia and Delmarva Peninsula – Avian influenza 
Two major outbreaks of avian influenza (AI) have impacted Rockingham County, 
Virginia, over the last 20 years.  In 1984, more than 5,700 t of poultry carcasses required 
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disposal and another 16,900 t were disposed of in 2002.  On-site burial accounted for 87.5% of 
the carcasses in 1984, with the remaining carcasses disposed of in landfills.  On-site burial cost 
and landfill costs were $25/t for a total of $142,000.  In that outbreak, 1.4 million birds were 
destroyed at a total economic cost of $40 million, and disposal costs accounted for less than .5% 
of total costs (Brglez, 2003).   
While carcasses take 6 months to decompose when composted, they can take several 
years to totally decompose in landfills or on-site burial pits.  An example of this occurred in 
Virginia when a school was built in the late 1990s on a 1984 AI burial site and people were 
shocked to find the carcasses in near complete condition with little decomposition.  This caused a 
change in state law requiring landowners to agree to record carcass burial on their property deed 
if they are applying for an on-site burial permit (Brglez, 2003).  Additional research and 
excavation of burial sites has shown carcasses can remain relatively intact for several years 
(Glanville, 2006; Flory, Bendfeldt, & Peer, 2006a; Blake et al., 2008). 
In the 2002 Virginia outbreak, 4.7 million birds were destroyed and disposed.  Landfills, 
slaughter, incineration, composting, and burial where used in the disposal process (Puffenbarger, 
2003).  Initially, on-site burial was the preferred method, but was stopped due to public concern 
over well contamination (Wilkinson, 2007).  Two primary landfill sites were used and more than 
64% of total tonnage was shipped over 160 mi to these landfill sites.  The cost to dispose in the 
landfill was $45/t, but more than $1 million in transportation expenses was expended for 
specially prepared trucks.  In one case, the waste management plant associated with a landfill 
could not handle the ammonia leachate produced (Brglez, 2003).  The distance, expense, and 
shortage of trucks for transportation of carcasses made landfilling problematic (Wilkinson, 
2007). 
Four incinerators were used late in the process due to slow negotiations.  For 29 days, 76 
t/day were disposed through the incinerators.  The total cost of disposing of 3,023 t was 
$317,616.16 at a rate of approximately $105/t, including transportation.  Transporting the 
carcasses to the quarry where the incinerators were located cost $267,908 for truck rental and 
mileage.  Other costs included the rental of incinerators and labor for $810,389, screener rental 
and screening of ashes for $75,283, removing ashes and delivering as fertilizer for $173,466, and 
wood fuel costs of $477/t.  This was an expensive process, and the stench and related public 
perception resulted in a negative externality (Brglez, 2003).   
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In the case of controlled slaughter, diseased birds were quarantined until the virus ran its 
course.  Once the birds tested negative, they were sent to slaughter.  Slaughtering protocols were 
used for 943,000 birds from 40 AI-positive flocks.  With the implementation of a new state 
disposal protocol requiring all flocks be depopulated within 24 hr of disease confirmation, this 
practice came to an end.  Controlled slaughter is less expensive, creates less waste and 
environmental impact, and generates producer income from the sale of the birds.  However, 
consumer response was not positive because of concerns of disease transmission.  Concerns also 
exist over increased biosecurity needs in the processing plant, transportation of live birds, 
keeping live birds on the farm, and possible virus mutation into a highly pathogenic strain.  
There is also a potential negative in the export market.  It will not likely be acceptable in future 
outbreaks (Flory et al., 2006a).  
A small percentage of the birds, about 43,000, in the 2002 outbreak were composted 
using in-vessel composting and windrow composting inside the poultry houses.  The in-house 
composting was considered more successful and less challenging (Wilkinson, 2007).  Because 
on-farm methods are preferable, in-house composting has some advantages, but has greater 
logistical demands and longer-term management than some other options.  It is highly biosecure, 
relatively inexpensive, requires minimal equipment and personnel, requires no government 
approval or permits, and has limited negative perceptions in the public (Flory, Bendfeldt, & Peer, 
2006b). 
In the 2004 outbreak of (low pathogenic avian influenza) LPAI in Delaware, Maryland, 
and Virginia, composting was used significantly.  In the 2004 LPAI outbreak on the Delmarva 
Peninsula, in-house composting was used to dispose of poultry carcasses.  The virus was 
contained to three farms and the disease was eradicated in 14 days.  In the same year, 
composting was used to dispose of half of the 1.2 million birds impacted by HPAI in British 
Columbia, Canada.  These disposal scenarios and the success of composting disposal efforts 
brought composting to the top of the preferred methods list by some researchers (Malone, Cloud, 
Alphin, Carr, & Tablante, 2004; Flory et al., 2006a; Bendfeldt, Flory, & Peer, 2006; Wilkinson, 
2007; Vanier et al., 2008; EPA, 2006).  
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 Wisconsin – Chronic Wasting Disease 
In February of 2002, Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) was identified in whitetail deer in 
southwest Wisconsin.  CWD is a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE).  In order to 
control the disease, a 360-sq m disease eradication zone and surrounding management zone was 
developed.  All deer within the zone were designated for elimination and deer in the surrounding 
area were designated to be reduced.  Many of the deer were destroyed by citizen hunters, but 
they could not be used for venison.  Disposal methods were selected that did not endanger 
animal or human health or environmental quality.  Selected methods had to be able to handle a 
large number of carcasses and be regulatory compliant.  Cost was also a consideration, and 
disposal costs were considered one of the most significant expenses of the CWD control 
program.  The four preferred methods identified were landfilling, rendering, incineration, and 
chemical digestion (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources [WDNR], 2002).  
The aggressive approach of WDNR was not effective.  Hunters and the general public 
created significant backlash.  Since 2002, the geographic region where CWD exists in Wisconsin 
has grown extensively, and in 2010 the WDNR changed their focus to limiting the geographic 
spread of the disease.  The revised goals included continued support of the proper disposal of 
carcass parts, road kill, and butcher waste inside and outside of Wisconsin to reduce the risk of 
disease transmission.  Further research confirms landfills as safe and reliable, and the Wisconsin 
legislature passed a bill protecting landfills from financial liability.  Nonetheless, landfill 
operators, local government officials, and municipal wastewater treatment facility workers 
remain concerned about landfilling deer.  The WDNR continues to work to increase available 
landfills by working with these officials to educate them on the safety and cost-effectiveness of 
landfill use and providing indemnification to landfills that accept carcasses and butcher waste 
(WDNR, 2010).  In 2009, WDNR restricted the movement of carcasses and select carcass parts 
from wild-deer from the CWD management zone or other infected states to non-infected parts of 
the state.  In the last 11 years the presence of CWD has increased dramatically in all sex and age 
classes of deer despite WDNR efforts.  More than 20% of adult male deer are estimated to have 
CWD (an increase from 8-10% in 2002) and the prevalence in females has increased to 9% from 
about 3-4%.  The disease is currently in 18 counties in Wisconsin, as well as Colorado, Illinois, 
Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, New Mexico, 
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Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming, Alberta, and 
Saskatchewan (WDNR, 2013). 
 United States – Natural disasters 
Three natural disasters – the Texas floods in 1998, Hurricane Floyd in North Carolina in 
1999 and a blizzard in South Dakota in fall 2013 – have provided similar yet smaller scale 
carcass disposal experiences.  Dee Ellis of the Texas Animal Health Commission (TXAHC) 
reviewed the Texas and North Carolina disasters, collected data, and performed numerous 
personal interviews.  His findings are summarized as follows.  
In October 1998, torrential downpours in south central Texas resulted in the flooding of 
the San Marcos, Guadalupe, San Antonio, and Colorado River Basins.  More than 23,000 cattle 
were drowned or lost in addition to hundreds of swine, sheep, and horses.  The TXAHC worked 
with state emergency personnel from the Governor’s Division of Emergency Management, the 
Texas Department of Transportation, and the Texas Forest Service to manage the disposal of 
animal carcasses.  Local emergency response personnel played integral roles in the actual 
disposal process.  Most animal carcasses were buried (where found if possible) or burned in air-
curtain incinerators.  Two air-curtain incinerators were utilized.  One difficulty that arose was 
finding a burn site that was not located on saturated ground.  Carcasses must be disposed of in a 
timely manner before decomposition makes movement of the remains nearly impossible.  Some 
carcasses were inaccessible and began to decompose before actual disposal could take place.  
According to Ellis, the main carcass disposal issues were the lack of prior delineation or 
responsibilities between agencies, no carcass disposal plans and pre-selected disposal sites, a 
short window of time to complete disposal, minimal pre-disaster involvement between animal 
health and local emergency officials, and inaccessibility of some carcasses (Ellis, 2001). 
In September 1999, Hurricane Floyd devastated North Carolina.  The hurricane, 
combined with earlier heavy rains, resulted in the worst floods in state history.  Animal loss was 
estimated at 28,000 swine, 2,860,000 poultry, and 600 cattle.  Disposal of dead animals was 
coordinated by the North Carolina Department of Agriculture.  Costs were partially subsidized at 
a cost of $5 million by the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Emergency 
Watershed Protection program (Ellis, 2001).  Total disposal costs exceeded $10 million and total 
agricultural loss neared $813 million (Wilson, 2003b). 
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The North Carolina State Veterinarian coordinated disposal to ensure safety for human 
health and the environment.  Major problems related to carcass disposal included contamination 
of drinking water sources, fly control, odor control, zoonotic disease introduction, and removal 
and transport of carcasses.  These problems were compounded in the cases of highly 
concentrated swine and poultry losses on heavily flooded property.  The order of preference for 
disposal in North Carolina is rendering, burial, composting, and incineration.  However, 
rendering capacity was so limited that it was not a viable option.  Burial was the most widely 
used option and was utilized for 80% of swine, 99% of poultry, and 35% of cattle.  Incineration 
was used for the remainder of the carcasses.  Most burial took place on the land of the livestock 
producers.  They were offered a financial incentive to bury on their own land in order to 
minimize transport of carcasses.  However, this process led to additional environmental concerns 
because producers often buried carcasses in saturated ground that allowed carcass runoff to leach 
back into ground drinking water or local water resources.  This threat caught the attention of 
environmental watch groups and the national media, resulting in a study group that created a 
multi-agency approach and animal burial guidelines for future use.  Ellis summarized the major 
issues in North Carolina to be the high number of dead swine located near populated areas, 
environmental threats to groundwater and water resources, interagency jurisdictional conflicts, 
lack of well-developed carcass disposal plans, and minimal involvement of animal health 
officials with the state emergency management system (Ellis, 2001). 
On October 4, 2013, an early autumn blizzard hit South Dakota bringing over 4 feet of 
snow in some parts of the state and killing an estimated 15,000 to 30,000 cattle.  It was expected 
the state lost 5% of its cattle population, and some ranchers lost more than half of their herd.  
Ranchers were told they could burn, bury, or render cattle carcasses and encouraged to dispose 
of them as rapidly as possible.  In Pennington County, emergency management officials prepared 
two, 20-ft deep, 60-ft wide disposal pits in accordance with Animal Industry Board guidelines.  
The pits were opened for ranchers to use 10 days after the storm on October 14.  For some 
ranchers, the pits were more than 100 mi away.  Regulations require that carcasses be buried at 
least 4 ft deep or disposed of in a licensed rendering plant within 36 hr of death (although the 
governor waived the time requirement).  Burial is restricted within 1,000 ft from surface water, 
floodplains, rivers, and public and private drinking wells.  Limitations on burial also exist when 
the pit is primarily sand or gravel, or the aquifer is less than 20 ft from the bottom of the pit.  It is 
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anticipated many cattle would be disposed of where they were found.  Saturated ground previous 
to the snowstorm combined with wet weather after the storm made it difficult for ranchers to 
even locate dead cattle because high winds and the storm itself moved cattle tens of miles from 
their original location.  Carcass disposal was not an immediate priority because the focus of most 
ranchers was on the cattle that survived (Lammers, 2013; Brokaw, 2013).   
 Other examples 
The need for mass carcass disposal can occur without a disease outbreak or natural 
disaster.  For example, in Northern Ireland in 2009, 4,300 cattle, along with hundreds of tons of 
meat, had to be destroyed and disposed of because the animals were provided feed contaminated 
with dioxins.  While relatively small compared to a disease outbreak, the costs were millions of 
dollars and the culling lasted three weeks.  Rendering and disposal was highly controversial and, 
while initially told they would not receive reimbursement, policies were changed so producers 
earned 70% of the animals’ and products’ market value.  Officials determined that existing 
agreements needed to be reviewed and revised (Hayes, 2009). 
 Current Policy 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 [HSPD-9] established a national policy to 
defend the nation’s agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 
other emergencies (Federal Food and Agriculture Decontamination and Disposal Roles and 
Responsibilities [FFADDRR], 2005).  The effective disposal of carcasses and related material is 
fundamental to a successful response.  The goal of disposal operations is to “eliminate in a 
timely, safe, biosecure, aesthetically acceptable, and environmentally responsible manner all 
animal carcasses that result from an animal health incident” (NAHEMS, 2012, p. ii).  All 
materials that cannot be cleaned or disinfected must also be disposed.  Disposal sites must be 
evaluated and appropriate methods must be selected (NAHEMS, 2005b; EPA, 2006). 
 National Animal Health Management System 
The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services 
(VS) National Animal Health Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines call for a coordinated 
effort between local, state, and federal governments and the private sector to assess the 
emergency, respond, control the situation, and ensure recovery.  It also calls for the emergency 
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management community and the agricultural community to work together (APHIS, 2002; 
NAHEMS, 2005a; NAHEMS, 2012).   
The disposal response goal as noted in the NAHEMS Foreign Animal Disease 
Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) is to “properly dispose of contaminated and 
potentially contaminated materials, including animal carcasses, as quickly as possible while 
maximizing pathogen containment, environmental sustainability, stakeholder acceptance, and 
cost effectiveness” (NAHEMS, 2012, p. 1).   
The 2005 NAHEMS guidelines list burial as the preferred method of disposal, and noted 
that other methods could be considered under certain circumstances (NAHEMS, 2005b).  The 
revised NAHEMS guidelines on disposal that were made available to the public in March 2013 
have an increased emphasis on environmental considerations in the decision process and no 
longer indicate burial as a preferred method.  Instead, the guidelines indicate six methods that are 
most likely to be considered: composting, rendering, permitted landfill or burial, fixed-facility 
incineration, air-curtain incineration, and open-air or uncontrolled burning.  The guidelines also 
note potential emerging technologies and mention the importance of engaging an experienced 
professional in waste management during the decision process (NAHEMS, 2012).  
Pre-planning and preparation are critical to a successful response.  History has proven, in 
the case of catastrophic disposal, when procedures are not pre-approved and preparation has not 
taken place, the consequences will include delayed responses, conflict, and increased costs 
(Blake et al., 2008).  Therefore, policy approaches that address the appropriate methods of 
carcass disposal are necessary.  
 Government and agency roles 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in coordination with the USDA, 
Department of Health and Human Service (HHS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
Department of Defense (DOD) was tasked with documenting Federal Food and Agriculture 
Decontamination and Disposal Roles and Responsibilities (FFADDRR) in animal, crop, and 
food incidents.  The document is consistent with the National Response Framework (NRF).  
There are three levels of response: level 1 – local/limited response, level 2 – state/regional 
response, and level 3 – national response (FFADDRR, 2005).   
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HSPD-9 identifies the USDA and HHS as “responsible for recovery efforts that rapidly 
remove and effectively dispose of contaminated food and agriculture products or infected plants 
and animals” (GAO, 2011, p. 17).  The Food and Agriculture Incident Annex charges USDA, 
HHS, and EPA to “provide technical assistance and guidance to State, tribal, and local 
authorities who are coordinating the disposal of contaminated food, animal carcasses, or plants” 
(DHS, 2008a, p. 7). 
 Local and state roles 
Most decontamination and disposal responsibilities are at the state level.  Most disposal 
actions will occur at the local level with guidance from federal agencies when appropriate 
(FFADDRR, 2005).  USDA APHIS provides guidance for carcass disposal to local and state 
government though NAHEMS, and the EPA Office of Solid Waste provides guidance to assist 
local decision makers as well (Marburger, 2007).   
State solid waste agencies, in cooperation with USDA, are responsible for management 
of carcass disposal in the case of a foreign animal disease (FAD).  Local and state emergency 
management disposal plans should be predetermined and federal documents specifically 
recommend landfills be identified for disposal.  Local and state plans will be supported by 
federal resources.  Disposal efforts will be focused on stopping disease spread, protecting human 
health and the environment, and conserving meat and animal protein if appropriate.  Specific 
disposal decisions will be finalized by individual states based on pathogen/agent and site-specific 
conditions (FFADDRR, 2005).   
In the ICS, there will be disposal unit leader and multiple disposal team managers and 
members.  The disposal group is in the disease management branch in the operations section of 
ICS (FFADDRR, 2005).  APHIS identifies the importance of defining a disposal unit leader and 
team to be responsible for the safe and efficient disposal of carcasses before an animal health 
emergency occurs.  The disposal unit leader is responsible for maintaining up-to-date contact 
information, determining disposal needs, staying current with disposal technologies, determining 
necessary supplies and equipment, negotiating contracts for disposal services, working with 
environmental officers, training personnel, keeping records and reporting, and developing a 
disposal plan.  The disposal unit leader and disposal team must observe strict biosecurity, 
cleaning, and disinfection measures (APHIS, 2002).  The disposal group and the euthanasia 
group must work together to make sure timing and efforts are coordinated (NAHEMS, 2012). 
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Regulations vary between states and local regions.  Proper permits and approvals must be 
obtained before disposal begins.  Communication with the appropriate state and other officials is 
necessary to determine regulatory compliance.  Animal health officials, experts in waste disposal 
and remediation, licensed professional environmental, civil, or agricultural engineers, and 
environmental officials need to be consulted as well (NAHEMS, 2012). 
Carcass disposal laws differ from state to state and are often not based on science (King, 
McDonald, Seekins, & Hutchinson, 2009).  As an example, in California, deficiencies in carcass 
disposal regulations became markedly apparent during a heat and humidity wave in 2006, 
resulting in 20,000 livestock mortalities.  These large numbers, combined with a breakdown at a 
rendering plant, led to an extreme shortage in disposal capacity.  Local regulatory officials 
allowed composting, burial, and landfilling even though it went against state regulations and 
little technical guidance was provided.  This crisis resulted in the development of an Emergency 
Animal Disposal Workgroup (EADW) by the California Department of Agriculture and the 
California Integrated Waste Management Board with the purpose of addressing short and long-
term livestock disposal needs.  The workgroup consists of more than 100 members from more 
than 50 academic, industry and regulatory groups.  The group developed a rendering database, a 
landfill database, landfill re-permitting template language, a secure web portal, clarification of 
emergency proclamation authority, and composting research plans.  However, a number of laws 
and regulations would need to be changed for burial, landfilling, and composting to be legally 
allowed (Payne et al., 2009).  
In some states and localities, certain disposal methods are approved for routine use while 
others are prohibited.  In emergency situations, those restrictions may be relaxed to allow other 
methods to be used.  However, as noted in the California, timely response to allow for the use of 
restricted methods was “hampered by a morass of ambiguous regulatory jurisdictions” (Collar et 
al., 2009, p. 3).  Each state has the authority to establish carcass disposal-related regulations.  In 
some states, that power lies with the state’s environmental agency, and in others it is with the 
animal health commissioner.  In some cases, multiagency agreement is necessary.  In Texas, the 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality cannot establish carcass disposal rules and 
regulations without the agreement and consent of the TXAHC.  There is still ambiguity, as well 
as the fact that the DHS would have authority over a state in the case of a nationally significant 
incident (Boadu, 2010). 
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It is critical to understand which level of government has responsibility for carcass 
disposal-related regulations.  If an FAD response based on local regulations is in conflict with 
EPA regulations, as an example, there will be significant disconnect in execution of the response 
plan (Crnic, 2010).   
Incident management will begin at the lowest organizational level, but the dynamic 
nature of the industry will likely demand a greater level of response.  The response may require 
only limited federal personnel and equipment, but the potential risk level will warrant federal 
management.  Thresholds for federal response and support must remain flexible (FFADDRR, 
2005).  
 Federal roles 
The federal government serves in a technical assistance and advice role, not one of 
implementation.  If state or local resources are overwhelmed, federal officials may take on 
operational responsibilities.  Appropriate disposal decisions will involve multidisciplinary 
expertise and teamwork (FFADDRR, 2005). 
 Federal Food and Agriculture Decontamination and Disposal Roles and Responsibilities 
The FFADDRR recognizes seven phases of emergency response: 
preparedness/surveillance, detection/notification/initial response, control/containment, 
characterization, decontamination, disposal, and clearance.  The response phases may not always 
be linear.  The USDA serves as the primary coordinator of incident response in the control and 
eradication of a highly contagious animal disease outbreak.  The procedures for response were 
developed based on an FMD scenario.  Additional scenarios related to crop and food 
contamination were also considered (FFADDRR, 2005). 
In the case of FMD or another FAD, USDA APHIS may assume a primary role and will 
serve as the lead federal agency in the coordination of disposal and decontamination efforts.  In a 
presumptive positive case, APHIS, under the power of the USDA Secretary, will quarantine 
premises.  Movement of susceptible animals will stop.  Surveillance and infected zones will be 
determined, as will the depopulation and disposal of infected herds.  APHIS will work in 
conjunction with local and state government environmental and health agencies.  Vaccination 
may be considered for strategic use to create barriers between infected and disease-free zones 
(FFADDRR, 2005).  In the case of an FAD, federal responsibilities include: 
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 USDA APHIS has lead federal oversight on carcass disposal, 
 Activation of NRF will provide full federal authority and resources in the case of 
a catastrophe, 
 EPA will provide technical assistance for food and animal incidents, 
 Wildlife carcass disposal is under the authority of the Department of the Interior 
(DOI), 
 FDA is responsible for animal feeds and should be involved with rendered 
material decisions; and 
 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and NRCS will be involved with handling of 
mortalities if needed (Marburger, 2007). 
In the optimal situation, all animal carcasses should be disposed within 24 hr of 
depopulation for disease control, aesthetics, and public relations (FFADDRR, 2005; NAHEMS, 
2005a).  This goal creates extraordinary challenges.  In addition, disposal must occur in a manner 
that does not create a negative environmental impact and stops the spread of pathogens (GAO, 
2011).   
Human health and the environment should be protected in all disposal efforts.  The 
FFADDRR document identifies incineration, on-site burial, off-site burial in a municipal solid 
waste or hazardous waste landfill, alkaline digestion, composting, and rendering as potential 
disposal options.  Acceptable options will be developed by the USDA and state solid/hazardous 
waste officials depending on the disease, number of carcasses, transportation, and availability of 
disposal capacity (FFADDRR, 2005). 
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Table 3-3 Response Phase 6 – Disposal of Carcasses and Related Materials  
Carcass Disposal Process 
Level 1 – Local Limited Response 
 Incident Command is at the state emergency management level 
 Primary resources are local, state resources may be used, and federal resources are limited 
 USDA APHIS support efforts to assess disposal needs 
Assess volume of animals for disposal 
Determine methods of euthanasia and disposal, evaluate risks of options, and develop a site specific 
disposal plan 
If rendering, determine fate of byproducts 
If burial, determine whether euthanasia and disposal will occur on-site, off-site, or in combination 
If on-site disposal, obtain appropriate permits 
If off-site disposal, arrange transportation and approval 
Appraise value of animals for indemnification purposes 
Follow pre-approved plan for predetermined sites 
Procure equipment and prepare site, including perimeter control 
Carry out disposal plan following USDA Disposal Operations Guidelines 
Close disposal site per requirements by state authorities 
Arrange for disposal of all appropriate equipment and related waste 
Level 2 – State/Regional Response 
 Local resources used fully, state resources required to greater degree, and need for federal resources may 
increase but remain moderate 
 USDA APHIS support used to a greater degree 
 USDA AERO teams may be used 
Same steps, but the scale increases 
Level 3 – National Response 
 Unified command (local, state, and federal) at the incident level with area command at the state level and 
national coordination through the NRF 
 USDA may coordinate interagency support through DHS and FEMA, but roles may vary depending on nature 
of emergency 
 All available assets from multiple agencies will be used, NRF will be fully engaged, and ESF#11 will guide 
efforts 
 EPA fully involved 
 DOD, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Department of Interior (DOI), and U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) may all provide contract support in disposal efforts 
 Additional resources made available through emergency declarations from Governor and the President  
Same steps, but the scale is much larger  
Note. Adapted from FFADDRR (2005). 
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 Food Safety and Modernization Act (FSMA) 
In 2012, Congress passed the Food Safety and Modernization Act (FSMA) that includes 
Section 208: Decontamination and Disposal Standard Plans.  It codifies many of the directives 
under HSPD-9 and reemphasizes the need for a coordinated federal approach to disposal and 
decontamination planning and preparedness.  The intent is to enhance federal support and 
assistance to local and state governments in dealing with waste management.  It does not amend 
any of the roles and responsibilities delineated in the NRF, Emergency Support Function (ESF) 
ESF#11, HSPDs or other documents, but it does designate EPA as the lead in interagency 
disposal and decontamination efforts in food and agricultural emergencies including an FAD 
outbreak.  It provides for no additional authorities or resources.  It calls for the development of 
standards and model plans as well as exercises and plan modification reviews.  An interagency 
working group consisting of EPA, USDA, HHS, and DHS has been assigned to review and 
identify gaps in existing standards, protocols, model plans, information needs, tools, and 
national/regional exercises.  Efforts will be made to adapt new and existing guidance for food 
and agriculture scenarios.  Enhanced collaboration with state and local governments, as well as 
environmental and agricultural communities, is a priority.  The working group intends to hold 
food and agriculture decontamination and disposal exercises to test decision making processes 
and technology choices (GAO, 2011; Reyes, 2012; WARRP, 2012).  
 Contradictions in federal responsibilities 
The designation in the FSMA of the EPA as the lead agency has created an additional 
challenge.  This designation differs from the authority granted USDA APHIS in the Animal 
Health Protection Act for coordinating carcass disposal when FAD is a factor.  USDA officials 
have expressed concern that this discrepancy could lead to confusion during an animal disease 
outbreak (GAO, 2011).   
Previous to this legislative contradiction, a lack of clarity on carcass disposal 
responsibilities when ESFs are activated already existed and has resulted in inefficient execution 
of ESF#11.  If ESFs are activated, the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) has 
responsibility for determining the roles of federal agencies.  FEMA officials consider carcass 
disposal as debris under ESF#3 on public works and engineering, and thus a responsibility of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).  If, however, the carcasses were impacted by 
chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological contamination, they would be covered by ESF#11 
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and be the responsibility of USDA.  When FEMA has previously designated responsibility to 
USDA, responsibility has sometimes been designated to the USDA Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) and other times to USDA APHIS VS.  Further disagreement exists 
over whether or not carcasses needing disposal after a natural disaster create a public health 
threat.  The ESF#11 coordinator says the responsibility will lie with the USACE unless HHS or a 
state declares the carcasses a public health threat.  While the Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
indicates carcasses are not traditionally a risk to public health, other federal officials believe the 
rodents and insects attracted by decaying carcasses create a public health threat.  This lack of 
clarity has caused slow and ineffective carcass disposal in some recent emergency responses, 
such as the disposal of cattle carcasses in Texas after Hurricane Ike (GAO, 2011).  
The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Committee on Homeland and 
National Security subcommittee on Foreign Animal Disease Threats (FADT) identified a number 
of research needs for disposal and decontamination.  Even if vaccination is used, euthanasia, and 
disposal will continue as significant elements of a national FAD response.  Specifically, the 
FADT noted the need for research investment in disease agent persistence, fate, and transport 
related to methods and species; cost/benefit analysis of disposal methods; ecological and human 
health risk impact assessment; and identification of surrogate agents for research purposes 
(Marburger, 2007).  
Research questions identified by the FADT focused on: 
 Coordination between national, regional, and local disposal operations; 
 Required state and federal approval of disposal decisions;  
 Application of lessons learned from previous disposal operations; and 
 Ability of local decision makers to weigh disposal options in site-specific 
situations based on public, animal, and environmental health protection in a 
timely manner (Marburger, 2007). 
The inconsistency related to federal authority regarding carcass disposal in a national 
disposal operation was also identified as a concern by the subcommittee.  They contend that no 
technologies should be used to meet mass disposal surge capacity needs that are not used as part 
of regular disposal operations system; instead, technologies used on a daily basis should be 
adapted to meet mass disposal needs.  They noted that the development of a disposal operations 
system recognized by industry, farmers, ranchers, and all levels of government is the number one 
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priority for effective and safe carcass disposal in future mass animal disposal situations.  Such a 
system is necessary to address the lack of standardization between guidance coming from 
numerous agencies, including HHS, United States Geological Survey (USGS), EPA and USDA 
(Marburger, 2007). 
The NSTC developed a Decontamination and Disposal Working Group.  Disposal 
research priorities were identified by this group as risk-related projects designed to determine the 
ability of disposal methods to inactivate pathogens, development of regional disposal strategies 
and transportable disposable technologies, and economic feasibility cost-benefit analysis for 
disposal technologies with a focus on long-term impacts.  As of late 2012, research projects on 
composting had been completed; projects on rendering, unlined burial, and permitted landfill 
were underway, and gaps had been identified related to fixed incineration and open burning.  
DHS also identified the need for a cost estimating tool (Miller, 2012a).  As of October 2013, 
there is no new information on the NSTC website. 
The multiagency involvement and the multidisciplinary nature of carcass disposal make it 
a challenging policy dilemma. 
 Disposal method selection 
Selection of an appropriate disposal location and disposal technology is a critical 
concern.  A single disposal site is preferred for the purpose of disease containment.  On-site 
disposal as well as off-site disposal and temporary storage options should be considered.  
Historically, the most common and preferred method of disposal was burial on-site at the 
location of the death.  Burial is seen as simpler, more expeditious, more economical, and 
depending on water tables and soil condition, less likely to cause damaging environmental 
effects.  On-site burial minimizes biosecurity concerns in moving carcasses off-site (APHIS, 
2002; CFSPH, 2012; NAHEMS, 2012). 
 Considerations for selection 
Any decision-making system designed to determine optimal locations and methods 
should consider: 
 public health, 
 pathogen containment, 
 environmental impact,  
164 
 
 environmental protection laws and regulations, 
 availability of alternative sites (landfills), 
 proximity of burial or incineration site to location of euthanasia (if necessary), 
 scale and species of animal loss,  
 types of additional materials that need disposed (milk, waste, feedstuffs, manure, 
bedding, wool, etc.),  
 potential hazard the material may pose to humans or animals,  
 type of soil and rock at disposal site,  
 slope and permeability of site location, 
 transportation needs, 
 truck access to disposal site,  
 water table at disposal site and local minimum permissible distance between 
water table and burial pit,  
 proximity of proposed site to water resources,  
 proximity to high population centers and public view,  
 locations of underground and overhead utility structures,  
 climate, weather, and seasonal conditions,  
 scavenger access, 
 air quality, 
 biosecurity requirements, 
 site security requirements, 
 future intended use of site,  
 physical and psychological health impacts, 
 public perception, 
 stakeholder acceptance, 
 cost effectiveness. 
 availability of necessary disposal equipment, and 
 availability of the necessary supplies for method used (fuel, chemicals, etc.) 
(NAHEMS, 2005a; APHIS, 2002; CFSPH, 2012; NAHEMS, 2012).  
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Decision makers must be able to consider all alternatives and make safe, quick, and 
responsible decisions with limited environmental and biosecurity consequences.  All critical 
factors must be considered in the decision process (NAHEMS, 2012). 
Off-site disposal, transportation, or temporary storage may be necessary in some cases.  
Climate, environmental conditions, high animal population densities, and wild animal/scavenger 
presence that can spread disease may influence disposal site selection.  Carcasses and materials 
may need to be temporarily stored until disposal conditions are amenable.  If on-site burial or 
incineration options are eliminated, carcasses must be safely and efficiently transported to the 
off-site disposal locations.  Insufficient space, unsuitable soil, high water table, seasonal 
conditions, or proximity to public areas may cause the need for off-site disposal.  Carcasses may 
also be able to be landfilled or rendered more efficiently.  If transported, special procedures and 
precautions must occur.  Transportation to off-site premises offers multiple concerns, especially 
in the cases of contagious viruses and contaminated carcasses.  Vehicles must be specifically 
prepared and all moving vehicles must be accompanied by government representatives and, 
potentially, law enforcement.  Temporary storage may be necessary if prompt carcass disposal is 
impossible, which is highly possible in the case of a large-scale infection or death loss.  In all 
cases, carcasses must be secured to prevent unauthorized access or potential disease spread 
(NAHEMS, 2005a; APHIS, 2002). 
USDA NRCS serves as a resource to farmers and ranchers in identifying and preparing 
disposal sites.  Technical assistance has long been available through the Animal Mortality 
Facility Conservation and Composting Facility Conservation Practice Standards.  Due to recent 
emergency response efforts, NRCS was added as a member of the NSTC FADT Subcommittee.  
They have also developed a web soil survey tool for identifying suitable soils for disposal sites 
(Carpenter, 2009).  The electronic code of federal regulations specifies in Title 9: Animals and 
Animal Products that in the case of a H5/H7 LPAI outbreak poultry carcasses must be disposed 
of using a method selected by the cooperating state agency in coordination with APHIS.  
Approved methods include burial, incineration, composting, and rendering.  No other approved 
carcass disposal methods or technologies are identified for other species or diseases in the CFR 
(eCFR, 2012).  On-site burial may be the most inexpensive, but off-site burial, composting, 
incineration, digestion, and rendering may be alternatives.  The focus of disposal efforts should 
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be to provide biosecurity related to disease spread and minimizing the impact on the environment 
(APHIS, 2012d).  
 Disposal hierarchies 
Some states have developed disposal hierarchies to guide their decisions.  USDA APHIS 
developed Online Emergency Management Tools to provide easy access, simple carcass disposal 
decision tools, and guidance.  The objective of the tools is to share information about cost-
effective disposal options, prioritize the options with a decision tree, provide web interface to 
make selections of options easier, provide training on options, and to summarize disposal options 
(Miller, 2009).  In 2009, Lori Miller, at the time an employee of USDA APHIS, noted that 
APHIS tools are a “good starting point” but that primary information was limited to poultry and 
much additional information related to large animals was needed (Miller, 2009).  As of fall 2013, 
the tools were still minimal and had not been recently updated, although referred to in published 
NAHEMS FAD PReP documents.  The only decision tree provided on the USDA emergency 
response tools website is for in-house poultry composting and no large animal decision tools are 
included.  The emergency response tools are located at: 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/emergency_response/tools/aphis_role_emergency_tools_disposal.sht
ml (APHIS, 2013a). 
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Figure 3-1 Emergency preparedness and response emergency management tools 
poultry disposal trees (APHIS, 2013a). 
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However, in 2012, Miller shared a disposal options decision tree at the 4
th
 International 
Symposium on Managing Animal Mortalities.  Miller indicated current studies are being 
completed to determine and facilitate the use of the most sustainable disposal options and online 
decision tools and training modules would be updated.  Focus will be on composting, rendering, 
and permitted landfills with EPA and DHS (Miller, 2012b).  This decision tree indicates 
Figure 3-2 USDA APHIS disposal decision tree (Miller, 2012b). 
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slaughter, rendering, composting, and onsite burial are the first choices for disposal, but the 
complexity of the decision process are not represented in the choices provided. 
An agricultural waste disposal workshop was held in Weld County, Colorado, in summer 
2012.  Local, regional, state, and federal emergency management officials along with DHS, 
EPA, USDA, state animal health and environmental officials, private sector, and academic 
experts participated.  The goal of the workshop was to work through a carcass disposal scenario 
based on an FMD outbreak in a 20,000-head feedlot.  Specifically, the group tested APHIS 
carcass disposal decision-making tools (WARRP, 2012). 
One of the APHIS developed tools shared at the summit was a matrix of disposal options.  
It is designed as a risk assessment matrix with numerical values assigned to each disposal 
method based on pre-determined criteria.  Each disposal method was ranked as ideal, not ideal, 
or not suitable against a number of factors.  Scores were then totaled and averaged to determine 
best technologies.  The matrix indicated composting and rendering to be the best disposal 
choices.  The matrix was then used to develop a disposal decision tree and checklist for each 
method.  The decision tree provides for a linear progression of steps to be considered when 
making a carcass disposal decision.  The checklist provides detailed considerations for each 
disposal option.  The combination of these tools is referred to as MaTCh (matrix, tree, and 
checklist) (WARRP, 2012). 
The tools are not currently available on the APHIS online emergency management tools, 
but were made available for the purposes of the workshop.  This decision tree, also presented by 
Lori Miller, indicated a different disposal preference order than the one presented two months 
earlier (WARRP, 2012).  These decision trees are shared in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. 
Prior to exercising the scenario, the Colorado State Veterinarian, Dr. Nick Striegel, noted 
that depopulation and carcass disposal would begin immediately in the case of a confirmed case 
of FMD.  The group was charged with applying the decision-making tools with the intent that all 
animals in the infected feedlot were depopulated within 24 hr and disposed of within 48 hr.  In 
addition, they had to consider if the 90,000 cattle located at a neighboring feedlot 2 mi away 
should be depopulated as well (WARRP, 2012). 
After the exercise, the process and tools were discussed.  A number of the comments 
centered on the need for technical expertise and participants expressed a number of technical 
questions that were not covered by the available tools and information.  A variety of opinions 
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existed on the best disposal option, although some did consider composting to be the best option.  
There was some limited consensus that vaccination may be more viable than mass depopulation 
(WARRP, 2012). 
There was a significant amount of concern with the decision making tools.  Concerns 
were expressed that these options and tools would work for small farms, ranches, and disease 
outbreaks, but would not be effective for a large operation or incident.  It was noted that a 
decision tree may not be the best option because all disposal methods should be considered 
simultaneously rather than sequentially.  Questions were also raised over the values assessment 
in the decision matrix.  While the checklist was lauded for providing some good information, it 
was seen as more of an educational tool and less likely to be useful during a disease outbreak.  In 
fact, one participant commented that while it was a good informational tool, it actually led to the 
conclusion that these tools would not work (WARRP, 2012).   
It was also noted that science is often trumped by public perception, and is, therefore, 
unlikely to drive decision making.  Replacing the advice of experts and scientists with publicly 
determined approaches will lead to interference with the process and deter carcass disposal from 
occurring in the most logical manner (WARRP, 2012). 
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Table 3-4 APHIS Disposal Options Matrix 
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Public health risk 3 3 3 3 2 1 ? 
Need to transport carcasses off-site 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Byproducts 3 3 2 3 1 1 ? 
Pathogen inactivation 2 3 2 2 1 1 ? 
Cost effectiveness 3 2 3 1 1 3 ? 
Environmentally sustainable 3 3 2 2 1 1 ? 
Volume reduction 2 3 2 3 3 2 ? 
Capacity 2 2 3 1 2 3 1 
Throughput 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 
Availability 2 2 3 1 3 1 1 
Speed to implement 2 2 3 2 1 1 ? 
Public acceptance 3 2 3 2 1 1 ? 
Efficiency 2 3 2 2 1 2 ? 
Operability 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 
Total points 37 37 35 29 26 26 7 
Average score .5 .5 .3 .9 .7 1.7 1.4 
Key: 3 – Ideal, 2 – Not Ideal, 1 – Not suitable  
Note. Adapted from WARRP (2012). 
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Figure 3-3 APHIS Carcass Disposal Decision Tree (WARRP, 2012). 
 
Carcass disposal is multidimensional and typical disposal hierarchies may be limited in 
value, neglect relevant dimensions, and not fully capture all the issues.  Preferred methods may 
not be possible, even if the hierarchy is based on a single priority such as direct cost or 
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environmental impact.  In a catastrophic mortality situation, any hierarchy may be set aside for 
the sake of emergency management.  Decision makers should consider these possibilities in the 
planning process and have a strong understanding of all the alternative methods and their 
impacts.  Any policy tool designed to provide decision making guidance needs to be 
multidisciplinary and address all related issues (Nutsch & Kastner, 2008). 
 Carcass Disposal Methods and Alternatives 
The optimal disposal method will depend on the circumstances of the emergency.  USDA 
APHIS (2002) defines the goal for disposal as “to control and contain the spread of disease.”  
Prompt disposal is critical to disease control as well as public perception and other factors.  
Local, state, and federal environmental laws and regulations must be considered and 
environmental agencies must be consulted.  If a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE), 
such as BSE or CWD, is present, specific regulations will apply.   
It is unlikely that only one disposal method will be used in a large scale animal disease 
emergency.  To be most effective, multiple disposal technologies may be integrated into the 
overall disposal strategy.  The strategy must remain flexible to allow for necessary changes and 
improvements as the emergency progresses (NAHEMS, 2012). 
The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) (2012) identifies burial, 
subsurface disposal/landfills, incineration, composting, and rendering as the most common 
methods of carcass disposal.  Other methods include air-curtain incineration, alkaline hydrolysis, 
and other novel technologies.  The OIE also identifies a list of 11 recommended methods of 
disposal (OIE, 2007a; OIE 2012b).  The common methods, as well as a few alternative methods, 
are described in the sections that follow. 
 Burial 
Burial has often been considered the preferred disposal method by many government 
entities, except in the case of BSE-infected or exposed carcasses.  Burial can take place on-farm 
or in mass burial sites.  Trench burial can be utilized to bury large numbers of carcasses, while 
disposal pits are more appropriate for smaller losses.  The environmental impact of burial should 
be a consideration when determining if burial is appropriate (Ellis, 2001; APHIS, 2002).  The 
decision to bury will also be influenced by soil conditions, prevailing winds, topography, 
availability of digging equipment, and proximity to public areas (NAHEMS, 2005a).  The 
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specific burial site should be located near the site of euthanasia and the pace of depopulation and 
disposal should be synchronized (NAHEMS, 2012).  Geographic information system (GIS) 
technology can be used in the planning process to identify sites suitable for burial.  Databases 
can model topography, geologic, water, and soil characteristics and allow for the mapping of 
burial sites that are least likely to negatively impact the environment (Jacobs, 2006; Harper, et 
al., 2008).  
In the US, each state has the responsibility for defining burial requirements, and disparity 
exists between state guidelines.  Minimum burial depth in Wisconsin for a natural disaster death 
is 2 ft, while in Kansas it is 6 ft.  The minimum distance from streams and wells in Arkansas is 
600 ft, but in Texas there is no minimum standard.  California regulations state that the minimum 
burial distance from residential dwellings is 100 ft, yet neither North Carolina nor Florida 
requires a minimum distance.  It is unclear if these stated offsets are actually regulations or 
implied guidelines that can be set aside in the case of an emergency (APHIS, 2002; Morrow & 
Ferket, 1993; Scudamore, Trevelyan, Tas, Varley, & Hickman, 2002; Ellis, 2001).  Some states 
will not permit burial, and it is anticipated that burial will become a less and less favored 
alternative due to regulatory considerations and fear of groundwater contamination.  In 1994, 
Arkansas prohibited burial as a means of poultry carcass disposal, and Alabama prohibited burial 
starting in 2000 (Blake et al., 2008).  As an example, Texas is approved for burial and 
incineration (Boadu, 2010).  While many states may set aside regulations in an emergency 
situation, water quality concerns and public perception may eventually eliminate burial as an 
alternative (Blake et al., 2008).  
Significant land area is required for burial efforts.  Each bovine carcass requires about 3 
ft of trench length and 14 sq ft (42 cu ft) of surface area.  Five hogs or sheep are the equivalent to 
one bovine carcass.  For poultry, 1 sq ft of surface area is required per bird.  For every additional 
3 ft in depth, the number of animals per 14 sq ft can be doubled (NAHEMS, 2005a).  For 
example, to bury all the cattle in one 30,000-head feedlot would require a hole the size of a 
football field 31-ft deep.  Other estimates indicate a 100,000-head feedlot would require 128 
acres for burial (not including any buffer zone space) and create 4,000 gal leachate per day 
(Miller, 2011).  Engineered mass burial sites that are designed for significant numbers of animals 
and incorporate containment measures and a more sophisticated approach may also be a 
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possibility (Nutsch & Kastner, 2008).  Mounding is the process of aboveground mass burial and 
has similar impacts as mass burial and composting (OIE, 2005; OIE, 2012b).   
The transportation to off-site mass burial sites can also create a significant challenge.  As 
an example, a 100,000-head feedlot with cattle weighing an average of 1,000 lbs each creates 
100 million lbs (50,000 t) to transport.  A large transport container can transport about 30 t, so 
nearly 1,700 containers would be required in this scenario (Miller, 2011).  Some USDA officials 
have indicated burial is simply not feasible in a large scale outbreak especially due to intensive 
labor related needs.  In at least one exercise, it was determined that the 70,000 cattle that needed 
to be disposed of could not be buried in four days (GAO, 2011).   
Klassen and Malek (2009) indicate mass burial is a “safe, cost-effective, and 
environmentally acceptable method of disposal (p.1)” and seen by the public as the least 
controversial method (Klassen & Malek, 2009).  However, some researchers have argued 
disposal by mass burial should be avoided because of the risk to groundwater pollution, unless 
engineered sanitary landfilling is used.  If burial has to occur, only preplanned sites with lowest 
environmental impacts should be used (Harper et al., 2008).  Liners should be used to minimize 
seepage; and groundwater, surface water sources, air quality, and odor should be monitored 
following a mass burial (CFSPH, 2012).   
Because containment loads will occur at one time rather than over time, sites approved 
for routine burial may not be appropriate for mass burial.  The potential long-term impacts and 
site characteristics deserve more careful evaluation.  The environmental impact of mass burial is 
poorly understood and little knowledge exists on leachate movement from mass burial sites.  The 
strength of the leachate is 5-10 times higher in a mass burial site than it is in manure storage and 
landfill sites (Pratt & Fonstad, 2009; Pratt & Fonstad, 2012).  Researchers in Saskatchewan 
studied the impact of ion exchange and leachate movement beneath two preexisting burial sites, 
one 7 years post-burial of CWD elk and the other 60 years post-burial of FMD carcasses.  At the 
CWD site, leachate movement was minimal and ions of concern remained in the burial pit.  The 
same results were seen at the FMD site with no impact to surrounding soil cores.  While hard 
water plumes resulting from the ion exchange reactions from ammonium will be the first to reach 
groundwater sources in the long term, this is less concerning than if there was movement of the 
attenuated ions from the burial pits.  Further research is needed to determine the potential long-
term hazards related to mass burial in different soils and locations (Pratt & Fonstad, 2012). 
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If mass burial is an intended disposal method, preapproved sites are a crucial emergency 
management practice.  These sites can be selected to be more cost effective and reduce risk.  
Topography, geology, and hydrology should be considered when selecting sites in a transparent 
manner.  A rapid response is more likely if sites are preidentified and preselection is a part of 
emergency plans (Klassen & Malek, 2009).  A lack of preapproved burial sites was identified as 
a significant hindrance slowing the emergency response during the Japan FMD outbreak in 2010.  
Japanese officials originally decided to bury with the intent not to disturb the burial sites for 
three years, although post incident interviews indicated the selection of three years was arbitrary 
(Miller, 2011).  The rainy season added an additional complication with burial because the lined 
pits accumulated rain water and required pumping out (OLPC, 2012).  After reviewing the 
response efforts, Japanese officials have determined that a combination of alternative disposal 
methods, including incineration and rendering, must be considered in the future (Muroga et al., 
2012). 
The public has become more environmentally conscious and is likely to oppose burial for 
fear of groundwater contamination.  Also, producers may not be supportive of on-farm burial 
because of impacts on land value and future land-use decisions (Flory et al., 2006a).  Mass burial 
may also be a challenge in cold weather (CFSPH, 2012).  Burial may not be the best option, 
although the “knee jerk reaction to any emergency, whether due to disease outbreak or natural 
disaster, is to bury” (Schwarz & Bonhotal, 2009). 
 Landfill 
Public landfills are also an option for disposal.  Carcasses are considered non-hazardous 
waste and can be disposed in landfills (FFADDRR, 2005).  While landfills are often used for 
companion animal disposal, landfills are unlikely to be prepared to handle the additional needs 
that would be created with significant carcass disposal.  They may serve as a reasonable 
alternative if burial is identified as the best method for the circumstance, yet timing and location 
do not make digging burial pits efficient or effective (Bagley, Kirk, & Farrell-Poe, 1999; Franco, 
2002; Sander, Warbington, & Myers, 2002). 
The greatest advantage of landfilling is that the infrastructure already exists.  They pose 
little risk to the environment, because they have already taken necessary environmental 
precautions (Flory et al., 2006a; Harper et al., 2008).  Landfills are highly regulated under the 
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Resources Conservation and Recovery Act and most have leachate and gas collection systems in 
place.  It is possible that carcass degradation may take longer in a landfill site (CFSPH, 2012).   
Timely disposal is critical and landfills already have preexisting sites, equipment, 
personnel, procedures, and containment systems.  However, some landfills will simply refuse 
carcasses or increase landfill costs to an exorbitant level.  Landfills may be owned by 
municipalities, private owners, or corporations and operators may choose not to cooperate.  Use 
of landfills depends on preplanned agreements with landfill owners.  For example, during an AI 
outbreak in British Columbia, landfill operators closed their gates on trucks carrying dead 
poultry.  The need for transportation to a landfill site will also create challenges.  Appropriate 
permits will need to be obtained as well (Flory et al., 2006a; Harper et al., 2008).   
In the US, there are three types of landfills: subtitle C – hazardous waste, subtitle D – 
municipal solid waste, and subtitle C&D – construction and demolition debris.  Subtitle C and D 
landfills are designed with leachate collection and gas recovery, and subtitle D landfills are 
generally clay or synthetically lined (NAHEMS, 2012).  Research has indicated that subtitle C 
landfills are the only kind suitable for carcass disposal.  If a national emergency required the use 
of subtitle D landfills, sites would need to be indemnified by the federal government (Vanier et 
al., 2008).  However, recently published NAHEMS guidelines indicate subtitle D landfills are the 
optimal landfill type for carcass disposal.  Some small local landfills may not meet the subtitle D 
landfill regulations (NAHEMS, 2012).  
The public may oppose landfilling large numbers of carcasses.  Public opinion has varied 
in previous carcass disposal emergencies.  In the U.K. FMD outbreak, landfill capacity could 
have handled all the carcasses needing disposal, but only 16% of carcasses were landfilled due to 
strong public opposition.  However, in the California END outbreak, a majority of carcasses 
were disposed in landfills with little public reaction (Nutsch & Kastner, 2008).  Local public, city 
officials, farmers near the landfill, and interest groups could influence landfill availability if prior 
planning and communication has not occurred (Harper et al., 2008).  The geographic locations of 
landfills may serve as either an advantage or disadvantage depending on the situation (Nutsch & 
Kastner, 2008).   
Landfilling TSE-infected carcasses is not recommended.  After the 2003 BSE case in 
Washington state, risk analysis was conducted by major disposal companies and landfilling for 
TSE-infected carcasses was deemed safe.  However, concerns remain that prions could pass 
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through wastewater treatment.  National Carcass Disposal Symposium (2006) presenters agreed 
such disposal comes with some level of risk (Hater, Hoffman, & Pierce, 2006; Lin, 2006; Vanier 
et al., 2008).   
Some landfills are likely to be unwilling or hesitant to accept animal carcasses.  This 
concern may relate to a lack of understanding or influence of public opinion.  It may also be the 
result of a lack of personnel, equipment, and soil.  Precatastrophe agreements between 
government agencies and landfill operators will make their use in an animal disease emergency 
simpler and more likely (Ruman, 2012; NAHEMS, 2012).  As a response to this concern and the 
concern that agreements should be prenegotiated with local landfills, a major landfill company, 
Waste Management, Inc., was approached by the USDA APHIS VS Area Emergency 
Coordinator for Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, and Wisconsin regarding their willingness to accept 
FMD animals into their landfills.  After providing the necessary information, completing the 
appropriate forms, and gathering relevant resources, the application was accepted, the company 
agreed to accept FMD animals into three sites in Illinois.  Financial arrangements are still under 
discussion and signing authority was also being considered.  This type of pre-planning and 
further expansion of these types of agreements with landfill companies is critical.  Because each 
disease and species will be different, educational efforts must be complete and multiple 
agreements are necessary rather than a blanket approach.  Also, due to variations in state 
regulations, it is likely that each state must be handled individually (Ruman, 2012).  
 Incineration/burning 
Burning is likely only to be used if other options are not possible.  It is often considered 
to be difficult and expensive when labor and materials are included in cost estimates. 
There are three methods of incineration: open burning, stationary or fixed-facility 
(municipality/commercial) incineration, and air-curtain incineration.  Burning on-site can occur 
if carcass numbers are limited, burning permits can be obtained (if necessary), and appropriate 
fuel is available.  Pathology incineration, resulting in safe and complete disposal, is a possibility, 
but access is normally limited.  This type of biological incineration is ideal for small numbers in 
close proximity to the location of the incinerator or when the disease agent is BSE or a similar 
prion (APHIS, 2002; Ellis, 2001; Ekboir, 1999; NAHEMS, 2005a).  Species type will largely 
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impact speed of burn because carcasses with higher fat percentage will burn more efficiently 
(NAHEMS, 2012). 
Open burning is designed to use maximum fire temperatures and minimum burn time to 
dispose of carcasses through efficient combustion.  Burn sites need to be in a flat area, out of 
public view, and accessible to large vehicles.  Burning can be done above ground, in a burn pit, 
or on combustible burn pyres.  Considerations need to be given to prevailing winds and the 
prevention of unnecessary smoke and objectionable odors in public areas.  Burn permits and air 
pollution regulations must be considered.  Obtaining sufficient fuel material will be challenging, 
and burn temperatures may vary.  Local availability and weather conditions will influence 
material choice between straw, hay, heavy untreated timbers, kindling wood, coal, and liquid 
petroleum fuel.  Controversy may exist over public reaction, environmental impact, and possible 
open-air disease transmission (Vanier et al., 2008; NAHEMS, 2005a).  While there is no proof 
from previous disease incidents that pathogens have been transported after being expelled from 
animals’ respiratory tracts during open burning, concerns remain that open burning may initially 
help spread the disease through possible particulate transmission as a result of incomplete 
combustion (Harper et al., 2008).   
State burning regulations vary.  Many states have strict requirements on burning, yet they 
will routinely waive those restrictions in the case of an emergency.  Public reaction to burning 
was significantly negative in the UK and potential public relations problems exist with all 
burning options (APHIS, 2002; Ellis, 2001; Ekboir, 1999).  Overall, open air burning is an 
unfavorable choice for catastrophic mortality disposal (Harper et al., 2008).  
Municipal or commercial incinerators are fueled by natural gas, diesel fuel, or propane.  
They are designed to burn household or industrial wastes with moisture content of 20-25%, so 
burning carcasses with 70% moisture may be challenging.  Burn temperatures can be controlled 
and effective inactivation of pathogens can be guaranteed.  Rising cost of fuel combined with the 
high energy requirements to dehydrate high moisture carcasses may make fixed-facility 
incineration difficult (Vanier et al., 2008).  Co-incineration can also be considered.  It is a 
process where carcasses are burned with hazardous waste incineration, clinical waste 
incineration, and other industrial incineration such as power plants, cement kilns, blast furnaces, 
and coke ovens (OIE, 2005; Marburger, 2007). 
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Air-curtain incineration uses a burn pit or refractory box with fan-forced air to burn the 
materials.  It is more fuel efficient, environmentally friendly, and has been proven effective in 
carcass disposal.  It is also a faster acting burn technology, because 4,000 lbs of animal carcasses 
can be burned in an hour at higher temperatures than other burn methods.  This method is an 
excellent choice when dealing with smaller numbers of carcasses.  Air-curtain units are portable 
and can be moved from site to site.  However, large quantities of fuel are still required (APHIS, 
2002; Ellis, 2001; Ekboir, 1999).  Air Burners, LLC, air-curtain manufacturers, contend that their 
method is the only publically acceptable method that lends itself to effective and safe disposal of 
carcasses infected with highly contagious disease (Air Burners, 2008). 
More economical incineration units may become more viable disposal alternatives as 
their improvements are based on incineration technology that increase ease and efficiency of on-
farm use.  Ash disposal, overall costs of operation, and turnaround time remain challenging 
(Blake et al., 2008).   
 Composting 
Composting is a fairly simple process if proper supplies and an appropriate site are 
available.  But, while appearing simple, composting remains a complex process and good 
management techniques are critical to success.  Composting is the controlled, biological 
decomposition of organic materials and consists of two stages, a high temperature active stage 
and a lower temperature curing stage.  The process requires a variety of carbon sources, bulking 
agents, and biofilter layers.  Nitrogen, oxygen, carbon, and moisture are required for composting 
to occur.  Composting is an environmentally friendly technology, because it is basically 
recycling.  The end result is a nutrient rich byproduct that can be applied to agriculture land to 
increase nutrients and productivity.  While examples with animal disease are minimal, volume 
composting has been effective on mass death losses in poultry.  It is commonly used in the 
poultry industry and is starting to be applied more frequently to larger animals.  However, 
composting is not legal in some states for large animals.  While composting is fairly inexpensive 
and the end product can be utilized for land application as a soil amendment, it is a slow process 
and is not appropriate in some situations.  Bin or static windrow composting are both possible 
alternatives, and the required carbon nitrogen ration is between 25:1 and 40:1.  In large-scale 
emergencies, passive low-tech composting techniques may be used.  The focus would be on 
181 
 
disposal, not creation of compost.  Compost piles will need to be monitored and isolated until the 
disease agent is no longer present, especially when predators or scavengers are possible. (Ellis, 
2001; APHIS, 2002; NAHEMS, 2005a; Wilkinson, 2007; Harper et al., 2008; OIE, 2005; 
CFSPH, 2012; NAHEMS, 2012).  Bag composting or in-house composting are also options for 
carcass disposal.  In-house composting has proven successful in poultry houses, especially in the 
Delmarva Peninsula AI outbreak.  In some cases, compost windrows have been removed from 
poultry houses in 10 days with effective disease eradication (Bendfeldt et al., 2006; EPA, 2006; 
Flory, Peer, & Malone, 2009). 
Composting can contain the disease and limit off-farm transmission while limiting the 
risk of groundwater and air pollution.  Pathogens in the carcass and litter are deactivated and 
specialized equipment is not required.  Typically, composting would not be impacted by severe 
weather or frozen ground and the general public is less likely to be concerned about disease 
exposure or environmental impact.  To be most effective, carbon sources, euthanasia methods, 
worker decontamination plans, adaptation of housing designs, and identification of rapid 
response teams should be predetermined (Flory et al., 2009).  If carcasses are composted 
properly, the compost piles should not contribute to surface and groundwater contamination 
through leachate and runoff (Bonhotal & Schwarz, 2009).  
Catastrophic composting can be effective especially when a disease agent is involved.  
Pathogens are deactivated by high temperatures, so composting is believed to be a relatively 
biosecure process when performed properly.  While burial may remain a more likely option for 
catastrophic mortality disposal, composting can be especially useful when limitations exist 
because of shallow water tables or frozen ground (DeRouchey, Harner & Murphy, 2005).  It also 
appears that composting poses less environmental risk than burial or open burning, making it the 
most environmentally friendly on-site method that does not require special machinery (Harper et 
al., 2008).  Mass mortality composting has been considered better suited for small to medium 
carcasses, such as swine and poultry (Wilkinson, 2007; Vanier et al., 2008).   
The ability of composting to eliminate pathogens is one of the primary concerns, 
especially with large animals.  There is uncertainty regarding the ability of composting to 
eradicate large animal pathogens, the amount of time pathogen elimination will take, and spatial 
uniformity when composting large animals.  Researchers in Alberta, Canada performed tests on 
feedlot cattle that indicated the majority of bacteria and viruses were rapidly inactivated.  The 
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bacterial surrogates for anthrax and scrapie prions were reduced, but survived the composting 
period.  Researchers also found duration of heating was more important than peak temperature.  
Reduction of the manure moisture content and elevation of carcasses led to improved pathogen 
elimination and carcass degradation.  In addition, compost piles create less public scrutiny and 
minimize risk to groundwater and air (Standford et al., 2009). 
In an Iowa State University study, 54 t of cattle carcasses were composted to assess 
effectiveness in disease control and environmental impact.  Researchers found composting to be 
a successfully biosecure process for cattle and have published guidelines for composting cattle 
mortalities (NAHEMS, 2005a; Glanville et al., 2006; Glanville et al., 2008).  Researchers agree 
that additional efforts are needed to determine the level of biosecurity risk associated with 
composting in the case of a disease outbreak (Harper et al., 2008).  A study of stocker calf 
carcass composting showed that pine shavings and poultry litter were effective compost 
materials and reached temperatures required for pathogen inactivation and were more effective 
than hay (Payne & Pugh, 2009).  
In 2004, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency used a “plastic-wrapped passively 
ventilated composting system” for emergency disposal of poultry during an AI outbreak 
(Glanville, Ahn, Crawford, Kozial, & Akdeniz, 2009, p. 1).  Glanville et al. (2009) tested this 
system for emergency disposal of swine carcasses.  Tests were completed in cool and warm 
weather with six potential envelope materials.  The research focused on biosecurity.  The 
research showed that average moisture content declined, leachate was minimal, and the carcasses 
became desiccated due to excessive airflow.  While corn silage did not meet minimum O2 levels 
due to excessive moisture, the envelope material met and maintained high enough internal 
temperatures for pathogen reduction.  Excessive airflow resulted in loss of valuable moisture and 
heat.  By controlling air flow, biosecurity and pathogen reduction may be more effective, which 
indicates that more research is needed (Glanville et al., 2009). 
In the LPAI outbreaks in West Virginia and Virginia in 2007, composting was used as an 
effective method for disposal of poultry, including 40-lb turkeys.  It is important that disposal 
and depopulation methods work together, and these incidents allowed composting to be tested in 
conjunction with firefighting foam as a method of depopulation.  Composting was found 
effective when used with firefighting foam, and, in fact, quality foam was found to benefit the 
composting process.  Large birds were effectively composted within 4-6 weeks, even without 
183 
 
preprocessing.  These findings, combined with the fact that composting inactivates the AI virus, 
make composting a disposal method that should be seriously considered (Flory & Peer, 2009). 
Another concern regarding composting relates to its ability to be used with sodium 
pentobarbital as a method of euthanasia.  Secondary poisonings of domestic animals and wildlife 
have occurred when improperly disposed euthanized carcasses were accessed.  Increased risks to 
the environment, public health, and wildlife may exist if sodium pentobarbital is used for mass 
euthanasia prior to large-scale disposal.  Research needs to determine how long and in what 
levels sodium pentobarbital might persist or enter the environment if euthanized animals are 
composted (Schwarz & Bonhotal, 2012; Wolfgang, Vadathala, & Murphy, 2009).   
A study at Oklahoma State University on sodium pentobarbital residues in equine 
composting indicated that in the 129 days it took equine soft tissue to compost, there was no 
reduction trend in the concentration levels of sodium pentobarbital (Payne, Farris, Parker, 
Bonhotal & Schwarz, 2012).  Further study has indicated the sodium pentobarbital may be 
detectable for up to 224 days at reduced levels, but properly built compost piles will keep 
scavengers away until levels are reduced.  Comparisons to breakdown in the soil indicate the 
reduction is not due to the heat of composting but more likely to biological degradation.  The 
final compost product did not contain concerning levels of the barbiturate.  Research also 
showed that nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs given to animals for relief of pain and 
inflammation do not persist in compost piles (Schwarz & Bonhotal, 2012). 
A field exercise designed to test the state’s FMD response plan was conducted by the 
Maine Department of Agriculture on an active dairy farm in 2008.  The exercise focused on all 
aspects of the response with an emphasis on composting the carcasses.  Based on previous trials, 
Maine’s plan called for on-farm composting using active municipal compost as cover.  A number 
of lessons were learned related to needs for personal protective equipment, worker safety 
supplies, lighting, outside water source, additional trucks, generators, higher quality radios, and 
other supplies.  Overall, the use of composting as a disposal method was successful, primarily 
due to appropriate planning, input, and access to needed materials (Seekins, 2009). 
In Vermont, the Department of Agriculture used a catastrophic dairy barn fire to test 
trench composting as a means of carcass disposal in an emergency situation.  While the 
emergency management aspect of the project was successful, the composting component was 
not.  Containment and disposal were completed within three days and the compost trench 
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remained intact without disturbance by scavengers, odor emission, pathogen release, or leachate 
discharge.  However, the project resulted in poor composting performance because temperatures 
within the compost did not reach optimal temperatures and poor surface drainage caused a lack 
of aeration.  They also noted that limited availability of personnel and equipment was a challenge 
(Comstock & Weber, 2009). 
The Montana Department of Livestock has added composting to its possible disposal 
methods for use in an emergency situation and is conducting research on feasibility of large 
carcass composting through the composting of road kill.  Composting is considered a more 
viable alternative for AI or mass mortalities of small animals rather than for a number of large 
animal carcasses (Crowley, 2009). 
Composting is not considered a legal method of carcass disposal in California.  In 2008, 
the California Code of Regulations was amended to allow a research project on composting of 
bovine mortalities under real-world conditions to determine feasibility of composting as a 
disposal method and to investigate the potential environmental impacts of mass carcass 
composting.  Initial field tests indicated composting may be a practical and effective disposal 
method (Collar et al., 2009).  University of California Cooperative Extension completed a study 
in 2010 on carcass disposal in an emergency situation.  This study was a result of the situation 
California dairy producers found themselves facing in 2006 when heat waves killed thousands of 
dairy cattle, resulting in rendering facilities being overwhelmed.  At that time, Kings County 
approved emergency burial, but it was evident that other methods needed to be considered in the 
future.  The California Department of Agriculture funded the study to determine if composting 
was a reasonable alternative that would be environmentally safe and protect human and animal 
health.  California EPA provided approval for the study, although composting of mammalian 
carcasses is restricted.  Results indicated that composting is a viable alternative for emergency 
carcass disposal, although the only legal means of disposal is rendering.  Pathogen reduction, 
speed of decomposition, and heat levels attained all indicated effectiveness of composting.  A 
limited number of states allow animal composting for mass mammalian carcass disposal, 
including Kansas, Maine, Iowa, New York, Nebraska, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Washington 
(Souza, 2010).  
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 Rendering 
Rendering is a process of separating animal fats and proteins by cooking.  Carcasses are 
converted into protein-based solids.  Rendered products are used for feedstuffs and industrial 
purposes.  If rendering plants are available, it can be the most economical method of carcass 
disposal according to current guidelines.  The advantages of routine rendering could be applied 
in the case of mass disposal, including existing environmental regulation, biosecure end 
products, and cost recovery through marketable end products (Ellis, 2001; Morley, Chen, & 
Rheault, 2003; Harper et al., 2008; NAHEMS, 2012). 
The greatest concern comes with the transport of carcasses to the rendering facility.  
Managers of rendering facilities must be willing to cooperate and stop all other operations.  
Continuous, rather than batch, rendering should be used if diseased carcasses are rendered.  
Facilities must have strong security protocols.  The receiving side of the facility must be 
completely separate from the finished side, and airflow must be directed from the finished to the 
receiving side.  All rendered material must be tested to ensure it is safe and disease free.  The 
product may then be buried, incinerated, or composted.  While rendered material may be reused, 
public perception and disease transmission both must be considered.  BSE, CWD, or other TSE 
infected materials should not be rendered (Ellis, 2001; Food and Drug Administration [FDA], 
1997; Morley et al., 2003; NAHEMS, 2005a; CFSPH, 2012). 
Rendering is a business and depends on the marketability of the end product.  If end 
products from catastrophic mortality rendering cannot be used for animal feed, rendering 
companies will likely not find rendering to be economically justifiable without additional 
compensation (Vanier et al., 2008).  Over time, renderers have changed their business model 
from one that pays for carcasses to one that charges to pick up carcasses, resulting in a reduction 
of animals being rendered.  Renderers also have to pay landfills to take meat and bone meal 
(MBM) from specified risk material and then pass these costs on to farmers and ranchers.  
Research is taking place to determine if bovine MBM can be gasified to produce a useable 
syngas with the intent to regain value in the system (Fonstad et al., 2009).  The enhanced feed 
ban issued by the FDA in 2008 eliminating the use of the highest risk cattle tissues of brain and 
spinal cord from all animal feed is likely to continue to negatively impact rendering profitability 
(Collar et al., 2009; FDA, 2012).  There are cases where rendered fat has been used as fuel in 
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rendering facilities and where other rendered products (MBM) have been used as fuel in power 
stations (Vanier et al., 2008).   
Currently, there are approximately 300 rendering facilities in North America according to 
the National Renderers Association (NRA, 2012; Lemieux, 2012a).  Due to the changes in feed 
rules, the rendering industry has consolidated.  In the case of a catastrophic mortality disposal 
effort, rendering plants could easily become overwhelmed and haul distances to rendering plants 
may prove too burdensome (Glanville et al., 2008; Harper et al., 2008).   
Rendering is a highly logical approach when facilities are available because it is more 
efficient that other recycling systems.  In addition, removing animal carcasses from the waste 
stream via rendering would result in the emission of significantly less greenhouse gases than if 
those carcasses were disposed of in landfills, compost piles, or burial pits and the carbon released 
as CO2 into the atmosphere (NRA, 2012).  Current research is examining the challenges of 
returning a rendering facility back to normal operation following use for mass carcass disposal in 
a disease event (Lemieux, 2012a). 
 Alkaline hydrolysis 
Alkaline hydrolysis is a form of tissue digestion created for the biomedical and 
pharmaceutical industries to dispose of radioactive animal carcasses.  It was introduced in 1992 
by Waste Reduction by Waste Reduction, Incorporated (WR
2
).  Recent advances in equipment 
and technology have made alkaline hydrolysis a more feasible option in carcass disposal.  Heat 
and pressure combined with sodium hydroxide or potassium hydroxide digests the carcass and 
results in liquid effluent and the mineral portion of bones and teeth.  The effluent can be 
discharged into the sewage system, or, if potassium hydroxide is used, it can be dehydrated and 
used as a fertilizer.  The bone and teeth can be crushed and sent to a landfill (Ellis, 2001; APHIS, 
2002; Taylor & Woodgate, 2003; NAHEMS, 2005a; Vanier et al., 2008; Waste Reduction by 
Waste Reduction Inc. [WR
2
], 2008).  Alkaline hydrolysis is effective in destroying numerous 
infectious pathogens, and there are few emissions and minimal odor associated with the process.  
However, its role in catastrophic disposal efforts would be limited by the lack of available units 
(Kaye, Weber, Evans, & Venezia, 1998; Harper et al., 2008; CFSPH, 2012). 
Permanently installed alkaline hydrolysis units currently in operation require 
transportation to the site, but portable units are being developed.  Fixed systems can handle 
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10,000 lbs/cycle and portable units take 4,000 lbs/cycle.  Other methods are under development 
that will significantly increase the efficiency of digestion capacity.  The use of alkaline 
hydrolysis tissue digesters is a preferred method for disposal of TSE contaminated carcasses 
because it ensures a biosecure end product.  It has been utilized for the disposal of elk and deer 
that are infected or exposed to CWD.  It is also a preferred method for disposing of poultry 
infected with AI H5N1.  It has also been found to compare well economically for disposal and 
animal byproducts especially in large-scale, intensive livestock production systems.  In theory, 
large-volume portable units in routine use around the country could be pulled together to deal 
with a mass animal disease disposal effort (Ellis, 2001; APHIS, 2002; Taylor & Woodgate, 
2003; NAHEMS, 2005a; Vanier et al., 2008; Gwyther, Williams, Golyshin, Edward-Jones, & 
Jones, 2011; Williams, Gwyther, Golyshin, Edward-Jones, & Jones, 2012). 
 Lactic acid fermentation 
Fermentation is a closed system of anaerobic microbiological decomposition.  Lactic acid 
fermentation is an anaerobic process that produces an end product that may be pathogen-free and 
nutrient-rich.  Lactobacillus acidophilus, bacteria that produces lactic acid from fermented 
sugars, is the most common form of inoculant.  To be most effective, carcasses should be ground 
before fermentation.  Carcasses are mixed with a fermentable carbohydrate source such as 
lactose, glucose, molasses, ground corn, or whey.  During this process, carcasses can be 
decontaminated and there is a possibility of recycling the final products into feedstuff.  
Fermentation should be viewed as a means to preserve carcasses for up to 25 weeks until they 
can be rendered.  The resulting product is biologically safe, a valuable feed ingredient, and can 
be stored until transport to an appropriate facility is viable (Crews, Donald, & Blake, 1995; 
Harper et al., 2008). 
 Anaerobic digestion  
Anaerobic digestion, also known as biodigestion, is an alternative disposal method and 
has been mostly evaluated for poultry mortality disposal.  Its use is increasing.  It involves the 
transformation of inorganic matter by a mixed-culture ecosystem with no oxygen into the 
generation of heat, carbon dioxide, and methane, which can be used as fuel.  It also results in end 
products of liquid and solid fertilizers.  Anaerobic digestion couples methane production with 
waste treatment and effectively inactivates pathogens.  It is a highly complex process and can 
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require intensive equipment investment.  It is traditionally used for processing animal waste, but 
could be adapted to carcass disposal (Chen, 2000; Harper et al., 2008; Gwyther et al., 2011; 
Williams et al., 2012). 
Variances occur in size and technology, depending on location and needs.  An on-farm 
system can be a plastic-covered trench with attached storage tank or large commercial plants.  
The combination of time and temperature reached impacts the survival of pathogenic agents, and 
biodigestion can be highly efficient when carcasses are co-digested with livestock waste.  
Previous studies show various impacts on pathogen removal, and the combination of 
biodigestion with a secondary heat treatment and minimum storage period aids in inactivation of 
pathogenic organisms.  TSEs are not destroyed at normal operational temperatures and additional 
heat treatment would be required following digestion.  Biodigestion is an optimal environmental 
option, but the need for further treatment to address biosecurity may increase the environmental 
footprint.  While the initial capital costs make this a challenging alternative to implement for on-
farm disposal, the production of bioenergy makes this option, if existing digesters could be used 
for carcass disposal, economically and environmentally appealing (Gwyther et al., 2011; 
Williams et al., 2012).  
In Sweden, anaerobic digesters are used to convert animal carcasses, seized alcohol, and 
human waste into alternative biofuel.  Biogas is used to fuel more than one-quarter of the city 
buses in Stockholm.  Overall, anaerobic digesters produce more than 250 million cu ft of biogas 
(Sen, 2007).  Biogas production from carcasses thorough a closed system of anaerobic 
fermentation is included on the OIE recommended methods list (OIE, 2012b). 
 Other methods and technologies 
A few examples of other forms of disposal that have been discussed include: 
fermentation, acid preservation, plasma vitrification, refeeding to non-affected species such as 
fur or alligator farms, refrigeration or freezing, isolation, pet food processors, scavengers, ocean 
deposit, biofuels, and mounding (top of ground) (Ellis, 2001; Sander et al., 2002; EPA, 2006).  
The NAHEMS guidelines specifically mention plasma vitrification, and gasification (NAHEMS, 
2012).  These novel technologies and others are described in limited detail. 
Fermentation, acid preservation, and refrigeration or freezing will not decompose 
mortalities but they can serve as a means for storage, stabilization, and potential pathogen 
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reduction (Crews et al., 1995; Harper et al., 2008).  Yeast fermentation is similar to lactic acid 
fermentation and requires the grinding of the carcasses, the addition of a fermentation 
carbohydrate, and a yeast starter culture.  This process has limitations for inactivation of 
pathogens (Blake et al., 2008).   
Another potential storage technology is acid preservation.  This method uses mineral 
acids or organic acids to preserve carcasses until transported for rendering (Blake et al., 2008).  
Ground, split, or punctured poultry carcasses have been preserved for more than a month in a 
3.4% sulfuric acid solution (Morrow & Ferket, 1993).  Because of the risks associated with 
sulfuric acid, phosphoric acid can be used as well and may be more practical (Harper et al., 
2008).  
Refrigeration or freezing could serve as storage before transportation to a rendering 
facility or other disposal location.  It is a fairly expensive option, but does allow for carcasses to 
be stored and held for disposal or later conversion into valuable feed ingredients (if feasible).  In 
the Netherlands outbreak of classical swine fever in 1997, 200,000 t of carcasses were kept in 
cold storage prior to being rendered.  Again, with FMD in 2001, cold storage plants were used as 
temporary storage and eliminated the bottleneck created from limited rendering capacity (Crews 
et al., 1995; de Klerk, 2002).  
Bioreduction is a potential method for storing and simultaneously reducing the volume of 
carcasses in need of disposal.  A water-tight vessel is used to heat the material while being 
aerated with a pump.  The vessels are filled with two-thirds water before the carcasses are added.  
The carcass material liquefies and volume is reduced through vented evaporation.  Anaerobic 
reduction, with no air input, has been used on pig and rabbit farms, while aerobic bioreduction 
has been tested on sheep.  The rate of carcass breakdown shows this method is highly effective.  
The impact on TSEs continues to be investigated, but it is possible they are degraded if they do 
not adhere to the solid components of waste material and vessel.  This method could provide an 
on-farm disposal alternative (Gwyther et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012). 
Isolation, especially in warm weather, may be a viable option for poultry in cases of rapid 
virus deactivation.  To ensure safe handling, carcasses should be covered and contained.  
Isolation can be used as an interim method and used in combination with composting, 
incineration, or burial.  Or, if the virus is deactivated due to isolation alone, material may be 
disposed of in another manner at a later time (EPA, 2006). 
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Plasma vitrification is the use of a plasma arc generated from electricity to produce an 
extremely hot flame in an efficient and cost-effective manner.  In theory, carcasses could be 
placed in a burial pit and then the plasma torch used to pyrolize the carcasses in the soil 
generating a gaseous effluent (Brglez, 2003).  Solids remaining after vitrification can be used as 
gravel, made into concrete aggregate, or landfilled.  Methane gas can also be captured for energy 
use (Gwyther et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012). 
Hydrolysis uses indirect steam applied to a bioreactor where that material is treated at 
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C.  It produces a biofuel, but is not seen as suitable for TSE-infected materials (Gwyther et 
al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012). 
High-pressure, high-temperature thermal hydrolysis in a sealed chamber, also known as 
biorefining, is on the OIE-approved list and is considered effective against microbial agents and 
TSEs (OIE, 2012b). 
Fast-burning napalm can be used to burn carcasses.  Air emissions, as well as ash and 
potential contamination of soil and groundwater, are all environmental concerns.  In addition, 
human health hazards exist when handling napalm (Gwyther et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012).  
Pyrolysis is the use of electromagnetic waves to heat organic material.  Thermal 
depolymerization utilizes high heat and pressure to produce a biofuel from organic matter.  The 
resulting waste minerals can be used as a fertilizer.  This method is expected to eliminate prions 
and pathogens as organic matter is destroyed at the molecular level.  Low amounts of waste are 
produced, energy requirements are low, and emissions and hydrocarbons are reduced (Gwyther 
et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012).  Co-combustion systems that have been built in the EU since 
the BSE crisis can be used for carcass disposal while creating heat and electricity (Blake et al., 
2008). 
Gasification technology heats the biological material inside a confined high-temperature 
burn container and generates carbon monoxide and hydrogen, known as synthesis gas, which 
serves as a fuel to create further combustion.  The gasifier converts the biomass into an inert ash 
and the combustible synthesis gas, which is burned in a secondary chamber.  The process is 
similar to incineration, but is more fuel efficient and produces less air emissions.  While it has 
applicability in carcass disposal, commercial adoption has been slow and few commercial 
gasification units are available (Harper et al., 2008; Lemieux, 2009a; Lemieux, 2012b).   
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Single-chamber systems were used in the U.K. BSE outbreak, but newer dual-chamber 
units are a significant improvement, more efficient, effective at eliminating disease risk, and 
environmentally safe.  Research has focused on development of transportable dual units.  The 
initial research goal is to develop a unit with six gasifiers linked to one macerator that allows for 
throughput of 150 t per day (Brookes, 2009).  In North Carolina, the DOD, in coordination with 
the EPA and USDA APHIS, built a transportable gasifier to be tested for disposing of large 
numbers of animal carcasses during an emergency event.  Tests indicated it was transportable 
over primary and secondary roads, could be ready to operate within 24 hr, and the burner and 
material feed systems operated sufficiently.  However, deficiencies included that it was not able 
to handle equine or bovine carcasses, the ash removal system was inadequate, material feed 
distribution needed adjustment, the oil-fired burners were difficult to ignite and could not be 
replaced while hot, the electrical system was not sufficiently shielded from heat, and operation 
required a significant amount of manual labor.  The project working group has planned initial 
modifications and will perform another round of tests in maximum throughput capacity and 
long-term operation (Lemieux, 2009a; Lemieux, 2012b).  Gasification is not considered a viable 
alternative for elimination of TSEs, but is a preferred method in disposing of poultry infected 
with AI H5N1 (Gwyther et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012). 
Homogenization can be used by producers in disposing of small carcasses.  Carcasses can 
be ground or homogenized and disposed of in the existing manure system (Harper et al., 2008).  
The potential also exists to use carcasses for feeding exotics.  In Minnesota, the fur industry 
utilizes dead animal carcasses as feed for minks.  A farmer in Pasco County, Florida feeds dead 
hog and poultry to alligators slaughtered for hides and meat, and a hog farm in Singapore fed all 
its dead animals to crocodiles slaughtered for the leather industry (Morrow & Ferket, 1993).  In 
California, dead livestock carcasses are used to feed condors as part of a condor reintroduction 
project (Brandt & Massey, 2009).   
Extrusion processing could also be used for carcass disposal.  Extrusion uses high 
temperature over a short time to cook, sterilize, dehydrate, and stabilize byproducts into highly 
digestible feed ingredients (Blake et al., 2008).  It has been used to convert whole chicken 
carcasses into high-protein feeds and is being investigated for swine disposal.  Fluidized bed 
drying using a centrifugal fan over a natural gas or propane burner is being tested for waste 
disposal including poultry and swine carcasses.  Flash dehydration is a similar process also being 
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tested (Morrow & Ferket, 1993).  Another disposal option is ocean dumping.  Ocean disposal is 
an approved OIE option.  It requires an EPA permit and is clearly only an option in coastal areas 
(OIE, 2012b; Wilson, 2003b).  It does require biosecure transport and carcasses must be treated 
so that they will sink (Wilson, 2003b).  Some researchers have argued that ocean disposal should 
not be an approved option in an intentional bioterrorism disease incident because the Marine 
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act restricts any materials produced or used for 
radiological, chemical, or biological warfare from being disposed of in the ocean (Boadu, 2010). 
While most contaminated carcasses or animal products will be disposed of using methods 
already described, some materials require special considerations.  Milk, eggs, wool, mohair, 
wastewater, hatchery waste, and manure, as well as contaminated feed, grain, hay, straw, and 
silage all require special considerations in the disposal process (APHIS, 2002). 
It is also possible to consider sending uninfected animals to slaughter through normal 
methods.  This reduces the number of animals that need disposed and eliminates the need for 
welfare slaughter.  However, the public and trading partners must be willing to accept the 
product (Rubira, 2007). 
Special considerations must be given to prion disease outbreaks.  No method (except 
closed furnace burning) has proven to deactivate prions with 100% effectiveness, but rendering, 
incineration, and alkaline hydrolysis are the most reliable technologies for prion deactivation 
(OIE, 2005).   
  Direct and Indirect Costs of Disposal Alternatives 
In order to analyze the economic implications of disposal options, various costs need to 
be identified, including those related to direct disposal, transportation, facilities, equipment, 
energy requirements, environmental impact, and social costs.  Major economic factors and 
implications also need to be identified and disposal options need to be compared and contrasted.   
An effective control strategy will not only limit disease spread but will keep costs low 
and economic impact minimized.  There is relatively little data on the costs of carcass disposal, 
and consistency regarding direct and indirect costs is lacking.  The available data are primarily 
related to routine disposal and not disposal in an emergency situation.  Costs can be divided into 
the following categories: direct costs – including fixed costs and variable (operating) costs – and 
indirect costs. 
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In the following section, examples of direct costs are identified and potential indirect 
costs are discussed relative to each technology.  However, most existing data applies only to 
small-scale disposals and does not attempt to quantify indirect costs. 
 Burial 
The two most common forms of burial are disposal pits and trench burial.  Both can be 
used for daily mortality needs, but trench burial is the most likely process used when there is 
large-scale death loss (Wineland, Carter, & Anderson, 1997).  Decision makers usually assume 
burial is a low-cost option.  Most direct-cost estimates available are relative to the use of disposal 
pits for normal mortality use, and the costs in a large-scale disaster situation would differ 
significantly. 
Burial requires significant labor and equipment, and actual costs depend on the 
availability and accessibility of these two factors.  A number of studies have identified costs 
related to routine disposal efforts.  These studies may provide insight into the cost factors in 
large-scale disposal estimates.   
In a study by University of Nebraska researchers to be discussed repeatedly in this 
section, costs were estimated for the disposal of normal death loss on a hog farm.  Nebraska 
regulations state that burial must occur within 36 hr of death and carcasses must be buried at 
least 4-ft deep.  They also recommend that trenches should be immediately closed, making it a 
difficult option for routine disposal purposes.  Therefore, they paid relatively less attention to 
burial costs in their research.  They did estimate a basic budget that included building one trench 
to hold one year’s death loss of 40,000 lbs.  Digging the pit and fencing the area would cost 
approximately $600.  Additional labor costs based on 135 hr for transporting animals to the 
burial site and covering the carcasses appropriately were included.  Estimated costs totaled 
$3,878 per year, resulting in estimates of $0.097/ lb of mortality and $193.90/t (Henry, Wills, & 
Bitney, 2001). 
Researchers at the University of Alabama investigated routine poultry carcass disposal.  
The poultry industry produces 18 million broilers each week, but also generates 800 t of 
carcasses weekly that require disposal, thus economically efficient and environmentally friendly 
disposal methods are important in daily routines.  Disposal pits designed for everyday use are a 
potential solution for both large and small producers.  The cost of the pits varies depending on 
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materials used and size of pit.  Routine mortality disposal costs were estimated for a flock size of 
100,000.  Estimates included initial investment costs ($4,500), annual variable costs ($1,378) and 
annual fixed costs ($829) totaling $2,207, resulting in a cost per hundredweight of $3.68 or cost 
per ton of $73.60.  For a flock of 200,000 birds, the cost per ton would be reduced to $62.40 
(Crews et al., 1995). 
Sparks Companies, Inc. (2002) estimated costs of on-farm burial of daily livestock 
mortalities.  They assumed each mortality was buried individually, all environmental safeguard 
procedures were followed, on-farm burial was feasible, and the only direct costs associated with 
burial are labor (estimated at $10/hr) and machinery (rental or depreciation estimated at $35/hr).  
These costs resulted in per mortality costs of $15/head for cattle over 500 lbs and $7.50/head for 
calves and hogs.  These estimates are likely not representative of the costs that may be incurred 
during a catastrophic mortality loss, because multiple mortalities would be buried together, rather 
than individually as estimated here.  Furthermore, actual hourly rates for labor and equipment 
may be significantly different during an emergency.   
A survey of Iowa Pork Producers Association members was conducted in March 2001 to 
determine the disposal methods used for daily mortalities, as well as associated costs (Schwager, 
Baas, Glanville, Lorimor, & Lawrence, 2001).  The authors defined the total estimated cost for 
disposal by burial (including labor, machinery, contractors, and land) as a function of operation 
size, rather than as a function of the number of mortalities disposed.  They estimated that the 
total cost for burial was approximately $198 per 100-head marketed.  A report on various carcass 
disposal options available in Colorado identified the cost of renting excavation equipment as 
$50-75/hr (Talley, 2001). 
The New South Wales Department of Agriculture Resources states that on-site burial 
may be the only economic choice because the costs of transport may be expensive relative to the 
value of the stock.  They estimate on-farm disposal can cost A$1-2/ head if machinery is hired 
(Burton, 1999).   
Little information exists regarding the costs associated with carcass burial during 
emergency situations.  During the 1984 AI outbreak in Virginia, a total of 5,700 t of poultry 
carcasses (about 1.4 million birds) were disposed.  Approximately 85% of this total (about 4,845 
t) was disposed by trench burial at an estimated cost of approximately $25/t (Brglez, 2003). 
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The 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak provides emergency disposal cost examples for mass 
burial sites.  The costs of mass burial sites includes purchase or rental; construction, operation, 
and maintenance; and long-term restoration and maintenance.  Based on the estimated number of 
carcasses buried at each site, the approximate cost per carcass has been estimated.  The 
approximated cost per ton ranged from £20.41(US $29.38) at the Birkshaw Forest mass burial 
site to £337.77 (US $486.39) at the Tow Law site, with an average cost of £90.26 (US $129.97) 
for the 1,262,000 carcasses buried in five mass burial sites.  Although cost per ton would be a 
more preferred basis for comparison, for all sites except Throckmorton, it was not possible to 
determine this value because few reports provided either the total weight of carcasses buried at 
each site, or the number of carcasses by species at each site (although reportedly the majority of 
carcasses were sheep).  For the Throckmorton site, based on an estimated total weight buried in 
the site of 13,572 t, the cost of using this site on a per ton basis is estimated to be £1,665 (US 
$2398) per ton (NAO, 2002). 
Burial as a method of carcass disposal can result in a variety of indirect costs, including 
environmental costs.  The major environmental impact is ground- and surface-water 
contamination, particularly in areas with light soil and a high water table.  Body fluids and high-
concentrate ammonium leachate could pollute the groundwater.  Most degradation would occur 
within 5-10 years, but leachate could be released for 20 years or more.  Calculating values 
aligned with indirect costs is challenging because individual producers may not have knowledge 
of or may choose to ignore approved procedures, leading to additional environmental costs.  
Predators could also be a problem by spreading the disease or causing an unsightly disturbance if 
they are uncovering the carcasses.  Such disturbances or other unpleasing circumstances may 
also create negative public reactions.  In addition, if anaerobic digestion occurs, the hydrogen 
sulfide created can exceed safe human levels.  It is also possible that acid-forming bacteria may 
exist and decomposition-inhibiting fermentation may occur.  Burial on private land can also 
impact future land use and land values, especially if legislation requires that carcass burial be 
listed on the property deed.  Mass burial offers similar environmental risks at a higher level of 
significance (Harman, 2001; Morrow & Ferket, 1993; Sparks Companies, Inc., 2002; Wineland 
et al., 1997). 
196 
 
 Landfills 
The use of public landfills is another potential disposal alternative requiring the 
cooperation of operators, transportation to the disposal location, and regulatory compliance. 
The fee charged by a landfill for accepting waste is typically based on either weight or 
volume, and may vary with the type of waste deposited.  Even though many state regulations 
allow landfill use for carcass disposal, many municipal authorities refuse carcasses.  Many can 
charge $10-30/t, making them cost prohibitive (Morrow & Ferket, 1993). 
For landfill disposal of small numbers of animal carcasses – such as companion animal 
remains, carcasses resulting from hunting activities (such as deer or elk), or small numbers of 
daily mortalities from livestock production facilities – fees may be based either on weight or on 
the number of carcasses (Talley, 2001).  Landfill disposal fees vary, but average around $70/t 
(Blake et al., 2008).  Fees at three landfills in Colorado were reportedly $10/animal, $160/t, and 
$7.80/cu yd, respectively (Talley, 2001).  As of 2003, fees for carcass disposal in Riverside 
County, California consist of a $20 flat fee for quantities less than 1,000 lbs and $40/t for 
quantities greater than 1,000 lbs.  These fees are slightly higher than those charged at the same 
facility for general municipal solid waste because animal carcasses are classified as “hard-to-
handle” waste because they require immediate burial (immediate cover) (Riverside County 
Waste Management Department [RCWMD], 2002).  Landfill costs for disposing of animal 
byproducts in European countries range from 30- 80 Euros/t of material (Commission of the 
European Communities [CEC], 2001).  During the 2002 outbreak of END in southern California, 
disposal fees were approximately $40/t of poultry waste, plus additional transportation costs 
(Hickman, 2003). 
Following confirmation of two cases of CWD in South Dakota, the City Council of Sioux 
Falls established disposal fees for deer and elk carcasses at the city landfill.  A mono-fill area 
(waste of only one type) designed to accommodate up to 10,000 deer carcasses was developed in 
an unused expansion of the landfill at a reported cost of about $50,000.  Fees of $50/t were 
established for deer or elk carcasses originating within the state, and $500/t for carcasses 
originating outside the state.  However, private individuals are exempt from the ordinance and 
may dispose of up to 10 carcasses without charge (Tucker, 2002).   
In situations involving significant volumes of carcass material (e.g., an animal disease 
outbreak), fees would most likely be based on weight (i.e., per ton of carcass material).  Costs 
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associated with transportation of carcass material from the site of the outbreak to the landfill 
must also be considered.  In instances where this distance is great, transportation costs can be 
significant.  During the 2002 outbreak of AI in Virginia, disposal fees were approximately $40-
45/t of poultry carcasses.  However, significant additional cost was incurred due to transportation 
distance.  More than 64% of the carcasses were shipped over 160 mi to available landfills.  Each 
truck could only make two trips a day and an average of 10 trucks were on the road each day, 
hauling 20 t of carcasses.  In addition, the trucks had to be specially prepared to transport the 
carcasses (Brglez, 2003).  When costs of all equipment and transportation were included, costs 
increased to approximately $122/t (Flory et al., 2006a).  Another example cited landfill disposal 
fees, known as tipping fees, ranging from $46-90/t, with costs increasing to $149/t when killing, 
transport, and tipping fees were all included (Wilkinson, 2007). 
Disposal in landfills requires additional daily management, which leads to increased 
management costs.  The use of a landfill for carcass disposal is likely to impact the location’s 
ability to handle other waste disposal needs, which creates opportunity cost.  In addition, if 
landfills are used, the county may be financially impacted if the life expectancy of the landfill is 
reduced prematurely.  Environmental costs also exist with landfill usage.  Disposal of carcasses 
in landfills can generate very high organic loads and other pollutants for up to 20 years.  The 
odors are also considered a public nuisance.  Landfills offer similar concerns as burial regarding 
groundwater contamination and predators.  If landfill usage is mandated at a higher level of 
government, the cost of public perception and poor cooperation could be large as well (Morrow 
& Ferket, 1993). 
 Incineration/burning 
There are three common forms of incineration: open burning (e.g., pyre burning), air-
curtain incineration, and fixed-facility incineration.  Intervals of approximation have been used 
to describe the costs for each incineration technology.  These intervals are listed as $196-723/t 
for open burning, $98-2,000/t for fixed-facility incineration, and $143-506/t for air-curtain 
incineration.   
An open-air pyre requires fuel, which may include coal, timber, pallets, straw, or diesel 
fuel.  While this may seem clear, specific cost data is limited.  Cooper, Hart, Kimball, and Scoby 
(2003) estimate open-air pyre burning of cattle carcasses to cost $196/t (Cooper et al., 2003).  
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During the U.K. 2001 FMD outbreak, there were concerns about the on-farm burial of pyre ash.  
Therefore, pyre ash was disposed of at landfills at a cost of approximately £317 ($457) per ton 
(Anderson, 2002). 
The most significant costs related to fixed-facility incineration are the fixed costs 
associated with construction of the incineration facility and purchase of incineration equipment.  
These are the most extensive costs for individual producers and governments preparing for large-
scale mortality capability (Harman, 2001).  A 500-lb capacity incinerator costs $3,000 and will 
last for approximately four years (Sander et al., 2002). 
Researchers at the University of Nebraska have estimated disposal costs on an annual 
basis for a pork production system with average annual mortality loss of 40,000 lbs per year.  
The costs do not include labor or loader use for removing dead animals from the farm, because 
they assumed no change between alternatives.  They calculated fixed costs to include 
depreciation, interest on the undepreciated balance, repairs, property taxes, and insurance.  The 
incinerator used had a 500-lb capacity and along with a fuel tank and fuel lines, costs $3,642.  
The rate of incineration was estimated to be 78 lbs per hour with diesel fuel consumption of 1 gal 
per hour priced at $1.10/gal (compared to over $3/gal at the time this dissertation was 
completed).  The incinerator was calculated to last 10 years or 5,000 hr.  Interest rates were 
calculated at 10% and annual repairs were calculated as 3% of original cost.  This study assumed 
the incinerator would be taken to the production unit, so transportation costs were not relevant.  
An incinerator with an afterburner may be necessary to reduce emissions and would increase 
investment costs by $1,000 and increase fuel consumption to 1.35 gal/hr.  The study estimated 
costs for both types of incineration as depicted in Table 3-5 (Henry et al., 2001). 
In Alabama, poultry producers utilize incineration when burial is ruled out due to 
environmental concerns.  An incineration unit with gas or oil burners is required, and producers 
need a concrete slab and shelter to house the unit.  Additional cost considerations are fuel costs 
and burn rate.  Initial investment costs are $2,000 at a minimum with annual variable costs of 
$4,833 and annual fixed costs of $522.  These equate to total net costs of $5,355 and a cost per 
hundredweight of $8.92, resulting in a per ton cost of $178.40 (Crews et al., 1995).  In a similar 
study in Alabama, costs are estimated at approximately $3.50 per 100 lbs or $70/t of carcasses 
assuming fuel costs at $0.61/lb (Crews et al., 1995). 
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Table 3-5 Cost Estimates for On-Farm Incineration of Daily Mortalities  
 Incineration without 
afterburner 
Incineration with afterburner 
Disposal equipment Incinerator and fuel tank Incinerator and fuel tank 
Capital investment $3,642.00 $4,642.00 
Labor hours per year 60.7 60.7 
Budgeted annual costs $710.19 $905.19 
Fixed costs –    
Disposal equipment   
Machinery operation $572.00 $1,341.44 
Labor $667.33 $667.33 
Annual cost per year $1,949.52 $2,913.96 
Annual cost per pound $0.049 $0.073 
Annual cost per ton $97.48 $145.70 
Note. Adapted from Henry et al., (2001). 
 
In a study at the University of Tennessee, the use of incineration for poultry mortality 
management was studied.  Variability in fuel prices will impact the cost of incinerator operation.  
If propane costs are estimated at $.75/gal, the cost to burn 100 lbs of poultry broiler carcasses 
will average at $4 per 100 lbs or $80/t.  The amount of fuel needed is impacted by the size of 
birds and their body fat percentage.  The researchers also noted that while incineration is an 
effective technique, producers should have an alternative plan for handling catastrophic bird loss 
(Burns, 2002). 
The Georgia Department of Agriculture reports that the cost of incinerating 450 t of dead 
chickens after 2001 tornadoes struck Mitchell County was $300/t or outsourced for $1,600/t. 
Larger, fixed-facility incineration has been approximated by WR
2
 at $460-$2,000/t of 
carcass material in the US.  This interval captures a forecasted during-emergency price of 
$1,531/t (Western Australia Department of Agriculture, 2002). 
Cost information for air-curtain incineration depends on species type, fuel costs, and ash 
disposal.  The model described below is completely self-contained and powered by a diesel 
engine with a 15,000 CFM centrifugal caged fan.  Air speed can be adjusted up to 165 mph, and 
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air is forced across the top and angled down into the trench.  Combustion efficiency and burning 
rate increase as oxygen is fed into the fire with a burning rate 4-6 times faster than an open fire 
and less fuel requirements.  Once the fire is started and the air-curtain is operating, no auxiliary 
fuel source is needed.  The largest single expense related to air-curtain incineration is the 
expense of the air-curtain incinerator, either by purchase or rental.  In a test operation in Texas 
held by the USDA and Texas Animal Health, a trench burner was leased from Air Burners, LLC 
for 3 days for $7,500 including transportation to the site and operators.  The test operation 
disposed of 504 head of swine carcasses weighing 91,600 lbs.  In this same case, fire wood was 
used as the fuel and with delivery cost nearly $4,000.  Another large expense was the 
transportation of swine to the location costing more than $4,500.  All costs noted for the 
operation of the air-curtain incinerator are listed in Table 3-6.  The project investigators did not 
include the time of any animal health or emergency professionals nor did they attempt to account 
for any indirect costs (Ford, 1994).  Jordan (2003) and Brglez (2003) estimated per ton 
incineration costs for poultry to be $143 and $477, respectively. 
 
Table 3-6 Air-Curtain Incineration Project Cost Based on 91,600 lbs of Swine Carcasses  
USDA/Texas Animal Health Incineration Project Cost 
Site and equipment preparation $1,700 
Site rental (by contract) $650 
Air-curtain incinerator $7,500 
Diesel fuel $300 
Protective wear $2,400 
Lumber and plywood $135 
Firewood and delivery $3,960 
Truck rental $250 
Animal transportation $4,640 
Modification of chute/knock box $1,285 
Miscellaneous supplies $225 
TOTAL $23,045 
Cost Per Ton $503 
Note. Adapted from Ford (1994). 
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The negative impacts of burning include pollution of the environment and release of 
noxious gases and compounds, including dioxins, which affect the health of the population.  
Dioxins have been identified as a possible carcinogen and the opportunity exists for uptake by 
plants or animals, and thus for the contamination of the food chain.  Public perception of pyres, 
combined with emissions of dioxins and the health effects from smoke inhalation, are additional 
negative externalities.  Mass slaughter of animals and the large “funeral” pyres in the UK 
horrified the public, and these televised images contributed to greater economic damage, 
specifically tourist activity (Franco, 2002; Hickman & Hughes, 2002; Hutton, 2002; National 
Farmers Union [NFU], 2002; Serecon, 2002).  The Canadian Animal Health Coalition concurs 
that scenes of piles of dead animals burning in farmers’ fields would not help the values in 
Canada’s brand in the international market place (Serecon, 2002). 
While incineration is biologically safe, produces little waste, and does not create water 
pollution concerns, the primary concern is emission of particulates generated during burning.  
Indirect environmental costs include the impact of emit particles and other products of 
combustion on air, liquid leakage on soil and water, and the remaining ash that needs disposed.  
The concern of disease spread through the air is also a concern.  The air quality risk will be 
higher if the process is not properly managed.  Smoke and odor are both a concern to neighbors 
and the general public.  Other issues for cost consideration include worker safety precautions, 
management expenses, and burn permits.  The cost of maintaining on-farm incineration permits 
has escalated, as has the inspection and regulatory costs for large incinerators for medical or 
hazardous waste disposal (Harman, 2001; Morrow & Ferket, 1993; Sparks Companies, Inc., 
2002; Winchell, 2001; Wineland et al., 1997).  Available estimates do not take into account 
regulatory-compliance costs as well as public-perception problems, which in 2001 in the UK, 
were tremendous for the tourism industry. 
 Composting 
Composting has captured the attention of producers as a means of disposal because they 
are already familiar with the practice in manure management.  It has moved from a novel, 
experimental idea to a viable, common practice in more industries than just that of poultry 
(Rynk, 2003).  Three types of composting deserve consideration: bin, windrow, and enclosed 
composting.  For individual livestock producers, decisions regarding an appropriate carcass 
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composting system will depend not only on the recurring expenses associated with the method, 
but also on the initial investment required for construction of the system (bin or windrow) and 
required agricultural machinery and equipment.   
The most important factors involved in cost analysis of carcass composting processes 
have been described by Mescher (2000) and are ordered in importance: volume and weight of 
mortality, frequency of mortality occurrence, labor requirements, accessibility and timeliness, 
impact on the environment, required facilities and equipment (new and existing), and their useful 
life expectancy.  The major rendering costs are construction, equipment, and labor needs.  
Plentiful carbon sources must also be readily available.  Carcass composting has some economic 
advantages, such as long life of the facility or pad, minimal cost of depreciation after startup, 
similar labor requirements, inexpensive and readily accessible carbon sources in most livestock 
production areas, and, finally, no need for new equipment (Mescher, 2000).   
In the University of Nebraska study, two types of composting units were used for average 
annual cost estimates.  Both structures included concrete floors and bin walls, and the higher 
investment option also included a roof, higher sidewalls, a storage bin for carbon source, and a 
concrete apron in front of the facility.  The estimated construction cost of high-investment 
version was $15,200, and the low-investment version was $7,850.  The lifetime of both was 
estimated to be 15 years.  Researchers estimated that 80 cu yd of sawdust would be needed at a 
cost of $4/cu yd.  A skid steer loader would be utilized at $10/hr for transporting dead animals, 
moving sawdust, and loading materials on the manure spreader.  Labor was measured for daily 
loading of sawdust and animals, moving materials from primary to secondary bins, and moving 
materials to a recycling bin and spreading the remainder.  Labor costs for the low-investment 
option are slightly higher, because the carbon source materials are not stored in the compost bins 
and must be moved into the bin (Henry et al., 2001).  Estimates do not include indirect costs, nor 
do they show the economic benefit of the final product (see Table 3-7).  
In the Alabama poultry study, researchers estimated costs for large-bin and small-bin 
composting.  Poultry producers have readily accepted composting as a means of disposal and 
more than 800 have purchased freestanding composters.  The large-bin composting method 
requires two covered bins with concrete foundations.  The initial investment cost is $7,500 with 
annual variable costs of $3,281 and annual fixed costs of $1,658.  The total cost is $4,939, but 
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the value of the byproduct for fertilizer use is $2,010, which results in an annual net cost of 
$2,929 and cost per hundredweight of $4.88 or $97.60/t (Crews et al., 1995). 
 
Table 3-7 Estimated Costs for Bin Composting of 20 t Annual Routine Daily Mortalities 
 Composting High Investment Composting Low Investment 
Disposal equipment Compost bins and buildings Compost bins 
Capital investment $15,200.00 $7,850.00 
Other equipment needed Skid steer loader, tractor, 
manure spreader 
Skid steer loader, tractor, 
manure spreader 
Labor hours per year 115 125.9 
Budgeted annual costs $2,305.33 $1,190.58 
Fixed costs – Disposal equipment  
Machinery costs $382.19 $447.39 
Fixed $254.79 $298.26 
Operating $320.00 $320.00 
Other operating costs   
Labor $1,265.15 $1,384.68 
Annual cost $4,527.47 $3,640.92 
Annual cost per pound $0.113 $0.091 
Annual cost per ton ~$226 ~$182 
Note. Adapted from Henry et al. (2001). 
 
Sparks Companies, Inc. (2002) estimated the overall cost of small-bin composting 
carcasses of different species.  Their report indicated the total annual costs of composting 
incurred by the livestock sector to be $30.34/head for cattle and calves, $8.54/head for weaned 
hogs, $0.38/head for pre-weaned hogs, and $4.88/head for other carcasses.   
Kube (2002) used a windrow system and composted cattle carcasses with the three 
different methods, each with 1,000-lb carcasses.  The first method was conventional composting 
(no grinding), the second was grinding carcasses after composting, and the last was grinding 
carcasses before composting.  The cost analysis of this experiment indicated that, depending on 
the option selected for carcass composting, the total estimated cost ranged from $50-104/t of 
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carcasses.  While carcass grinding before composting increased the operation cost by about 
$6/head, it reduced time, surface area, and management costs needed for composting in 
comparison with conventional windrow system.  Furthermore, the value of finished compost was 
estimated at a rate of $10-30/carcass or $5-15/t, and the estimated net cost per carcass was found 
to be approximately $5-42.  In this estimate, no value was assigned to the organic matter of the 
compost (Kube, 2002).   
An enclosed or in-vessel system of composting organics using aerated synthetic tubes 
called Ag-Bags has been available commercially for the past 10 years.  The system consists of a 
plastic tube 10 ft in diameter and up to 200 ft long.  These tubes are equipped with an air 
distribution system connected to a blower.  Raw materials are loaded into the tube with a feed 
hopper.  Tubes used for medium or large intact carcasses are opened at the seam prior to loading 
raw materials and then sealed for forced-air distribution during composting.  In the 2002 AI 
outbreak in Virginia, 200 t of turkey carcasses and 25 t of layer pens were composted in Ag-Bags 
(Flory et al., 2006a; Mickel, 2003).  APHIS used Ag-Bags to compost more than 100,000 birds 
infected with AI depopulated from poultry houses in West Virginia.  The structural equipment 
costs are estimated at $130,000 with additional equipment operating costs of $6-10/t (Mickel, 
2003).  These costs do not include the necessary carbon source expense or labor expense 
estimates.  Virginia AI Ag-Bag composting costs were reported by Brglez at $60/t with service 
from an outside agency (Brglez, 2003).   
The value of the byproduct would offset a portion of the estimated costs.  No permits 
would be necessary for composting and it could serve as a temporary step because the virus is 
destroyed quickly and could be moved and disposed of elsewhere permanently (Brglez, 2003).  
Odors can be a concern if improperly managed.  Risks to water sources occur if composting is 
poorly located or managed.  Opportunity costs could exist if land use is impacted while 
composting is taking place.  Keeping the carcasses in public view could also be a public relations 
problem.  In a large-scale outbreak, more compost may be created than can be used, and, 
therefore, another disposal problem will exist in the long-term.  A problem also exists with the 
attraction of disease vectors such as flies, mosquitoes, rats, and wildlife.  Additional record 
keeping and management time is also necessary (Franco, 2002; Sparks Companies, Inc., 2002). 
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 Rendering 
Renderers have historically played a critical role in disposal of animal carcasses, 
accounting for approximately 50% of all routine livestock mortalities and representing the 
preferred method of disposal.  Renderers typically charge modest fees to collect mortalities, but 
they are able to keep the costs low because they profit from the sale of meat and bone meal.  
However, the role of the rendering industry is changing significantly.  The risk of BSE has 
prompted the US and other countries to create safeguards to protect the livestock industry, 
resulting in tight restrictions and bans on rendering livestock carcasses.  Changes in regulations 
are likely to result in large increases in renderer fees to make up for the profit loss associated 
with the reduction of the MBM market (Sparks Companies, Inc., 2002). 
Therefore, the rendering industry has experienced general consolidation in recent years, 
resulting in higher fees and discontinued service in some areas.  There are fewer rendering 
plants, and those plants are located at a greater distance from the livestock farms that depend on 
them to process mortalities.  Farms used to be paid by the rendering plants for the mortalities, but 
renderers no longer find it profitable to pay for the carcasses.  Instead, producers are required to 
pay for the same service.  Depressed world market prices for fats, protein, and hides, combined 
with the elimination of use of animal proteins in ruminant feeds, are forcing many renderers to 
leave the industry or significantly increase their fees.  Additional regulations that limit the use of 
rendering will have an increasingly significant impact.  Therefore, use of rendering for even 
daily carcass disposal has become a more significant problem (Rynk, 2003; Doyle & Groves, 
1993; Henry et al., 2001; Morrow & Ferket, 1993; Peck, 2002). 
The most important factors involved in cost analysis of massive carcass rendering include 
collection, transportation, temporary storage fees, extra labor requirements, impact on the 
environment (sanitation for plant outdoor and indoor activities, odor control, and wastewater 
treatment), and potential needs for additional facilities and equipment.  These expenses primarily 
make the renderers’ costs much higher than the cost of usual rendering.  
In a University of Nebraska study, cost estimates for routine rendering to accommodate 
annual mortality of 40,000 lbs were budgeted at four pickup loads a week at a cost of $25/load.  
The cost of creating a holding pen away from the production facility and public view is estimated 
to be $300.  Labor costs include transporting to and from the holding pen at an average of 70 
min/week.  The values included in Table 3-8 refer to the four pickup loads per week and results 
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in a cost per pound of mortality of $0.163.  The estimates for one, two, three, five or six load 
would be $0.066, $0.098, $0.131, $0.196, and $0.228 per pound of animal mortality, 
respectively.  When calculated per ton, costs range from $132-456/t (Henry et al., 2001). 
 
Table 3-8 Estimated Rendering Costs to Dispose of 20 t Annual Mortality 
 Rendering  (4 pickups per week) 
Disposal equipment Screen storage area 
Capital investment $300.00 
Other equipment needed Skid steer loader 
Labor hours per year 60.7 
Budgeted annual costs $51.00 
Fixed Costs – Disposal equipment  
Machinery costs $364.00 
Fixed $242.67 
Operating $5,200.00 
Labor $667.33 
Total annual cost $6,525.00 
Annual cost per pound $0.163 
Annual cost per ton ~$326 
Note. Adapted from Henry et al., (2001). 
 
Sparks Company, Inc (2002) estimated the labor and equipment (rental or depreciation) 
costs, at $10 and $35/hr, respectively.  As long as the rendering industry can market valuable 
products from livestock mortalities (including protein-based feed ingredients and various fats 
and greases), collection fees will likely remain relatively low.  However, collection and disposal 
fees will be much higher if the final products can no longer be marketed.  Having a commercial 
value for end products is key to the economic feasibility of carcass disposal by rendering.  The 
national average for renderers to pick up a bovine carcass is $25/head.  If there is no use for end 
products, the charge would likely near $100/head (Vanier et al., 2008).  
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For rendering, theoretical estimates were based on a plant owner agreeing to a fee of 
$80/t with one cooker solely dedicated to diseased carcasses as a biosecurity measure.  If all 
tonnage were taken to this plant in a 2002 scenario, the total government cost would have been 
$2,820,206, including the disposal of the rendered product at a landfill, which would result in a 
per ton cost of approximately $167.  If the rendered product could be used as a fuel source, the 
total cost would be $1,565,006 or $93/t, and, if the product could be used in feed to local trout 
farms, the final cost would be $662,606 or $39/t (Brglez, 2003). 
Currently in the US, rendering cannot be used for any carcasses that could be infected 
with a TSE.  Therefore, rendering creates an indirect cost related to lack of biosecurity, the risk 
of disease spread when carcasses are moved to the rendering plant, and in the impact on the 
future use of the rendering plant (Winchell, 2001; Wineland et al., 1997).  The environmental 
costs are minimal if the plants are well managed and control measures are followed (Harman, 
2001). 
Rendering animal mortalities is advantageous to the environment and helps stabilize the 
animal feed price in the market.  Selling carcass meal on the open commodity market will 
generate a competition with other sources of animal feed, which allows animal operation units 
and customers to benefit by not paying higher prices for animal feed and meat products. 
Exporting the carcass rendering end products promotes U.S. export income and 
international activities.  For example, the US exported 3,650 million lbs of fats and proteins to 
other countries during 1994, which yielded a favorable trade balance of payments of $639 
million returned to the US (Prokop, 1996).  This export figure is particularly important in view of 
the shared rendering industry for future marketing of U.S. fats and protein materials and their 
impacts on the country’s economy.  
 Lactic acid fermentation 
Fermentation was studied in the Alabama poultry study, which was based on 30-t annual 
death loss.  To practice this method, the producer must purchase a grinder and multiple fiberglass 
holding tanks.  All equipment should be housed in an open shed of approximately 150 sq ft.  The 
initial investment cost is fairly expensive at $8,200.  Annual total costs of $4,052 include 
variable costs of $2,862 and fixed costs of $1,190 (Crews et al., 1995). 
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The value from byproducts totals $1,320, resulting in annual net costs of $2,732 and per 
hundredweight costs of $4.55 or $91/t.  Other estimates range from $68-171/t.  On-farm 
fermentation results in reduced transportation costs and safer transport with the fermented 
product (Crews et al., 1995).  Fermentation can hold carcasses for more than 25 weeks and the 
resulting product could be used as fur animal or aquaculture feeds.  Acid preservation costs are 
estimated at $0.10/lb and could be a fairly low cost alternative (Morrow & Ferket, 1993). 
The costs in an emergency are estimated to be about $650/t.  Their example was based on 
the disposal of 1,000 head of cattle weighing approximately 1,100 lbs.  This price does not 
include the sale of byproducts to rendering companies or resale of used equipment (Crews et al., 
1995).   
 Alkaline hydrolysis 
A mobile tissue digester, supplied by WR
2
, is a specially designed mobile unit for carcass 
disposal.  The units have a 4,000-lb capacity and can dispose of that amount in less than 3 hr.  
For the 2002 Virginia AI outbreak, Brglez (2003) estimated 12 digesters would have needed to 
operate for 24 hr with one operator per location, regardless of the number of units.  Each unit is 
priced at $1 million.  The digesters handle 15 t per day and would have required operation for the 
full 90 days at a cost of $97/t or $1,636,567.  Disposal of effluent may also have been necessary 
if it is not possible to use it as fertilizer (Brglez, 2003).  Current estimates indicate fixed-based 
systems cost between $500,000 and $1.2 million, and the large mobile prototypes being tested 
will each cost approximately $2 million (Vanier et al., 2008). 
The cost of operation of these units is low compared to some other means of carcass 
disposal.  Estimated cost of disposal of animal carcasses with the unit operating at maximum 
capacity and efficiency is $0.02-0.03/lb or $40-60/t.  Estimated cost of the mobile trailer unit 
with vessel, boiler, and containment tank included is approximately $1.2 million.  This unit 
would have capacity of digesting 4,000 lbs of carcasses every 8 hr or approximately 12,000 lbs 
in 24 hr (Wilson, 2003b).  Researchers experienced with alkaline hydrolysis have estimated 
$0.16/lb ($320/t) including costs for power, chemical inputs, personnel, sanitary sewer expenses, 
maintenance, and repair (Powers, 2003).  Manufacturer estimates indicate a cost of $0.04-0.07/lb 
for fixed-base systems, with mobile units being higher to cover generators, supply trucks, and 
transportation (Vanier et al., 2008). 
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 Anaerobic digestion 
Anaerobic digestion costs were estimated by Chen (2000) on a system with one upflow 
anaerobic sludge blanket and five leachbeds.  He estimated the costs for a poultry farm with 
10,000 birds at $105-118 per 10,000 kg live-weight production.  Capital costs made up 41% of 
the costs and economies of scale existed with decreasing costs as farm size increased.  With 
100,000 bird operations, costs were estimated at $28 per 10,000 kg live-weight production.  
Based on Chen’s assumption of an 8% mortality rate, the costs per ton of mortality range from 
$109-123/t for a 10,000-bird operation to $29/t for a 100,000-bird operation.  Calculating the 
potential benefits available from the sale of methane could improve the economic impact (Chen, 
2000).  Scale-up consideration and a costing analysis showed that thermal inactivation was likely 
to be more suitable and considerably less expensive (Turner, Williams, & Cumby, 2000).  
The various alternatives for construction materials and installation methods will impact 
the cost of the chosen system.  If digester use is temporary, the construction materials will be less 
expensive, estimated at less than $50/kg of daily capacity ($22.73/lb of daily capacity) and the 
construction could be done in less than a month.  For a permanent installation, concrete 
construction of the digester takes about six months and would cost between $70-90/kg of fresh 
carcass daily capacity ($31.82-40.91/lb of fresh carcass daily capacity).  Consequently, this type 
of installation requires construction well in advance of an emergency situation.  It would be 
logical to use the digester for other substances like manure or municipal waste to help alleviate 
the expense (White & Van Horn, 1998; Boehnke, Eidam, & Pierson, 2003).  
 Novel Technologies 
 Refrigeration/freezing 
Refrigeration/freezing can be used for the purpose of storage and allowing disposal 
efforts to catch up with depopulation efforts.  The initial purchase cost of a large-capacity freezer 
combined with ongoing electrical costs makes this a very expensive option.  Initial costs are 
estimated at $14,500 with annual variable costs of $5,378 and annual fixed costs of $2,670.  The 
value of the byproducts is $1,200 and if combined with total costs of $8,048, results in an annual 
net cost of $6,848 or $11.41 per hundredweight or $228/t (Crews et al., 1995).  Freezing has 
been utilized in the poultry industry.  Freezers that hold one ton of carcasses are available for 
around $2,000 and require electricity at approximately $1.20/day or $0.01/lb ($20/t) (Morrow & 
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Ferket, 1993).  A broiler company in Florida developed special weatherproof units that could be 
moved with a forklift.  The freezer unit that cooled the containers never leaves the farm.  The 
loaded containers are hauled away or emptied at the farm to transport the contents to a 
processing facility (Damron, 2002). 
 Grinding 
Grinding of carcasses is a mechanical process that can be used as a pre-process to make 
mortality processing more rapid and effective and is required before fermentation.  Typically, 
carcasses would be ground to an inch or less in diameter and would result in a paste-like 
material.  A large portable grinder would be taken to the site and processed material can be 
preserved with heat or chemicals and contained for off-site transport.  Smaller grinders can be 
used for poultry or swine and larger grinders for cattle.  The largest portable grinders available 
could handle about 15 t per day.  Power and water will be required, and a bulking agent such as 
straw, sawdust, cornstalks, or a similar material is needed to absorb liquid.  If the final product is 
used for alligator or pet food, the bulking agent needs to be digestible (Jones, Hawking, & Ess, 
2004).  The installation costs for a grinder appropriate for pigs would be approximately $11,000 
for a cutter, grinder, and associated costs.  Shelter for the grinder and bulking agents are not 
included in the cost estimate.  A portable unit would be more expensive because of the 
associated transport costs and portable power plant required.  The size of carcass and the 
throughput needed will greatly affect cost and type of grinding equipment (Foster, 1999). 
 Grinding/sterilization by STI Chem-Clav® 
WR
2
, also known as Biosafe Engineering, headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana, 
patented nonincineration technology for processing biological and biohazard waste materials 
called the STI Chem-Clav®.  Equipment can be stationary or portable and has traditionally been 
used to process medical wastes.  Waste is shredded to maximize surface area for permeation of 
steam from a steam auger into the materials.  The end result is a dry, sterilized material.  This 
system would not neutralize prions.  Depending on the disease agent and ability to deactivate 
pathogens, the resulting materials can be composted, deposited in a landfill, cold stored, or 
utilized in an energy recovery system such as thermal depolymerization or a plasma arc furnace 
(Jones et al., 2004). 
211 
 
The cost of a mobile STI Chem-Clav® as is approximately $150,000.  This does not 
include a semi-tractor or fuel supply trucks for transport.  A fuel source such as propane and 
electricity are also required and would add to the expense of operation.  The addition of a 
disinfectant into the screw-processing mechanism would add to the cost.  If the system were used 
on a daily basis for processing other wastes (food scraps, medical, etc.), the cost of processing 
would be decreased; however, the normal flow of feedstock would need to be diverted or stored 
in the event of a large mortality event (WR
2
, 2008).   
 Ocean disposal 
Ocean disposal can be a low-cost option where geographically available, estimated at 
approximately $1/t.  Costs are primarily due to biosecure transportation to the location by truck 
and then barge rates of $2,000/day and tug rates of $2,500/day.  There would also be a minimal 
cost for weighting the carcasses to sink.  Indirect costs of ocean disposal are minimal.  The most 
significant environmental risk is that of transportation risk.  The actual disposal itself is 
environmentally friendly and is beneficial to marine life.  However, appropriate public relations 
efforts would be necessary in order to avoid significant public disapproval (Wilson, 2003b).  
Before ocean disposal is considered, sufficient information about the disease and the potential 
risk to marine life should be understood and evaluated.  
 Plasma arc 
Plasma vitrification generates heat in an efficient and cost-effective method.  Brglez 
(2003) estimated that four plasma arc torches would have been needed to assist with the Virginia 
AI outbreak.  The units cost $2 million each and the gas collection hoods cost $500,000.  Five 
people would be needed to operate and maintain the torches.  The operation costs were estimated 
to be $120/t and the cost of digging the pit was $30/t.  The total cost for 240 t of carcasses was 
$36,000/day and the total cost for the 2002 AI outbreak disposing of 16,500 tons was $2,475,000 
resulting in a per ton cost of $150.  There is no odor, little to no environmental risk; it is 
considered very biosecure (Brglez, 2003).  At the North Carolina Disposal Conference, costs 
were estimated costs to be $60/t to treat in situ (i.e., buried) carcasses (Wilson, 2003b). 
  
212 
 
 Thermal depolymerization/pyrolysis 
Pyrolysis is an approach used by Renewable Oil International LLC (ROI) similar to 
thermal depolymerization.  Pyrolysis is done at a higher temperature than thermal 
depolymerization, uses a considerably dryer feedstock, and does not take place in the presence of 
water.  ROI estimates a capital cost of $3 million for a 120 t/day and a 2.5-MW gas turbine to 
generate electricity, including the cost of feedstock (Renewable Oil International LLC [ROI], 
2004).  
 Refeeding (primarily to alligators) 
Startup costs for an alligator farm can be substantial at approximately $250,000.  Some 
operations in the Southeast raise alligators indoors in temperature-regulated facilities.  Alligator 
waste must be filtered from the water in which they are kept, secure fencing must be provided 
(Sewell, 1999), and permits acquired (where necessary).  Some poultry farms in southeastern 
states use alligator farms as a routine disposal method, and research has been done on the 
potential use for swine disposal.  Alligator farms in Georgia and Florida of 6,500 alligators can 
devour more than a ton of dead chickens per day (Clayton, 2002).  Disease impacts on alligators 
should also be considered.   
 Napalm 
Estimated costs of using napalm for carcass disposal are $25-30 per animal but will 
depend on the cost and temperature of available fuel and the size of animal.  The price of 
aluminum soap powder varies from $4.60-5.30/lb.  The disposal of a large number of carcasses 
may be more efficient than dealing with small disposal situation (Wilson, 2003b). 
 Non-traditional rendering 
While the operational costs of using flash dehydration followed by extrusion to recycle 
mortality carcasses or spent laying fowl appear to be economically sustainable, the process is 
unlikely to attract outside investors because the time to recover capital expenditures ranged from 
11.41 to 48 years.  The addition of the expeller press technology could be expected to increase 
the capital costs and reduce the annual profits for the plant.  Extrusion has been used in the food 
industry for some time.  The cost to dehydrate turkey mortalities to 20% moisture is about $27/t 
of final product and $40/t if followed by extrusion (Nesbitt, 2002).  The use of extrusion methods 
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has high capital costs, but it is possible that farmers could use the extruders for other purposes in 
creating feeds (Morrow & Ferket, 1993). 
 Agreements and contracts 
For efficient and immediate action during an outbreak of an FAD and reduce the 
uncertainties, agreements with all parties must already be in place and as many decisions as 
possible should be made prior to the outbreak.  Agreements should be in contracts.  Contracts 
should be in place to allow for the increase of expert staff and resources so situations will be 
controllable.  It is easier to negotiate prices with service providers during a disease-free time.  
Contracts should be negotiated with providers responsible for laboratories, rendering plants, 
slaughterhouses, cold-storage plants, incinerators, disinfection companies, equipment suppliers, 
employment agencies, large machinery owners and operators, shower trucks, livestock haulers, 
communication systems, accommodation suppliers, and others.  Any required licenses should be 
confirmed at this time as well.  To ensure proper use of public funds when commercial operators 
are involved, sound management with consistent and sound financial control is necessary.  
Government agencies should utilize and delegate to specialists available in the private sector to 
deal with a large animal death loss (de Klerk, 2002; NFU, 2002). 
During the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the UK, organization and management of contracts 
and the increasing number of contractors created serious challenges in disposal operations.  
Material for pyres became difficult to obtain, and rapid price inflation existed on fuel sources.  
Poor quality coal made achieving combustion difficult and a lack of available manual labor 
caused efforts to be less efficient than in the 1967 outbreak (Scudamore, Trevelyan, et al., 2002). 
The disposal of thousands of animal carcasses in North Carolina in the wake of Hurricane 
Floyd resulted in additional provisions regarding carcass handling.  In the County Plan 
recommended by the North Carolina State Animal Response Team, the Mortality Management 
Section coordinators, Drs. Jim Kittrell and Dan Wilson, identified the need to prearrange 
contracts for resources to handle dead animal removal, burial, and disposal.  Under the State 
Plan, it is recommended to work out financing so counties can arrange local contracts with 
understanding of reimbursement.  An important consideration in any contract is how the 
contracted work is measured and compensated.  In developing such contracts, consideration 
should be given to how the animal will be handled and the condition of the carcass.  Both parties 
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of the designated contract, the payee and payer, must be able to accurately and consistently 
measure and count the unit (Ellis, 2001; Kittrell & Wilson, 2002). 
 Previous Carcass Disposal Comparisons  
FADs and the efforts to control them are costly.  Disposal methods and other means of 
disease eradication will have high short-term costs.  However, failure to employ an effective 
strategy will lead to enormous long-term costs.  Selection of appropriate strategies should 
consider both the short and long-term costs (Nelson, 1999). 
 Cost comparisons 
A 2002 study commissioned by the National Renderer’s Association and conducted by 
the Sparks Company investigated methods of disposal for livestock and their potential costs.  
The evaluation was completed to examine the economic impact of regulations on rendering as an 
alternative for daily mortality disposal because of the related risks to BSE.  Their estimates were 
based on 2000 annual mortality rates in the US of 3 billion lbs of livestock and 346 million lbs of 
poultry (Sparks Companies, Inc., 2002).  These estimates are calculated at a per ton rate that do 
not include capital costs for specialized facilities (Table 3-9). 
Renderers typically charge modest fees, but rendering is still highly cost effective 
because of the operating and fixed costs of other methods.  However, if regulations keep 
renderers from selling their byproduct, their fees will likely increase significantly.  The viability 
of disposal options for producers will depend on logistics, mortality quantity, facility locations, 
soil type, topography, labor availability, and equipment accessibility.  Estimated costs will be 
driven by producers’ attitudes toward the environment, management preferences, and 
government regulations.  Results indicated rendering is a top preference assuming current 
rendering rates.  If rendering prices increase, producers will likely choose other methods and, 
depending on method choice, could increase costs on society through environmental degradation, 
groundwater pollution, or spreading of disease.  Furthermore, if the costs of “approved” methods 
increase, the use of “unapproved” methods may increase and lead to greater environmental risks.  
Methods with high capital investment costs will be especially challenging for small producers.  
Therefore, any regulations impacting disposal methods need to carefully analyze the benefits and 
costs of any proposed change (Sparks Companies, Inc., 2002). 
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Table 3-9 Cost Estimates for Methods of Mortality Disposal  
 Rendering    
Species 
MBM sold 
for feed 
MBM not 
sold Burial Incineration Composting 
Total (Sector-Wide) Operating Costs ($1,000) 
Cattle and 
calves 
34,088 99,619 43,902 38,561 125,351 
Weaned 
hogs 
48,020 79,061 51,450 16,906 58,018 
Pre-weaned 
hogs 
5,533 7,786 8,300 1,226 4,209 
Other  5,828 8,003 6,245 1,184 4,063 
Total 
operating 
costs 
$93,470 $194,470 $109,898 $57,879 $191,643 
Cost per ton 
($) 
$55 $116 $66 $35 $115 
Operating Costs, Dollars per Mortality ($/head) 
Cattle and 
calves 
$8.25 $24.11 $10.63 $9.33 $30.34 
Weaned 
hogs 
$7.00 $11.53 $12.45 $4.09 $14.04 
Pre-weaned 
hogs 
$0.50 $0.70 $2.01 $0.30 $1.02 
Other $7.00 $9.61 $1.51 $0.29 $0.98 
Total (sector-wide) Fixed Costs for Specialized Facilities ($1,000) 
Beef cattle    797,985 1,241,310 
Dairy cattle    333,630 518,980 
Hogs    158,031 245,826 
Other    90,000 140,000 
Total fixed 
costs 
   $1,379,646 $2,146,116 
Note. Adapted from Sparks Companies, Inc. (2002). 
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Dan Wilson of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture gathered data from a 
variety of vendors and presented a simple cost comparison at the Midwest Regional Carcass 
Disposal Conference held in Kansas City, Missouri on August 18-19, 2003.  His data appears in 
Table 3-10 (Wilson, 2003b). 
 
Table 3-10 Estimated Cost Per Ton and Technology Capacity for Various Carcass Disposal 
Methods  
 Cost Capacity 
Rendering $86 35-40 t/hr 
Burial $30-60 10 t/hr 
Composting $40-60 Equipment limit 
Air-curtain incineration $30-200 5-6 t/hr 
Landfill $40-100 Transport limit 
Alkaline hydrolysis $45-260 4 hr/cycle 
Plasma $60 .25-7.5 t/hr 
Ocean disposal $1 Transport limit 
Note. Adapted from Wilson (2003b). 
 
In a study completed at Iowa State University, data was analyzed from pork producers on 
disposal methods used, satisfaction with method, and costs associated with each method, 
including capital investment, labor, and operating costs.  Incineration requires the highest capital 
investment, while burial requires the lowest investment.  However, this investment level changes 
if feasible burial land is not available.  Composting does require an initial capital investment, but 
often an existing facility was converted to a composting bin.  Burial had the highest labor costs, 
and rendering required the least labor because renderers picked up the dead stock.  Depending on 
the labor available to the producer, it became a critical factor in method selection.  Since 
composting is a fairly new method for these producers, labor costs are high but are likely to 
decline over time.  Due to equipment costs, total operating costs were the highest for burial, 
followed by composting.  If the producer already owns the necessary equipment, these costs 
would be relatively lower.  When calculated for 100 head, rendering was the least costly.  When 
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satisfaction is considered, rendering and burial are the least satisfactory; while composting, a 
more expensive alternative, had the highest satisfaction level (Schwager et al., 2001). 
While rendering is a common option, regulatory changes in the ability of renderers to use 
dead animal byproducts may increase the cost to producers for rendering services.  This will in 
turn deter rendering and result in an increase of on-farm disposal.  Small producers are more 
likely to change activities than large producers, yet small producers may spend just as much in 
appropriately disposing of their death loss on their own property (FDA, 1997). 
In the University of Nebraska study that estimates cost for routine disposal, incineration 
at $0.049/lb ($98/t) is the lowest cost alternative, followed by the incinerator with afterburner at 
$0.073/lb ($146/t).  Low-investment composting comes next at $0.091/lb ($182/t), followed by 
burial at $0.097/lb ($194/t).  (Researchers do not consider burial as a viable option).  High-
investment composting is next at $0.113/lb ($226/t) and rendering is the most expensive at 
$0.163/lb ($326/t) (with four loads per week) (Henry et al., 2001). 
Alabama researchers found small-bin composting to be the most efficient method at a 
cost of $3.50 per hundredweight ($70/t).  The size of the production unit has an impact on the 
identification of the most economic method.  Three size operations were compared: operations 
with 40,000, 100,000, and 200,000 chickens.  Large-bin composting showed economies of scale 
when comparing a farm of 40,000 to 200,000 with a reduction in net costs of 53%.  Increasing 
flock size reduced net costs of fermentation by 60%.  Burial pits were the least responsive with 
the operation size increase showing a reduction of only 26% while small-bin composting costs 
were reduced by 26% and incineration costs declined 30%.  Refrigeration costs decreased by 
11% (Crews et al., 1995). 
Incineration and composting of poultry (broilers, broiler breeders, and commercial layers) 
were compared by researchers at North Carolina State University.  Cost analysis is based on fuel 
consumption, composter capacity needs, and labor requirements.  Analysis was based on 100,000 
head of broilers, layers, and broiler breeders.  The capital investment for incineration of layers 
and broiler breeders was $2,500 and $1,400 for their composting.  The additional cost to 
incinerate layers was $1,730 and to compost was $2,237.  For broiler breeders, the cost to 
incinerate was $1,612 and to compost was $1,976.50.  Broilers are more expensive to dispose 
because they are larger.  The capital investment for incineration was $3,500 and $3,750 for 
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composting.  The fixed and variable costs of incineration were $4,003.50 and $4,093 for 
composting (Wineland et al., 1997). 
The Canadian Plan Service compared methods of disposal of poultry mortalities.  They 
considered regulation compliance, reliability, biosecurity level, and economic factors, such as 
amount of carcasses, capital costs, equipment availability, and labor costs.  They considered four 
methods: incineration, rendering, composting, and farm burial.  Catastrophic losses would 
require alternative plans be in place because no single method could likely handle the disposal 
needs.  Incineration costs will vary depending on the types of poultry to be destroyed and the 
most significant cost is capital expense, followed by fuel costs.  Delivery to a rendering plant for 
the producer is the easiest, lowest cost method, but depends on a rendering plant being nearby.  
Composting costs include the building of the compost bin, material, labor, and the positive value 
of the fertilizer.  Burial on-farm was the most common, but the least recommended.  However, it 
may be necessary in the case of a catastrophic death loss (Winchell, 2001). 
In Australia, a commission estimated the economic, social, and environmental costs of an 
FMD outbreak.  They specifically looked at control and disposal costs and found significant 
social costs exist related to disposal and other strategies.  Also, environmental costs from carcass 
disposal can be minimized with good preparation and site selection.  The Australian Veterinary 
Plan (AUSVET Plan) identifies a “stamping out” policy to control FMD.  The steps of the plan 
include establishing a quarantine around the outbreak, slaughtering infected and exposed herds, 
disposing of animals, disinfecting properties, compensating stock owners for livestock slaughter, 
and inspection and surveillance.  The added pressure on producers, communities, and emergency 
workers due to the large-scale slaughter and disposal can lead to depression, psychological 
impacts, substance abuse, physical health problems, family and relationship difficulties, and 
disrupted communities.  It is noted that these costs should be estimated in further studies 
(Productivity Commission, 2002). 
The Productivity Commission also found the environmental effects due to the disposal of 
carcasses and livestock products need further review.  Groundwater pollution caused by leachate 
from disposal pits and visual and emission pollution from burning are examples.  This study did 
not attempt to evaluate the cost of the environmental impact, but noted that the key to 
minimizing risk is good preparation.  The costs of minimizing risk would not be small, but, in 
relation to overall economic and social costs, the magnitude or risk minimization would be 
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modest.  The disposal methods for carcasses and livestock products were burial, pyre burning, 
rendering, and incineration.  Burial was the endorsed method.  The control costs calculated 
included slaughter, disposal, disinfection, movement restrictions, etc.  They were calculated 
together because component costs were not available.  The estimated control costs were $20-25 
million for a 3-month outbreak, $130-150 million for a 6-month outbreak, and $360-420 million 
for a 12-month outbreak.  Moreover, the export loss was expected to be up to $12.8 billion and 
the loss to tourism to exceed $300 million (Productivity Commission, 2002; Baker, 2005). 
In a study by the University of California Agricultural Issues Center, the total estimated 
cost of an FMD outbreak (direct, indirect, and induced costs) is estimated in a two-component 
model: an epidemiologic module that simulates an FMD outbreak in the South Valley and an 
economic module that estimates the economic impact.  The economic model has three parts: (a) 
calculating the direct cost of depopulation, cleaning and disinfection, and quarantine 
enforcement; (b) using an input-output model of the California economy to estimate direct, 
indirect, and induced losses; and (c) estimating the losses caused by trade reduction.  The first 
component includes only cattle and swine.  Carcass disposal costs are included in a summed 
depopulation cost with compensation payments and euthanasia costs.  Depopulation cost per 
individual animal is estimated and multiplied by the expected loss from the first module.  The 
model assumes all disposal occurs through burning and burial.  Recommendations from the study 
state that depopulation costs would exceed the financial resources available and includes the 
following statement: “Depopulation and carcass disposal would face serious difficulties – timely 
availability of sufficient human, physical and financial resources, availability of burning 
materials, lack of knowledge of the cost imposed on different social groups by alternative carcass 
disposal methods, environmental and legal issues, etc” (Ekboir, 1999, p. 68). 
 Previous comparative studies 
Norman Willis (2003), past president of the OIE: International Committee, reported on a 
survey of 15 OIE members to identify available technologies for carcass disposal and develop a 
hierarchy.  Parameters considered for evaluation were environmental impact, production 
intensity, trade and economic impact, animal welfare, pathogenic characteristics, disease control, 
producer impact, financial and logistical impact, and public reaction.  A well-balanced choice 
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must be able to be made and implemented in a short time, because speed of decision making is 
paramount (Willis, 2003).  
The resulting hierarchy was rendering, incineration (fixed, mobile air curtain, municipal, 
and co-incineration), pyre burning, composting, mass/open farm burial, licensed commercial 
landfill, mounding, fermentation, and new technologies such as alkaline hydrolysis and 
biosphere process.  If a prion disease is involved, the selected technology must be effective at 
inactivating prions, including rendering, incineration, and alkaline hydrolysis.  Survey results 
indicated each disposal technology has advantages and disadvantages, but that overall capacity is 
critical.  Further consideration should be given to technical and financial preparedness, 
simulation exercises, risk communication tools, mobile and environmentally responsible disposal 
technologies, and the need to avoid slaughter if possible (Willis, 2003). 
In a CAST study in 2008, researchers noted the unpredictability of mass disposal events 
and the lack of practical methods to reproduce such events have limited the ability of researchers 
to perform scientific studies comparing disposal technologies.  They identified questions that 
need to be considered when determining the appropriate disposal choice specifically in the case 
of poultry: 
 Cause of the event; 
 Number and size of birds involved; 
 Spread of loss – partial, whole-house, entire farm, regional;  
 On-farm or company resources and disposal options available; 
 State of carcass decomposition; 
 Proximity of infected farms to other farms; 
 Local, state, and federal regulations; 
 Site conditions and weather; 
 Public perception; 
 Anticipated disposal costs and who is responsible for costs; 
 Compatibility of depopulation methods with disposal options; and 
 Farm accessibility during or immediately after event (Blake et al., 2008). 
Researchers recognized burial, incineration, composting, and rendering as the most 
common methods for poultry disposal.  They noted continuing problems with burial, 
improvements in incineration technology, increasing acceptance of composting, logical 
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advantages of rendering when appropriate facilities and innovative storage are available, 
usefulness of alkaline hydrolysis in limited quantity cases, and the potential of emerging 
technologies such as pyrolysis and co-combustion.  Final recommendations included the 
importance of having a response plan in place and using multiple disposal methods because no 
one method will be satisfactory (Blake et al., 2008).  
Based on AI outbreaks in Virginia, Brglez (2003) compared methods of disposal in the 
case of a catastrophic avian influenza outbreak.  Each method was evaluated on its capacity to 
dispose of 188 t of diseased poultry carcasses per day for 90 days.  Actual costs of the disposal 
methods used were compared with hypothetical cost estimates.   
Brglez found rendering as the method of choice.  The other methods considered included 
on-site burial, landfill burial, composting, incineration, alkaline hydrolysis, and in situ plasma 
vitrification.  The variables of disposal cost estimated were transportation, labor, materials, land-
use fees, and equipment usage.  The value of potentially saleable products was also considered.  
All methods were considered to meet the needs of stopping the spread of pathogens.  It was 
important for the method to be cost effective and quickly accessible.  Environmental concerns 
can be managed with burial, landfill, and incineration management techniques.  The objective of 
the study was to determine the cost, environmental impacts, public perception impact, and 
complexity of each method.   
Brglez examined each method by weighing the four factors on a point scale with good=1, 
average=2, and poor=3.  Any decision-making tool needs to consider all factors.  The 
recommended choice in his final analysis was rendering (Brglez, 2003). 
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Table 3-11 Summary of Comparative Analysis  
Method Cost Environment Perception Complexity Total Score 
On-site 
burial 
2 2 3 1 8 
Landfills 3 2 2 1 8 
Incineration 3 2 3 3 11 
Composting 1 1 1 3 6 
Rendering 1 1 2 1 5 
Alkaline 
hydrolysis 
3 2 2 2 9 
In situ 
plasma 
vitrification 
3 1 2 1 7 
Note. Adapted from Brglez (2003). 
 
Flory et al. (2006) compared methods of disposal for poultry carcass disposal.  After a 
qualitative comparison of advantages and disadvantages of several methods, they determined the 
preferred methods to be: 
1. In-house composting;  
2. Out-of-house on-site composting; 
3. Other on-site methods as availability allows (i.e. alkaline hydrolysis, anaerobic 
digestion); 
4. Landfill off-site; 
5. Rendering, incineration, or comporting off-site; and 
6. Burial on-site under emergency permit (Flory et al., 2006b). 
Based on the 2002 Virginia AI outbreak, they found incineration to be the most costly at 
approximately $500/t and the least publically accepted (Flory et al., 2006a). 
The EPA issued a report comparing bird carcass disposal options in an AI outbreak.  
They compare methods but do not offer a set hierarchy, instead noting that each disease situation 
will be unique.  The EPA offers three critical factors for selecting a method:  
 Limiting transportation to ensure virus containment,  
 Expedience in the response to reduce potential for genetic mutations or human 
transmission, and 
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 Disease containment and virus inactivation. 
On-site management is identified as a priority when feasible (EPA, 2006). 
The OIE, in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, compares multiple disposal methods 
(OIE, 2005; OIE, 2012b).  Listed below are the risk factors and practical considerations 
identified that may influence the choice of disposal technology.  The list has expanded as 
additional research has occurred.  Factors include: 
 Speed and timeliness – Early disease detection, immediate depopulation, and rapid 
carcass removal and disposal are critical to disease control. 
 Occupational health safety – Workers should be adequately protected from potential 
zoonotic disease spread and the other health risks associated with handling 
decomposing animal carcasses. 
 Pathogen inactivation – The method must rapidly inactivate the pathogen, or at a 
minimum, block the spread of the pathogen. 
 Environmental concerns – All methods may have negative impacts in the 
environment. 
 Availability of capacity – All disposal methods may have capacity limitations, but it 
is important that the method(s) of choice will not create a bottleneck in the disposal 
efforts. 
 Cost and funding adequacy– Each technology will come with associated costs, and 
those methods requiring sophisticated equipment may be costly.  
 Public reaction and societal acceptance – Carcass disposal may lead to adverse public 
reactions for multiple reasons. 
 Acceptance by farmers – Owners on infected farms will want disposal to occur off-
site; famers outside an infected zone will want disposal to stay inside the zone. 
 Transportation and necessary equipment– On-site and off-site transport vehicles must 
be available and properly prepared and equipped.  Off-site transportation creates the 
need for additional biosecurity precautions.  Selection and availability of transport 
contractors must also be considered. 
 Logistical preparedness – Availability of materials, qualified personnel, manual labor, 
facilities, electricity, cell phone coverage, and other logistical requirements are 
critical to successful disposal efforts. 
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 Wildlife, scavengers, and vectors – Diseases can be transmitted between domestic 
stock and wildlife, so disposal decisions must consider the potential of disease spread 
to wildlife (OIE, 2005; OIE, 2012b). 
 Economic impact – The method selected will have an impact on the economic impact 
of the outbreak (OIE, 2012b). 
The OIE report identifies the following hierarchy: 
1. Rendering,  
2. Incineration (fixed, mobile air curtain, municipal, and co-incineration; open 
air/pyre burning is not recommended), 
3. Composting, 
4. Trench burial and mass burial, 
5. Licensed commercial landfill, 
6. Mounding (aboveground mass burial), 
7. Fermentation, 
8. Alkaline hydrolysis, 
9. Lactic acid fermentation, 
10. Anaerobic digestion, and 
11. Non-traditional and novel technologies, such as pre-processing, ocean 
disposal, and biorefining (OIE, 2005). 
In order for carcass disposal efforts to be effective, a number of major issues must be 
considered.  Disposal efforts will be expensive, accumulating fixed and variable costs as well as 
direct and indirect expenditures.  A disposal hierarchy may not be fully capable of capturing and 
systemizing all dimensions of carcass disposal.  When all options are considered, a less preferred 
technology may be required.  Decision makers must have a comprehensive understanding of all 
methods of disposal and be able to balance the scientific, economic, and social issues.  The 
primary considerations for policymakers should be timely slaughter and disposal along with 
security and prevention of disease spread (OIE, 2005). 
The OIE defined the process for decision making as a five-step process:  
1. Define all relevant factors to be considered in the decision process.  Flexibility should 
exist to account for situational modifications.  Factors may include operator safety, 
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community concerns, international acceptance, transport availability, industry standards, 
cost effectiveness, and speed of resolution. 
2. Determine the relative importance of the factors by weighting each on their importance.  
The value of the Factor weighting (F) must total to 100. 
3. Identify all disposal technologies.  Rate each option against each factor and assign a 
Utility rating (U) of between 1 and 10 to each comparison.  The U assigned should reflect 
how well the disposal option achieves the ideal in respect to each factor (1 is the worst 
possible fit and 10 is the best fit). 
4. Multiply the F by the U to yield a numeric Balanced Value (V), (V = F x U). 
5. Sum the Vs for each disposal option.  Compare the suitability of each technology by 
numerically ranking the sums.  The largest sum should identify the best balanced choice 
(OIE, 2005; OIE, 2012b). 
An example which is included on the OIE website and Terrestrial Animal Health Code is 
duplicated in the following table. 
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Table 3-12 Carcass Disposal Decision Making Process Example  
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Factor Weight(F)  V  V   U  U V U V 
Operator safety 20 7 40 4 80 8 160 3 60 7 140 8 160 
Speed of resolution 20 8 60 8 160 2 40 5 100 5 100 6 120 
Pathogen inactivation 15 10 150 10 150 8 120 5 75 4 60 4 60 
Impact on environment 10 10 100 8 80 3 30 10 100 3 30 3 30 
Reaction of the public 10 10 100 7 70 1 10 9 90 3 30 4 40 
Transport availability 5 1 5 1 5 8 40 5 25 3 15 8 40 
Acceptable to industry 5 7 35 7 35 7 35 7 35 6 30 7 35 
Cost 5 4 20 1 5 6 30 9 45 8 40 9 45 
Risk to wildlife 5 10 50 10 50 5 25 4 20 5 25 5 25 
Capacity to meet 
requirements 
5 5 25 3 15 9 45 9 45 9 45 9 45 
Total weight & 
balanced value 
100  785  650  535  595  515  600 
Note. F = Factor weighting, U = Utility Rating, V = Balanced Value 
Adapted from OIE (2005); OIE (2012b). 
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In the EU, disposal requirements for all animal byproducts not intended for human 
consumption are detailed in Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002.  Animal byproducts are categorized 
into three areas: Category 1 – TSE sensitive material, Category 2 – high risk material, and 
Category 3 – low risk material.  Category 1 materials must be incinerated either in an 
incineration plant or processed by approved method and then incinerated.  Non-risk materials 
must be heat processed and disposed in an approved landfill.  Category 2 material must be 
incinerated or processed by approved method.  Material use may include use as a fertilizer, fuel 
for a biogas plant, or compost.  Category 3 can be used in a biogas plant, composted, or used in 
pet food.  Ruminants may be incinerated and landfilled.  No livestock carcasses in these 
categories may be used in animal feed or human food.  EU scientific committees are considering 
alkaline hydrolysis, high pressure hydrolysis biogas production, and biodiesel production for 
Category 1 materials.  For Category 2 and 3 materials, the three previously listed methods, as 
well as high pressure high temperature hydrolysis and Brookes gasification, are under 
consideration.  In the Netherlands, regulations are even stricter (Hoeksma, Lourens & Bokma, 
2009).   
Studies have been completed to attempt to reduce veterinary risk and cost related to 
carcass disposal in the Netherlands.  Previously, the Dutch government covered a high 
percentage of associated disposal costs, but over the last 10 years those costs have been shifted 
primarily to farmers.  The economic feasibility of on-farm preservation and processing has been 
considered.  Specifically, freezing, incineration, composting, and fermentation were considered.  
Conclusions included: 
 On-farm carcass treatment is generally more costly than central rendering; 
 Co-fermentation can be cost effective if a biogas plant is nearby; 
 Composting large carcasses is too expensive, but small carcasses can be 
composted at costs similar to rendering; 
 Temporary freezing can reduce cost and risk; and 
 Reduction of veterinary risk, need for transportation, and odor nuisance may 
justify higher expenses (Hoeksma et al., 2009). 
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The U.K. Department of Health compared carcass disposal methods solely related to the 
potential significant risk to public health.  Their analysis resulted in a hierarchy based on the 
lowest public health hazard: 
1. Rendering, 
2. Incineration, 
3. Landfill, 
4. Pyre, and 
5. Burial (United Kingdom Department of Health, 2001). 
In 2011, researchers at Bangor University in the UK assessed the potential environmental 
impacts and biosecurity risks associated with different disposal options and considered the 
socioeconomic and practical implications of existing EU policy.  While traditionally burial and 
burning have been the most common disposal methods worldwide, EU Animal Byproduct 
Regulations forbid these practices and limit disposal options to incineration, rendering, alkaline 
hydrolysis, and licensed maggot farms.  These prohibitions are based on concerns related to 
pathogens and infected agents entering the food supply and that carcass disposal is considered 
pollution.  The differing perceptions “raise questions about the quality of evidence-base upon 
which legal decisions have been made” (Williams et al., 2012, p. 1) and create a need for a more 
critical analysis of disposal options (Gwyther et al., 2011). 
Williams et al. (2012) compared the socioeconomic aspects, human health 
considerations, biosecurity risks, and environmental impacts of several carcass disposal methods 
using a five-star system to classify factors based on scientific evidence.  They concluded that 
while there are numerous disposal methods available, the limitations created by the inability to 
destroy TSEs and other pathogens make many of them unacceptable in the UK and other regions.  
The preferred methods are those that allow for on-farm disposal, such as composting and 
anaerobic digestion, because they are considered to be more practical and economical as well as 
providing greater biosecurity benefits and fewer environmental repercussions.  However, the EU 
does not consider these options safe, and the approved legal options are not acceptable to the 
agricultural community.  This difference of opinion leads to extensive noncompliance and 
increases environmental and biosecurity risks due to illegal activity.  Therefore, there is a need 
for alternative disposal methods to be developed and for policy changes to be implemented based 
on new evidence.  The researchers identified bioreduction as a promising alternative.  Williams 
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et al. (2012) further noted that while proper analysis of mortality disposal systems is important, 
these systems have been scrutinized far more than other livestock industry activity such as waste 
disposal and livestock access to waterways that may pose even greater risk to human health and 
the environment.  It is necessary that disposal policy be based on realistic and proportional risk 
levels rather than a zero-risk approach.  They noted where further research was warranted and 
called for further research into the economic impacts of disposal alternatives and lifecycle 
assessments so policymakers can understand the cost implications and the long-term 
environmental impacts (Gwyther et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012). 
 
230 
 
Table 3-13 Grading of the socioeconomic and biosecurity aspects of methods used throughout the world for disposal of routine 
livestock mortalities; assuming best practice  
Method 
Socioeconomic aspects 
Human 
health Biosecurity risks 
Process 
Speed 
Relative 
cost 
Practicality 
(for farmer) 
Dioxins 
& furans 
Pathogen contamination of: 
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Air Soil Water 
Burial *** ***** **** ***** **** *** MRN N/A ***** * 
Burning **** **** *** ** MRN MRN MRN MRN ***** *** 
Incineration (on-
farm)
a
 
***** ** *** **** *****
b
 *****
b
 *****
b
 MRN ***** ***** 
Incineration (large 
central facility) 
***** ** ***** *** *****
b
 *****
b
 *****
b
 MRN * ***** 
Rendering ***** *** ***** MRN N/A MRN MRN N/A * **** 
Composting
c
 ** **** *** MRN *** MRN MRN MRN ***** *** 
Anaerobic digestion ** ***
d
 *** MRN *** *** *** MRN ***** ** 
Alkaline hydrolysis **** **
e
 *** MRN ***** ***** ***** ***** ***** ***** 
*Very poor, **Poor, ***Moderate, ****Good, *****Very good; MRN More research needed; N/A Not applicable 
a
 Assumes conformation to ABPR (1774/2002) specifications e.g. use of afterburners 
b
 Omits handling and storing phase of carcasses pre-incineration which may constitute potential biosecurity risks (Section2.3) 
c
 Assumes unlined static pile with no forced aeration 
d
 Benefits from methane production (biogas for energy production) not considered 
e
 Unlikely to be suitable for small farms; although increasingly cost-effective with increasing farm size 
Note. Adapted from Gwyther et al. (2011, p. 771), Williams et al., (2012, p. 5). 
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Table 3-14 Grading of the environmental impacts of methods used throughout the world for 
disposal of routine livestock mortalities; assuming best practice 
Method 
Environmental impacts 
Odour 
Greenhouse 
gas emission 
Pathogen contamination of: 
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Air Soil Water 
Burial *** **** ***** ** *** N/A 
Burning * MRN MRN MRN MRN MRN 
Incineration 
(on-farm)
a
 
**** ** ****
b
 ****
b
 ****
b
 MRN 
Incineration 
(large central 
facility) 
**** ** ***
b
 ***
b
 ****
b
 MRN 
Rendering *** **** MRN ***** *** MRN 
Composting
 
(unlined) 
**** **** MRN *** MRN **** 
Anaerobic 
digestion 
**** ***** ***** MRN MRN **** 
Alkaline 
hydrolysis 
*** MRN MRN **** *** *** 
*Very poor, **Poor, ***Moderate, ****Good, *****Very good; MRN More research needed; N/A Not 
applicable 
a
 Assumes conformation to ABPR (1774/2002) specifications e.g. use of afterburners 
b
 Omits handling and storing phase of carcasses pre-incineration which may constitute potential 
biosecurity risks (Section 2.3) 
Note. Adapted from Gwyther et al. (2011, p. 772), Williams et al. (2012, p. 13). 
 
A study was completed from 2003-2006 in New Zealand by the Ministry of Primary 
Industries (formerly Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) on carcass disposal alternatives and 
policy approaches with a focus on burial, rendering and portable incineration units.  
Specifications for on-farm and mass burial sites were developed that complied with national 
biosecurity, environmental, and legal regulations.  Research showed that burial sites needed to be 
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preidentified.  Air-curtain incineration was found only to be feasible at the beginning of an 
outbreak or in limited disease scenarios.  Rendering capacity was limited as was geographic 
distribution.  In addition, existing systems could not handle whole or hide-covered carcasses.  
Neither rendering nor air-curtain incineration were viable alternatives in the case of a large 
disease outbreak, such as FMD.  Landfills were then considered as was composting and small-
scale pyre burning in isolated areas.  A disposal hierarchy was created based on: rendering → 
incineration → landfill → pyre burning → mass burial or on-farm burial.  A gap analysis of 
these alternatives was completed leading to the identification of the need for further research and 
planning (Pollard, 2012). 
Researchers at Texas A&M University noted that the best method for carcass disposal 
depends on the situation and must be determined on an individual basis.  Selecting the optimal 
disposal method requires considering the availability and capacity of disposal technologies and 
facilities, and the regulatory environment (Jin, Gao, McCarl, Ward, & Highfield, 2006; Jin & 
McCarl, 2008).  Previous carcass disposal cases have been relatively small and lessons learned 
from them are minimized due to the uncertainty related to the impact of a larger disease 
outbreak.  Factors to be considered include: disease control, daily carcass disposal load, event 
size, cost, environmental impact, public reaction, and availability of disposal facilities.  
Researchers compared methods based on biosecurity and safety, environmental, regulatory and 
legal, logistical and infrastructure, and economic and cost factors (Jin & McCarl, 2008).  
Direct costs of operations, transportation, storage, facilities, equipment, permitting, and 
security were considered while comparing costs between methods.  Indirect costs related to 
disease spread consequences, environmental impacts, public perception and related business 
impacts, international demand, and losses in related regional income were also identified as 
factors.  Potential revenue offsets from byproducts were included (Jin & McCarl, 2008). 
Twelve simulations of disease outbreaks were considered based on a stochastic, state 
transition simulation model.  Model output mortality ranged from approximately 16,000 to 
8,500,000 heads with epidemic length ranging from 46 to 113 days.  For the largest mortality 
result, variable costs ranged from $113-439 million.  Lactic acid fermentation was the least 
expensive, burial was the next least expensive, and anaerobic digestion was the most expensive.  
But, in the case of fermentation, the fixed costs are high and the number of facilities is 
insufficient to meet the need (Jin et al., 2006; Jin & McCarl, 2008).  Distance to disposal 
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locations is also an important consideration, especially when combined with facility capacity, 
size of the outbreak, and outbreak duration.  These limitations can make some technologies 
infeasible.  For example, in the largest mortality scenario, some technologies would take more 
than 10 years to deal with the carcasses based on current capacities.  Therefore, portable 
technology and the ability to transport carcasses over long distances to other facilities needs to be 
considered in emergency response (Jin et al., 2006). 
Researchers also focused on effects of the rate of accumulation of carcasses, strategies to 
slowing down the slaughter rate, environmental impacts, cost estimation, welfare slaughter, and 
regulatory considerations.  Results indicated vaccination or other strategies that reduce carcass 
flow can reduce costs by 15%.  Data indicates vaccination may transition from being considered 
an undesirable option to a more desirable option as carcass disposal costs and concerns increase.  
This is especially true if welfare slaughter can be reduced or animal products can be salvaged for 
some positive use.  Reducing welfare slaughter can reduce disposal costs by up to 40% in some 
scenarios (Jin & McCarl, 2008).   
In 2012, New Zealand began a carcass disposal project aimed at FMD preparedness 
building on the previous findings and developing better guidance on carcass disposal.  The 
guidelines will: 
 Be based on sound science and evidence; 
 Add onto previous findings; 
 Meet local and international biosecurity and legal requirements; 
 Have board agreement from industry, government, and other interested parties; 
 Focus on simplicity and low technology solutions; 
 Be able to be implemented immediately upon decision to depopulate; and 
 Include a decision-making process if disposal guidelines do not cover a situation 
(Pollard, 2012). 
It is anticipated that multiple options will be utilized in the case of a large-scale outbreak.  
In addition, national, regional, local and on-farm options will all be a part of the solution.  On-
farm disposal is considered the preferred option because all off-farm disposal options require 
biosecure transit.  On-farm options to be considered are burial, air-curtain incineration, 
composting, and pyre burning.  Off-farm options to be considered include burial on a nearby 
farm, mass burial sites, landfills, composting on a nearby farm, mass composting site, 
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composting in a landfill, whole carcass rendering, pre-processing before rendering, air-curtain 
incineration, pyre burning, and disposal at sea.  Disposal alternatives that are not considered 
feasible and will not be studied are: lactic acid fermentation, alkaline hydrolysis, anaerobic 
digestion, depolymerization, plasma arc, refeeding to alligators/crocodiles, napalm, pyrolysis, 
non-traditional rendering (flash dehydration, fluidized-bed drying, extrusion, expeller press), and 
any other non-traditional, novel, or unusual technologies or methods of disposal (Pollard, 2012). 
Burial remains a primary focus with an understanding it has to be implemented well to 
reduce environmental impacts.  Air-curtain incineration or fixed incineration units are likely to 
be used in limited capacities and pyre burning is unlikely to be used except in isolated areas.  
Composting is an option that has been given new attention and may provide a practical 
alternative.  Composting expertise has grown substantially and it offers a simple, low tech 
solution.  The key issue is that research must show that composting can eradicate the FMD virus; 
if it cannot, composting can only be a pre-process.  The sourcing and stockpiling of composting 
materials also needs consideration and discussion.  In comparison to burial, the environmental 
impacts are lower; the process is quicker, easier, and more effective; and site rehabilitation is 
simpler.  Rendering remains a limited capacity option in New Zealand, although available 
capacity is likely to be utilized.  Disposal at sea is also identified as a practical option with fewer 
environmental impacts.  Little scientific evidence supports the pollution impact and those that 
exist need to be compared with the environmental impacts of other disposal options.  It is likely 
only to be used as a last resort (Pollard, 2012).  
The New Zealand study group is also assessing the decision-making process.  Attention is 
focused on involvement of all groups and organizations, not just government entities.  The 
resulting approach should be one that is standard, consistent, transparent, and acceptable to all 
involved (Pollard, 2012). 
Decision support tools are also being developed to support the decision-making process.  
The New Zealand process will incorporate three tools for disposal analysis: decision criteria, 
decision tree, and decision matrix.  The decision criteria is aligned with the OIE Terrestrial 
Animal Health Code and intended to provide a common understanding and consistent approach 
to the decision process.  The decision tree is a structured, logical approach to the criteria and 
disposal options.  It is designed to be used with other tools and depends on decisions from 
previous steps.  Indecision or disagreement in one step will cause a delay in the overall response.  
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The decision matrix is designed to work with the decision criteria and tree and serve as a record-
keeping tool of all relevant decisions.  The decision-making process is the discussion itself and 
the tools are intended to support that discussion (Pollard, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3-4 Proposed New Zealand decision making process (Pollard, 2012). 
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The decision criteria included in the New Zealand decision process include: 
1. Time and spread of resolution – how quickly will the method be in place, sufficient time 
to identify, collect and deploy needed physical resources, is the FMD process inactivated 
by the selected method; 
2. Occupational health and safety – is the method safe for staff and operators;  
3. Cost effectiveness – is the method cost effective; 
4. Biosecure transport – is sufficient transportation and equipment available; 
5. Public/stakeholder/industry/political opinion/community concerns – does public opinion 
align with decision, is there consensus, are industry/farmer concerns addressed, do those 
with political influence support decision, is decision process able to withstand legal 
challenge, is decision agreed upon and accepted by participants even if they do not agree 
with the outcome; 
6. Legislative and regulatory requirements – are appropriate administrative and legislative 
mechanisms in place; 
7. International organizations and trading partners – does method align with international 
standards and agreements and is it acceptable to international jurisdiction and trading 
partners;  
8. Economic impacts – are short- and long-term economic impacts clear; 
9. Human/physical resources and logistics – are there sufficient human and physical 
resources for implementation in the field and to deal with non-field components, are 
domestic or international reserves available, are there sufficient resources for security of 
high-risk sites, can resources be scaled up rapidly, q43 logistics in place for disposal of 
other items; and 
10. Environment impact – impact on environment, sufficient knowledge of physical 
geography, accounted for weather pattern and season (Pollard, 2012). 
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Figure 3-5 Proposed New Zealand decision tree (Pollard, 2012). 
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Carcass disposal plans must be flexible and adaptable.  Regardless of its content, once a 
disposal plan has been developed, it needs to be documented in policy.  Many carcass 
management policies and regulations are not based on science and are not updated with 
development of new technology.  As is the case in California, the only approved method is 
rendering, so even research on other methods is challenging (King et al., 2009).  
There are benefits to understanding the quantitative and qualitative impacts of control and 
disposal strategies and other aspects of infectious disease dynamics.  In order to do so, farm data, 
location of animals, location and type of facilities, disease characteristics, and control and 
disposal data must be factored in so that the model will have enough information to influence 
policy (Royal, 2002). 
Any animal health plan must include at least these points for consideration when 
determining the appropriate disposal technology.  Any plan should include multiple methods of 
disposal and steps need to be taken before an emergency to prepare for the usage of multiple 
disposal methods (Ekboir, 1999; Harman, 2001).  If plans are based solely on what is cheap and 
fast, poor decisions may be made.  For example, in Alberta, “Dr. Gerald Ollis noted that burying 
carcasses is the cheapest disposal method because rendering and incinerating can cost several 
times more than an animal is worth” (Teel, 2003). 
Animal health officials are examining preemptive slaughter strategies across the country.  
In Kansas, as an example, the policy that all animals within an infected zone should be destroyed 
has been questioned.  Feedyard concentration may impact the feasibility of such a policy.  If an 
animal in a feedyard is infected, it may not be necessary to destroy animals more than ½-mi 
away if there are no cattle immediately surrounding the feedlot.  There may be no way for the 
disease to be carried from one lot to another and the hot, dry climate of western Kansas does not 
lend to easy survival of FMD (Bickel, 2003). 
The impact on the environment will be greatly impacted by any change in rural economy 
and agricultural policy regarding large animal death loss and specifically carcass disposal.  
Water, air, soils and biodiversity should all be considered.  Recent outbreaks have proven that 
limited time to select burial or burning locations, rapid authorization of disposal permits, 
communication difficulties between agencies, and public contentions all were directly related to 
environmental concerns (Harman, 2001).  The impact on public health as a result of 
environmental impacts as well as other physical and psychological issues is also a concern. 
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Another issue to be discussed is the need for interagency cooperation and clearly defined 
responsibilities amongst those agencies.  State interagency coordination is fundamental to being 
prepared to handle an animal health emergency (Ekboir, 1999).  These issues need to be 
addressed between local, state, and federal governments as well as between agencies at any 
government level.  Jurisdictional conflicts exist and must be resolved prior to the onset of an 
emergency situation.  Few states have comprehensive disposal plans in place although such plans 
are critical to making efficient and effective decisions in the face of both small- and large-scale 
death losses.  Therefore, there is a critical need to further review and recommend policy and 
regulation guidelines (Ellis, 2001).  In the US every state has regulations regarding the disposal 
of dead animals; therefore, each state must approve the disposal method before it is used based 
on their regulations (Morrow & Ferket, 1993).  For example, in Kansas KDHE must approve 
disposal method and potential disposal sites.  Some sites have been pre-approved for expedience 
in an emergency. 
 Summary of Lessons Learned 
The historical experiences related to large-scale carcass disposal have provided lessons 
from which policymakers can learn.  The choice of disposal technologies utilized should involve 
a number of factors based on lessons learned from previous mass disposal experiences. 
Animal health protection is paramount.  Disposal and the related depopulation efforts 
must limit disease spread and protect animal health.  This must be a top priority and speedy 
decisions and implementations are necessary to most effectively hamper the spread of disease. 
Any large-scale animal death loss will create significant economic costs.  The disposal of 
large number of carcasses will be expensive, and fixed and variable costs will vary with the 
choice of disposal method.  In addition, each method will result in indirect costs on the 
environment, local economies, livestock producers, and allied industries.  Decision makers need 
to better understand the economic impact of disposal technologies.  Broader policy 
considerations involving carcass disposal and a large-scale animal disaster need to be identified 
and discussed as well.   
Previous experiences dictate that strong interagency relations, cooperation, and 
communications are critical to effectively dealing with a large-scale animal disaster.  Federal, 
state, and county regulations related to carcass disposal may be unclear or in conflict with one 
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another.  Interagency issues may result in additional problems or the extension of the disaster.  
Steps must be taken to identify interagency relationship problems and develop a comprehensive 
plan for dealing with a large-scale carcass disposal.   
A disaster-level animal death loss event will cause significant public concern.  Historical 
experience shows that the disposal of carcasses creates public dismay and apprehension.  To 
assure positive public perception, decision makers handling massive livestock mortality and 
carcass disposal must have access to expert public information professionals and agree to make 
communicating with the public a top priority.   
Serious issues mandate the need for a security system during carcass disposal operations.  
Examples of security threats related to carcass disposal include potential equipment theft, angry 
and discontented livestock owners, an uninformed public, and unintentional animal or human 
activity.  The most important aspect of security is keeping the disease from being spread from 
the disposal site to other areas.  A well-designed security system would control these issues.   
Carcass disposal events can result in detrimental effects on the environment.  The specific 
impacts vary by carcass disposal technology, specific properties of the location, weather, the type 
and number of carcasses, and other factors.  Environmental monitoring will be necessary to 
accurately determine the impact of a specific carcass disposal event on the environment.  
Geographic information systems (GIS) should play a significant role in the management of 
mapped or spatial data prior to, during, and after carcass disposal events.  At the simplest level, 
GIS can provide maps, and at the more complex level, it can serve as a decision support 
capability.   
The disposal of carcasses following a large-animal disease event will likely require 
transportation to an off-site disposal location.  The transportation of large numbers of diseased 
animals or carcasses requires significant planning and preparation to prevent further 
dissemination of the disease to animal and human populations.  
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Chapter 4 - Vaccination 
Over the last dozen years, there has been an overarching attitude change about the use of 
vaccination as an emergency measure in responding to a foreign animal disease (FAD), 
instigated primarily by the U.K. foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak.  Prior to the U.K. FMD 
experience, mass depopulation and disposal were considered the clear policy choice to stop 
disease spread.  Concern over available resources, public reaction, environmental impacts, and 
animal welfare have driven the debate and made vaccination a more likely alternative.  However, 
the decision to implement emergency vaccination protocols remains a controversial policy 
decision. 
“Vaccination will remain pivotal to the control of many livestock diseases, especially in 
view of the ease with which intensive production systems facilitate the easy transmission of 
pathogens between individual animals, and will be absolutely essential if domesticated livestock 
are to be reared on a scale and intensity sufficient to feed a significantly high proportion of the 
world’s population” (Shirley, Charleston & King, 2011, p. 115). 
Vaccines are designed to produce immunity in defense of a specific disease agent 
(APHIS, 2007).  The use of emergency vaccination in an animal disease outbreak is a complex 
policy question and a number of factors need to be considered, including vaccinology, cost, 
feasibility, public acceptability, trade impacts, tourism, economic factors, animal welfare, as well 
as social, cultural, and religious issues (Garland & de Clercq, 2011; Barnett et al., 2013). 
While the debate over the use of vaccination in dealing with emergency animal disease 
applies to multiple diseases, emphasis will be placed on FMD for the purposes of this discussion.  
Classical swine fever (CSF) and avian influenza (AI) examples will be discussed minimally 
when appropriate for the purpose of comparison and to provide a broader understanding of 
vaccination policy issues.  Due to the complexity of vaccination, there is no single policy 
approach that can be applied to all animal disease emergencies. 
 Historical Experience 
Vaccination has historically been used as a prevention and control strategy in some 
countries on a routine basis while not used at all in other nations and regions.  Emergency 
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vaccination has been implemented in some regions that had previously been FMD-free while 
stamping-out has been used in other cases.  A few examples are shared in the following sections. 
By 2004, more than 200 million cattle across the world received biannual vaccination 
against FMD (Premashthira, 2012; Hutber, Kitching, Fishwick, & Bires, 2011).  Previous 
experience with FMD outbreaks indicates the disease status of a country or region will determine 
the appropriate vaccination approach.  Endemic areas are more likely to use a routine vaccination 
policy, while disease-free areas are more likely to utilize vaccination in combination with 
slaughter to control disease (Hutber et al., 2011). 
In review of previous outbreaks where vaccination was not used, the need for rapid 
implementation of control strategies was critical; however, if vaccination is used, then rapid 
implementation of additional response strategies becomes less critical.  Livestock with lower 
immunity will show more acute clinical signs and require a more rapid response and 
implementation of slaughter control to abate disease spread (Hutber et al., 2011).   
In the case of FMD, disease responses against major outbreaks in Taiwan, the 
Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, and the UK have all involved extensive culling of infected and 
exposed animals combined with movement controls.  In some cases, emergency vaccination was 
also used (Hagerman et al., 2012).  While emergency vaccination was highly effective in the 
regional outbreaks of FMD in Korea in 2000 and the Netherlands in 2001, attempts to use 
targeted vaccination in Uruguay in 2001 and Korea in 2010-2011 failed and resulted in 
implementation of country-wide blanket vaccination.  In some cases, vaccination has been 
effectively used to localize an outbreak, but it is not always successful (Muroga et al., 2012). 
 United Kingdom 
The economic impacts of vaccination were considered when developing the strategy to 
control the disease outbreak during the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK.  While vaccination was 
not incorporated into the control strategy within the UK, it was used outside the borders in 
countries like the Netherlands in a targeted manner to reduce disease spread (Burrell & Mangen, 
2001; Hutber, Kitching, & Pilipcinec, 2006).  The spread of the outbreak in the UK would have 
necessitated significant vaccine reserves and a large number of vaccination teams to implement 
an effective vaccination program in the UK.  Concerns over availability of resources and 
economic damage resulting from the delayed ability to reestablish disease-free status drove the 
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policy decision to not allow vaccination and maintain a mass depopulation approach (Paton, 
Sumption, & Charleston, 2009).  If a vaccinate-to-live policy had been implemented, 12 months 
of U.K. agriculture exports would have been lost.  However, the epidemic itself lasted eight 
months and the succeeding ban added an additional three months, indicating it may have, in fact, 
been comparable to a ban associated with vaccination (Hutber et al., 2006). 
One of the biggest lessons from the 2001 UK FMD outbreak is the impact disease control 
policy decisions have on animal welfare.  While culling animals from infected premises or those 
with dangerous contact to animals from infected premises proved effective, culling livestock 
from farms contiguous to infected premises was not found to be necessary to control disease 
spread.  Eighty percent of the livestock culled were disease free, and the depopulation was 
heavily reported in the media leading to a change in the U.K. response policy to consider 
vaccination in an FMD response (Hutber et al., 2011).  Vaccination was repeatedly considered 
for use and was actually approved in Cumbria and Devon, but the industry, animal health 
community, and public was not supportive (Scudamore, 2007).  The experience created a 
renewed focus in other FMD-free countries on vaccination as a component of disease response 
along with culling and other zoo-sanitary measures (Paton et al., 2009).   
In the 2007 FMD outbreak, the use of vaccination was approved and, within five days of 
disease confirmation, was ready to be implemented with 300,000 doses and 50 vaccination 
teams.  However, vaccination was not used because culling and movement control restrictions 
stopped disease spread and allowed for disease control (Hagerman, et al., 2012; Anderson, 
2008).  A decision tree was used to compare alternatives and decisions were made quickly.  
Concerns continue to exist amongst industry professionals about the proposed vaccination plans 
and the practical aspects of vaccination and handling vaccinated animals and products.  The data 
system had not been tested with a realistic amount of data and the tracing system of vaccinated 
animals was not ready for use.  Uncertainty over pros and cons of vaccination, economic impacts 
of the potential development of a two-tiered market (vaccinated and non-vaccinated animals) and 
trigger points that would cause vaccination to be implemented remain a concern (Anderson, 
2008).  During the 2001 and 2007 FMD outbreaks in the UK, the FMD vaccine bank located at 
Pirbright, Surrey, England was not used (Hutber et al., 2011) primarily due to the economic 
impacts expected from losing disease-free status for a longer period of time and policy indecision 
about the value and costs of vaccination. 
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 Netherlands 
During the 2001 FMD outbreak in the Netherlands, 26 cases of FMD resulted in the 
destruction of 268,000 animals including those vaccinated – an average of 10,000 animals 
destroyed for every confirmed case.  It became apparent during their outbreak they did not have 
the capacity for preemptive culling and their animal destruction policy proved insufficient to 
control the spread of FMD (Kahn et al., 2002; Pluimers, 2001).  The public demanded an 
alternative strategy and vaccine was used for targeted vaccination after approval was granted by 
the European Union (EU) government (Kahn et al., 2002; Pluimers, 2001).  Twenty-six farms 
were infected, and emergency vaccination-to-cull was applied within 2 km of all infected farms.  
In one area, vaccination was applied in a larger area.  The disease was contained in one month 
and the last vaccinated animal was culled one month later.  An effort by farmers to keep 
vaccinated animals alive was not met with success due to the desire of the Dutch government to 
quickly regain FMD-free without vaccination status (Pluimers, Akkerman, van der Wal, Dekker, 
& Bianchi, 2002). 
A study of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the Netherlands indicated that the economically 
optimal control strategy depended on animal density, course of epidemic, and animal culling and 
rendering capacity.  The study concluded vaccination within a zone surrounding an infected area 
is the most economically viable strategy for densely populated livestock areas.  Results also 
indicated vaccinated animals should be destroyed to minimize economic impact.  If vaccinated 
animals were immediately destroyed, the livestock industry would suffer losses of .5% income 
and 1,340 person-years of employment annually.  If vaccinated animals were allowed to live, it 
could extend the trade ban from four months to at least one year, causing the livestock industry 
to lose 2-3% of income and 7,000 person-years of employment (Kahn et al., 2002; Pluimers, 
2001). 
 Uruguay 
Vaccination has been a major component of national FMD programs in South America 
since the 1960s.  In 1996, Uruguay achieved FMD-free designation without vaccination and 
boosted their export value by 50% and increasing revenue from U.S. imports by 20,000 t of beef 
and $110 million in revenue.  In addition, the government saved $8-9 million annually in routine 
vaccination program costs (Knight-Jones & Rushton, 2013). 
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During a large FMD outbreak in 2001, vaccine helped lead to an eventual FMD-free 
designation in Uruguay.  Farmers objected to a repeat of the slaughter control strategy used in 
previous outbreaks and vaccination was used instead.  Initially, emergency ring vaccination was 
attempted but failed to stop the spread of disease and mass vaccination became necessary and 
was continued until 2003 (Diaz, Urdapilleta, Chowell, & Castillo-Chavez, 2005; Premashthira, 
2012; Hutber et al., 2011).  Vaccination costs made up 55% of the $13.6 million in outbreak 
costs (Knight-Jones & Rushton, 2013).  Once in place, blanket vaccination achieved disease 
control in four months, but this compared to an FMD epidemic six months earlier that was 
controlled within one month through culling (Hutber et al., 2011).   
 Japan 
During the 2010 FMD outbreak, stamping out and movement restrictions were 
insufficient in stopping disease spread (Muroga et al., 2012).  More than 126,000 animals were 
vaccinated as a means of disease control but were eventually depopulated due to perceived 
disease risk along with 175,000 additional animals.  More than 40% of animals depopulated were 
healthy vaccinates.  Vaccination was employed in order to slow down depopulation and allow 
time to identify burial sites.  This outbreak proved again an FMD outbreak is difficult to control 
and vaccination served as a method to aid in control and eventual eradication (Hagerman et al., 
2012; Nishiura & Omori, 2010; Miller, 2011; Barnett et al., 2013; Muroga et al., 2012).   
The decision to vaccinate was made 21 days after the initial report of FMD and 
vaccination began four days later (Muroga et al., 2012).  Vaccination operations were slowed 
because of the onset of the rainy season (OLPC, 2012).  Within five weeks, all vaccinated 
animals had been culled and buried (Muroga et al., 2012).  The report of an inquiry commission 
after the outbreak indicated challenges existed in determining which entity and individuals had 
the authority to determine vaccination should be utilized (Tsutsui & Ban, 2012).  According to 
Muroga et al. (2012), the delay in the decision to vaccinate indicated the importance of making a 
timely decision and concluded an earlier decision may reduce the number of animals vaccinated 
and eventually requiring depopulation (Muroga et al., 2012).  
 South Korea 
Following the burial of livestock in South Korea in response to the 2010-11 FMD 
outbreak, officials identified underground water sources had been polluted with organic 
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contaminants (Miller, 2011).  Over three million head were destroyed and buried, and some 
reports also indicated some animals were buried alive (OLPC, 2012).  This finding resulted in 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) advocating vaccination to balance 
animal welfare and environmental impacts (Miller, 2011).  Government officials, upon realizing 
the disease was not being contained and response strategies were not effective, changed from 
their culling-with-no-vaccination policy to mass vaccination with no culling (Zentis, 2011).  
Vaccination of cattle began on December 27, 2010, and was extended to pigs on January 10, 
2011 (Ahn, 2012; Bryant, 2011).  Twenty days earlier officials had refused to vaccinate for fear 
of losing its FMD-free status (Bryant, 2011).  Estimates from South Korea estimated more than 
13 million head of hogs and cattle were vaccinated by January 2011, with secondary 
vaccinations planned for animals in infected provinces (OLPC, 2012).   
Once South Korea decided to vaccinate, the vaccine antigen banks in Pirbright, England 
supplied 1.2 million doses of FMD vaccines in six working days rather than the standard four 
months (Zenopa, 2011; Bryant, 2011).  South Korean officials also asked countries with 
vaccination supplies to donate vaccines.  Belgium, for example, provided 800,000 doses (Zentis, 
2011) and the North American FMD Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB) provided antigen for the 
manufacture of 2.5 million doses of FMD (Hayden, 2011).  The Korea Joongang Daily 
editorialized in February of 2011 that the government was distracted by the effort to keep its 
FMD-free status, effectively turned the country into a massive farm animal graveyard, and the 
more rapid use of vaccination protocols could have eliminated FMD quicker (Bryant, 2011; 
Miller, 2012b).  Costs for culling, compensation, and vaccination were estimated to exceed $2.7 
billion (Bryant, 2011; Ahn, 2012).  While in the midst of dealing with the FMD outbreak through 
quarantine and limited vaccination, President Lee Myung-bak announced South Korea would 
pursue FMD vaccine development and manufacturing.  Based on their findings, vaccination was 
the best response to control highly contagious animal disease.  His announcement was met with 
some skepticism over the hastiness of his decision, the practicality of such an effort, and the 
impact it had on the immediate situation (Kim, 2011; Bryant, 2011).   
During the outbreak, Juan Lubroth (2011), the FAO Chief Veterinary Officer, advocated 
strongly for vaccination and the need to consider animal welfare and the environmental impact in 
the decision process.  He noted developments in vaccine technology, specifically related to the 
ability to differentiate vaccinated animals from infected animals, would make it easier for 
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countries engaging in emergency vaccination to regain export access.  “Emergency vaccination 
with the aim to disrupt disease transmission and assist progressive elimination is increasingly 
applied, particularly during the peak of an epidemic, so as to buy time during culling operations.  
Vaccination can also be applied to protect animals and keep them alive and productive” 
(Lubroth, 2011, p. 1). 
 Response Alternatives and Strategies 
There are several possible FMD response strategies using stamping out, vaccination, or a 
combination of both: 
 Stamping out, no vaccination; 
 Stamping out, vaccinate-to-kill/cull; 
 Stamping out, vaccinate-to-slaughter; 
 Stamping out, vaccinate-to-live; and 
 Vaccinate-to-live, no stamping out (Styles, 2011; Parent, Miller, & Hullinger, 
2011; APHIS, 2012a). 
The goal of modified stamping out with emergency vaccination-to-kill is to suppress 
disease spread and then destroy and dispose of animals at a later time following emergency 
protocols.  This suppressive emergency vaccination strategy could be applied to highly-
susceptible animals in the infected zone, control area, or vaccination zone.  A common 
application of this strategy is ring vaccination.  This approach will likely require traceability 
systems, animal identification, and permitting (APHIS, 2012a). 
A variation on vaccinate-to-kill is vaccinate-to-slaughter which implies all vaccinated 
animals will be sent to slaughter facilities for normal processing and the food products will enter 
the food chain.  Trace back, animal identification, and appropriate permits will be necessary 
(Parent et al., 2011).  USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) combines 
vaccinate-to-kill and vaccinate-to-slaughter as one policy alternative (APHIS, 2012a). 
The goal of modified stamping out with emergency vaccination-to-live is designed to 
allow at-risk animals not infected or in-contact to be vaccinated and allowed to live.  Animals 
intended for slaughter could still be slaughtered, but animals bred for breeding, milking, or other 
purposes could continue to serve in that capacity.  This strategy can be effective with high-
valued genetic stock, production animals, or in high-density animal populations.  This system 
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will require permitting, traceability, and identification as well.  This strategy overlaps with the 
emergency vaccination-to-slaughter response (APHIS, 2012a). 
The emergency vaccination-to-live with no stamping out response is designed to allow all 
infected and vaccinated animals to serve out their lives to meet their original purpose.  This 
strategy is unlikely to be implemented at the beginning of FAD outbreak, but could be used if a 
disease was so widespread that resources are not available to meet stamping-out requirements.  It 
could result in endemic status (APHIS, 2012a). 
Emergency vaccination can be considered when a safe, effective vaccine is available and 
vaccination meets national and international protocols.  High quality strategies for movement 
control, traceability, information technology systems, permitting, and epidemiological expertise 
are necessary if vaccination is used. 
 Types of vaccines 
Vaccines are used to provide protection from infection by a pathogen, prevent clinical 
symptoms associated with infection, or reduce disease duration or severity.  Vaccines are not 
expected to be 100% effective or to serve as a cure for the disease in question.  
There are two traditional types of vaccines: modified live and killed inactivated.  
Modified live vaccines are distinguished by their ability to replicate in the host while showing 
limited clinical signs and inducing an immune response to help protect animals from the disease 
pathogen.  Inactivated pathogens or antigenic portions of the pathogens are contained in killed 
vaccines and often require an adjuvant to stimulate an immune response (NAHEMS, 2011c; 
Williams, 2007).  Vaccines may also be classified as non-marker vaccines (indistinguishable 
from natural infection by pathogen) and marker vaccines (immune response can be differentiated 
from natural infection) (Williams, 2007).  The ability to differentiate vaccinated animals from 
those naturally infected is critical to business continuity, effective vaccination efforts, and 
surveillance of disease spread (APHIS, 2012c).  Whether a vaccinated animal can be 
differentiated from a naturally infected animal is a critical issue when considering how 
vaccination will influence trade restrictions.  
Most vaccines cause the development of antibodies to antigens associated with the 
infectious agent and make it difficult to differentiate whether the immune response is a result of 
the animal being exposed to the natural infection or the vaccine.  DIVA vaccines provide a 
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protective immune response, but do not contain some specific antigens associated with the 
pathogen.  This allows the DIVA vaccine to be differentiated from the actual pathogen.  DIVA 
vaccines are critical to disease eradication efforts because they allow for a clearer interpretation 
of disease causality and thus a quicker return to a disease-free status.  Vaccines can be delivered 
by intramuscular or subcutaneous injection, transdermal injection, intranasal, ocular, oral, and 
spray/topical application.  The necessity of proper handling, transportation, and storage of 
vaccines adds to the complexity of a mass vaccination effort (NAHEMS, 2011c).  In addition, 
the ability to identify and trace animals through a livestock traceability system is critical to a 
successful response (NAHEMS, 2011c).  The lack of a robust animal traceability system in the 
US will hinder response time and effectiveness (Hullinger, 2013).  
 Suppressive or protective purpose 
Generally, in the case of an FAD, the use of vaccine could be suppressive or protective.  
A suppressive role indicates the vaccine is used to reduce potential virus production in exposed 
herds and to protect animals not already infected from clinical disease through development of 
sufficient immunity.  Suppressive vaccine protocols are typically applied in the infected zone 
(Kahn et al., 2002; Williams, 2007).  In many cases, these animals would eventually be 
depopulated or slaughtered.  If the vaccination is intended to be protective, it is used to create a 
buffer and protect herds in the vicinity of an outbreak but not yet exposed.  In most cases, 
exposed and diseased animals are eliminated, but it is possible to allow all vaccinated animals to 
live out life if they are confirmed absent of viral activity and clinical signs of infection (Kahn et 
al., 2002).  
Protective vaccination can be narrowed into two categories: preventive and barrier.  
Preventive vaccination, also known as preemptive, is typically applied to animals at high risk for 
exposure and located in a zone likely to become infected.  Barrier vaccination results in the 
delineation of a barrier outside the infected zone designed to slow disease transmission by 
vaccination of all susceptible animals in the zone.  The zone can be determined by radius, 
geography, animal population and density, and other factors.  Ring vaccination, border 
vaccination, and firebreak vaccination are all modes of protective barrier vaccination (Williams, 
2007).  In any case, speed is of the essence in developing the barrier.  For example, it is better 
when establishing a ring vaccination zone to get it established quickly with a narrower radius and 
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then expand it rather than take longer to gather resources and establish an initial vaccination zone 
with a wider radius.  Strict movement controls must accompany a barrier zone for it to be 
effective (Geering & Lubroth, 2002). 
 Prophylactic and emergency methods of application 
A number of different vaccination methods have been used in some countries to 
successfully control FMD and reduce the chances of or shorten the length of an epidemic.  If the 
transition rate of susceptible animals becoming infected is greater than the rate at which they 
become immune then an epidemic occurs (Green & Medley, 2002).  Effective control strategies 
have included: 
 Prophylactic protection prior to an epidemic (typically in endemic or semi-
endemic areas), such as 
o Blanket vaccination at regular time intervals across entire farms or 
regions; 
o Annual synchronized ring, firebreak, or targeted vaccination in specific 
geographic areas; or 
o Post-outbreak vaccination to abate an undetected subclinical challenge 
(Hutber et al., 2011; Leon, 2012). 
 Regional vaccination during an epidemic or farm-level vaccination during an 
outbreak (typically in endemic areas), such as 
o Revaccinating to abate chronologically recurrent waves of disease 
transmission, or 
o Revaccinating with a new or different vaccine to abate a challenge from a 
new or different serotype (Hutber et al., 2011; Leon, 2012). 
 Vaccination used with a ring, blanket, or target approach during an epidemic in 
combination with slaughter control (typically in disease-free regions), such as 
o Emergency vaccination-to-live where livestock are preserved post 
vaccination and may or may not enter the human food chain or 
o Emergency vaccination-to-cull where livestock are culled and may or may 
not enter the human food chain (Hutber et al., 2011; Leon, 2012).  
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Prophylactic vaccinations used during disease-free periods can help lessen the likelihood 
of extended epidemics.  Pre-challenge vaccinations are 81-98% effective and when used with a 
booster vaccine administered 3-4 days prior to an FMD challenge increases the efficacy by up to 
13%.  However, if the high vaccinal protection is waning such as when vaccination was more 
than 75 days prior, subclinical disease and occult (hidden) transmission can occur.  The risk 
increases in a corresponding manner as the level of protection decreases.  Disease-free regions 
are unlikely to use regular prophylactic vaccination due to the economic impact of regular, 
multiple vaccinations and the possible onset of persistent subclinical disease if the herd is 
exposed to disease.  In semi-endemic regions, disease-free status can be maintained by using 
prophylactic vaccine administration in sub regions.  This is the case in Argentina and Brazil 
where the country is divided into vaccination and non-vaccination zones (Hutber et al., 2011).   
Non-prophylactic vaccination can be used as a component of an emergency response in 
countries or regions traditionally disease free (Hutber et al., 2011; Leon, 2012).  The EU has 
maintained a nonprophylactic policy since 1991 but supports use of prophylactics in countries 
near its borders.  The success of such policies directly corresponds to the disease challenges in 
the region.  If the challenge is low, then nonprophylactic policy is likely to work.  In semi-
endemic regions, it is less likely to be successful (Hutber et al., 2011). 
Emergency ring vaccination can decrease disease spread while minimizing the number of 
animals to be vaccinated.  It is a primary component in disease control policy in disease-free 
regions.  In Uruguay, however, emergency ring vaccination failed to stop the spread of disease 
and it became necessary to use extensive emergency blanket vaccination.  In other cases, 
emergency ring vaccination has been successful when combined with slaughter control.  Another 
complication with emergency ring vaccination is that it can take 2.5-5 times as long to achieve 
immunity as it would take to cull the same herd.  Emergency ring vaccination also allows for the 
possibility of disease spread beyond the ring via fomites, personnel, or illegally transported 
animals (Hutber et al., 2011).  Leon (2012) notes ring vaccination does not significantly reduce 
the risk of FMD spread between premises compared to stamping out, but it is the best method to 
reduce virus circulation when stamping out is not an option. 
In past cases, emergency blanket vaccination has been successful in disease control and 
has typically been used in conjunction with animal movement restrictions.  As was the case in 
Uruguay, the use of blanket vaccination is unlikely to stop disease spread as quickly as 
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depopulation.  Adding to the lack of confidence in an emergency blanket vaccination policy is 
the fact that multiple vaccine administrations have been used in previous cases, which makes the 
efficacy (proportion of vaccinated animals protected) of a single vaccination uncertain.  This is 
especially true with a variety of serotypes, differing rates of transmission, and a range in the 
strength of disease challenges.  Therefore, blanket vaccination as an alternative over slaughter 
control remains controversial, because neither has been conclusively proven more effective.  
Both tools can be used as a component of the overall disease control strategy depending on the 
characteristics of the regions and epidemic (Hutber et al., 2011).  Blanket vaccination or 
inaccurately targeted vaccination is not only costly but also increases the risk of hiding clinical 
signs of disease amongst carrier animals in challenged herds (Hutber et al., 2006).  Blanket 
vaccination can be used when the size of the disease outbreak significantly exceeds expectations 
(Leon, 2012). 
Targeted emergency vaccination can be useful in rural areas with high livestock density.  
Preventive targeted vaccination could be especially useful with pigs because they often function 
as massive replicators of FMD virus which makes them a tremendous potential source of 
infection to other susceptible species.  Cattle could also benefit from targeted vaccination as a 
protective measure (Hutber et al., 2011).  
Local factors will be critical in determining the best option for disease control, but the 
most critical component in the decision process is the region’s disease status.  These factors will 
determine where vaccines are used.  Biomodels and cost-benefit analysis can indicate when 
vaccines should be used.  A combination of local epidemiological factors and biomodels can 
help determine how vaccinations should be used.  According to Hutber et al. (2011), there is no 
economic benefit to ring or targeted vaccination-to-kill above slaughter control, but there are 
economic welfare benefits to vaccinate-to-live policies.  The potential economic benefit of 
emergency blanket vaccination over slaughter remains in question.  The success of a vaccination 
program declines as the disease challenge increases, the wrong vaccines are utilized, epidemics 
are prolonged, and livestock numbers increase (Hutber et al., 2011).  
 Diagnostic testing 
While vaccination strategies are critical to FAD control policy discussions, there are 
other factors and technologies related to animal diseases that need further research and 
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discussion as well.  Rapid and accurate disease diagnosis is one of these factors and is critical to 
effective disease response, including decisions about implementation of control strategies.   
A quick and accurate diagnosis is critical to the effective use of vaccination.  Diagnosis 
typically begins with trained personnel such as producers and veterinarians and is supported by 
laboratory tests to confirm the disease.  Future advances in science and technology will improve 
diagnostic capabilities, but the time needed to transport suspect material to a laboratory for 
testing can be lengthy and slow down disease response.  In some cases, when rapid diagnosis is 
critical, it will be more effective to base confirmation on clinical signs (Shirley et al., 2011).   
Away from advanced laboratories, established and emerging technologies can be 
deployed onsite.  These tests designed to support local decision making are known as point-of-
care, pen-side or chute-side, portable, onsite, or field tests.  These tests can facilitate more rapid 
decision making thus reducing the spread of disease, reducing costs, and avoiding unnecessary 
slaughter.  Advancements in these technologies are due to the focus and investment on disease 
identification for humans and homeland security.  Lateral flow devices (LFD) or dipstick tests 
and portable nucleic acid-based tests such as PCR are the two most common assay systems 
suitable for field use.  In regard to FMD, an LFD has been developed identifying all seven 
serotypes.  While the analytical sensitivity is lower than PCR, confidence in the result can be 
increased at the herd level by testing multiple animals.  These resources could be used to provide 
rapid and objective support to local professionals in determining response strategies but need to 
be incorporated into hardware platforms suitable for use by veterinarians, animal health 
professionals, and livestock producers (Shirley et al., 2011).  
During a large-scale animal disease outbreak, in multiple locations or states, the USDA 
deploys rapid diagnostic tests to identify infected livestock.  Such tools were used in the END 
outbreak in California and the AI outbreak in Virginia.  These tests were done at local 
laboratories.  Pen-side tests, while being researched, have not been validated.  Even if pen-side 
tests are further developed, confirmation tests would be required because tests are designed to be 
sensitive not specific.  The USDA believes in extreme caution in disease identification.  
Validated tests managed by experienced diagnosticians are necessary (GAO, 2005). 
Early detection, combined with a shortened interval between infection and 
implementation of a response such as vaccination, has the most significant impact on duration 
and extent of an outbreak.  Surveillance, awareness, reporting, rapid diagnosis, and immediate 
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tracing of animals movements are necessary.  Inexpensive and accurate pen-side tests allowing 
for rapid confirmation are critical to an effective disease response.  Like most infrequently-
utilized emergency response technologies, including vaccination, there is little economic 
incentive for private development of these technologies (Rubira, 2007).  The development and 
planned use of rapid diagnostic tests are critical to an effective response and important to the 
decision and actual implementation of an emergency vaccination protocol. 
ARS researchers at PIADC worked with a biotechnology company to develop an 
improved diagnostic test for FMD after a 2002 request from Congress.  It can detect RNA from 
the FMD virus in less than 2 hr using real-time PCR.  USDA uses the test in the National Animal 
Health Laboratory Network and labs across the US can use the test to diagnose samples rapidly 
in the case of an FMD emergency.  However, the disease is not considered confirmed until after 
results are available from PIADC.  These tools could be used along with vaccination to help 
address an FMD outbreak (DHS, 2012, July 9). 
 Considerations and Challenges 
Vaccination has advantages as a disease control measure.  Some slaughter of non-
infected animals may be avoided which reduces the accompanying social and psychological 
challenges.  There may be significantly less carcass disposal and the viral excretion from 
infected premises can be reduced or eliminated.  But, as with any policy choice, there are also 
disadvantages.  Vaccination of large numbers requires a significant amount of trained manpower, 
extensive post-vaccination surveillance, and may require accumulative administrations of 
vaccine to achieve prophylactic protection (Hutber et al., 2006).  
 Advantages and disadvantages 
Williams (2007) identified advantages and disadvantages of emergency vaccination as an 
emergency animal disease control strategy.  Advantages include: 
 Potential reduction in the number of animals infected, 
 Potential reduction in the number of animals destroyed, 
 Potential reduction in resource demands (through reduction of depopulation and 
disposal as well as disease transmission),  
 Maximization of animal protein for its intended use (in a vaccinate-to-live or 
vaccinate-to-slaughter versus vaccinate-to-kill scenario), 
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 Protection of public health, and 
 Protection of high-value animals and endangered species (Williams, 2007). 
Williams noted the importance of a risk-based approach in determining if vaccination is 
used and identified the following disadvantage and limitations: 
 Vaccine effectiveness in terms of efficacy, vaccination protocol, and time for 
immunity response; 
 Reversion of live vaccine agents to a previously virulent state or inadequately 
inactivated vaccines; 
 Effect on the evolution of more pathogenic strains of an organism; 
 Potential for molecular reassortment; 
 Potential for vaccines to become contaminated and cause other disease; 
 Existence of carrier and subclinical animals (especially of concern in suppressive 
vaccination campaigns); 
 Creation of a false sense of security;  
 Initially high demand on resources and personnel; 
 Risk of disease transmission by vaccination teams; 
 Difficulties with handling vaccines, such as maintaining a cold chain; 
 Difficulties surrounding, resources required for, and significance of follow-up 
surveillance; 
 Pressure from government and industry to eradicate disease quickly; 
 International trade restrictions and economic implications; 
 Consumer resistance to vaccinated products could lead to short- and long-term 
demand shifts or the need to destroy vaccinated animals and their products to 
keep them out of the food supply; 
 Public health and occupational safety of animal health workers; 
 Environmental issues; and 
 Need for caution in developing and executing vaccination protocols (Williams, 
2007). 
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 Overarching concerns 
Mass vaccination protocols “rarely result in all animals developing a protective level of 
immunity” (Rubira, 2007, p. 337).  Vaccination may be more useful in an endemic situation due 
to costs, trade barriers, and the need for the vaccine to work against all strains.  It will be very 
resource intensive, may divert limited resources from other needs, is difficult to implement in a 
timely manner resulting in the development of a protective level of immunity, and may be an 
attempt to buy time.  Vaccination may be most useful when there has been a delay in detection 
leading to widespread disease and exceedingly long disease duration (Rubira, 2007).  
The use of vaccination can potentially reduce the number of animals identified for 
depopulation.  In many cases, infectious disease control response tends to be reactive rather than 
preemptive.  Culling is used to stop disease spread but can be contentious when healthy animals 
are destroyed.  The response decision is often influenced by the fraction of transmission 
occurring before the infected animal shows disease symptoms (Charleston et al., 2011).  
Decision makers need to act quickly to determine if vaccination is to be used in dealing 
with an FAD in order for its use to have an impact.  However, limited resources of personnel, 
vaccine, and equipment may keep authorities from meeting the demand even if the decision is 
made in a timely manner (Williams, 2007).  Because vaccines for some animal and poultry 
disease are not readily available, effective, or differentiable, veterinarians and animal health 
officials are limited in the ability to control disease spread and cannot implement the most 
effective or appropriate control measures (Gilsdorf, 2009).  Vaccination is more likely to be 
effective if the interval between vaccination and exposure is longer allowing for immunity to 
build.  Some animals will continue to shed the virus after vaccination even if protected from 
clinical signs.  Other vaccines suppress such transmission (NAHEMS, 2011d). 
A poorly executed vaccination program will likely result in a slow and uneven spread of 
disease which is harder to detect, may extend the duration of the outbreak, and increase 
likelihood of disease becoming endemic (Geering & Lubroth, 2002). 
In 2011, Shirley et al. noted the recent rapid expansion of genetic sequence data available 
is a key component to the development of tools and strategies to control livestock diseases, such 
as novel diagnostics and vaccination strategies.  These strategies can make a significant 
difference to our ability to deal with disease outbreaks, but they will require a commitment of 
financial and human resources.  Commitments need to be made to increasing the availability of 
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trained personnel; strengthening the veterinary infrastructure; international cooperation, 
transparency, and data sharing; and acceptance of the difference of importance in certain diseases 
between developed and developing countries (Shirley et al., 2011).  
Disease control is most effective when vaccination is used with diagnostics to monitor 
disease epidemiology.  Rinderpest eradication can serve as a template for disease control and 
eradication.  In the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, slaughter and quarantine worked to eradicate 
Rinderpest from Europe and Russia.  Development of live attenuated vaccines with lifelong 
immunity, combined with sanitary controls, led to eradication in China in seven years.  
Vaccination alone worked in India but took 40 years.  Mass vaccination, requiring international 
coordination and external funding, was successful in Africa.  Small scale, focused vaccination 
guided by the FAO was effective in the final stages of disease eradication.  A few examples of 
diseases that could benefit from new effective control measures and a global eradication effort 
are East Coast fever (ECF), African swine fever (ASF), FMD, and haemorrhagic septicaemia 
(HS) (Shirley et al., 2011).  Veterinarians have also stated vaccine usage may be most feasible in 
dealing with Rift Valley fever (RVF), Nipah virus, and AI (Monke, 2007). 
The only vaccination option available for ECF is highly effective but highly complicated, 
inconvenient, and expensive.  Access to new genome data will be critical to development of new 
vaccines that do not require live organisms.  There are no safe ASF vaccines available for its 
control, and the need to identify cross-protective antigens for use against a variety of viruses is a 
challenge for researchers.  Even though vaccines and diagnostic tests are available, as with FMD 
and HS, there remains a significant need for improvement in diagnostic capability and 
vaccination systems to facilitate eradication and disease control (Shirley et al., 2011).  With 
FMD, there is no universal vaccine and one of the additional challenges is to develop methods to 
select vaccine antigens to protect against newly emerging strains – similar to the challenges 
faced with influenza (APHIS, 2007; Shirley et al., 2011).   
 Economic and Cost Factors 
“The decision on whether or not to vaccinate or pursue a stamp-out eradication strategy 
will likely be based on economic factors…” (Bates, Carpenter, & Thurmond, 2003, p. 806).  
Economics can play a critical role in the selection of a disease control strategy, both in regard to 
short-term costs and long-term economic consequences.  “The control of infectious diseases 
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often times is determined by the economical resources as well as the accessible control 
measures” (Diaz et al., 2005, p. 1).  “The motivation behind not vaccinating is an economic one” 
(Junker et al., 2009, p. 55).  The economic advantages and disadvantages and how they are 
distributed will impact policymakers in their selection of response strategies.  “The economic 
impact of epidemic diseases is largely influenced by the methods used by countries to control 
and eradicate outbreaks” (Horst, de Vos, Tomassen, & Stelwagen, 1999, p. 369).  
The economic impact of disease response strategies affect individual farms and 
producers, related industries (including potential costs passed on to consumers), agricultural 
sectors, consumers, government, national economies, and international economies (Horst et al., 
1999).  The direct costs of vaccination protocols include the investments costs related to vaccine 
development, availability and delivery infrastructure; variable and recurrent costs related to the 
actual vaccines, vaccination supplies, and delivery; and costs associated with animal 
identification, traceability, and serological surveillance.  Lost productivity caused by animal 
stress, disruption of routine, and negative reactions to the vaccine may create additional indirect 
costs.  Blanket vaccination programs will be more expensive than targeted strategies.  Feeding 
and caring for the animals during a quarantine period will add costs, and there will likely be 
reduction in market price if animals are kept beyond prime market weight after vaccination and 
before slaughter (NAHEMS, 2011d). 
The economic justification to use emergency vaccination as an FAD control method is 
worthy of consideration.  It is first necessary to determine if vaccination is technically viable.  If 
it is, then economic viability can be considered by evaluating the impact on international trade 
and the use of vaccination to protect the livelihoods of farmers and ranchers.  Conflicting results 
may exist, so weighing the impacts and finding the appropriate balance to meet the objectives is 
necessary.  The funding source for vaccination and the cost effectiveness of vaccine delivery 
must also be considered (McLeod & Rushton, 2007).   
The economic impact of various vaccination strategies increases the complexity of the 
decision of ‘if’ and ‘when’ to vaccinate against FMD.  An economic differential exists between 
the decisions to vaccinate-to-live versus vaccinate-to-kill.  The international FAO/OIE ban on 
agricultural exports to FMD-free countries is at least six months for vaccinate-to-live and three 
months for vaccinate-to-kill after the final infected or vaccinated premise is culled.  The ban is 
three months for culling without vaccination.  The 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak was controlled by 
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culling for a number of reasons, but was strongly influenced by the economic advantages of a 
shorter ban on exports.  The dilemma of whether or not benefits from vaccination outweigh a 
shorter ban on exports is a controversial question (Hutber et al., 2011). 
A number of approaches have been used to analyze the economic pros and cons of using 
vaccination as a tool in FMD control and will be discussed in an upcoming section.  Research 
had been done assessing the overall economic benefit or deficit related to direct costs of 
vaccination compared to disease control by slaughter.  Quantifying the length and prevalence of 
the epidemic under different control strategies allows for a comparison of the costs of slaughter 
as a control mechanism versus vaccination with an export ban (Hutber et al., 2011).  
In an exporting country, a successful stamping-out campaign is likely to allow a faster 
return to trade.  Large farmers and ranchers who export have a greater safety net than small-scale 
producers who depend more on cash flow with limited safety nets.  In the case of smaller 
producers, vaccination will result in greater economic benefits if the disease can be controlled 
with little depopulation, national markets are minimally disrupted and quickly restored, and 
impacts on economic sectors such as tourism and local communities are minimized.  Larger 
farmers and ranchers are more concerned with the time export markets are closed being as short 
as possible (NAHEMS, 2011d; McLeod & Rushton, 2007).  If a country is primarily focused on 
a domestic market rather than an export market, vaccination-to-live is considerably advantageous 
(McLeod & Rushton, 2007).  While an abundance of research indicates depopulation may be 
more beneficial economically, Dr. Bruce McCarl noted vaccination-to-live can reduce the costs 
of carcass disposal efforts by as much as 15%.  Salvaging some usable product from the exposed 
animal even for a lower value will likely reduce the economic consequences (WARRP, 2012). 
An economically effective strategy of disease response needs to consider costs related to 
livestock loss, public health hazards, environmental impacts, and economic impacts on 
government, industry, and consumers (Jin, Huang, & McCarl, 2005). 
 Vaccine Development 
Vaccine development for some of the most threatening animal diseases is a critical and 
significant technological development in animal disease control, especially when a vaccinated 
animal can be differentiated from a naturally infected animal (Elbers & Knuttson, 2013). 
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The NSTC subcommittee on FADT identified the need for significant investment in a 
vaccine countermeasure program.  Specifically, they called for increased research on the speed 
and efficacy of existing vaccines to control disease spread and infection and the development and 
licensure of new generation marker vaccines providing rapid and long-term disease suppression 
while being safe to produce in the US.  Basic research and discovery needs to be transitioned to 
applied research and product development to meet vaccine program research needs.  Vaccine 
platforms producing different vaccine products for specific FADs were also identified as a 
research need.  In addition, the subcommittee noted the need for exploring immunomodulators to 
complement vaccines and stimulate the immune system between the time of administration of 
vaccines and the onset of protection (Marburger, 2007).  
The NSTC FADT subcommittee defined the ideal vaccine as: 
 Compatible with a vaccinate-to-live strategy, 
 Able to differentiate between infected and vaccinated animals, 
 Initiates rapid onset of innate and adaptive immunity, 
 Significantly reduces or prevents virus spreading and shedding, 
 Prevents host animals from developing carrier states, 
 Suitable platform for rapid mass inoculation, 
 Able to be administered in one dose and in mass delivery methods, 
 Shelf stable and rapidly deployable, and  
 Provide cross serotype protection (multivalency) (Marburger, 2007, p. 13). 
As Horn and Breeze (2003) described the incentive for vaccine development, “There is 
an old saying that it is better to have a vaccine and no epidemic rather than an epidemic and no 
vaccine” (p. 5).  
 Historical perspective – FMD vaccine 
In 1897, two Prussian researchers, Friedrich Loeffler and Paul Frosch, leading the 
Research Commission on FMD issued the first description of an animal disease virus.  Their 
original charge was to develop a vaccine for this disease.  Since the early 1900s, inactivated 
FMD vaccines have been available with industrial production beginning in the 1950s.  
Originally, vaccines were developed from tongue epithelium infected with FMD virus and 
inactivated with formaldehyde.  Cell-suspension cultures replaced primary cell usage in the 
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1960s and eventually ethylene imines replaced the formaldehyde inactivation.  Inactivated FMD 
vaccines today consist of killed virus without nonstructural viral proteins (Gay & Rodriguez, 
2011). 
These vaccines have helped eradicate FMD in some regions of the world and repressed 
clinical disease in other regions.  FMD vaccines represent more than 25% of livestock vaccine 
sales worldwide, which is the largest single share in the marketplace (Gay & Rodriguez, 2011).  
While effective in preventing clinical disease, inactivated FMD vaccines do not necessarily 
prevent viral replication and can result in persistent infections in more than half of naïve and 
vaccinated animals when exposed to FMD.  These carrier animals create a difficult challenge in 
the control and eradication of disease.  These types of vaccines also make vaccinated animals 
indistinguishable from infected animals.  Therefore, there has been a need for FMD vaccines 
capable of preventing infection and clinical signs, and with antigenic markers to allow 
vaccinated animals to be differentiated from infected animals (DIVA testing) (Gay & Rodriguez, 
2011). 
In 2004, 15 different vaccines were manufactured internationally to protect against the 
multiple FMD serotypes in a variety of combinations (Breeze, 2004).  Even as vaccines become 
more readily available, the lag time in an emergency outbreak after disease detection and before 
the supply of the correct vaccine is available would allow for significant disease spread.  Vaccine 
markets have always been problematic due to sporadic demand, production lags, ineffective 
strains, and government influence on price (Hennessy, 2008).  
There has been ongoing FMD vaccination research for a number of years, but there are 
few research centers with the necessary resources for long-term research efforts.  An ideal 
vaccine would be given orally, immediately effective in stopping viral replication and disease 
spread, and allow meat to be used for human consumption.  Such a vaccine may not be practical, 
but would potentially meet needs for both emergency and routine use (Paton et al., 2009).  
FMD vaccines have improved significantly and manufacturing process changes are 
helping to address the differentiation of infected animals from vaccinated animals.  However, 
major differences exist between manufacturers and vaccines used in FMD-free and FMD-
endemic regions.  Three formulations exist representing a majority of inactivated FMD vaccines: 
high-potency vaccines for emergency use, oil-emulsion conventional vaccines for routine 
control, and aluminum hydroxide vaccines for use in cattle.  In regard to potency, OIE 
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recommends six PD50 (protective dose for 50% of animals) because high potency provides 
greater defense against heterogeneous strains, creates immunity more quickly, and expands 
protection against viral shedding and transmission.  However, use at the PD50 level (which is 
twice normal potency) would quickly diminish the number of emergency vaccines in 
international FMD vaccine banks (Geering & Lubroth, 2002; Gay & Rodriguez, 2011).  
Current FMD vaccines protect animals from clinical signs assuming the strain matches 
and ample time exists for immunity to set in before animals are exposed to FMD.  However, 
current vaccines do not protect against infection and do not eliminate virus transmission (Leon, 
2012).  Generally, protective immunity needs at least four to seven days to develop after 
vaccination, so disease control strategies need to handle this delay.  The development of vaccines 
meeting the DIVA strategy of vaccinate-to-live continues to be a concern as well.  These 
inefficiencies, concerns, and other vaccine issues are the focus of vaccine research as efforts are 
being made to improve FMD vaccination capabilities (Gay & Rodriguez, 2011).   
It is important to note, while efficacy is crucial for all vaccines whether they are to be 
used in routine or emergency vaccination protocols, the preferred characteristics of vaccines in 
these scenarios are different.  In a routine vaccination protocol, high priority is placed on 
thermostable formulation, long-lasting protection, low risk of virus release, and low production 
costs in addition to efficacy.  However, in an emergency situation, priority would be on rapid 
formulation, rapid onset of immunity, and existence of a negative marker, in combination with 
high efficacy and low risk of virus release (Paton et al., 2009). 
It is the goal of the OIE, the FAO, and other international organizations to eradicate FMD 
by 2030.  The majority of vaccines currently available will not serve this goal because they 
induce only short-term protection, do not cross-protect against multiple serotypes and subtypes, 
have a short shelf life, require cold chain from production to delivery, require expensive 
biosafety lab facilities for virus production, do not protect against infection, are too expensive to 
produce, and do not fit regional needs.  In order to meet the goal of eradication, fit-for-purpose 
vaccines must be developed and used in combination with appropriate diagnostics and control 
strategies tailored to each region (Gay & Rodriguez, 2011).  If vaccine development is a priority, 
then research must also be focused on understanding and predicting viral persistence and 
emergence as well as development of better diagnostic tools to improve vaccine selection (Paton 
et al., 2009).  Currently, only exporting countries will likely be motivated to invest the resources 
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necessary for complete eradication, and investments from outside stakeholders may be necessary 
in disease-endemic countries.  International cooperation and collaborative research will be 
required in combination with incentives, cooperative agreements, and the necessary resources 
(Gay & Rodriguez, 2011; Paton et al., 2009).   
 Recent developments 
 FMD vaccine 
In 2007, ARS along with the DHS Targeted Advanced Development (TAD) unit and 
GenVec, Inc., a Maryland-based biopharmaceutical company, announced the development of a 
new experimental FMD vaccine with significant potential – the first FMD vaccine that could be 
produced in the US.  At the time, ARS announced the vaccine had been tested on swine and 
cattle, and it worked quickly.  It demonstrated effectiveness within seven days and created a 
minimum of 21 days of immunity in cattle.  The vaccine was the first molecular-based FMD 
vaccine for cattle and would allow for the US to plan for adequate supplies for the USDA AHPIS 
National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS).  It is administered in a non-replicating adenovirus, does 
not require expensive production facilities, and can be safely produced in the US.  It can also 
allow for the differentiation between vaccinated animals or animals carrying antibodies through 
infection.  Future testing would examine the vaccine’s commercial viability and effectiveness 
against multiple serotypes (McGinnis, 2007).   
Marvin Grubman, the lead researcher on the ARS FMD vaccine development project, 
also examined the joint administration of interferons, proteins produced by the immune system, 
with FMD vaccine to provide non-specific antiviral protection during the seven days after the 
vaccine is administered before full immunity occurs (McGinnis, 2009).  
In November 2011, John R. Clifford issued a Field Safety Trial Notice for the FMD 
vaccine developed under the direction of ARS and DHS.  The field study, required to be done 
under typical animal husbandry conditions before it could be licensed by USDA, allowed 
vaccination of cattle with a recombinant virus product containing genes from the FMD virus.  
Because there was no live or weakened FMD virus in the vaccine, the field study created no risk 
of a disease outbreak.  The field study vaccinated about 500 cattle in Michigan, Missouri, and 
Nebraska and observed them for post-vaccination reactions.  The Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) approved the vaccinated animals for slaughter after a 60-day withdrawal period 
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(Clifford, 2011).  Immunity was induced in cattle and pigs within seven days and offered 
protection for at least 42 days (Cima, 2012).  
After the successful field study, GenVec, Inc. announced in 2012 that USDA APHIS 
Center of Veterinary Biologics (CVB), had issued a conditional license to Antelope Valley Bios, 
Inc. for their FMD adenovirus vaccine in cattle.  This is the next step necessary to make the 
vaccine available to be distributed to animal health with the authorization of USDA officials in 
the case of an FMD emergency.  This provides authorities a tool they have never had before to 
deal with a potential FMD outbreak in the US and removes U.S. dependency on foreign 
laboratories for vaccine development.  Because no live virus is ever handled, it reduces risk 
while complying with U.S. law prohibiting handling live FMD virus outside of Plum Island 
Animal Disease Center (PIADC).  The vaccine proved highly efficacious in the DHS testing and 
the study trials confirmed it could be safely administered under normal cattle production 
conditions.  In addition, GenVec licensed to Merial the rights to develop and commercialize the 
proprietary FMD vaccine technology for cattle (GenVec, 2012, June 7; Benchmark, 2012, June 
16).  Public-private efforts encouraging industry and government to develop strategic 
partnerships, such as this one, in next-generation molecular vaccines are critical to the 
development of FMD vaccines and should be expanded to other high-priority FADs if NVS is to 
meet their objectives (Elsken et al., 2007). 
DHS also touted the development of this licensed vaccine for one strain of FMD and 
indicated several vaccines for other serotypes will soon enter the licensure process.  It took seven 
years for the vaccine to be developed and licensed.  PIADC Director Dr. Larry Barrett called it 
the biggest news in FMD research in more than 50 years and noted it supported a vaccinate-to-
live strategy in FMD response.  Grubman indicated this development means it is no longer 
necessary to destroy all exposed animals when only a few animals have been infected.  Research 
continues on the FMD vaccine production process, developing FMD vaccines effective against 
other strains, and developing vaccines against CSF, ASF, and RVF (DHS, 2012, July 9; DHS, 
2012, July 2).  While the intent is for the newly developed vaccine to be included in the NVS, a 
spokesperson of USDA APHIS indicated it had not been determined if it would be included in 
the NVS or used in an emergency response (Cima, 2012).  As of December 2013, according to 
USDA APHIS officials, this vaccine is not included in the NVS and no contracts have been 
signed for its manufacture in the case of an FMD emergency in the U.S. Therefore, vaccines 
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would still have to be sent overseas for manufacturing after the strain is matched extending the 
time vaccines would become available to 2-3 weeks after the disease is identified (personal 
communication).  Continued research is expected to focus on increasing potency, decreasing 
potential costs, developing vaccines with broader immune response that can protect against 
multiple serotypes, and addressing remaining challenges related to FMD vaccines (Cima, 2012). 
 Validation and approval 
While research is developing new vaccines and determining when it is most effective to 
vaccinate, other challenges exist in vaccine development.  The validation of vaccines is a 
bottleneck in the application of new products.  Studies are laborious, expensive, and require 
extensive resources and infrastructure.  The development of additional prescreening options will 
be critical to overall vaccine development.  The development of better vaccines and diagnostics 
depend on utilization of resources from the genomic era and the further investigation of the host-
pathogen relationship.  The use of new methodologies such as comparative genomics, 
transcriptomics, preteomics, and metabolomics will be critical to vaccine development rather 
than dependence on attenuated or killed vaccines (Shirley et al., 2011).  One risk associated with 
use of vaccination is the risk of disease spread as an unintended consequence if any live virus 
exists in incompletely inactivated vaccine (Kahn et al., 2002). 
 FMD Vaccination Considerations 
“The question of whether or not to use vaccines during an epidemic of foot-and-mouth 
disease (FMD) has interested veterinary administrators for many decades” (Hutber et al., 2011, 
p. 18).   
Because FMD replicates rapidly, is highly contagious, and affects a number of domestic 
and wild species, control of the disease is difficult (Paton et al., 2009).  In order to control the 
spread of FMD, three critical measures must be considered: eliminating the source of the 
infection, interrupting contact between infected and susceptible animals, and decreasing the 
proportion of susceptible animals.  Vaccination is the key to this third control measure, but 
continues to be the most controversial control measure because of the need for the infected 
country to quickly regain disease-free status (Leon, 2012).   
The likelihood FMD can be stopped through vaccination depends on vaccine efficacy 
(proportion of vaccinated animals protected), the time between onset of outbreak and beginning 
266 
 
of vaccination protocol, the time between vaccination and onset of immunity, and the proportion 
of susceptible animals vaccinated (Leon, 2012).  The control of FMD based solely on 
vaccination measures is unlikely and other measures need to be implemented simultaneously for 
control strategies to be effective (Leon, 2012; Paton et al., 2009; Premashthira, 2012).  
 More than two billion animals are vaccinated annually worldwide, but policy strategies 
are not uniform amongst countries.  Vaccination is used in a very limited manner in many 
African and southeast Asian nations.  Large-scale programs in China, South America, India, and 
the Middle East use the majority of FMD vaccine (Paton et al., 2009; Premashthira, 2012).   
A number of concerns about the use of FMD vaccine have been discussed and debated.  
The greatest concerns include: 
 Risk of virus introduction by the actual vaccine or the vaccination teams, 
 Delays in the resurgence of international trade, 
 Increased culling due to lack of differentiation between infected and vaccinated 
animals, 
 Increased culling because of vaccinate-to-kill policies, 
 High costs of implementation, and 
 Shortage of necessary personnel and vaccination equipment (Hagerman et al., 
2012). 
USDA APHIS identifies specific challenges related to the production and use of FMD 
vaccines: 
 Conventional inactivated FMD vaccines are not allowed to be manufactured in 
the US, 
 Biosafety level (BSL) 3 facilities are required for growth of wild-type virus in cell 
culture in large volumes to produce vaccine seeds, 
 Supplies of non-formulated antigen concentrates are required as formulated 
vaccines have a short shelf life, 
 Newly emerging antigens have to be identified and stockpiled due to antigen drift 
and new field isolates, 
 The antigen in an outbreak must be identified for vaccine to be formulated (causes 
a one to two week delay), 
 Variability exists among serotypes for stability and immunity, 
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 Vaccines must be highly pure to be able to differentiate vaccinated animals from 
infected animals, 
 Vaccines provide only serotype-specific protection, 
 Onset of immunity is not immediate,  
 Duration of immunity will vary by species and vaccine, and 
 Diagnostic testing is required to differentiate vaccinated animals (APHIS, 2012c).  
If emergency vaccination is used as a response to FMD, it should be ceased as soon as 
practical and no more vaccinations made more than 28 days after the last case of FMD is 
recognized (APHIS, 2012c).  
 Virus variants 
The FMD virus is present in seven serotypes – O, A, C, SAT (South African Territories) 
1-3, and Asia I – each with immunologically distinct properties (Premashthira, 2012; Paton et al., 
2009).  FMD viruses evolve quickly due to quasispecies dynamics, large virus population size, 
and high replication rates resulting in intraserotypic subtypes.  Current serotypes are region 
specific and different regions require tailored vaccines for vaccination to be effective.  Most of 
the serotypes follow a natural regional distribution and progression with the most diversity in 
Africa where there is the least incentive to tailor vaccines.  Interestingly, the newest serotype 
FMD virus variants have been identified in countries of the Middle East, including Iran, and had 
not previously appeared outside the region (Paton et al., 2009).   
One of the most obvious challenges related to use of vaccines in an FMD outbreak is the 
serotyping and matching of a vaccine to the challenge strain (Hutber et al., 2011).  The serotypes 
have indistinguishable clinical signs but distinct immunological responses.  Vaccination or 
infection with one serotype does not confer immunity against another, and there are a large and 
indeterminate number of subtypes and variants.  The continuous monitoring of new strains to 
keep up with needed efficacy of actual vaccine formulations is necessary for vaccination to be an 
effective policy option (Leon, 2012).  As Leon (2012) states, “extensive genetic heterogeneity is 
considered one of the major obstacles for control of FMD by vaccination” (p. 37). 
The lack of cross-protection between serotypes and the incomplete protection with some 
subtypes influences the efficacy of vaccination.  These challenges are exacerbated by the 
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emergence of new variants.  In an FMD outbreak, the first step is to determine the virus serotype 
and implement the vaccine-matching assays to identify a vaccine strain (Leon, 2012). 
If an FMD vaccine matches the type and subtype, it will prevent against clinical signs but 
not necessarily FMD infection (APHIS, 2007) and occult transmission can continue.  The control 
of FMD must be seen as bigger than any one nation as long as susceptible species are traded 
across borders.  Regional efforts have been used in South America, Southeast Asia, and Europe 
(Paton et al., 2009). 
 Conventional versus emergency vaccination 
It is necessary to make a distinction between conventional and emergency FMD vaccines 
(Leon, 2012).  Emergency vaccines reduce the amount of virus shed by the vaccinated animals 
and protect against clinical disease signs.  If used, it may slow disease spread, reduce outbreak 
size, and result in speedier disease control.  Japan and Brazil are examples of countries utilizing 
an emergency vaccination protocol (Hagerman et al., 2012).  Emergency vaccination may be 
designated as ring vaccination in that animals are vaccinated within a ring surrounding the 
outbreak, focused on specially designated high-risk animal groups, or limited to a certain region 
or area (Hagerman et al., 2012). 
FMD vaccination has been used in a number of countries over the last century as a means 
of disease control, but its use is influenced by the developmental stage of the country and 
whether it is an importer or exporter.  For large developed countries, vaccination has tended to be 
used in emergency cases while in developing countries is it used as a prophylactic measure 
(Paton et al., 2009). 
 Immunity 
Inadequate immune response to vaccine is directly influenced by antigenic match of 
vaccine to virus and timing of vaccine relative to exposure (Kahn et al., 2002).  The use of 
vaccination against FMD has had fairly positive but somewhat inconsistent immunity results.  
FMD vaccine can help control disease transmission as well as prevent clinical disease.  It is not 
likely to be effective if animals have not had enough time to develop immunity between 
vaccination and disease exposure.  Vaccination against FMD is limited by the fact vaccines 
provide only serotype-specific protection which is dependent on the similarities between vaccine 
and the field strain as well as vaccine potency (APHIS, 2012c).  
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Most vaccines will not completely prevent infection because they are based on the 
development of an immune response often taking 10 days or more for maximum efficacy 
(DeHaven, 2005).  When a herd is vaccinated, it is typical for some animals to fail to develop 
immunity.  If those animals get exposed and infected, it is possible they could excrete large 
enough amounts of virus they could overcome the immunity of other animals and become 
infected as well (Kahn et al., 2002).  It is even possible for a strong FMD challenge to infect a 
vaccinated herd with high levels of herd immunity (Hutber et al., 2006) suggesting vaccination 
efforts may prove to be completely ineffective.  Booster vaccines can be used to extend 
immunity past the typical duration of protection, but it requires additional resources (Kahn et al., 
2002).  
A number of questions exist regarding the time necessary for the onset of immunity with 
FMD vaccines.  APHIS notes immunity in cattle is not immediate and may not be in full effect 
for two to three weeks although a decrease in viral shedding and clinical signs may occur within 
four days (APHIS, 2012c).  Cattle have shown to be protected in as soon as four or five days in 
some studies with high potency vaccines, but in other studies, protection at 10 days was still 
partial with full protection not occurring for three weeks (NAHEMS, 2011d).  With cattle and 
sheep, even if onset of immunity against FMD occurs in three to four days with a high potency 
vaccine, at least 10 days is required for clinical protection.  Similar, inconclusive results have 
been seen in swine and goats (NAHEMS, 2011d).  APHIS indicated swine may not be 
completely protected for three to four weeks.  Leon (2012) estimates full protection ranges from 
seven days to three weeks for swine (Leon, 2012).  Subsequent infection in all species is also 
possible because no vaccine available provides sterilizing immunity (APHIS, 2012c).   
 Efficacy 
High potency FMD emergency vaccines have an efficacy (proportion of vaccinated 
animals protected) of 81-98% with a critical inter-vaccinal period of 2.5 months, after which 
vaccinal efficacy declines and herds become susceptible to disease.  This knowledge makes it 
more possible to accurately predict the impact of vaccination in biomodels (Hutber et al., 2011). 
 Disease transmission 
One of the factors making it possible for FMD to be controlled without mass 
depopulation is related to the speed of disease transmission.  It is transmitted amongst cattle at 
270 
 
about half of the speed it was traditionally thought and not immediately infectious when clinical 
signs are first evident.  These factors make vaccination more suitable and mass culling less 
necessary (Charleston et al., 2011). 
In 2011, Charleston et al. investigated transmission rates of FMD in cattle.  They found 
the mean infectious period to be 1.7 days and found animals were not infectious until half a day 
after clinical symptoms appear (This finding is not consistent across species).  These results led 
the authors to conclude the need for preemptive culling of at-risk animals is likely overestimated 
and the need for better surveillance and preclinical diagnosis tools is critical.  Being able to 
identify FMD 24 hr earlier would significantly enhance response capabilities while reducing the 
number of animals needing to be depopulated.  Researchers further noted development of 
prophylaxis or antivirals for use on at-risk animals have the potential to be a more effective tool 
in preventing transmission.  These findings, while specific to FMD, could be similar for other 
animal disease outbreaks (Charleston et al., 2011; Strak, 2011, May 6). 
The goal of emergency vaccination is to reduce virus reproduction, incidence of clinical 
infection, and limit disease spread.  Emergency vaccination helps protect cattle, sheep, and hogs 
from FMD clinical disease and may reduce viral transmission.  The virus can be excreted 
through lesions, so reducing clinical signs and preventing lesions can decrease shedding (Halasa, 
Boklund, Cox, & Enoe, 2011; Parida, 2009).   
In addition, vaccinated cattle infected with FMD can serve as asymptomatic carriers of 
the FMD virus.  While cattle are protected by emergency vaccination, they are more likely to 
serve as carriers than swine or sheep.  Thus, the virus can be hidden and transmitted for a long 
time period, which could lead to an extension of trade restrictions and increase in economic 
impact.  While likely not a popular decision with the public, the depopulation of vaccinated 
animals resolves this dilemma.  Otherwise, strict surveillance and screening is necessary over a 
long period of time (Halasa et al., 2011; Parida, 2009).   
 Species variability 
Different species result in different considerations when vaccination is an alternative.  
Cattle are the most susceptible to disease spread by aerosol or close animal contact and are the 
most frequently vaccinated under prophylaxis or emergency vaccination.  Vaccinated cattle are 
more likely than other species to produce significant numbers of occult infected and persistent 
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sub-clinically infected animals.  When challenged with FMD, up to 47% of herds receiving 
regular vaccination can produce subclinical disease.  Pigs excrete the highest levels of FMD 
virus, but do not produce subclinical disease.  Infected pigs provide the greatest threat to other 
species (Hutber et al., 2011).  It is almost impossible to completely protect pigs with vaccination 
if they have direct contact with clinically infected animals (Kahn et al., 2002).  Therefore, for 
disease-free regions with multiple species, culling of potentially infected pigs may be the most 
effective strategy.  This policy approach may not be the best alternative when the majority of 
livestock are swine and other livestock are not at risk from infection, because pig-to-pig 
transmission is less effective via aerosol (Hutber et al., 2011).  In these cases, vaccination can be 
used to decrease viral excretions in emergency situations.  Sheep excrete a lower level of virus 
and intraspecies transmission is slow and self-limiting.  These low transmission rates allow for 
more traditional disease surveillance and may not require vaccination as rapidly as with other 
species (Hutber et al., 2011).   
 Accessibility of vaccines  
Few vaccines are available for many of the FADs of greatest concern to the US including 
FMD.  While USDA ARS is developing some new vaccines, it is improbable, if not impossible, 
to develop vaccines for the vast number of strains and subtypes for each disease.  In addition, a 
terrorist could introduce a new genetically engineered strain (GAO, 2005).   
The majority of FMD vaccines stored in the US is concentrated and not stored in a ready-
to-use state.  To be activated, they must be sent to the UK so the FMD additive can be added 
where the process of activation can take up to three weeks.  Activated vaccines have a shelf-life 
of only one or two years, and their creation is expensive.  This procedure does not meet the 
objective dictated by HSPD-9 calling for vaccines to be deployed in less than 24 hr – clearly 
creating a policy dilemma and contradictory priorities.  If animals cannot be vaccinated, the 
USDA has no choice but to slaughter animals for disease control.  This could lead to greater 
numbers of animals being destroyed than necessary and greater economic losses (GAO, 2005).  
The recent developments in FMD vaccines allowed to be manufactured in the US has the 
potential to addresses these concerns to a degree, but new vaccines are not available for all 
serotypes and the newly developed vaccine is not under contract for production by USDA. 
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 Time for implementation 
One of the challenges faced by decision makers in the case of FMD is determining when 
to use vaccination.  Vaccines must be specific to the strain of disease and, usually, have a shelf-
life of 18 months or less.  With FMD, having stocks available may be prudent, but it is not 
considered cost effective to have a continuous supply of each strain of each disease.  The 
existing decision trees are complex and may take too long for a decision.  But, a more rapid 
decision-making process will still not reduce the time to select, deploy, equip, and direct 
vaccination.  Days are needed before a full-scale vaccination program could be in place, and 
procedures based on speed could be detrimental.  Recent and future development of marker 
vaccines to be used on at-risk livestock allowing differentiation between infected and vaccinated 
animals will play a strategic role in disease control and eradication efforts and allow for more 
flexibility in animal movement (DeHaven, 2005). 
The administration of vaccines and subsequent immunological response leading to 
protective immunity will take several days, in addition to time needed to serotype the strain and 
match a vaccine.  This compares to culling which in some cases could be completed within 48 hr 
(Hutber et al., 2011).  
 Surveillance needs 
For protocols to be implemented in a timely manner, strong surveillance systems need to 
be in place for disease control with nonvaccinated and vaccinated populations.  Because virus 
excretion can begin up to four days before the onset of clinical signs in some species, the typical 
two-week surveillance period based on the FMD incubation period of 24 hr-14 days needs to be 
extended to 21 days to deal with the possibility of emerging subclinical disease (Hutber et al., 
2011; Leon, 2012).  Disease incidence in nonvaccinated populations can be as high as 100% and 
the number of expected secondary cases is dependent on the infectiousness of agent, contact rate, 
and duration of the infectious period.  Additional variable factors include management 
differences, stocking rates, movements within herd, and nature of physical facilities (Leon, 
2012).  Surveillance of clinical signs remains critical when dealing with vaccinated populations 
as well because transmission can be occult and may have preceded diagnosis (Hutber et al., 
2011).   
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 Trade restrictions 
 “For a country with a strong export orientation and pronounced net exporting position, 
any FMD outbreak, no matter the control strategy selected, causes severe damage to the 
industry” (Junker et al., 2009, p. 56).  
The use of vaccination extends the export bans implemented at the direction of 
international trade officials.  While serological samples may distinguish vaccinated carrier 
animals from non-infected vaccinated animals, current tests for most FMD vaccines do not reach 
full diagnostic sensitivity and could leave some carrier animals undetected (Hutber et al., 2011).  
Being able to differentiate vaccinated from naturally infected animals is critical, and serological 
tests must be reliable (Kahn et al., 2002).  The export bans will reduce potential disease 
transmission outside of the infected country or region when surveillance fails to identify carrier 
animals.  These export bans become more critical when vaccination is used because the risk of 
animals transmitting disease sub-clinically increases.  It also creates additional challenges to 
fulfill the need for repeated surveillance and vaccination in extensive epidemics.  In these cases, 
the export ban creates a final “line of defense” against disease spread (Hutber et al., 2011, p. 21).  
Limited information exists about the reaction of export markets to emergency vaccination 
(Boklund, Halasa, Christiansen, & Enoe, 2013).  Success in convincing trading partners to accept 
products from vaccinated animals would positively impact the economic effects of the trade 
restriction due to an animal disease outbreak (Backer, Bergevoet, et al., 2009). 
 Environmental and waste implications 
FMD control strategies excluding vaccination may cause problems other than those 
associated with trade status.  The traditional stamping-out approach in the absence of vaccination 
will likely result in a greater number of animals being destroyed leading to a waste of animal 
protein and serious environmental concerns related to disposal (Parent et al., 2011).  This same 
dilemma applies to a vaccinate-to-kill strategy and adds the risk of the vaccine being dispersed in 
environment through disposed carcasses. 
 Welfare considerations  
While vaccination is typically seen as more welfare friendly than mass depopulation, 
there are a number of welfare issues to consider in a vaccination strategy.  The public may be 
more negative about a vaccinate-to-kill approach than a stamping-out approach and may not 
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understand why vaccinated animals should be destroyed.  Even in a vaccination-to-live approach, 
movement restrictions keeping feed and supplies from reaching live animals may lead to welfare 
problems and potential welfare slaughter.  Animals that cannot be moved to slaughter may reach 
weights exceeding typical production weights resulting in welfare concerns.  If vaccination 
results in more extensive trade restrictions, the increase in domestic supply could reduce prices 
to the point where farmers and ranchers are not receiving the revenue to adequately care for their 
animals or are destroying animals rather than taking a greater financial loss.  As noted by Horst 
et al. (1999), it is even possible the government could engage in a buyout program to prevent 
severe domestic market disruptions resulting in destruction of healthy animals and additional 
welfare concerns. 
 Public acceptance of food products 
Meat and other products from livestock with FMD are safe for public consumption.  
European animal health authorities have modified EU regulations and propose modification of 
international recommendations to allow vaccinated cattle to be kept alive and allow products to 
enter the food chain and international markets.  If this change occurred, it would be possible to 
mitigate economic losses associated with use of vaccine as long as a country is free of infection 
and there is a demand for the product.  It is possible that FMD vaccines could cause lesions 
lowering the carcass value and images of which could influence consumer demand (Kahn et al., 
2002).   
Limited information exists about the willingness of consumers to eat meat and products 
from vaccinated animals.  Food industry leadership is also concerned about potential labeling of 
vaccinated versus non-vaccinated products.  EU regulations would differentiate vaccinated 
products and require separate processing.  While food manufacturers and retailers indicate they 
back vaccination, support will be soft if the public is not confident in the safety of vaccinated 
products (Scudamore, 2007).  While vaccination is a normal animal husbandry practice, the 
general public is likely unaware of these practices and may be concerned if emergency 
vaccination is implemented.  There has been a dramatic increase in the general public’s concern 
over food safety and their demand for food products to be pure without additives or residues.  
Consumers know little about animal vaccination, especially in the case of an emergency.  The 
public has expressed its disapproval over mass depopulation in an animal emergency which has 
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helped lead to more discussion of vaccination.  But, significant gaps exist between scientific 
reality, public perception, and consumers’ confidence in the safety of food products from FAD 
vaccinated animals.  The perceived societal acceptance of vaccination will likely have an impact 
on policymakers when faced with the decision to vaccinate (Scudamore, 2007). 
Retailers in the UK were unwilling to market animal products from vaccinated animals 
because they were worried about consumer acceptance.  Regardless of conflicting information 
provided by the British Food Standards Agency that meat from FMD vaccinated animals 
presents no health risks, 45% of U.K. consumers believe it is too risky to eat meat products from 
animals vaccinated for FMD (Kahn et al., 2002).  On the other hand, the public could see the 
destruction of vaccinated animals as abhorrent and a waste of valuable protein.  This was the 
case found by some Dutch officials in dealing with animal destruction after the Netherlands 
outbreak.  The Federation of Veterinarians of Europe agreed and do not support killing of 
healthy animals for disease control where vaccination is seen as a possible alternative (Kahn et 
al., 2002). 
A consumer survey in the UK during the 2001 outbreak expressed concern about food 
safety, but post-outbreak surveys indicated consumers would have been willing to consume milk 
and meat products from vaccinated animals as an alternative to mass culling.  Those interviewed 
during the outbreak were concerned about the health impact of eating vaccinated product, or 
simply preferred not to eat it even if they thought it was safe.  Efforts to reassure customers that 
vaccinated products are safe should be a key component in a vaccinate-to-live strategy.  While 
some consumers have indicated labeling should be required, segmentation of the products by 
labeling is not recommended.  Vaccination plans should be in place and shared with all 
stakeholders before an outbreak, and conditions should be clear regarding when it will be 
implemented (NAHEMS, 2011d). 
In a 2012 survey of consumers, most respondents saw vaccination as a routine, necessary 
practice protecting humans and animals, but some did express concern vaccine would be passed 
to people who ate or drank product from vaccinated animals.  When more information was 
provided, confidence in the safety of the product increased (Ahlem, 2013).  In an EU FMD 
outbreak with accompanying trade restrictions, most countries will have more meat products 
than can be consumed by their own citizens, meaning they will need to export meat products to 
other countries where meat production does not meet demand.  The potential negative perception 
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of consumers about vaccinated meat products will create an additional obstacle and likely cause 
a decrease in product value (Elbers & Knuttson, 2013).  If products from vaccinated animals 
enter the food chain, are not labeled, and consumers are afraid to eat them, it could further 
decrease demand for meat or milk products and compound the negative economic impact. 
An effective communications strategy implemented by government and industry to 
encourage the public to continue to purchase and consume products from vaccinated animals will 
be critical.  The existence of an educated public will reduce the potential economic impacts of a 
disease outbreak (Swallow, 2012).  The opinions of the public related to mass depopulation and 
animal welfare and their willingness to consume meat and milk products from vaccinated 
animals will influence their reaction to vaccination policies.  In general, the public, consumers, 
and producers, have reacted negatively to the mass culling of seemingly healthy animals (e.g. 
UK, Netherlands, and Uruguay).  Not all farmers and ranchers may agree, because large 
exporters may have a different opinion than small farmers about the use of vaccination.  While 
no human health risks have been associated with eating products from FMD vaccinated animals, 
the public tends to be concerned about food safety and the purity of their products and may not 
accept such products (NAHEMS, 2011d).   
 Decision Criteria for an FAD Outbreak 
Because emergency vaccination may be used in an FAD outbreak, a decision to modify 
the stamping-out approach should be based on descriptive, analytic, and evaluative 
epidemiological principles of response (APHIS, 2012a).  “It is not possible to delineate a priori 
the specific factors that might signal the need to modify the response to a FAD outbreak” 
(APHIS, 2012a, p. 2-22).  The decision to vaccinate will be made by the incident commander, 
the state animal health officials, and the USDA APHIS VS administrator.  The FAD response 
goal if vaccination is used calls for the rapid request of resources if the decision is made to 
vaccinate and full engagement in a public awareness campaign explaining the use of vaccination 
(APHIS, 2012a). 
Williams (2007) identifies a number of factors to consider when deciding to include 
vaccination in an emergency disease response: rate of disease transmission, ability to 
differentiate between infected and vaccinated animals, performance of vaccine in the field, 
population density, vaccine availability, trade requirements, high-value animals and endangered 
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species, public health, resource needs, costs of vaccination and surveillance, food security, and 
exit strategy from vaccination (Williams, 2007). 
The NAHEMS guidelines provide a policy for strategic vaccination.  If an effective 
vaccine exists for the identified disease and a known supplier is available, the USDA chief 
veterinary officer (CVO) will order vaccine.  Before the vaccine arrives, the CVO will use a 
vaccine decision tree matrix to determine if the vaccine will be utilized.  If use of vaccination is 
approved to help prevent disease spread, a vaccination plan will be used to direct the appropriate 
use and distribution of vaccines.  Vaccination may be a part of the stamping-out policy.  
Emergency vaccination may be used to create a firebreak around the infected zone.  The decision 
to use vaccine will be influenced by vaccine availability, availability of human resources, socio-
political factors, and economic impact.  Vaccinated animals must be identified with a specific, 
tamperproof permanent mark, so they could be eventually culled to allow the country to regain 
disease-free status.  Emergency vaccination of rare, endangered, or valuable animals may also be 
considered (NAHEMS, 2005b). 
USDA APHIS identifies multiple factors to consider when determining if emergency 
vaccination should be used in an FAD emergency situation.  Table 4-1 outlines the factors noted 
by APHIS as adapted from the EU Council Directive 2003/85/EC. 
As noted in the previous section, the decision to use vaccination for FMD is highly 
complex.  Table 4.2 outlines the factors recognized by USDA APHIS that deserve consideration 
when determining the appropriate response strategy for FMD. 
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Table 4-1 Factors Determining Viability of Emergency Vaccination 
 Vaccination Decision Points 
 For vaccination Against vaccination 
Suitable vaccine for FAD agent Available Not available 
Public health assessment Supports vaccination Does not support 
vaccination 
Population density of 
susceptible animals at high risk 
of becoming infected 
High Low 
Movement of infected animals, 
products, or fomites out of 
control area 
Evidence of widespread 
movement 
No evidence of widespread 
movement 
Origin of outbreak Unknown Known 
Spread of outbreak Rapid Slow 
Distribution of outbreak Widespread Limited or restricted 
Public reaction to total 
stamping out (may vary by 
species, scale, and disease) 
Strong opposition Neutral reaction or weak 
opposition 
Domestic stakeholders’ 
acceptance of regionalization 
with vaccine zones 
Yes No 
Third-country acceptance of 
regionalization with vaccination 
zones 
Known Unknown 
Assessments and economic 
analysis of completing control 
strategies 
It is likely that a control 
strategy without emergency 
vaccination will lead to 
significantly higher 
economic losses or longer 
duration of the outbreak 
It is likely that a control 
strategy with emergency 
vaccination will lead to 
significantly higher 
economic losses or longer 
duration of the outbreak 
Note. Adapted from APHIS (2012a, p. 2-23). 
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Table 4-2 Factors Influencing a Response Strategy or Strategies for U.S. FMD outbreak  
Factor or 
criterion 
supporting the 
response 
strategy 
Strategy 
Stamping out 
Stamping out 
modified with 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
slaughter 
Stamping out 
modified with 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
live 
Emergency 
vaccination-to-
live without 
stamping out 
Suitable vaccine 
for FMD 
outbreak 
Not 
available/feasible 
Available Available Available 
Resources for 
stamping out 
(such as 
disposal) 
Adequate Adequate Limited Limited 
Resources for 
vaccination 
(such as 
diagnostic 
testing, tracing 
efforts, and 
permitting 
activities) 
Limited Adequate Adequate Adequate 
Population 
density of 
susceptible 
animals at high 
risk of becoming 
infected 
Low High High High 
Population 
density of virus 
amplifying 
animals 
Low Moderate High High 
Movement of 
infected animals, 
products, or 
fomites out of 
control area 
No evidence of 
extensive 
movement 
Evidence of 
extensive 
movement 
Evidence of 
extensive 
movement 
Evidence of 
extensive 
movement 
Origin of 
outbreak 
Known Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Location of Isolated premises Livestock Livestock Livestock 
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Factor or 
criterion 
supporting the 
response 
strategy 
Strategy 
Stamping out 
Stamping out 
modified with 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
slaughter 
Stamping out 
modified with 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
live 
Emergency 
vaccination-to-
live without 
stamping out 
initial outbreak producing area producing area producing area 
Spread of 
outbreak 
Slow Rapid Rapid Rapid 
Distribution of 
outbreak 
Limited or 
restricted 
Widespread Widespread Widespread 
Risk of infection 
in valuable, rare, 
endangered, or 
high-value 
genetic livestock 
High High Moderate Low 
Likelihood that 
FMD could 
become 
prevalent in feral 
swine, deer, or 
other wildlife 
High High Moderate Low 
Public 
acceptance of 
stamping-out 
strategy 
Neutral reaction 
or weak 
opposition 
Weak 
opposition 
Strong 
opposition 
Strong 
opposition 
Surveillance, 
diagnostic, and 
laboratory 
resources for 
serosurveillance 
after vaccination 
Limited Limited Available Available 
Domestic 
stakeholders’ 
acceptance of 
regionalization 
with 
vaccination-to-
live or 
vaccination-to-
slaughter  
No Yes Yes Yes 
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Factor or 
criterion 
supporting the 
response 
strategy 
Strategy 
Stamping out 
Stamping out 
modified with 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
slaughter 
Stamping out 
modified with 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
live 
Emergency 
vaccination-to-
live without 
stamping out 
Third-country 
acceptance of 
regionalization 
with 
vaccination-to-
slaughter 
N/A Accepted N/A N/A 
Third-country 
acceptance of 
regionalization 
with 
vaccination-to-
live 
N/A Not accepted Accepted Accepted 
Assessments and 
economic 
analysis of 
competing 
control 
strategies 
(particularly for 
producers) 
It is likely that a 
control strategy 
without stamping 
out will lead to 
significantly 
higher economic 
losses or longer 
duration of 
outbreak. 
It is likely that 
a control 
strategy 
without 
stamping out 
modified with 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
slaughter will 
lead to 
significantly 
higher 
economic 
losses or longer 
duration of the 
outbreak.  
It is likely that 
a control 
strategy 
without 
stamping out 
modified with 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
live will lead to 
significantly 
higher 
economic 
losses or longer 
duration of the 
outbreak. 
It is likely that 
a control 
strategy 
without 
emergency 
vaccination-to-
live will lead to 
significantly 
higher 
economic 
losses or longer 
duration of the 
outbreak. 
Note. Adapted from APHIS (2012c, p. 4-16). 
 
In the case of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), the primary control and 
eradication strategy in the US is mass depopulation.  If stamping out cannot keep up with disease 
spread or if other factors come into consideration, emergency vaccination may be used.  Such a 
decision will be based on the outbreak’s prevailing epidemiological circumstances, because it is 
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not possible to delineate before an outbreak the specific factors resulting in a decision to 
vaccinate.  While stamping out remains the preferred option, emergency vaccination-to-live and 
emergency vaccination-to-kill strategies are options.  Elements to consider include the 
probability that the disease can be contained, proximity of disease to high-value genetic birds, 
poultry density in the area, risk of introduction to neighboring countries, availability of human 
and physical resources, socio-political factors, consumer confidence in poultry industry, potential 
of zoonotic infection, impact on international trade, economic consequences, disease spread to 
waterfowl, wild birds, backyard flocks, live bird markets, and valuable, rare, or endangered 
nondomestic species.  Figure 4-1 illustrates a decision tree for emergency vaccination in 
domestic poultry (APHIS, 2012d).   
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For a vaccination program to be successful the FAO identifies essential prerequisites to 
include political and community support, commitment of stakeholders, planning based on 
epidemiological evidence, availability of safe and potent vaccines, accurate knowledge about 
serotypes and strains, availability of cold chain and necessary storage, accessibility to livestock, 
Figure 4-1 Decision Tree for Emergency Vaccination in Domestic Poultry (APHIS, 
2012d ). 
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well-trained and sufficient veterinary support, and sufficient disease surveillance systems to 
monitor and detect potential infections (Geering & Lubroth, 2002).  
 Current FMD Policies 
There are four principles related to the control and eradication of FMD: 
1. Reducing access of the virus to susceptible animals (accomplished through 
quarantines, import controls, movement controls, biosecurity practices, etc.); 
2. Eliminating contact between infected and susceptible animals (accomplished 
through zoning, quarantine, and livestock movement controls, etc.); 
3. Reducing the number of infected and potentially infected animals (accomplished 
through depopulation and disposal); and 
4. Decreasing the number of susceptible, at-risk animals (accomplished through 
depopulation or vaccination) (Geering & Lubroth, 2002). 
 World Organization for Animal Health  
Sixty-seven of 178 OIE countries are recognized as FMD free, and 65 of these do not 
practice vaccination.  Eleven countries have disease-free zones with or without vaccination, and 
96 are endemic or have never proved absence of FMD.  In addition, five countries previously 
FMD free are dealing with reemergence (Leon, 2012; Barnett et al., 2013).  
In FMD-free countries, FMD control strategies include emergency vaccination, 
movement restrictions, biosecurity protocols, and culling of infected and exposed animals.  In 
most cases, vaccinate-to-kill is often not considered as ethical or as economical as vaccinate-to-
slaughter or vaccinate-to-live (Parent et al., 2011).  FMD vaccination of susceptible animals is a 
common and established strategy in countries and regions where FMD is endemic (Kahn et al., 
2002).  
The OIE establishes guidelines for international trade of animals and food products 
between countries with different zoosanitary status.  Countries that are FMD-free with 
vaccination and those FMD-free without vaccination are recognized separately by the OIE.  
Countries FMD-free without vaccination have the advantage because they can export live 
animals and animal products to all other countries, regardless of the importing country’s status.  
For the UK, for example, FMD-free status is worth more than $1.75 billion annually (Kahn et al., 
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2002).  International policy has historically encouraged exporting countries to rapidly slaughter 
and dispose of all animals exposed or vaccinated against FMD (Kahn et al., 2002).   
The OIE code relative to FMD has changed over the years. 
 1971 –  FMD was added to the OIE code 
o FMD-free status applied to vaccinating and non-vaccinating countries 
o Systematic vaccination countries had to be disease free for 2 years and 
nonvaccinating countries for 3 years to receive disease-free status 
o Recovery waiting period after a disease occurrence was an additional 6 
months for all countries 
 1992 – Vaccination for FMD was banned in Europe due to poor performance of 
vaccination in South American outbreaks 
o OIE declared two different statuses – FMD-free country not practicing 
vaccination (12 months to achieve) and FMD-free country practicing 
vaccination (2 years to achieve) 
o FMD-free status with vaccination was deemed inferior and the waiting 
period was extended 12 months after vaccination ended to become FMD-
free without vaccination (totaling 3 years) 
o Recovery waiting period remained an additional 6 months for non-
vaccinating countries and was extended to 12 months for vaccinating 
countries 
 1998 – OIE statuses changed to FMD-free country where vaccination is practiced 
and FMD-free country where vaccination is not practiced 
o Changed the recovery waiting period from an additional 6 months to 3 
months for a non-vaccinating country that used emergency vaccination-to-
cull in an outbreak (3 months after last vaccinated animal was destroyed in 
addition to initial 12 months) 
o Time frames did not change if vaccinated animals were not destroyed (2 
years) 
 2002 – Pressure to make vaccination more acceptable and introduction of new 
DIVA diagnostic tests led to changes in OIE policy 
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o Reduced the 12-month waiting period to 6 months to earn FMD-free status 
where vaccination is not practiced when emergency vaccination is used 
without depopulating vaccinates 
o Recovery period for FMD-free country where vaccination is practiced was 
reduced to 6 months with DIVA surveillance (totaling 18 months) 
o Introduced concept of freedom from infection versus freedom from 
disease due to potential subclinical infections (Geale, Barnett, Clarke, 
Davis, & Kasari, 2013; Kitching, 2002). 
The OIE can currently designate countries as: 
 FMD-free country where vaccination is practiced, 
 FMD-free country where vaccination is not practiced, 
 FMD-free zone (geographically defined region of a country or territory)  where 
vaccination is practiced, 
 FMD-free zone where vaccination is not practiced, 
 FMD-free compartment (an animal subpopulation contained in one or more 
establishments under a common biosecurity management system), and  
 FMD-infected country or zone (APHIS, 2012a; OIE, 2012a). 
The 2004 OIE International Conference on the Control of Infectious Animal Diseases by 
Vaccination participants determined, based on ethical, ecological, and economic reasons, mass 
depopulation as a primary means of FMD eradication was not acceptable and vaccination 
policies needed to be developed as alternatives (NAHEMS, 2011d; Schudel & Lombard, 2007). 
Previous OIE policies indicated a country applying rigorous surveillance and using 
stamping out of all infected herds could earn FMD-free status in 3 months.  If a country used 
vaccination to help control disease spread, the period before FMD-free status granted was at least 
12 months unless all vaccinated animals were depopulated.  This period was deemed necessary 
because of the risk of ongoing viral circulation and the possible existence of undetected carrier 
animals (Paton et al., 2009).  
In Article 8.5.9, the current OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code indicates FMD-free 
status can be reinstated 3 months after the last known disease case has been depopulated when 
stamping out without vaccination combined with serological surveillance has been applied.  
Under vaccinate-to-live with stamping out, the OIE will consider an application to reinstate 
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FMD-free status 6 months after the final case or last vaccination whichever was last.  The 
country must also provide serological surveillance evidence that the disease is absent from 
vaccinated herds allowed to live.  This policy assumes marker vaccines were used and 
vaccinated animals can be differentiated from naturally infected animals (Paton et al., 2009; 
NAHEMS, 2011d; Leon, 2012).  If vaccinate-to-kill is used, FMD-free status is regained 3 
months after the last vaccinated animal is destroyed (NAHEMS, 2011d; Leon, 2012).   
To promote vaccination, the OIE agreed to a reduction in the holding period time frame 
before freedom from disease can be declared if vaccination was used (McLeod & Rushton, 
2007).  If the US vaccinates-to-live, it will extend the waiting period for at least 3 months.  The 
benefits of vaccinating must outweigh this delay in FMD-free status. 
If no stamping out is included in the policy response, the OIE will consider reinstating 
FMD-free status after 12 months have passed with no outbreak, no evidence of infection, no 
vaccination, and no vaccinated animal has been introduced into the country or region (OIE, 
2012; Leon, 2012).  If emergency vaccination-to-live and surveillance with no stamping out is 
applied, the reinstatement of FMD-free status could likely take 18 months (Miller, 2011).  For 
countries where routine vaccination is practiced, it takes 6 months to regain free status when 
stamping out, emergency vaccination, and continued surveillance occurs.  If they do not apply a 
stamping-out approach, it takes at least 18 months to regain status (Leon, 2012).  If significant 
long term emergency vaccination is needed, it is also possible a country could obtain FMD-
freedom with vaccination as an intermediary step before moving back into an FMD-free status 
without vaccination.  This would extend the OIE restrictions to at least two full years and FMD-
freedom without vaccination could not be regained until 12 months after the last vaccination is 
administered (APHIS, 2013b).  
History indicates it will take longer than the official waiting period for the OIE ban to be 
lifted because a lag exists for administrative and bureaucratic processes to be completed.  The 
infected country has to complete a dossier explaining control measures, surveillance activities, 
and results.  This information has to be evaluated and approved by various OIE commissions 
which extends the recovery period (Junker et al., 2009).  The OIE Scientific Committee must 
meet and make a recommendation which is then forward resolution for consideration and vote by 
the OIE World Assembly (OIE, 2012).  The OIE will consider regionalization of trade 
restrictions within a country so trade limits only affect the infected region and other regions of 
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the country can continue to trade without restriction (Paton et al., 2009).  If zoning is accepted, 
the area outside of the containment zone would return to its previous status in 28 days.  While 
the OIE recognizes regionalization based on animal disease status and legal or geographic 
borders and it is becoming more accepted as a trade concept, trading partners do not always 
accept such delineation for trade purposes (Junker et al., 2009).  As an example, U.S. regulations 
(US 9 CFR part 94) only recognize disease-free status on a nationwide basis and would not allow 
for recognition of a regional disease-free approach for trading purposes (Swallow, 2012). 
On June 27, 2012, the OIE and the FAO unveiled a new global strategy for controlling 
FMD.  Officials noted animal diseases do not have boundaries and a global response is required 
for effective disease control.  Lost trade opportunities, impact on human development, and the 
ability of the disease to affect farmers in developing countries with hunger and economic ruin 
were cited as reasons for global action.  The Global Strategy is focused on developing veterinary 
services and systems with an emphasis on surveillance and long-term disease eradication (OIE, 
2012, June 27).  
 Potential for change 
The lengthening of trade restrictions placed on a country choosing vaccinate-to-live as an 
FAD response policy creates a disincentive to vaccination and works in contradiction to the 
OIE’s encouragement of vaccination over mass depopulation.  For a country designated as FMD 
free where vaccination is not practiced, a more rapid return to trade and minimization of 
economic losses requires culling despite public and ethical concerns.  It took Korea 12 months to 
regain FMD-free status after their second round of vaccination was implemented during the 2000 
FMD outbreak (Barnett et al., 2013).  There is great value in achieving a premium export market.  
It is estimated that meat products from OIE designated FMD-free countries realize price 
premiums of 10-50% in world markets  (Rich & Winter-Nelson, 2007; Schroeder, Pendell, 
Sanderson, & McReynolds, 2013).  Before 1997, Uruguay spent between $7-9 million annually 
to vaccinate.  Once free of FMD, it gained a U.S. beef market worth nearly $20 million a year 
(McLeod & Rushton, 2007).  It is important to note that this study like many of the others 
discussed accounts for economic impacts on producers only and does not account for the 
potential gains to consumers from lower prices on the domestic market. 
Vaccination can help address the social value concerns associated with depopulation, but 
OIE policies should be more supportive of vaccination policies.  Because vaccination is more 
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successful the earlier it is used, policy decisions need to be made simpler and not be contradicted 
by OIE policies.  An internal EU policy already allows trade between EU members post-
emergency with vaccination use if clinical and serological surveys confirm the absence of FMD 
(Barnett et al., 2013). 
Barnett et al. (2013) examined the benefits, efficacy, performance in differentiation, and 
potential use of higher potency and purity emergency vaccines formulated in vaccine banks.  
They conclude such vaccines reduce FMD virus subclinical circulation and risk of carriers.  
Recommendations for OIE include the development of formal definitions (time of use and 
composition) of emergency vaccination and vaccines, broader recognition of DIVA tests, and 
alignments of waiting periods between vaccinate-to-live and vaccinate-to-die (Barnett et al., 
2013).  They argue surveillance intensity is much more critical than waiting periods to the risk of 
spreading FMD and specifically call for the OIE to establish “an acceptable level of statistical 
certainty for surveillance or target probability of freedom to substantiate the absence of FMDV” 
(Barnett et al., 2013, p. 15).  
The current waiting periods do not reflect specific scientific rationale; rather, they are 
based on historical precedence and considered expert opinion.  Waiting periods should evolve 
and other risk management tools should be utilized as science and technology advance.  OIE 
policies and individual countries’ trade policies should recognize the positive aspects of 
vaccinate-to-live policies with the intent to no longer incentivize the destruction of healthy, 
vaccinated animals solely for trade and economic gain (Barnett et al., 2013; Geale et al., 2013).  
“According to [Netherlands State Secretary and Minister of Agriculture Sharon] Dijksma, there 
is no scientific evidence to justify delays in the recovery of the disease-free status of countries 
following their use of certified vaccines” (Moesker, 2013, p. 1). 
 Additional international trade restrictions 
A country vaccinating is never considered equivalent to a country free of FMD without 
vaccination.  Even if the designated post-vaccination period is over and testing shows an absence 
of the FMD virus, there is no guarantee trading partners will accept imports from a country that 
has experienced an FMD outbreak.  The OIE recovery waiting period is just one trade issue to be 
realized following an outbreak (Parent et al., 2011; Geale et al., 2013).  A country free of FMD 
may choose not to import from countries having used vaccination regardless of OIE timeframes 
(McLeod & Rushton, 2007).  Importers may choose to ban products (most likely fresh meat 
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products) for an unknown length of time because trading partners’ decisions are not based solely 
on OIE recommendations (Miller, 2013).  The US does not currently recognize all of the 
countries and zones on the OIE FMD-free lists as FMD-free for import purposes (APHIS, 
2012c).   
 In addition, even if trade is allowed, trading partners may choose to discriminate against 
another country by paying a lower price for commodities derived from vaccinated animals.  
Trade response and willingness of customers to accept vaccinated products will have a critical 
influence on economic impact of an FAD outbreak (Geale et al., 2013).   
During the HPAI epidemic in Texas in February 2004, more than 44 countries banned 
poultry imports from the US.  While the OIE recognized the outbreak as regional, most trading 
partners did not.  The outbreak was limited to three locations, lasted only three weeks until all 
birds has been depopulated, and was followed by a 4-week surveillance period.  Although no 
vaccination was used, trading partners did not reopen markets until August 2005.  This response 
indicates trading partners would likely further extend the trade ban beyond the OIE standards 
regardless of the use of vaccination (Parent et al., 2011).  
The 2003 U.S. BSE incident provides an example of the imbalance in trading partners’ 
actions to quickly close markets but be slow to open markets even after trade restrictions have 
been lifted by the OIE.  Trade restrictions can be economically devastating.  As an example, 
from 2004-2007, the economic loss due to trade restrictions on beef was estimated to be nearly 
$8 billion from lost trade with Japan and $7 billion from trade lost with Korea (International 
Trade Commission [ITC], 2008). 
While many countries opened markets to U.S. beef in 2004, many others did not.  In May 
2007, based on regulatory changes implemented by USDA FSIS and an improved BSE 
surveillance program, OIE recognized the US as having a controlled risk for BSE which 
indicates all trade restrictions should be lifted.  Korea partially lifted the ban in 2007 but 
maintained a ban on bone-in beef cuts until 2008.  While Japan opened their markets to U.S. beef 
in 2006, they only allowed cattle 20 months of age and younger.  In both cases, restrictions were 
more stringent than OIE recommended.  A full four years after the BSE case, countries that made 
up one-half of the beef export market maintained some level of restrictions (ITC, 2008) and 
China remains closed to U.S. beef.  Japan increased the age limit to 30 months in 2013 which has 
finally helped return beef trade revenues with Japan to pre-2003 levels (Andrews, 2013). 
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In January of 2013, the chief of the OIE, Bernard Vallat, called on China, Japan, South 
Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to open their markets to Brazilian beef after they closed them 
due to a reported atypical BSE case found in Brazil in 2010.  Vallat argued the closure was not 
justified and that according to OIE standards no restrictions were justified.  Brazil threatened 
retaliation if bans were not lifted (MercoPress, 2013).  After the BSE crisis in the EU in 1997, 
the US closed its import market to EU beef.  In November 2013, U.S. officials announced the 
release of a final rule changing its import regulations to be in line with OIE’s risk status 
protocols, which reopened import markets to EU beef.  This change will make the U.S. more in 
line with international standards set by the OIE.  While the stance may not significantly increase 
imports, it is likely to influence future negotiations with other countries regarding U.S. beef 
exports.  Leaders from the EC applauded the move, although they noted it was late in coming 
and that the ban was unjustified and did not follow OIE recommendations.  Earlier in 2013, the 
US was declared a negligible risk for BSE by the OIE (Andrews, 2013; MeatPoultry.com, 2013; 
Driver, 2013).  
While these examples are based on BSE and related trade restrictions, the key point to 
consider is that countries tend to close their borders to imports faster than they open them, and 
they do not necessarily follow the guidance of the OIE.  Relative to an FMD outbreak, the actual 
length of trade restrictions will likely depend more on each trading partner’s individual response 
and less on the OIE.   
In December 2013, the US announced it intended to allow importation of fresh meat from 
Brazil.  Previously, due to concerns over FMD, Brazil could only export pre-cooked meat to the 
U.S.  The decision is based on a risk analysis of the exporting region and evaluation of Brazilian 
FMD protocols.  In order to export, Brazil must certify that no beef originated in an area with 
FMD until 12 months after the last FMD case has been eradicated (a time frame longer than OIE 
requirements).  USDA APHIS must continue to assess Brazil’s FMD mitigation program and 
publish a final rule before importing can begin (Roybal, 2013).   
As another example, if trade partners followed guidelines, an emergency vaccination-to-
kill strategy would not extend the trade ban and, if vaccination shortened the duration of the 
outbreak, it may lessen the impact on trade (Hagerman et al., 2012).  However, if they do not 
follow OIE proposed guidelines, the impact could be far greater economically than otherwise 
anticipated. 
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For further illustration, in a comparison done by USDA APHIS, the time required to 
regain FMD-free status from the OIE was compared to the time required to be granted official 
U.S. recognition as FMD-free for trade purposes.  On average, the US recognizes freedom from 
FMD 721 days after the last FMD case while the OIE averages 200 days.  When vaccination is 
not used, the average time for the US and the OIE is 372 days and 151 days, respectively, to 
grant another country FMD-free status.  With both the US and OIE, the use of vaccination delays 
the approval of FMD-free status (APHIS, 2013b).  The US policy in regard to FMD freedom 
might indicate that other countries will likely extend trade bans against the US in the case of an 
FMD outbreak. 
 Other countries and regions 
 European Union 
In a directive issued in 2003, the EU called for development of a vaccination protocol 
with the ability to differentiate vaccinated from infected animals (Paton et al., 2009).  According 
to the EC website section on animal health and welfare, accessed on November 1, 2013, Council 
Directive 2003/85/EC identifies control measures designed to control and eradicate FMD with 
the objective to regain disease-free status.  The EU strategy is described as committed to 
eradication of FMD as quickly as possible while minimizing the economic damage.  Control 
strategies are founded on stamping out infected and in-contact herds and regional movement 
restrictions of susceptible animals and their products.  Provisions are also made for the use of 
emergency vaccination to prevent disease spread using ring vaccination with a radius of 1-3 km 
around infected herds.  However, it is noted this response should only be considered temporary 
for animals awaiting depopulation when insufficient culling and disposal capacity exists (EC, 
2013a; EC, 2013b).  Routine vaccination was practiced in the EU until the early 1990s.  After 
completion of a cost-benefit analysis, the EC reversed their vaccination policy in 1991 to one of 
non-vaccination to increase international trade opportunities and ensure high quality animal 
health standards, resulting in savings of £1 billion by 2001 (Prempeh, Smith, & Muller, 2001; 
Burrell & Mangen, 2001). 
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 United Kingdom 
While the UK did not use vaccination in 2001, current policy indicates the use of high-
potency emergency vaccines on infected and exposed farms is a likely response strategy (Parent 
et al., 2011).  In addition, the UK has updated their stock of vaccines, prepared a vaccination 
distribution system, developed an automatic national stop-movement order at the first diagnosis 
of FMD, improved their animal identification and records system, and established protocols on 
swine feeding and sheep transportation (Paton et al., 2009).   
 
 
 Netherlands 
The Netherlands, which has experienced epidemics of CSF, FMD, and HPAI, has 
engaged in policy debates over the use of emergency vaccination.  FMD vaccination protocols 
Figure 4-2 DEFRA vaccination decision tree (NAO, 2005). 
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found emergency vaccination can stop disease spread just as well as culling in densely populated 
agriculture regions (Elbers & Knuttson, 2013).  There is public concern over mass depopulation, 
but contradictory objectives exist between agriculture and general society making a policy 
resolution difficult (Backer, Bergevoet, et al., 2009).  In the 2001 FMD outbreak, 260,000 
animals were culled for disease control purposes and 186,645 of them had been vaccinated but 
were destroyed for trade purposes (Garner et al., 2007). 
The Dutch FMD contingency plan approved in 2005 lists emergency vaccination as 
preferred over mass depopulation, but questions remain in regard to its effectiveness.  Concerns 
are based on the effectiveness of ring vaccination over ring culling because of the time necessary 
for the onset of immunity, cost effectiveness, potential increases in subclinical infection, and the 
risk of sub-clinically infected animals avoiding detection and instigating another disease 
outbreak in country or being exported and causing an outbreak elsewhere.  The Dutch Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality commissioned an investigation and report on FMD 
vaccination to evaluate options.  Results were intended to support policymakers in the decision-
making process over FMD response.  The study is further discussed in the section on FMD 
vaccination research (Backer, Bergevoet, et al., 2009). 
The Netherlands newly revised CSF contingency plan lists emergency vaccination as 
preferred to mass depopulation because it has been found to be equally safe and effective in 
research completed by Backer, Bergevoet et al. (2009) as discussed in the section on CSF 
vaccination.  The biggest concern is the marketing of animals after vaccination because the intent 
would be to implement a vaccinate-to-live policy (Elbers & Knuttson, 2013).  Dutch leadership 
played a critical role in getting the EU to accept emergency vaccination but is still arguing for 
the marketing of products of vaccinated animals.  The State Secretary and Minister of 
Agriculture in 2013, Sharon Dijksma, said she was personally committed to a vaccinate-to-live 
approach and “obtaining international acceptance of emergency vaccination as a legitimate 
measure in the fight against infectious animal diseases” (Moesker, 2013, p. 1).  
 New Zealand 
The New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries (formerly known as the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry) has adopted a prioritization tool designed to guide the decision-making 
process on the use of vaccination during an FAD outbreak (Dunn et al., 2010).  New Zealand is 
an FMD-free country, and vaccination is included in the New Zealand FMD response plan as an 
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interim measure to induce immunity and reduce viral shedding.  All vaccinated animals would be 
depopulated, which allows FMD-free status to be regained 3 months after the last vaccinated 
animal is culled.  The advances that have occurred in vaccination technology to differentiate 
between infected and vaccinated stock could lead to a policy change in New Zealand and allow 
vaccinated herds to live out their traditional life cycle.  Industry and government are working 
together to develop FMD vaccination policy based on evidence available (New Zealand 
Combined Government and Industries FMD Preparedness Working Group [NZFMG], 2011). 
 Australia 
The Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan for emergency animal diseases identifies the 
use of vaccine in four policy frameworks: 
 Vaccine is the primary element and can be used alone or in conjunction with 
stamping out, 
 Vaccine is a secondary element used to complement stamping out and other 
disease-control methods, 
 Vaccine is a tertiary element and is only used if the disease spreads extensively 
and a long-term eradication campaign becomes necessary, and 
 Vaccine is not used due to resources, trade restrictions, safety standards, etc. 
(Williams, 2007). 
 North America 
According to the North American Guidelines for FMD Vaccine Use produced by the 
North American FMD Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB), if FMD can be eradicated through 
depopulation, then vaccination should not be considered.  If USDA APHIS concludes it is 
necessary because of the region infected, suspected origin of the outbreak, and disease spread, 
then vaccination can be used as a component of the response (APHIS, 2010;  APHIS, 2012c; 
Hagerman et al., 2012). 
Canada, Mexico, and the US jointly developed the NAFMDVB in 1982 under a 
contractual agreement to provide rapid access to killed FMD vaccines with proven safety and 
potency.  The NAFMDVB is located in the US at the USDA Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic 
Laboratory at the PIADC.  Each country contributes $500,000 to the Bank annually.  The chief 
veterinary officers of all three countries would have to agree in order to activate the Bank.  It 
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stocks concentrated, inactivated FMD virus antigens for several types and subtypes.  The 
antigens are stored at ultralow temperatures over liquid nitrogen allowing for them to be kept 
indefinitely and used for specific vaccine development at production facilities abroad (Kahn et 
al., 2002; APHIS, 2007).  U.S. regulations do not allow for traditional FMD vaccination 
production within the borders which can also delay the start of a vaccination protocol (Miller, 
2013).  Because the US prohibits the manufacture of conventional inactivated FMD vaccines, 
antigens would be shipped to the country where the antigen originated for formulation and 
manufacture if needed.  If the manufacturing methods and production facilities are approved, 
vaccines manufactured internationally can be stored for just-in-time use if they meet efficacy, 
potency, purity, and safety standards.  Commercial vaccines from FMD-endemic countries may 
be used instead of emergency vaccines but are often less potent as discussed in a previous 
chapter.  If a new vaccine needs to be prepared to meet a new disease strain, development and 
manufacturing can take up to six months.  As human adenovirus 5-vectored empty capsid FMD 
vaccines and associated DIVA tests are developed for use in the US, they can also be stored in 
the NAFMDVB.  Because they do not contain a live virus, they can also be manufactured in the 
US.  To date, the NAFMDVB has never been activated (NAHEMS, 2011d).  USAHA recently 
noted the NAFMDVB has limited vaccine supplies with emergency stocks significantly below 
those needed for an FMD outbreak in multiple states or in a livestock-dense region (U.S. Animal 
Health Association [USAHA], 2013).   
Another multinational cooperative vaccine bank has been developed in the EU and 
Australia; New Zealand and other partners have developed a third international vaccine bank 
(NAHEMS, 2011d; Aftosa, 2007).  Some small, noncommercial vaccine banks exist in other 
countries, such as the UK, Japan, and Argentina.  An international FMD vaccine bank network 
was created under the OIE in 2006 with the goals of vaccine standardization and reserve 
maintenance (NAHEMS, 2011d; Hagerman et al., 2012). 
In an outbreak, the strain would be compared with antigens in the Bank and, if an antigen 
is identified to be protective against the virus, the concentrate would be sent to a contracted 
company for finishing into final doses within three weeks.  Protocols associated with the 
NAFMDVB written policy for decision making calls for all vaccinated animals to be 
permanently identified, placed under movement restrictions, and slaughtered as soon as possible.  
The related decision tree defines relevant factors as rapid disease spread or probability of spread 
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and the involvement of swine or multiple species in the disease outbreak.  The Bank enforces 
strict quality measures and rigorous assessment of safety including virus inactivation (Kahn et 
al., 2002).  The NAFMDVB requires all vaccinated animals be permanently identified with an 
official NAFMDVB pink metal ear tag with an individual identification number.  Full records 
must be maintained following USDA APHIS guidelines (NAHEMS, 2011d). 
Figure 4-2 outlines the NAFMDVB decision tree for the use of vaccination in an FMD 
outbreak (APHIS, 2012c).  The criteria in the decision tree will also influence vaccine 
distribution protocols and priorities, with emphasis placed on number and density of susceptible 
animals and herds in vaccination zone, geographic spread of herds, rate of disease spread, 
species and farm types in infected zones, ability and capacity to depopulate, contact rate, natural 
barriers, wildlife presence, and climate (APHIS, 2012c). 
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Figure 4-3 North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank Guidelines for 
FMD Vaccine Use (APHIS, 2012c, p. 4-22). 
 
The decision tree was updated in 2007 to reflect changes in OIE policy and the need to 
make the vaccination decision quicker after the onset of an outbreak.  It is designed to be used 
with decision matrices because a decision tree is linear and sequential and cannot evaluate 
multiple factors.  A matrix, however, is limited in use independently because decision makers 
cannot consider all factors simultaneously.  Each decision box is supported by a matrix in which 
appropriate factors have been identified for consideration with emphasis on outbreak factors 
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(contact rate, host or species, status of outbreak, and environmental) and mitigation factors 
(physical and human resources, sociopolitical factors, economic considerations).  The support 
factors for the decision tree are outlined in Table 4-3 (APHIS, 2012c). 
 
Table 4-3 North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank Decision Matrix for FMD 
Vaccine Use  
Decision Box   
Box #1 - Can 
disease be 
eradicated 
with 
stamping out 
only? 
Time to detection How long before disease was identified, age of lesions 
Contact rate Kind of farms, type of direct and indirect contacts 
(movement of people, animals and fomites), 
movement distances, efficacy of movement controls 
Host Species infected and species at risk 
Status of outbreak Number of affected herds, number of foci of infection, 
rate of spread 
Environment Livestock density and distribution, livestock 
management (size of operations), casual access by 
humans and vehicles, physical barriers, climate 
Physical resources Slaughter capacity, transportation capacity, disposal 
capacity 
Human resources Sufficient trained staff for emergency response system, 
movement control, epidemic projections, surveillance 
Social-political Legislative authority, public opinion, legislative will, 
perception of government, industry acceptance, 
socioeconomic status of producers or region 
(sophistication of producers, influence, need for 
genetic preservation) 
Economic Funding for compensation, value of exports, 
regionalization 
Box #2 – Is 
vaccination 
possible? 
Physical resources Vaccine strain available, vaccine doses available, 
vaccine logistics, vaccine distribution, laboratory 
capacity, time 
Human resources Emergency response system, movement control, risk 
of FMD introduction, epidemic projections 
Social-political Legislative authority, public opinion, perception of 
government, industry acceptance, socioeconomic 
status of producers or region (sophistication of 
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Decision Box   
producers, influence) 
Economic Cost of vaccination, value of exports, regionalization, 
compensation for decreased value of vaccinated 
animals 
Box #3 – Is 
the exit 
strategy 
vaccinate-to-
live? 
Physical resources Slaughter capacity, disposal capacity, time 
Human resources Emergency response system, movement control, 
epidemic projections 
Social-political Legislative authority, public opinion, perception of 
government, industry acceptance, socioeconomic 
status of producers or region (sophistication of 
producers, 
Economic Cost of vaccinate slaughter, compensation, value of 
exports, regionalization 
Box #4 – Are 
there 
additional 
cull strategies 
to consider? 
Social-political Legislative authority, public opinion, legislative will, 
perception of government, industry acceptance, 
socioeconomic status of producers or region 
(sophistication of producers, influence, need for 
genetic preservation) 
Economic Compensation, value of exports, 
regionalization/zoning 
Box #5 – Are 
resources 
available to 
perform 
additional 
culling 
strategies? 
Physical resources Slaughter capacity, transportation capacity, disposal 
capacity, time 
Human resources Emergency response system, movement control, 
epidemic projections 
Note. Adapted from APHIS (2012c). 
 
Canada is a member of the NAFMDVB, and Canadian contingency plans in the case of 
an FMD outbreak calls for the use of vaccine.  Their policy calls for stamping out but allows for 
vaccination of susceptible species in a designated buffer zone.  They would then continue with a 
vaccinate-to-slaughter approach to protect their trade status.  The intent of the Canadian policy is 
to slow the spread of the disease until slaughter.  These contingency plans have been developed 
in consultation with US and Mexico (Kahn et al., 2002).   
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Canada has a shortage of personnel, scarce rendering resources, and limited disposal 
equipment.  Based on the findings following the Netherland outbreak, these limitations make 
rapid slaughter and disposal a challenge.  Thus, vaccination is acceptable, but a shortage of 
personnel to administer the vaccines is also a problem (Kahn et al., 2002). 
Kahn et al. (2002) noted Canada imports meat products from Brazil, a country that 
vaccinates for FMD, and Canadian consumers frequently eat the product and many travel to 
Brazil and eat meat there with no concern over FMD. 
 United States 
CFR Title 9, Part 53.4(a) on the destruction of animals in the case of FMD calls for all 
animals infected or exposed to FMD to be killed promptly and disposed of by burning or burial, 
unless specified otherwise by the Administrator.  This wording has been in place since 1929 
(Miller, 2011).   
Because the US has been free from FMD since 1929, FMD vaccination has not been used 
to date.  The disease is not in the country and import prohibitions exist to keep the disease from 
infecting U.S. herds.  Imports of livestock and their products from all FMD-infected regions are 
restricted (APHIS, 2007).  In 1929, stamping out was an effective strategy to rid the US of FMD 
(DeOtte & DeOtte, 2009). 
FMD vaccine cannot be used in the US without USDA authority (Parent et al., 2011).  
The USDA has historically had a number of reservations about ever using FMD vaccine within 
the US.  It would be possible to spread the disease from one farm to another when vaccination is 
implemented if vaccine teams do not strictly follow proper sanitary measures.  Another concern 
is that vaccinated animals could become infected if challenged, carry the disease for an extensive 
period, and eventually spread the disease.  Moreover, the U.S. livestock trade would face 
restrictions that could cost producers billions of dollars, and vaccination would delay the ability 
to reenter international markets.  Therefore, USDA’s first response has traditionally been 
stamping out, imposing animal movement restrictions, and eradicating the disease (APHIS, 
2007).   
Breeze (2004) argued the US had determined the most profitable response to an FMD 
outbreak is a policy of animal mass depopulation that did not use vaccination, created the best 
option for market access, and worked against other countries choosing to vaccinate.  “It is 
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important to appreciate that government policies on how to respond to FMD are not related in 
any way to the seriousness of the illness in an animal or herd: they do not depend on animal 
health, welfare, pain, or suffering.  They are purely financial and based on estimates of the 
lowest costs that will ensue for animal agriculture as a whole (not for the whole rural economy)” 
(Breeze, 2004, p. 253). 
 Change in policy approach to consider vaccination 
By 2005, the UK reevaluated their FMD response policies and included vaccination as a 
more prominent part of their response, but U.S. policy remained the same as it had for more than 
50 years.  While the USDA did not previously identify vaccination as a viable alternative, the 
GAO reported in 2005 some USDA officials acknowledged vaccination, in combination with 
culling, may be a necessity to deal with an FMD outbreak.  The GAO noted the USDA had 
discussed the strategic use of vaccines to create barriers around infected animals.  Their policy 
required a complex decision tree with multiple matrices to evaluate multiple factors.  The 
process was deemed so complex it would not serve the need for rapid-decision making in the 
case of a disease outbreak.  The decision tree included availability of human resources, public 
opinion and perception of government, industry acceptance, vaccination costs, slaughter and 
disposal capacity, location, and trade restrictions.  The GAO recommended the development of 
stockpiles of ready to use vaccines that could be quickly deployed in the case of a disease 
outbreak.  They also recommended simplifying the decision-making process for determining the 
appropriate use of vaccines to control an outbreak to guarantee rapid decisions are made in the 
event of an attack (GAO, 2005).   
DHS officials also identified concerns with mass depopulation and disposal during a 
preparedness exercise conducted in 2008.  When faced with identifying the veterinary work force 
needs necessary to meet animal disease outbreak scenarios as a part of national preparedness 
plan developed by White House Homeland Security Council, DHS found the number of 
personnel required for traditional animal disease response efforts to be based on an infeasible 
assumption.  The plan calls for the traditional U.S. response of mass slaughter of all exposed 
animals, and DHS found this scenario improbable and determined other strategies should be 
identified when assessing workforce needs.  As an example, they noted the possibility of using 
vaccination and reducing the number of animals to be culled and disposed.  Because vaccinate-
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to-live had not been considered in the US at that time, contingency plans did not exist to 
determine workforce or other needs to implement the plan (GAO, 2009).   
APHIS officials have noted one way to reduce depopulation and disposal concerns is to 
alter traditional control strategies and increase the use of vaccines for at-risk animals, thus 
reducing the number of animals needing to be depopulated and disposed (GAO, 2011).  Dr. John 
R. Clifford (2011, Sept. 13) noted in testimony before Congress that the US needs a new 
approach to animal disease control strategy, specifically FMD.  He testified that it is critical to 
take steps in the best interest of the livestock industry and take advantage of new technologies, 
such as new vaccines, requiring fewer animals to be downed while still stopping the disease.  
“We cannot just have a scorched earth-type policy where we go out and kill and destroy millions 
and millions of animals, like we saw in the UK with burning carcasses” (p. 26).  Lori Miller, at 
the time an employee of USDA APHIS, expressed that in order to protect the environment and 
the economy, depopulation and disposal should be minimized and vaccination should be utilized.  
Stamping out will generate more mortalities than can be managed effectively, so current policies 
to stamp out and bury need to be reconsidered (Miller, 2011). 
One of the greatest concerns with the stamping-out policy is depopulation and disposal 
become infeasible with large numbers of animals, especially in large feedlots.  Multiple carcass 
disposal workshops and emergency response exercises have demonstrated these challenges.  
These approaches should be only one component of an overall comprehensive strategy including 
early detection, isolation, and selective vaccination (DeOtte & DeOtte, 2009). 
Emergency vaccination can play a supporting role in FMD control if there is an outbreak 
in an FMD-free country, specifically serving to create barriers between infected and non-infected 
areas.  However, vaccines could not be developed until the type and subtype of the virus has 
been identified, so it is unnecessary to keep large amounts of developed vaccine on hand.  If 
USDA officials determined FMD vaccines could be used and state officials requested vaccine, 
they would work together to determine vaccination regions and inform producers and consumers 
about the process and procedures of vaccination (APHIS, 2007). 
Large-scale vaccination may be necessary in an FAD outbreak to “minimize the impact 
on animal and public health, ensure continuity of the U.S. food supply, and minimize the 
economic impact of food producers” (NAHEMS, 2011c, p. 1).  But, in some cases depopulation 
without vaccination may lead to the most rapid return to disease-free status and allow trade to 
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resume more quickly, vaccination supplies may not be available, or vaccination may be 
impractical if vaccinated animals cannot be differentiated from naturally infected animals 
(NAHEMS, 2011c; NAHEMS, 2011d).  
Vaccination can, however, slow the spread of disease or reduce the shedding of infective 
pathogens.  If vaccination is used in a widespread disease outbreak, its use will likely be 
determined by the size and scope of the outbreak, the disease in question, the accessibility and 
efficacy of vaccines, and disease- or vaccine- related trade restrictions.  Strategies for 
vaccination may include targeting certain animals, such as high-valued animals, genetic lines, 
production animals, zoo animals, endangered species, or dense populations of uninfected, but 
susceptible animals.  Ring vaccination may be used to suppress disease transmission from 
leaving an infected zone.  Barrier vaccination can be used in a similar manner.  Other strategies 
include predictive and blanket vaccination (NAHEMS, 2011c; NAHEMS, 2011d). 
Miller stated on a conference call with state animal health departments in 2011 that all 
available tools needed to be used for FMD response and the US needed to vaccinate-to-live.  She 
noted meat is still okay to be used for its intended purpose and is safe to eat.  She further stated 
stamping out should only be used in small outbreaks and would never be feasible with large 
feedlots (Miller, 2011).  Miller further stated in May 2012 that APHIS has decided to vaccinate 
when appropriate so mortalities can be minimized.  USDA continues to refine vaccination policy 
and support the development of next-generation vaccines for FMD (Miller, 2012b).  These 
comments do not recognize the authority of state officials in the vaccination decision. 
Emergency vaccination strategies may be considered in an FMD outbreak if the disease 
cannot be contained by stamping out and if the vaccine matches the specific serotype.  The 
region infected, suspected origin of the outbreak, and disease spread may influence USDA 
APHIS to make vaccination a component of the response.  It is likely a combination of strategies 
will be implemented (APHIS, 2012c; APHIS, 2010; Hagerman et al., 2012).  The current USDA 
FMD policy supports emergency vaccination only when culling cannot control disease spread 
(Hagerman et al., 2012). 
If stamping out cannot control, contain, and eventually eradicate FMD, alternative 
strategies will then be considered.  Factors influencing the selection of a response strategy for an 
FMD outbreak include: 
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 Consequences of the outbreak on commerce, trade, national security, food 
security, animal health, the environment, the economic, and regulatory concerns; 
 Social and political acceptance from local, state, national, and global 
communities; 
 The scale of the outbreak (premises, species, distribution, number of animals);  
 Rate of disease spread; 
 Availability of veterinary countermeasures; and 
 Accessibility of necessary resources to carry out response (APHIS, 2012c). 
The USDA Center of Veterinary Biologics (CVB), who holds regulatory authority for 
licensing and permitting vaccines, coordinates with the NAFMDVB and NVS on the purchase of 
vaccine antigen concentrates and manufactured emergency use vaccines.  The traditional 
comprehensive evaluation of new vaccines is not likely feasible in an animal disease emergency.  
The USDA CVB has developed expedited processes for conditional approval of vaccines for use 
in an emergency.  Conditionally licensed products still must be tested for purity and safety, and 
have a reasonable expectation for efficacy and potency.  In addition, the APHIS administrator 
may exempt any veterinary biological product from any licensing or permitting requirement if it 
will be used under the USDA control for an official USDA program, an emergency animal 
disease situation, or an experimental trial (Elsken et al., 2007).  Such regulatory flexibility is 
necessary for timely emergency vaccine development, but may also have a negative impact on 
consumer and producer confidence in the safety and efficacy of the vaccine. 
DeOtte and DeOtte (2009) maintain vaccination should remain a last resort.  Because 
vaccinated animals cannot enter the food chain for 60 days, vaccination should only be 
considered for animals with at least 60 days remaining before slaughter.  Vaccination could, 
however, serve as an effective firebreak involving thousands or tens of thousands of animals.  
Such methods would likely be ineffective in even larger outbreaks with hundreds of thousands of 
cattle.  
 Lack of clarity in decision process 
The NAHEMS guidelines on vaccination do not indicate the exact steps to be taken, 
which provides flexibility, but also make it difficult to examine the effect of various policy 
approaches.  If USDA APHIS does not have a clear process for determining the appropriateness 
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of vaccination, decisions will be made in the middle of an emergency when time, information, 
sound decision-making processes, and other resources are lacking (Hagerman et al., 2012).  
While state animal health officials will make the request for vaccine if the preferred policy 
choice is to vaccinate, the decisions of whether or not to approve the use of vaccination will be 
made at the federal level and local decision makers must optimize strategies based on the federal 
directives (Kobayashi, Carpenter, Dickey, & Howitt, 2007b).  The U.S. policy for determining 
when to use FMD vaccination lacks clarity, and the criteria used in the decision-making process 
is not clearly defined.  “Planning and policy development for FMD vaccination in the U.S. is 
ongoing” (Parent et al., 2011, p. 793).  Greater coordination between state and federal officials is 
needed to resolve these issues.  These inconsistencies will likely delay the vaccination decision 
in an outbreak, exacerbating the situation.  There is a need for well-developed criteria and 
execution strategies for FMD vaccination in the US that is supported by stakeholders, well-
exercised, and extensively planned.  Otherwise, an FMD response will not be executed 
effectively and the effect will be greater than necessary (Parent et al., 2011). 
Parent et al. (2011) identified inconsistent policy approaches regarding the use of FMD 
vaccination in their interviews of seven potential animal health outbreak incident commanders.  
The total realistic number of incident commanders for an FMD outbreak in the US ranges 
between 25 and 30 individuals.  They were presented a scenario and received a weekly update 
with changes in the scenario.  In the situation presented to animal health decision makers, two 
chose vaccination after week one, two after week two, one after week three, one after week five 
and one opposed any vaccination in the scenario (Parent et al., 2011).   
The incident commanders who indicated they were likely to support vaccination in week 
one of the scenario chose vaccination because of the rate of disease spread and desire to avoid a 
slash-and-burn approach.  They indicated stamping out was still the first alternative and a 
vaccination strategy would be complicated to implement and must be started in the first week if 
it is to be effective.  Those who did not select vaccination after week one indicated the outbreak 
was still limited in size, stamping out was a better policy alternative, vaccination would 
complicate the response, vaccination would lengthen impact on trade, and the incident 
commander would not have time to consider vaccination in an actual outbreak.  Those who 
eventually selected vaccination did so because of disease spread, stamping out appeared to be 
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failing, and FMD spread from cattle to swine (Parent et al., 2011).  Few incident commanders 
may actually be in the position to make these decisions independently. 
The animal health officials ranked nine factors to consider when determining if 
vaccination should be used, and the capability to stop disease spread by stamping out ranked as 
the leading factor.  Other factors in order of ranking included: rate of disease spread, size of 
outbreak, livestock density in outbreak area, number and type of species and industries impacted, 
national security and economic impact, duration of outbreak, type of index case, and disease 
spread to wildlife.  Only one decision maker indicated concern about identifying vaccinates from 
nonvaccinates, and one mentioned concerns about FMD carrier status (Parent et al., 2011). 
In 2010, the U.S. Animal Health Association (USAHA), comprised of state and tribal 
animal health officials, animal production industry leaders, and associated processing industry 
representatives, passed a resolution asking USDA for clearer guidance on emergency vaccine use 
in dealing with FAD, such as FMD, CSF, and RVF (USAHA, 2010). 
A group of private, public, and non-profit leaders in animal agriculture discussed current 
FMD policy at the annual meeting of the National Institute on Animal Agriculture (NIAA) in the 
spring of 2013.  Further development of clear vaccination policy was listed as a top priority 
among producers, producer organizations, state veterinarians, animal health personnel, and 
government personnel.  They further noted vaccination decisions need to be made quickly and 
cannot wait three to seven days because opportunity costs go up as the decision is delayed 
(National Institute for Animal Agriculture [NIAA], 2013). 
In August 2013, steps were initiated by USAHA and NIAA, in conjunction with USDA 
APHIS, to develop a National FMD Preparedness Working group of animal health government 
officials, academic experts, and industry representatives to discuss and determine steps “to 
accelerate modernization and implementation of efforts to prevent, detect, contain, eradicate, and 
recover from an FMD outbreak in the United States” (USAHA, 2013, p. 1).  Specifically, the 
group will consider the nation’s capacity and needs related to FMD response strategies, including 
emergency vaccination (USAHA, 2013).   
In October 2013, after noting the critical nature of optimal disease control and related 
business continuity, USAHA passed a resolution at their annual meeting urging the working 
group to collaborate with a broad range of stakeholders to identify capabilities, gaps, and 
exercise plans.  Specifically, FMD vaccine quantity, capability, accessibility, deliverability, 
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distribution mechanisms, electronic identification, and other vaccine-related issues were 
designated as a priority.  USAHA also resolved that USDA APHIS should support and 
collaborate with working group efforts by providing information as well as integrating 
recommendations from the working group into preparedness and response plans (USAHA, 
2013). 
 National Veterinary Stockpile 
The NVS, the U.S. repository of critical veterinary counter measures, was established 
through HSPD-9 in 2004, and became operational in 2006.  It is coordinated by the National 
Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM) in USDA APHIS.  It provides 
logistical support to the NAFMDVB.  The NVS is designed to provide states with the resources 
they need to respond to one of 17 animal disease outbreaks within 24 hr (APHIS, 2011b).  
However, there are no USDA-licensed vaccines for the majority of foreign diseases identified as 
concerning to the horse, cattle, swine, sheep, goat, and poultry industries.  The NVS intends to 
acquire supplies for these 17 diseases, listed in order of importance, by 2016: 
 HPAI, 
 FMD,  
 RVF, 
 Exotic Newcastle Disease (END), 
 Nipah and Hendra virus, 
 CSF, 
 ASF, 
 BSE, 
 Rinderpest, 
 Japanese Encephalitis, 
 Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia,  
 Heartwater, 
 Eastern equine encephalitis, 
 Q fever, and 
 Akabane virus (NAHEMS, 2011c). 
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The NVS stocks supplies, vaccines, personal protective equipment, animal handling 
equipment, antiviral medications, and diagnostic test kits.  It also provides contracts for 
commercial support services such as emergency transportation of critical samples, laboratory 
facilities, and trained personnel with equipment prepared to help depopulate, dispose, and 
decontaminate.  If USDA determined vaccination was appropriate, the NVS would coordinate 
the collection and delivery of the vaccines (APHIS, 2011b).  However, in most cases, vaccines 
and diagnostic kits have not been developed or are too expensive for NVS to purchase.  Vaccines 
are unlikely to be deployed within 24 hr because of time needed for manufacturing and the fact 
that the NVS business plan calls for storing vaccines in a nonready-to-use state to reduce costs of 
storage, maintenance, and expiration.  This issue was the number one concern that state and U.S. 
territory animal health officials had with the NVS resources (GAO, 2011).  
If the policy approach is to vaccinate and enough vaccine is not available, the 
government may need to compensate farmers and ranchers who did not receive adequate vaccine 
supplies for all losses incurred due to the shortfall.  This could result in substantial costs (Breeze, 
2006).   
At a December 2013 FMD table-top exercises, USDA officials indicated there were 
antigens in storage to prepare 2.5 million doses of vaccines to be manufactured internationally 
and that no conventional inactivated vaccines are in storage at the NAFMDVB.  It was clear in 
the discussion that at least one state intended to request 25 million doses but would not expect to 
receive it.  Not only was capacity a limiting factor, but it was indicated it would be 2-3 weeks 
before vaccines may arrive to states that request it (personal communication).  This length of 
time may render vaccines nearly useless in actual disease control and response.  No plans are in 
place to determine how priority for distribution to states will be determined.  In addition, a 
number of states indicated in-state distribution and priority plans were minimal.  The overall 
feasibility of emergency vaccination based on adequate supply, distribution, and timing may 
limit the role vaccine can play in an FMD outbreak in the US.  
 Previous Economic and Epidemiological Research 
The focus of a majority of the economic and epidemiological research on the use of 
vaccination is focused on FMD.  The following sections discuss research findings from a number 
of epidemiological and economic models, cost-benefit analysis, and other research tools. 
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 FMD vaccination 
Berentsen, Dijkhuizen, and Oskam (1992) in a cost-benefit analysis of FMD control 
strategies found prophylactic vaccination was not a cost-effective strategy in areas where FMD is 
not endemic.  The goal of their research was to determine if eliminating routine FMD 
vaccination in order to gain FMD-free designation was economically efficient.  They used a 
three model system, including an epidemiological model that estimated size and duration of 
outbreak, a disease-control model that calculated direct losses for producers and government, and 
an export model that generated estimates of indirect losses to consumers, producers, and 
government.  The models were integrated to estimate national economic losses.  Costs 
considered were those generated by disease control measures including animal slaughter, ring 
vaccination, compensation payments, movement restrictions, related expenses, and idle 
production losses.  Depopulation of cattle on infected farms with and without ring vaccination 
was compared under a scenario of annual cattle FMD vaccination and a scenario with no annual 
cattle FMD vaccination.  Depopulation on serious contact farms was also evaluated.  They 
assumed ring vaccination started three weeks after outbreak and included all cattle and hogs 
within 25 km of the infected herds.  The highest number of outbreaks and largest economic loss 
were predicted to occur in a non-vaccinated population with depopulation of infected herds only.  
If serious contact herds were depopulated, the number of outbreaks and length of the outbreak 
were predicted to be greatly reduced.  Direct costs were highly related to size and length of the 
outbreak.  Indirect costs were estimated to be highest without annual vaccination.  The lowest 
economic loss was predicted to occur with a vaccinated population combined with eradication of 
livestock on infected farms and a 25-km ring vaccination (Berentsen et al., 1992; Bates et al., 
2003). 
In 1995, Garner and Lack looked at multiple combinations of slaughter and vaccination 
as an FMD control strategy in Australia.  Their stochastic simulation model, AusSpread, has 
served as the basis for a number of more recent studies.  Macroeconomic input-output analysis 
was used to capture secondary effects of FMD on employment and income in related economic 
sectors.  They also used a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate alternative strategies for disease 
control based on expected values of gains and losses.  Their model indicated that if FMD spreads 
rapidly, then slaughter of infected herds and dangerous contacts reduced the economic impact of 
the disease outbreak.  This was not the case in a slow-spreading disease outbreak.  This finding is 
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actually counter to the findings from USDA noted in Table 4-1 where rapid disease spread was a 
factor in using vaccination.  Ring vaccination was not economically beneficial compared to 
slaughter, but, again, if implemented early, would reduce the size and duration of the disease 
outbreak.  Zoning, if accepted by trading partners, was also predicted to be economically 
beneficial.  The model also was extended to incorporate a GIS framework with real farm 
boundary and point-location data.  This was designed to provide better tools for policymakers 
and management decisions (Garner & Lack, 1995; Schoenbaum & Disney, 2003; Elbakidze, 
Highfield, Ward, McCarl, & Norby, 2009).   
Leforban (1999) found that, in the case of FMD, the implementation of routine 
vaccination in disease-free regions is economically counterproductive (Leforban, 1999).  In the 
evaluation of direct economic costs to producer, if vaccination is used, vaccination-to-cull 
creates zero economic value.  Vaccinate-to-slaughter would likely send animals to slaughter 
prior to normal slaughter weights which could offer additional challenges and reduce producer 
profit, but could reduce consumer costs.  A vaccinate-to-live approach allowing all animals to 
live out their normal life would provide the best profit option and allow animals to be used for 
the highest and best available good, even though there will be an economic loss overall due to 
the outbreak (DeOtte & DeOtte, 2009). 
Mahul and Gohin (1999) explored the concept of irreversible investment and how it 
affects optimal dynamic decision making when comparing vaccination and depopulation in 
response to an emergency animal disease outbreak.  Vaccination creates additional costs that 
depopulation does not relative to decreases in value of vaccinated animals and their products and 
intensified trade restrictions.  These costs are considered sunk costs and are irreversible.  The 
gain in postponing consideration of vaccination must be weighed against the cost of delaying 
vaccination implementation.  Results indicated there is a quasi-option value to policymakers to 
delay a decision to vaccinate if a widespread epidemic is not probable due to the benefit of 
waiting for new information.  If delaying the vaccination decision results in a quasi-option value 
greater than the cost of waiting, the learn-then-act principle applies.  If the cost of waiting 
exceeds the quasi-option value, the decision maker would apply the precautionary principle.  
Therefore, their findings indicate a widespread epidemic is not highly likely (less than 55% 
probability of widespread epidemic with uncertainty unresolved, or less than 75% with certainty) 
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and a late vaccination strategy is more efficient than an early vaccination strategy, which allows  
decision makers to potentially save the otherwise sunk costs (Mahul & Gohin, 1999). 
In 2000, Mahul and Durand used epidemiological and economic models to simulate an 
FMD outbreak in France.  The input-output model assessed financial consequences of FMD on 
the breeding sector as well as other regional and national economic sectors based on the impact 
of international trade restrictions.  They compared stamping out of infected and in-contact herds, 
extension of stamping out to dangerous contact herds, the addition of emergency vaccination, 
and ring vaccination of all susceptible animals within the control area.  Herd size and density of 
livestock populations were considered.  Stamping out of infected and dangerous contact herds 
was found to most often contribute to an estimated reduction in economic losses.  If export losses 
could be offset by gains from reducing the duration of the epidemic, then emergency vaccination 
was predicted to be socially optimal which was possible in high-density livestock population 
areas if disease cannot be controlled.  Economic consequences from international trade 
restrictions were estimated to be more significant than livestock losses and production and 
processing disruptions, thus increasing the importance of limiting lengths of trade bans (Mahul & 
Durand, 2000). 
In 2002, Garner, Fisher, and Murray considered the consequences of an FMD outbreak in 
Australia.  The policy goals were determined to be disease eradication as rapidly as possible and 
the preferred option was evaluated to be stamping out.  Emergency vaccination was a 
consideration in some circumstances.  They also found zoning could be beneficial but the 
expectations of premium exports such as Japan, Korea, and the US need special consideration 
(Garner et al., 2000; Perry, McDermott, & Randolph, 2001). 
In a 2001 study by Keeling et al., researchers applied developed parameters of 
susceptibility and transmissibility to the U.K. FMD outbreak.  Ring slaughter and ring 
vaccination both proved successful in their models but only if implemented rigorously, and ring 
slaughtering was projected to be more effective for disease control.  Ring vaccination was 
estimated to reduce culling by 15%, and if only ring vaccination was used, total cull was 
estimated to double.  The parameters developed by Keeling et al. have been used in a number of 
other models.  Keeling found that a 10-km ring was predicted to decrease epidemic size by 20%, 
but focusing on nearby farms rather than high-risk farms was futile (Keeling et al., 2001; Le 
Menach et al., 2005; Elbakidze et al., 2009; Kitching, Taylor, & Thrusfield, 2007).  
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Ferguson, Donnelly, and Anderson (2001) completed an analysis of the U.K. FMD 
outbreak two months after the response began.  Disease incidence was estimated and the impact 
of control measures were simulated using a model designed to capture differing spatial contact 
patterns between farms before and after movement restrictions.  They compared temporal issues 
related to three incident time series from infection to reporting, reporting to confirmation, and 
confirmation to depopulation and found delays to be important to control strategy selection.  It 
was assumed all infected farms were eventually identified and that depopulation occurred 
within24 hr of disease reporting without waiting on confirmation because delays would extend 
epidemic.  They found that rapid implementation of infected farm depopulation was predicted to 
slow disease spread.  Ring vaccination and culling were projected to be necessary for rapid 
control if applied aggressively with culling being more effective than vaccination.  To have the 
same level of effectiveness between culling and vaccination, it was estimated that a much larger 
number of animals needed to be vaccinated compared to culling.  They also found vaccination 
was not beneficial if all animals eventually would be culled for trade purposes (Ferguson et al., 
2001).  
Tomassen et al. (2002) developed a decision tree to support decision making by 
evaluating FMD control strategies to minimize direct costs and export losses.  The decision tree 
creates a formal, structured approach that addresses uncertainty and leads decision makers in a 
chronological decision process to reach the best decision with limited information.  Because a 
speedy, informed decision is critical to effective disease response, emphasis was placed on the 
development of a tool that could be used in the first three days of an outbreak based on 
information available in that time.  The approach combined an epidemiological model based on a 
deterministic susceptible-infectious-recovered approach modeling the effect of an FMD control 
strategy on FMD dynamics, an economic model that converted the outbreak and control effects 
into direct costs and export losses, and a decision-tree module.  Costs with an economic impact 
on livestock producers and the government responsible for disease control were considered along 
with the lost value of livestock and related products that could not be exported (Tomassen et al., 
2002). 
The four control strategies compared were stamping out and culling of high-risk contact 
herds, ring culling within 1 km of infected herd, ring vaccination within 1 km of infected herds, 
and ring vaccination within 3 km of infected herd.  Movement control was implemented in all 
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four responses.  Livestock and herd density, possibility of airborne spread, and the high-risk 
period (HRP) (time between the initial infection and detection of disease) were used to define 
scenarios.  Airborne spread outside of the ring was taken into account and susceptible animals 
located downwind were also culled or vaccinated.  All vaccinated animals were depopulated as 
rapidly as feasible.  Seven density examples, two airborne spread options (none or maximum), 
and three HRPs of 7, 14, and 21 days were considered.  Analysis compared the difference 
between known and unknown HRP by policymakers which led to the ability to calculate the 
expected value of perfect information (Tomassen et al., 2002). 
Livestock density was a critical factor.  In densely populated areas, the economically 
optimal control strategy was ring vaccination due to a reduced number of infected herds and a 
shorter epidemic, but in sparsely populated areas, ring culling was projected to be economically 
optimal.  In densely populated areas, limited estimated to be the biggest economic factor.  For 
regions with density neither defined as densely nor sparsely populated, the length of the HRP and 
chance of airborne spread were predicted to be the most significant factors.  The results indicated 
failure to select the economically optimal response will likely lead to additional negative 
economic effects (Tomassen et al., 2002). 
In a study of U.S. vaccination strategies using spatial stochastic simulation modeling in a 
hypothetical FMD outbreak in California, Bates et al., (2003a ) and Bates, Thurmond, and 
Carpenter (2003b) compared a USDA-mandated eradication strategy with supplemental 
depopulation and vaccination within a certain radius, slaughter of high-risk animals, and 
expansion of infected and surveillance zones.  Strategies of preemptive depopulation of high-risk 
herds and vaccination within a specified radius both performed better than the baseline by 
decreasing size and duration of the epidemic.  Specifically, slaughter of the 5 to 10 highest risk 
herds was more effective than depopulation of herds within 1-5 km.  Key to the effectiveness of 
such a strategy is the ability to identify the highest risk herds.  They determined vaccination 
caused a significant decline in the number of infected herds as well as epidemic duration.  
Increasing the infected areas from 10 to 20 km and the surveillance zone from 20 to 40 km led to 
a 48% decrease in the size of the epidemic which was the single most significant strategic benefit 
found in strategy comparison.  It was also determined by increasing the vaccination zone to a 
diameter of 50-100 km from 5-10 km would result in a much smaller epidemic.  In the three-
county region used in the study, this increase would result in 2,161of 2,238 herds (97%) 
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requiring vaccination in just a few days (Bates et al., 2003a; Bates et al., 2003b).  While 
expansion of the zone is epidemiologically beneficial, it may not be well accepted by producers, 
industry representatives, or state officials (Dykes, 2010).  NAHEMS guidelines indicate while 
the selection of the size and shape of the vaccination zone is complex, it should be as small as 
possible to control the disease (NAHEMS, 2011d). 
In a cost-benefit analysis extension of their simulation model, Bates, Carpenter, et al., 
(2003) evaluated FMD control strategies of vaccination and preemptive culling based on the 
associated costs and benefits.  Direct costs considered included indemnity, slaughter, cleaning 
and disinfection, and vaccination.  Lost wages, reduced future production, and lost exports were 
not included in the analysis.  Depopulation of infected herds, sale yard closure, 10-km infected 
zone, and a surveillance zone of 20 km comprise the baseline strategy.  Ring vaccination within 
1-5 km and preemptive slaughter of one to10 high-risk herds in addition to the baseline were 
compared as control strategies (Bates, Carpenter, et al., 2003).  
Vaccination protocols were estimated to be economically efficient, but mass 
depopulation was not.  Selective culling of high risk herds was predicted to be the most preferred 
preemptive depopulation strategy.  The most preferred vaccination strategy was projected to be 
the 5-km radius.  Vaccine with high efficacy was found to be cost effective if vaccinated animals 
are not destroyed.  Overall, preemptive depopulation was estimated to result in a negative net 
benefit while a positive net benefit was estimated to result from vaccination (Bates, Carpenter, et 
al., 2003).   
Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) studied slaughter versus vaccination in the case of a U.S. 
FMD outbreak using a stochastic simulation model incorporating economic and epidemiological 
modules.  Scenarios included slaughtering only infected herds, slaughtering herds with direct 
contact to infected herds, slaughtering susceptible herds within 3 km, and slaughtering herds 
with direct and indirect contact to infected herds (full preemptive slaughter).  Strategies with no 
vaccination, vaccination within 10 km of two infected herds, and vaccination within 10 km when 
50 herds were infected were investigated.  Eradication costs, production losses, export loss, and 
indirect costs on other sectors were considered as total costs of an outbreak.  Slaughter was 
considered to begin 5 days after FMD confirmation and conclude within 24 hr.  In the case of 
vaccination, it was assumed that immunity occurred in 4 days and vaccinated animals were 
slaughtered within 30 days.  Cost scenarios were run representing vaccinated animals being sent 
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into normal slaughter processes and being depopulated and disposed of as was done with 
infected herds (Schoenbaum & Disney, 2003; Elbakidze et al., 2009).   
Results indicated herd demographics and the rate of contact between herds were the key 
factors in determining the best response strategy.  The optimal strategy was determined by the 
speed of disease spread, herd size, and population density.  Slaughtering herds in contact with 
infected herds was less expensive than slaughtering only contagious herds and resulted in a 
shorter epidemic.  Thus, it appeared to be the best strategy for controlling FMD infection but was 
based on an optimistic 100% traceback capability.  Full preemptive slaughter was estimated to be 
more effective in fast disease-spread scenarios versus slow-spread cases.  The most expensive 
slaughtering option estimated was slaughtering within 3 km.  Ring vaccination was predicted to 
be more costly than slaughter alone, but if implemented early with preemptive slaughter, it was 
expected to decrease the duration of the outbreak.  It was not found to be cost effective unless it 
was a fast-spread outbreak and there were not additional costs associated with slaughtering 
vaccinated animals.  Targeted preemptive slaughter was predicted to improve the 
epidemiological and economic results.  Higher capacity to slaughter and vaccinate was projected 
to lead to shorter outbreaks and lower costs (Schoenbaum & Disney, 2003; Elbakidze et al., 
2009).   
Le Menach et al. (2005), using a stochastic farm-based simulation model applied in 
France, assessed control policies in an FMD outbreak.  They found depopulation of infected 
farms as a standalone measure was not expected to stop disease spread.  Preemptive culling and 
ring vaccination in areas around infected farms had an estimated greater effect on reducing the 
number of FMD cases and the length of the epidemic.  Which response strategy was projected to 
be more effective depended on the region where the outbreak was located.  They concluded the 
results could serve decision makers when developing epidemic response planning (Le Menach et 
al., 2005). 
Diaz et al. (2005) studied ring vaccination as a control strategy with specific emphasis on 
ring size and speed of implementation.  They reviewed the 2001 outbreak in Uruguay and 
questioned if ring vaccination would have been more successful if it had been implemented 
quicker than 13 days after the outbreak and if the ring size of 10 km had been larger.  Their study 
included analysis of a policy approach with isolation of infected farms, movement restrictions, 
and ring vaccination.  Movement and isolation controls were estimated to be more effective 
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when vaccination was included.  The number of infected farms was projected to decrease by 
21% when vaccination was used and continued to drop until the vaccination rate met 0.4, at 
which further investment did not result in estimated further declines in the number of infected 
farms.  If movement restrictions begin on the 4
th
 day after the initial outbreak and vaccination 
began on the 13
th
 day as was the case in the 2001 outbreak, then the overall size of the epidemic 
was projected to be 16% larger than if vaccination would have also been implemented on the 4
th
 
day.  Diaz et al. (2005) concluded ring vaccination is effective when used in conjunction with 
movement and isolation restrictions, implemented immediately upon notice of an outbreak, and 
the ring size must be larger than identified in 2001. 
Hutber et al. (2006) developed a formula to help determine the economic viability of 
vaccination in the case of FMD.  Economic viability = [prevalence without vaccination x unit 
compensation costs for culling] + [export loss for epidemic duration + export loss during post 
epidemic ban due to culling] – [cost of targeted vaccinations + cost of lost exports during ban 
due to vaccination] (Hutber et al., 2006). 
The Hutber formula does not include the cost of implementing movement restrictions 
because the authors did not see these costs as significant on economic viability.  This approach 
depends on implementing a vaccinate-to-live policy at the initial identification of FMD – any 
delay would decrease economic and epidemiological benefits.  They also assumed all 
agricultural products enter the food chain; otherwise, an additional subtraction for the value of 
this product needs to be included.  FFI refers to the number of farms impacted by FMD during 
the first two weeks of an outbreak and FFI can be used to predict both prevalence and duration.  
If FFI indicates the epidemic is unlikely to last for as long as an export ban, then vaccinate-to-
live policy is inappropriate.  If FFI indicates the epidemic will be greater than or equal to the 
length of a trade ban, the benefits of vaccination outweigh the costs if implemented within the 
first two weeks of the epidemic.  Delaying vaccination implementation in a vaccinate-to-live 
program is estimated to reduce its economic and epidemiological benefits (Hutber et al., 2006; 
NAHEMS, 2011d). 
In 2006, Zhao, Wahl, and Marsh used a bioeconomic framework to integrate 
epidemiological processes, dynamic livestock production, domestic consumption and 
international trade and to analyze effects of invasive species introduction (animal disease 
outbreaks) on decision making.  FMD scenarios were simulated using stamping-out and 
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vaccination scenarios.  They assumed all beef exports were banned for 3 years, domestic demand 
decreased by 5%, and there was no disease reoccurrence after eradication.  Depopulation rates of 
60%, 70%, 80% and 90% of latent infectious herds without ring vaccination were compared.  
They also compared ring vaccination strategies that vaccinated susceptible herds at rates one, 
two, and three times larger than the number of infectious herds depopulated.  Depopulation at 
60% without ring vaccination was estimated to result in the best social welfare outcome.  
Researchers concluded animal disease management policy decisions are always about the 
balance between gains and losses (Zhao et al., 2006). 
Tildesley et al. (2006) studied optimal reactive and responsive ring vaccination based on 
data from the 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak.  They found optimal vaccination ring size to be 
dependent on logistical limitations and epidemiological parameters.  They assumed a vaccinate-
to-live policy was implemented with vaccine efficacy of 90%, a four-day delay between 
vaccination and protection, a goal of vaccination within two days of reporting, and a set limit on 
the number of vaccinations that could be done in one day.  Culling occurred on infected and 
dangerous contact (deemed to be at risk due to epidemiological investigation) farms.  
Vaccination was initiated within a set radius from an infected farm with priority based on order 
of reporting with at-risk farms further from infected farm vaccinated first when multiple reports 
occurred on same day.  They found that prioritizing vaccination closer to infected farms 
regardless of order and risk would reduce epidemic size regardless of the ring size.  It was also 
estimated that increasing vaccine capacity would reduce the average epidemic impact and that 
ring size should be adjusted to capacity so supplies were not exhausted without vaccination 
completed within the pre-determined ring zone.  A decrease in vaccine efficacy was estimated to 
extend the epidemic regardless of ring size.  If vaccination was done by prioritizing farms closer 
to infected premises, the number of farms culled was projected to be reduced by 50%.  Culling of 
contiguous premises was not assessed to be advantageous when vaccination was used (Tildesley 
et al., 2006).   
Kitching, Taylor, et al. (2007) took issue with the Tildesley model and argued it was 
questionable as a decision tool.  They found the model needed to be validated, was biased toward 
localized and pre-emptive disease control methods, and overestimated short-distance disease 
spread.  Tildesley et al. (2007) countered the stochastic variability of the model adds to its 
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usefulness in capturing realistic variability of disease outbreaks and that with limited vaccination 
resources, the order of vaccination does matter. 
Rich and Winter-Nelson (2007) integrated a multimarket model with dynamic and spatial 
epidemiological model to estimate regional and aggregate impacts of animal disease control 
measures over the short and long run and analyze the economic impacts of FMD in the Southern 
Cone (Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay).  Based on their findings, they assessed preventive 
vaccination is the best policy in the short term but is dominated by stamping out in the long run 
due to trade restrictions.  Using mitigation strategies differentiated by region was shown as 
beneficial, because a spatially differentiated policy combining vaccination in Paraguay with 
stamping out elsewhere was estimated to result in the highest long run net revenues in the 
agricultural sector (Rich & Winter-Nelson, 2007). 
Kobayashi, Carpenter, Dickey, and Howitt (2007a, 2007b) used a dynamic optimization 
model to evaluate FMD control strategies.  Control strategies of depopulation and vaccination 
are optimized on a daily basis within the model to minimize regional costs during the outbreak.  
The model was applied to a three-county region in California.  The optimization model allows 
for simultaneous consideration of all control options to find the optimal policy choice, which 
overcomes the limitation of models that consider predetermined choices.  In this case, decision-
variable levels are determined endogenously while minimizing the objective function.  One 
limitation of the model is the inability to target depopulation or vaccination; instead these 
strategies must be applied uniformly to susceptible, subclinically infected, and nonvaccinated 
herds.  Vaccination was modeled as immediately and perfectly effective in preventing disease 
and protecting susceptible animals (this is a significant simplification from reality) (Kobayashi et 
al., 2007a). 
The costs in the model apply only to the three counties and are defined as the value of 
livestock herds depopulated for disease control, daily operational costs, and direct costs of 
disease control.  Control measures were all implemented on day 21 of the outbreak.  The model 
was set to minimize costs and minimize the number of herds infected with budget constraints of 
700 million and one billion dollars.  This simulates a decision makers’ desire to minimize the 
consequences of an incident while attempting to deal with budget constraints.  Vaccination with 
a vaccinate-to-live policy was estimated to reduce epidemic size and economic costs, but the cost 
savings would only be significant in a fast-spreading disease, particularly when the index case is 
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in a sales yard.  Epidemic duration and incidence were projected to be lower with the infection 
minimization than the cost minimization, but led to a higher estimated cost.  Depopulation was 
the optimal choice projected under infection minimization, but vaccination was a more optimal 
choice under projected cost minimization.  As the budget decreased, depopulation was 
supplemented with vaccination.  When the model minimized the number of herds depopulated, 
results were similar to cost minimization except more herds were vaccinated instead of 
depopulated.  Overall, preemptive depopulation was not predicted to be optimal, vaccination was 
projected to be optimal with more than 30% cost savings, increased vaccination capacity further 
reduced estimated epidemic costs, increased carcass disposal capacity estimated total costs, and 
it was determined dairy operations (high-value operations) should be given preferential treatment 
for the use of limited resources.  It is important to note that costs incurred outside the region 
were not included in the model.  Optimization models are not intended to replace simulation 
models, but do offer different advantages and can be used in iterative fashion with simulation 
models (Kobayashi et al., 2007a; Kobayashi et al., 2007b). 
Riley concluded in 2007 prioritizing vaccination based only on distance from and 
dangerous contact with infected premises was predicted to be more successful at reducing the 
number of animals to be destroyed than other vaccination plans (Riley, 2007; Premashthira, 
2012).   
Barasa et al (2008) performed a cost-benefit analysis of FMD vaccination in South 
Sudan.  They estimated prevalence and mortality of acute and chronic FMD and calculated a 
benefit-cost ratio of 11.5.  More than 28% of the total FMD losses came from chronic FMD, 
indicating greater attention needs to be given to control of chronic losses.  Special attention was 
given to the region’s dietary dependence on milk.  Seasonal variations create a hunger gap period 
during which households are highly dependent on milk and the FMD outbreaks prior to this 
period made human food security even more tenuous (Barasa et al., 2008).   
Cattle are a central component of the economic and social wellbeing of more than 70% of 
the southern Sudanese.  Once Rinderpest was eradicated in the region, diseases such as FMD 
became a focus of animal health officials.  Previous researchers had identified FMD has little to 
no impact on productivity because African cattle suffered a mild version of the disease, but more 
acute cases occurred with movement of cattle for seasonal grazing.  Prevalence ranged from 
14.6-49% annually and mortality ranged from 1.1-5.3%.  In areas such as south Sudan, 
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government and economic instability make disease outbreaks a complex emergency with a focus 
on ethical humanitarian needs.  In these cases, traditional economic decision-making tools are 
rarely used, and decisions are made by humanitarian program officials with little expertise in 
animal disease control or economic analysis (Barasa et al., 2008).   
The dependency on milk increases at the end of the southern Sudan dry season and into 
the early wet season.  There are typically limited amounts of grain available for purchase, but 
purchasing power depends on cattle ownership and cattle health.  So, the humanitarian and 
economic impact of an FMD outbreak is directly related to its timing.  The goal of the study was 
to look at safeguarding the milk supply while addressing the challenges of multiple variants, 
operational structure, and epidemiology complexity.  The research team developed a benefit-cost 
model based on FMD prevalence, mortality, milk production, market values, and other values.  
Costs for FMD biannual vaccination with a 85% coverage rate included purchase and 
importation into Kenya, air transport into south Sudan, equipment and cold chain, training, 
supervision, and nongovernmental organizations’ overhead and administration.  Results 
indicated vaccination-based FMD control was justified on an economic basis.  Estimated costs 
were decreased substantially from mass vaccinations if the vaccination protocol was solely based 
on humanitarian needs, while still creating an economic benefit.  If economic values of social 
exchanges of cattle and agricultural products were included, the benefits were estimated to 
increase substantially.  In this case, food security is a critical consideration in policy 
development (Barasa et al., 2008).  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) researchers 
qualitatively studied FMD-outbreak scenarios in the US, Canada, and the Netherlands and 
compared response strategies of stamping out, stamping out combined with regionalization, 
vaccination-to-live, and vaccination-to-live combined with regionalization.  They utilized two 
modeling systems: one designed to evaluate impact on specific commodities and related market 
developments and the other focused on bilateral trade and welfare changes.  Epidemiological 
factors are determined exogenously.  Regionalization via zoning allows for an infected country 
to define an animal subpopulation based on geography or internal borders with a distinct animal 
health status (Junker et al., 2009). 
A number of factors influencing supply and demand were considered and modeled by the 
research team in a comparative static analysis, including effects on domestic supply, domestic 
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demand, and international markets as well as budgetary effects, spillover effects and 
externalities, and long-term production disruption.  Scenarios are narrowed to the impact of the 
trade embargo, and export supplies are considered dumped on the domestic market.  The models 
do not include assumptions about changes in consumer preferences or losses in production due to 
the disease itself.  The three countries considered represent three different market structures.  The 
US is an exporting country with a large domestic market, Canada is a large exporter with a 
smaller domestic market, and the Netherlands is an EU country with a highly developed 
livestock sector (Junker et al., 2009).  
The length of time exports are restricted is projected to strongly affect the economic loss 
due to trade restrictions.  In Canada, global welfare loss was estimated to decrease by 25% if 
stamping out is implemented rather than vaccination.  The concept of regionalization was 
predicted to decrease the opportunity costs of trade limitations, and the estimated costs of 
regionalization were lower than the estimated gains.  In general, the pork industry was preojected 
to experience a more negative economic impact than the beef industry.  The market structure of a 
country fighting FMD will cause different control strategies to have different impacts (Junker et 
al., 2009).   
For the US, vaccination-to-live was predicted to decrease annual export value by 80% 
while stamping out was estimated to reduce it by 50%.  Welfare gains by consumers were not 
projected to make up for the losses faced by producers.  Economic losses were consistently 
projected to be suffered by the FMD-infected country, but other countries were projected to gain 
and lose as well.  Importing countries were projected to experience economic loss due to reduced 
international supply and higher prices, but other exporting countries were expected to gain when 
their competitors face export restrictions.  If the US would experience an FMD outbreak, 
Canada, Mexico, and Japan were estimated to see a large negative impact because they import a 
large share of U.S. exports.  Australia and New Zealand were estimated to receive the biggest 
gain in regard to expanded and diverted beef exports to higher price regions such as Japan.  
Argentina and Brazil were predicted to recognize gain from additional pork exports.  Overall, the 
international economic consequence of trade restriction due to an FMD outbreak is estimated to 
be greater when vaccination is employed rather than stamping out due to the longer duration of 
trade distortion which has a nearly linear relationship with total costs to the economy (Junker et 
al., 2009). 
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Researchers in 2009 used a stochastic spatial simulation model to evaluate response 
strategies for an FMD outbreak in an eight county region of the Texas Panhandle, a high density 
livestock region.  The scenarios were based on four different index herds (company feedlot, 
backgrounder feedlot, large beef, and backyard) and variations on three response strategies (time 
of detection, vaccine availability, and surveillance).  Quarantines of infected premises and 
movement controls were assumed in effect in all scenarios.  Vaccination was either targeted or 
administered in a 5-km ring vaccination zone.  Vaccination was assumed to begin one week after 
disease confirmation, and all vaccinated animals were assumed to be depopulated.  Experts and 
livestock industry leaders were used to help predetermine the realistic availability of resources 
needed for disease response.  Early detection was the most useful in reducing outbreak duration 
and minimizing the number of herds depopulated.  Vaccination when adequate supply was 
available did not provide significant advantages; in fact, it led to increased time to eradication 
with a large beef herd index case and to a higher average number of herds infected with a 
company feedlot index case.  Vaccination becomes more effective in large outbreak where 
disease is being rapidly transmitted.  In general, time of detection was the critical influence, 
while vaccination and surveillance had little effect (Ward, Highfield, Vongseng, & Garner, 2009) 
In 2009, Elbakidze et al. investigated FMD mitigation strategies through the use of 
economic-epidemiologic modeling with a focus on early detection, enhanced vaccine 
availability, and enhanced surveillance.  Such analysis presents numerous challenges because of 
the uncertainties of disease-outbreak and disease-spread parameters.  Minimizing costs of ex-
ante and ex-post strategies requires understanding the probabilities of disease introduction, 
disease spread rate, relative costs, ancillary benefits, and the effectiveness of mitigation 
strategies (Elbakidze et al., 2009).  
Economic losses were predicted to be a result of decreased productivity, value of 
livestock destroyed, operational costs of response, reduction in consumer demand, trade losses, 
losses by supporting industries, declining stock prices, and environmental impacts.  Most 
previous studies have found slaughter to be generally superior to vaccination primarily due to 
trade ban implications (Elbakidze et al., 2009).   
The Wageningen UR researched FMD strategies using an interdisciplinary policy 
approach to compare epidemiological and economic consequences on behalf of the Dutch 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality.  Initial results were reported in 2009 and 
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detailed results and methods were published in 2012.  The Dutch contingency plan calls for 
vaccination within a radius of 2 km of the infected premise under a vaccinate-to-live approach.  
Researchers compared this policy to culling within 1 km combined with vaccination in 5 km and 
the EU minimal strategy of culling infected and exposed animals, regulating movement, and 
tracing dangerous contacts.  For the epidemiological portion of their study, they used a stochastic 
individual-based model coupling FMD virus transmission between and within herds.  For the 
purposes of the model, culling was assumed to start on day 1 and vaccination on the 7th day.  
They found vaccination will be less effective in high-density livestock areas than depopulation 
efforts early in an epidemic because immunity has not built up and will lead to more minor 
outbreaks and greater need for surveillance.  These findings are opposite the USDA expectation 
included in Table 4-1 that vaccination will be more effective in high-density areas. When 
modeled, the 2-km vaccination strategy was estimated to result in more infected farms and a 
slightly longer duration of the outbreak than a 1-km cull, but fewer farms were preemptively 
culled with vaccination.  A 5–km vaccination strategy was estimated to result in a smaller 
epidemic with fewer farms affected and shorter duration than either of the other options.  These 
results indicate vaccination will be better able to compete with culling for disease control if 
applied in a larger radius, but it will also require significant resources and may not be feasible.  
In the case of regions with low farm density, the EU minimal control strategy was projected to be 
sufficient.  Researchers also determined hobby farms should be exempt from preventive culling 
with negligible impact on the epidemic (Backer, Bergevoet, et al., 2009; Backer, Hagenaars, 
Nodelijk, & van Roermund, 2012).   
When considering the economic consequences, researchers looked at direct costs 
(infrastructure for control, depopulation and disposal, decontamination, destruction of related 
products and supplies, compensation, and vaccination), costs from export losses related to trade 
restrictions, ripple effects (effects felt upstream and downstream along the livestock chain), and 
spillover effects (effects on tourism and other services).  In low cattle density areas, there was 
relatively little difference in estimated costs between the options, but culling is the best economic 
choice.  In more densely populated areas, vaccination is the projected economic preference.  In 
very high densities, the 5-km vaccination strategy was estimated to result in lower costs, but in 
other areas the 2-km strategy estimated to be the least costly.  Excluding pigs from vaccination 
was projected to be less costly, caused relatively little estimated increase on the epidemic, was 
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predicted to reduce the number of animals to vaccinate by half, and should be considered to 
potentially extend vaccination to more susceptible species (Bergevoet, von Wagenberg, & Bondt, 
2009; Backer, Bergevoet, et al., 2009). 
Greathouse (2010) studied the impact of disease control strategies in response to an FMD 
outbreak in southwest Kansas on changes in consumer and producer welfare.  An 
epidemiological disease spread model and a multi-market equilibrium displacement model were 
used to evaluate three response scenarios, including depopulation of infected herds without 
vaccination, ring vaccination within 3 km implemented after one infected herd was detected, and 
ring vaccination within 3 km implemented after five infected herds were detected.  Vaccinate-to-
live and vaccinate-to-cull policies were also compared.  The results indicated producer welfare 
losses are predicted to be larger with the use of vaccination and increase further with 
vaccination-to-cull policies and extension of trade bans (Greathouse, 2010). 
In study of Spanish FMD policy, Martinez-Lopez, Perez, and Sanchez-Vizcaino (2010) 
compared six control strategies using a stochastic, spatial, disease state-transition model to 
estimate epidemic duration and magnitude.  Depopulation of infected premises combined with 
movement restrictions in a 10-km zone, and movement tracing was the reference scenario.  Other 
strategies considered included vaccination within a 3-, 5-, and 10-km radius and depopulation 
with 1 and 3 km.  Depopulation measures were projected to decrease the magnitude of the 
epidemic by a median 78%.  Preventive vaccination within 3 and 5 km was estimated to reduce 
the number of infected premises by 55%.  Researchers concluded the reference strategy was not 
estimated to be the most cost-effective strategy and that depopulation within 1 km and 
vaccination within 3 km was predicted to be the most effective of strategies considered.  The 
increase of preventive vaccination to 5 km and depopulation to 3 km was not found to be cost 
effective.  They also concluded that because use of vaccination will extend the time period to 
recover disease-free trade status and lead to greater estimated impacts, depopulation may be 
more beneficial for exporting countries (Martinez-Lopez et al., 2010; Premashthira, 2012). 
Ge, Mourits, Kristensen, and Huirne (2010) used integrated epidemiological-economic 
modeling to support dynamic decision making of FMD control measures.  They noted the need 
for information to support the dynamic decision process reflecting ongoing uncertainty about 
epidemic growth in a disease situation.  The model was applied to FMD in the Netherlands and 
was designed to perform static evaluation of pre-determined control strategies by providing 
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guidance during the decision process, generating more realistic cost estimates, and reducing 
potential of under- or overreaction.  The traditional EU strategy was compared with the addition 
of preemptive culling of nearby farms and the addition of emergency vaccination of nearby 
farms.  The model was designed to find the optimal choice at each decision point.  If explosive 
epidemic growth is expected with a medium to high level of uncertainty, emergency vaccination 
strategy was predicted to be the best response.  If medium epidemic growth is expected, 
emergency vaccination was only predicted to be best choice if uncertainty is low.  If an export 
ban is anticipated, then preemptive culling was projected to be the optimal choice (Ge et al., 
2010). 
Perevodchikov and Marsh (2010) used a bio-economic-epidemiological discrete time 
optimal control model incorporating price uncertainty, biological parameters, trade restrictions, 
and probability of disease incursion to assess the impact of FMD and disease control strategies 
on the Canadian cattle industry.  Changes in cattle inventories, domestic and international trade 
impacts, producer and consumer responses, eradication costs, asset losses, and short- and long- 
term effects of control strategies were examined.  They found it better to invest in surveillance 
and mitigation strategies that contain the outbreak faster to the point where marginal costs equal 
marginal benefits.  Total economic welfare costs were anticipated to decline as level or 
surveillance and traceability increased, and investment measures that more quickly contained the 
outbreak were estimated to reduce total welfare loss.  As the rate of depopulation increased from 
30-90% of latent infectious animals, the percentage of total inventory depopulated, costs, and 
welfare losses were predicted to decrease.  The most reasonable depopulation rate was projected 
to be 70% of latent infectious animals.  Policies that decrease negative trade impacts were 
evaluated as yielding more substantial economic benefits, and vaccination was found to be costly 
and resulting in a longer estimated time for markets to remain closed.  The goal of their research 
was to provide a decision-making tool for policymakers when considering disease control 
response options (Perevodchikov & Marsh, 2010).  A 2011 study found similar results when 
applying the model to the Mexican cattle sector (Nogueira, Marsh, Tozer, & Peel, 2011).   
Traulsen, Rave, Teuffert, and Krieter (2011) evaluated different FMD control strategies 
with a focus on preventive culling and emergency vaccination.  They used a spatial and temporal 
Monte-Carlo simulation model to compare control options while varying airborne virus spread, 
farm density, type of index case (dairy, swine farrowing, and swine finishing), and a delay of 1-3 
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days in establishing control measures.  Researchers assumed immunity started four days after 
vaccination, an efficacy of 98%, and no movement within vaccination zone.  The baseline 
control measure was based on the EU directive calling for culling of infected farms, a 3-km 
protection zone, a 10-km surveillance zone, and contact tracing in and out of infected farms.  
Preventive culling within 1 and 2 km, emergency ring vaccination within 1, 5, and 10 km, and a 
combined strategy were compared to the baseline strategy (Traulsen et al., 2011).   
They found the optimal solution depends on the situation, but the fewest farms were 
infected when preventive culling was applied with one kilometer and vaccination applied within 
a 10-km zone.  The index farm did matter because the dairy farm as an index case was predicted 
to lead to more infected farms likely due to the more frequent contact between farms (milk 
tankers, etc.).  As airborne spread increased, swine farms as the index case were estimated to be 
more severe.  More delays occurred with vaccination due to approval required, and a 3-day delay 
was estimated to increase the number of farms infected.  The effectiveness of emergency 
vaccination was assessed to decrease more than with culling in the case of a delay.  Speed of 
implementation is shown to be more critical with vaccination than with culling.  If resources 
were limited, culling was estimated to be more effective.  Severe epidemics in densely populated 
livestock areas were predicted to be best eradicated with a large vaccination zone, and vaccine in 
one larger zone around infected farm was evaluated to be more successful than culling in 
multiple smaller zones.  In low density livestock population areas, smaller zones were shown to 
be sufficient with a combination culling and vaccination strategy (Traulsen et al., 2011).  The 
Netherland research team also evaluated the impact of a vaccinate-to-live policy on regaining 
FMD-free status compared to a mass depopulation strategy.  Final surveillance and screening 
efforts were also evaluated.  The results from the FMD transmission model discussed earlier 
served as the input for the final screening model by calculating the expected number of 
undetected infected animals and herds and the number to be tested.  Results indicated 
vaccination yielded an estimated larger number of infected, undetected animals before final 
screening than preemptive culling.  However, final screening was estimated to reduce the 
undetected, infected animals to extremely low, comparable numbers (but a few animals still went 
undetected).  Undetected, infected animals were primarily found in nonvaccinated sheep herds 
and vaccinated cattle and sheep herds.  Thus, testing of pigs could be done by sampling and more 
screening efforts can be dedicated to cattle and sheep.  While it appears a vaccinate-to-live 
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strategy can be just as effective, uncertainties remain in regard to real-world application.  
Products from vaccinated animals will need to be processed separately which creates logistical 
challenges, additional costs, and likely price differentiation.  It is unclear if retail, consumers, 
and trading partners will accept products from vaccinated animals.  The Dutch retail industry and 
livestock sector have tentatively agreed to distribute products from vaccinated farms only in 
country (Backer, Engel, Dekker, & van Roermund, 2012). 
In 2012, researchers with the Naval Postgraduate School investigated the disease spread 
and outbreak parameters of FMD with the intent of identifying the effectiveness of different 
FMD control strategies for use in policy decisions.  They conducted a simulation utilizing 
experimental design based on an FMD outbreak in California.  Vaccination zones assumed all 
cattle within 10 km of an infected premise were vaccinated with 90% of the animals showing 
immunity within four days.  Their findings highlighted the effectiveness of surveillance and the 
shortage of depopulation resources, but did not mention the vaccination strategies as a significant 
factor in their results.  The importance of policymakers’ ability to respond quickly and 
effectively was noted as critical to the success of any FMD response (Axelsen, 2012). 
In 2012, Sith Premashthira generated input parameters for simulating a hypothetical 
outbreak of FMD to compare control strategies.  His study area included 413 counties in six 
states (Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Texas).  He used 
expert opinion from personal contacts to identify destruction and vaccination options.  
Premashthira expanded his work by simulating control strategies, including restricted animal 
movement, stamping out, and ring vaccination (Premashthira, 2012).   
The baseline scenario was limited disease control with movement controls established 
within 10 km of infected premises, a destruction capacity of three premises per day, a destruction 
priority of detected premises followed by direct contact premises, and no vaccination.  In 
comparison to the baseline scenario, the following strategies had the corresponding impact on 
infected premises: 
 Strengthened restricted animal movement decreased infected premises by 29.3%,  
 Initial ring vaccination on day 7 decreased infected premises by 23.7%, 
 Initial ring vaccination on day 14 decreased infected premises by 23%, 
 Additional capacity for trigger ring animal destruction within 3 km of infected 
premises decreased infected premises by 23.3%, and 
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 Additional capacity for animal destruction decreased infected premises by 21.2% 
(Premashthira, 2012). 
There was no significant difference at a P<0.05 level between either initial ring 
vaccination strategy and trigger ring animal destruction, but all three of these control strategies 
were estimated to be significantly better than additional animal destruction.  None of the 
strategies were predicted to shorten the duration of the epidemic.  Restricted animal movement 
was the best strategy for reducing epidemic size because it reduced the number of infected 
premises more than destruction and vaccination strategies.  The largest estimated number of 
animals destroyed in all scenarios was cattle on feedlots (16.3 million head in baseline and 15.8 
million in restricted animal movement).  Neither vaccination strategy was projected to decrease 
the number of animals destroyed (Premashthira, 2012). 
Hagerman et al. (2012) examined the impact of standard culling versus standard culling 
combined with emergency ring vaccination in an FMD outbreak.  Current U.S. policy would call 
for extensive culling resulting in a shift in national supply and trade restrictions.  Previous 
studies indicated emergency vaccination can reduce the size of outbreaks and reduce virus 
shedding.  In this case, vaccination was considered as a method to minimize animal losses, 
control costs, reduce welfare losses, and manage risks.   
Epidemic-economic (epinomic) models were applied to single-event, short-run case 
studies in high-value production areas in California and Texas.  Two epidemic models were used 
to simulate the outbreaks.  A partial equilibrium model was utilized to identify potential market 
and trade impacts.  The policy scenarios studied included vaccination versus non-vaccination and 
two time frames (7 and 14 days) for disease diagnosis.  The U.S. policy for stamping out of 
infected and dangerous contact herds with associated surveillance and movement restrictions was 
used as was a modified stamping-out approach with emergency vaccination-to-slaughter.  The 
concerns over timely delivery and administration of vaccine were addressed by including delays 
in the vaccine availability parameter and limitations on quantity which were relaxed over time.  
Because federal guidelines on emergency vaccination are not specific, researchers customized 
the vaccination application by region.  In Texas, vaccination occurred in a 5-km ring around the 
infected 50,000-head feedlot and all herds were vaccinated-to-kill.  In the California scenario, 
vaccination applied to only dairy herds within a 10- and 20-km ring around the infected 2,000-
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head dairy.  Vaccination costs were estimated on a per-dose cost of vaccine and a fixed cost per 
herd (Hagerman et al., 2012). 
In the California scenario, the number of animals slaughtered reached 173,000 head and 
the number increased with vaccination.  Under a 10-km ring with a 7-day delay, however 
differences were not significant.  When comparing the 7- to 14-day diagnostic delays, there was 
a statistically significant increase in the number of livestock culled with the longer time before 
diagnosis.  The duration of the outbreak lasted 88 days, resulting in a trade ban of at least 180 
days.  While vaccination slightly decreased the duration of the outbreak, it was not significant.  
The outbreak is shorter under a 7-day delay but increases under a 14-day delay in the 20-km 
vaccination scenario.  National welfare losses are greater with vaccination, but are only 
significant in the 20-km scenario.  These results indicate emergency ring vaccination is not 
economically advantageous in California (Hagerman et al., 2012). 
In the Texas scenario, animals culled ranged up to 400,000 head.  The number of animals 
slaughtered and herds quarantined increased with vaccination and diagnostic delay.  Vaccination 
was a statistically significant factor in the increased number of animals culled and herds 
quarantined, so a 5-km ring vaccination does not appear beneficial at limiting the number of 
animals culled.  Vaccination is statistically significant in reducing the maximum duration of the 
epidemic by 2 days in the 7-day delay scenario, but does not reduce the average duration of an 
outbreak.  National welfare economic losses increase with vaccination in all cases, except in the 
1-day delay scenario when vaccination reduces loss.  But, in no case, is the difference 
statistically significant (Hagerman et al., 2012).  
Risk aversion analysis was used to determine where the preference changes for decision 
makers between stamping out and modified stamping out with vaccination-to-slaughter.  The risk 
aversion coefficients for decision makers have not traditionally been studied.  Vaccination was 
evaluated as a risk management strategy.  Since information on risk preferences for decision 
makers was not available, it was not possible to use stochastic dominance to evaluate the 
strategies.  In the Texas and the California scenarios, the cumulative density functions for 
national welfare indicate a no-vaccination policy is a superior approach.  In the California case, 
when analyzed as a risk management strategy, a policy of culling without vaccination is 
preferable when considering national welfare.  Risk-neutral and risk-averse decision makers 
prefer no vaccination with a 7-day delay.  Under a 14-day delay, the 20-km ring was preferred to 
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the 10-km ring by risk-neutral and risk-averse decision makers.  In the Texas scenarios, risk-
neutral and risk-averse decision makers would prefer no-vaccination in regard to the number of 
livestock culled.  In regard to national welfare, preference changes to vaccination (Hagerman et 
al., 2012).  
In summary, with a risk-neutral approach in the California scenario, the additional 
slaughter and costs associated with vaccination outweigh the potential benefits.  With a risk-
averse approach, emergency vaccination becomes a preferred strategy if the focus is on reducing 
the number of livestock culled.  Under a risk-neutral approach in Texas, the costs associated with 
slaughter, vaccination, and depopulation do not outweigh the welfare losses.  If the decision 
maker is risk-averse and focuses on reducing the worst anticipated losses, then vaccination can 
be beneficial.  Results also indicate vaccination may be used as a risk management strategy and 
diagnostic delay plays a role in determining when vaccination should be utilized (Hagerman et 
al., 2012).  
One uniform finding in the research is the 7-day diagnostic delay results in less negative 
impacts than a 14-day delay.  This is consistent with evidence from FMD outbreaks indicating 
the longer the delay in diagnosis, the longer the duration of the disease, the more challenging it is 
to eradicate, and the greater the overall impact of the outbreak.  Culling alone was superior to a 
response including emergency vaccination because it resulted in lower animal and national 
economic welfare losses.  However, emergency vaccination did prove effective as a risk 
management strategy.  If culling cannot control an outbreak, results support the hypothesis that 
vaccination may play a more strategic role the longer the diagnostic delay.  Hagerman (2009) 
found, in a 21-day delay in California FMD outbreak, vaccination reduced mean national welfare 
losses (Hagerman et al., 2012).  
Trade ban durations were not varied in response to epidemic duration and the correlation 
between trade ban length and vaccination strategy was not accounted for in the study.  Future 
work could assume a longer trade ban or assume no regionalization in trade implications.  Study 
of a larger geographic region and longer outbreak duration would allow for inclusion of business 
interruption costs and delays in trade share recovery.  Additional knowledge about the risk 
aversion coefficients for decision makers would add to the risk management study approach.  
Moreover, additional logistical issues, other than vaccine and labor resource availability, need 
further consideration.  The methods included could be expanded to include advanced and DIVA 
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FMD vaccines, which could allow for inclusion of a modified stamping out with vaccinate-to-
live policy (Hagerman et al., 2012).  
In 2012, Tildesley, Smith, and Keeling modeled FMD control strategies in Pennsylvania 
with a defined goal of minimizing the number of livestock farms culled.  They find it likely that 
models will be used to inform disease control policy decisions, and tested an FMD model based 
on a number of control strategies.  The results were found to be highly dependent on the county 
where the disease originated in the model and the spatial scale of transmission.  The location of 
the index case to other farms and to densely populated livestock areas had significant influence 
on the results.  Ring vaccination and culling were predicted to reduce the size of the epidemic 
and the optimal radius varied depending on the county of origin.  Their results indicated that a 
vaccinate-to-live strategy was generally preferred to ring culling in regard to an estimated 
reduction in the number of premises that are culled.  Ring culling was not useful if the width of 
disease transmission was relatively small.  Researchers concluded that no single control strategy 
can always be guaranteed to minimize disease impact, but that well-targeted control efforts can 
significantly reduce the size and duration of an FMD outbreak in Pennsylvania (Tildesley et al. 
2012).  
Boklund et al. (2013) used two stochastic simulation models and cost-benefit analysis to 
study the epidemiological and economic impacts of an FMD outbreak in Denmark with a focus 
on ring depopulation and emergency vaccination.  Specifically, they evaluated four controls: 
base response of depopulation of infected herds with a 3-km protection zone and a 10-km 
surveillance zone, movement tracing, and 3-day national stop movement; ring depopulation in 
addition to the base response; protective ring vaccination (vaccinate-to-live) in addition to the 
base response; and suppressive ring vaccination (vaccinate-to-kill) in addition to the base 
response.  Vaccinations were assumed to commence 14 days after disease detection or after 10, 
20, 30, or 50 herds were detected to be infected.  Direct costs for a cost-benefit analysis included 
surveillance, depopulation, cleaning and disinfection, empty stables, compensation, welfare 
slaughter, national standstill, and vaccination.  Indirect costs included export losses for live cattle 
and pigs and their products and assumed a 25%-price reduction within the EU.  It was also 
assumed that exports would begin again outside the EU as soon as the OIE ban was lifted 
following the necessary recovery waiting period and time for the veterinary committee to meet 
(Boklund et al., 2013). 
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The two models used for evaluation provided different numerical estimates, but lead to 
similar strategy recommendations.  Vaccination was more effective when initiated after 14 days 
or after detection in 10 herds than after 20 or more herds were detected.  In regard to ring size, 
vaccination led to shorter, smaller, and less expensive outbreaks when the vaccination zone was 
extended from 1 km to 2 or 3 km, but when extended to 5 km, resulted in a more costly 
epidemic.  Epidemiologically, protective vaccination was preferred in a scenario where the 
outbreak started in a high-density area, but protective vaccination and depopulation had similar 
results if the outbreak started in a low-density area.  Protective vaccination was the best way to 
minimize the number of animals destroyed.  Cost-benefit analysis showed that depopulation was 
typically the best option from an economic perspective and suppressive vaccination was 
preferred in extreme epidemics, but protective vaccination was never cost effective.  The 
majority of costs were due to export losses from trade restrictions.  If the export ban was 
extended, suppressive vaccination was no longer a better option (Boklund et al., 2013). 
In a study by researchers at Kansas State University, vaccination control measures were 
evaluated based on their ability to control epidemic duration and number of herds depopulated 
compared to a depopulation only strategy.  They studied an FMD outbreak response in 
Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, the Texas Panhandle, and northern 
regions of New Mexico and Oklahoma.  Seventeen scenarios were compared using the North 
America Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) with variation in vaccine capacity, size of 
vaccination zone, number of infected herds before vaccination began, and priority of large 
feedlots over other production facilities.  Vaccine capacity was varied between high and low 
capacity, with capacity being defined as number of herds vaccinated per day and determined as 
low if only administered by USDA officials or high if administered by private farmers, feedlot 
operators, and ranchers (availability of dosages was not considered).  The number of infected 
herds required to trigger implementation of vaccination was varied between 10 and 100 infected 
herds, and size of vaccination zones was either 10 or 50 km.  Large feedlots were prioritized due 
to high contact rates and large number of facilities in the central US.  It was assumed all 
vaccinated animals were allowed to live out their normal production cycle (McReynolds, 2013).   
The size of the vaccination zone had the most impact with the larger zone resulting in 
estimated decreases in disease duration and number of herds depopulated.  The vaccination 
trigger and capacity had more limited and less consistent impacts, although increased capacity 
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was projected to improve the control impact in all but one scenario.  Researchers concluded that 
because the vaccination trigger was not an impactful factor that timing of the vaccination 
decision may not be critical.  The depopulation-only scenario resulted in the largest number of 
herds depopulated of all 17 scenarios.  When simulated biosecurity and movement controls were 
strengthened, vaccination no longer proved beneficial over depopulation only.  It was noted that 
large vaccination zones and large vaccination capacity may be not be feasible if limited resources 
are available (McReynolds, 2013). 
Ajewole (2013) completed a companion economic study estimating the economic 
impacts from simulated FMD outbreak responses using an equilibrium displacement model.  The 
distribution of losses and gains to producers and consumers relative to FMD control strategies 
were evaluated and mitigation strategies were ranked based on potential reduction in economic 
losses and minimization of the severity of an FMD outbreak.  The economic model integrates 
results from the NAADSM epidemiological model and analyzed the impact of the outbreak on 
domestic and international market sectors (Ajewole, 2013). 
The focus of the study was on the vaccination-to-kill scenarios from the McReynolds 
(2013) study and assumed all animals were depopulated in the same quarter in which they were 
vaccinated.  The three scenarios considered used two vaccination capacities and two sizes of 
vaccination zones.  The number of herds infected as a vaccination trigger was the same in all 
three scenarios.  Results were evaluated for beef, pork, and poultry sectors, including producer 
surplus for four market chains for beef, three market chains for pork, and two market chains for 
poultry.  Consumer surplus was also estimated.  In beef, the largest losses were estimated to 
occur in slaughter and feeder cattle market chains.  The most significant loss was projected to 
occur in the feeder cattle market in the scenario with the larger vaccination capacity and the 
smaller vaccination zone.  The greatest welfare loss in the pork industry was predicted to occur 
with the small vaccination capacity and small vaccination zone.  Within the retail poultry sector, 
the largest surplus gain was estimated to occur with the larger vaccination capacity and smaller 
vaccination zone followed by the smaller capacity and smaller vaccination zone, indicating the 
size of the vaccination zone was the more critical factor.  Impacts on wholesale poultry were 
negligible.  When overall producer and consumer surplus was projected, increasing the size of 
the vaccination zone and vaccination capacity both led to a lower surplus loss.  Consumer 
surplus was estimated to experience the greatest loss when vaccination capacity was larger and 
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vaccination zones were small.  In general, the size of the vaccination zone appeared to make a 
more significant economic impact than capacity.  The study was limited in that it only considered 
three scenarios and did not account for government costs for implementing a vaccination 
program (Ajewole, 2013).   
In another companion study to the McReynolds (2013) research, Schroeder, Pendell, 
Sanderson, and McReynolds (2013) estimated the economic impacts of alternative FMD disease 
control strategies with a focus on emergency vaccination protocols.  Changes in consumer 
surplus and returns to capital and management for producers associated with alternative FMD 
disease management scenarios were estimated.  Economic impacts on producers, consumers, and 
government of alternative FMD vaccination strategies, vaccination capacities, vaccination-to-live 
versus to vaccination-to-kill, and vaccination zone sizes were evaluated (Schroeder et al., 2013).   
A multi-market and multi-commodity quarterly partial equilibrium model of the United 
States agricultural sector that incorporates both vertical and horizontal linkages starting with 
livestock production through to the final consumer, including international trade and grain 
sectors is used in conjunction with the NAADSM epidemiological model.  It was assumed all 
feedlot animals vaccinated would go to commercial slaughter. For all other animals, those 
vaccinated-to-kill were depopulated within the same the quarter in which they were vaccinated 
and those vaccinated-to-live remained in their herds.  Government costs were also incorporated, 
including costs for euthanasia, disposal, cleaning and disinfection, indemnity costs for animals 
that are depopulated, and vaccination costs (Schroeder et al., 2013). 
Consumer demand was assumed to decrease.  In outbreaks lasting less than one quarter, a 
5% reduction in domestic consumer demand for beef, pork, and lamb and a 2.5% reduction in 
milk and dairy product demand were projected.  Meat demand began to recover in the second 
quarter but was still 2.5% below the base year and full recovery occurred in the third quarter.  
Milk and dairy product demand was estimated to fully recover in the second quarter.  For longer 
outbreaks, the decrease in demand was basically doubled.  Demand shocks were also 
incorporated to represent implementation of trade restrictions.  U.S. exports of red meat (beef, 
pork, lamb meat) were estimated to decline by 95% and export of live animals (cattle, swine, and 
sheep) was assumed to halt completely during the outbreak and for one full quarter after the last 
FMD case under scenarios with no emergency vaccination and vaccinate-to-kill responses.  With 
vaccinate-to-live, it was assumed trade restrictions were in place for two quarters after the end of 
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the outbreak to be consistent with OIE guidelines.  Full recovery was predicted to occur 
approximately two years after the outbreak ended (Schroeder et al., 2013).  These were the same 
assumptions used in the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility site specific study (National 
Research Council (NRC), 2013).   
Feedlots were considered a priority for vaccination as was the case in the McReynolds 
(2013) research, so economic results are most relevant to a scenario where feedlot cattle are 
vaccinated.  Under a stamping out with no emergency vaccination scenario, the loss to producers 
and consumers from an FMD outbreak was projected to be approximately $190 billion with an 
estimated additional $12 billion in government costs.  The most optimistic median economic 
impact, a $56 billion loss to producers and consumers and $1.1 billion in government costs, was 
predicted to occur under a scenario with the large vaccination zone and vaccination capacity.  
Consumers and producers would experience additional losses of about $30 billion under an 
aggressive vaccination strategy if stamping out or a less aggressive vaccination strategy could 
effectively and rapidly contain the disease outbreak.  Researchers noted that decision criteria to 
be used by animal health officials to distinguish outbreaks that can be contained rapidly by 
stamping out from outbreaks that are expected to be larger and longer lasting and require 
emergency vaccination would be valuable (Schroeder et al., 2013). 
The size of the vaccination zone was projected to be more important than the vaccination 
trigger.  Losses to producers and consumers declined by an estimated $70 billion (48%) when the 
vaccination zone was increased from 10 km to 50 km and by $15 billion (10%) when vaccination 
capacity increased.  Whether animals are vaccinated to live or die, the vaccination trigger, and 
very low vaccination capacity has limited economic impact in this research.  Further evaluation 
of vaccination zone sizes and capacities was determined to be needed and valuable (Schroeder et 
al., 2013). 
 Ex-ante and ex-post animal disease response strategy 
Elbakidze and McCarl (2006) evaluated the economic impacts of pre-event preparedness 
versus post-event response strategies related to a large-scale animal disease outbreak in an 
attempt to identify the optimal tradeoff between preparation costs and occasional event damages.  
Decision makers are faced with the choice of investing in pre-event actions or doing nothing.  At 
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the time of an outbreak, they face decisions about the level of investment in their response efforts 
(Elbakidze & McCarl, 2006). 
Decisions can be divided into six categories defining actions and activities: anticipation, 
prevention, detection, installation, response, and recovery.  Vaccination can be included in 
prevention as a pre-event action or response as a post-event action.  Response activities also 
include slaughter and carcass disposal.  Some of these actions are irreversible, meaning once 
implemented these actions cannot be reversed and other strategies may in turn no longer be 
considered feasible.  Others are conditional and can only be implemented if another step has 
already been taken.  Some costs are fixed and others are variable in an outbreak.  Most previous 
studies focused on post-event decision making, rather than pre-event decision making.  In this 
case, focus was on the economic benefit of periodic animal health testing and results indicated 
investment would increase as probability of an outbreak increased and such investment would 
substantially reduce the economic effect of a disease outbreak (Elbakidze & McCarl, 2006). 
Researchers at Texas A&M University found “carcass disposal generates a tremendous 
operational concern in the face of which society would try to minimize the loss from both disease 
management, facility investment cost and the adverse external costs induced by carcass disposal 
processes” (Jin et al., 2006, p. 2).  They hypothesized that buying time for carcass disposal might 
be beneficial.  A two-period and a multi-period model were used to study vaccination as a 
support strategy for slaughter and disposal in a disease outbreak.  They modeled vaccination-to-
slaughter as an alternative to slaughter policy combined with strict movement bans and 
optimized the number of animals to be slaughtered and vaccinated in each period.  Cost and 
capacity of disposal, cost of slaughter and vaccination, incident size, disease spread by 
vaccinated and non-vaccinated livestock, and the assumption that all animals would eventually 
be slaughtered were factored into the model to minimize costs (Jin et al., 2006).   
Results indicated a vaccination protocol gains time to reduce the flow of carcasses to 
slaughter and disposal while controlling the disease and, therefore, decreases slaughter and 
disposal cost.  As the marginal cost of vaccination declines, the outbreak size increases, the 
disease is more contagious and spreads more rapidly, and vaccine efficacy increases, so 
vaccination becomes more cost effective.  In addition, researchers assumed environmental costs 
decrease if the time pressure is removed from carcass disposal.  Such an approach indicated 
policymakers could choose a response strategy with lower costs and less negative environmental 
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effects.  If policymakers preferred a vaccination alternative, researchers noted the ability to 
provide vaccines in a timely manner and negotiate trade barriers and policies are issues that need 
further discussion (Jin et al., 2005).  Results indicate a new optimal disease control management 
system should be considered that establishes a “tradeoff between disease management costs and 
carcass disposal costs” (Jin et al., 2005, p. 4).  
Research comparing ex-ante strategies of prevention and preparedness to ex-post 
strategies of response and recovery lend credence to the consideration of vaccination.  Ex-ante 
strategies reduce the probability of a significant effect from an outbreak, but require investment 
in capability and infrastructure.  Ex-post strategies are designed to limit spread of disease and 
reduce consequences through implementation of contingency plans based on diagnosis, 
disinfection, slaughter, and disposal.  The goal in either case is to return to pre-event conditions 
as quickly as possible.  The optimal balance between ex-ante and ex-post strategies depends on 
probabilities, event severity, cost, and strategy effectiveness.  Ex-ante investment in animal 
disease proves more effective as the probability of disease outbreak increases, the disease 
spreads more quickly and is more contagious, the ex-post response is more costly, the damages 
are more consequential, and the target more valuable.  Ex-ante activities are also more desirable 
when they are less costly, more effective, have greater co-benefits, and when the public is more 
risk averse (Jin et al., 2009).  Industry leaders and policymakers need to consider if the long-term 
expenses tied to investment in disease control strategies is worth the economic payoff in the case 
of a disease outbreak (Swallow, 2012).  
 An exercise example 
In Operation Palo Duro, a tabletop exercise addressing an FMD outbreak in the Texas 
Panhandle, vaccination was considered.  USDA players activated the NAFMDVB on the first 
day.  Texas animal health officials were notified they would receive 350,000 doses in one week 
and an additional million doses after an additional week.  A request from exercise players to 
vaccinate rather than depopulate animals that were not showing clinical signs but were located 
on infected premised was denied by the policy group.  The policy implemented was vaccinate-to-
kill, but was actually vaccinate-to-slaughter.  Beef cattle in feedlots were determined to be 
allowed to live until normal slaughter would occur, but dairy cattle were to be slaughtered as 
soon as feasible.  A 60-day withdrawal period was established before vaccinated animals could 
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be slaughtered.  Farmers and ranchers were allowed to vaccinate their own animals under 
regulatory oversight.  While a vaccination strategy was developed following the NAFMDVB 
decision tree, exercise participants noted additional strategic and operational concerns needed to 
be considered.  The receipt, staging, storage, and distribution of vaccination were all identified as 
areas in need of further discussion.  Expectations were that vaccination distribution would occur 
rapidly and players were surprised by the limitations on how quickly vaccine can be produced, 
the limited number of vaccines Texas would receive, and the time it would take for vaccines to 
be distributed.  Players also noted the policy team should have more completely discussed and 
weighed the impact of trade restrictions versus disease eradication speed when selecting the 
vaccination policy approach (Giovachino et al., 2007). 
 Other Disease Examples 
While the focus of the vaccination section has been dedicated to a discussion on 
vaccination as a response strategy to FMD, the use of vaccination as a control measure for avian 
influenza and classical swine fever are discussed in the next sections in a more limited manner. 
 Avian influenza 
Historically vaccination has not been considered a viable response tool to AI and 
stamping out has been the preferred response strategy.  Stamping out, the classical approach to 
HPAI control has been successful in countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Mexico.  
However, it has not proved effective in Egypt, Indonesia, China, Vietnam and Bangladesh (Sims, 
2013).  Typically, vaccination has not been used unless surveillance, biosecurity, depopulation, 
and movement restrictions have not been implemented effectively to control the disease outbreak 
(Berg et al., 2008).  Cost, animal welfare issues in remote locations and poor countries, 
movement or sale of birds ahead of culling, and farmer resistance have been identified as the 
biggest challenges related to mass depopulation as a disease control method.  Early detection, 
effective disease reporting, and surveillance systems are important to the success of stamping out 
in high density areas (Sims, 2013). 
Due to HPAI, tens of millions of birds have died or been depopulated causing significant 
economic losses and creating animal welfare and ethical concerns (Capua & Marangon, 2007).  
Vaccination of poultry against HPAI can increase infection resistance, protect poultry from 
clinical disease, and reduce shedding if poultry becomes infected (Sims, 2013).  However, AI 
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vaccine research has not developed at the same rate as it has for other animal diseases (Capua & 
Marangon, 2007).  Vaccination may not be effective alone as an AI disease control strategy, but 
has the potential to be used effectively with other control measures, such as biosecurity, 
surveillance, movement control, education, quarantines, and culling of infected birds.  
Vaccination-to-live and vaccination-to-kill approaches can be used as part of a vaccination 
strategy.  The technical feasibility of vaccination, necessary funding, the types of species under 
consideration for vaccination, the impact on trade, market shocks, types of stakeholders involved 
and the availability of an effective, safe, and well-matched vaccine should all be considered in 
the decision to vaccinate (NAHEMS, 2011e). 
 Disease characteristics 
Influenza viruses are segmented, negative strand RNA viruses and can be identified as 
types A, B, or C, and only A viruses can cause natural infections in birds.  Type A viruses can be 
divided into subtypes of H and N, dependent on the antigenic characteristics of surface 
glycoproteins haemagglutinin and neuraminidase, respectively.  Sixteen H subtypes (H1–H16) 
and nine N subtypes (N1–N9) have been identified.  Those viruses that can infect poultry can be 
divided into two groups based on disease severity.  HPAI is caused by a very virulent virus, 
results in mortality in some susceptible species, such as chickens, at levels as high as 100%, and 
is limited to strains belonging to the H5 and H7 subtypes.  The impact on wild birds and 
waterfowl and their role as reservoirs of infection is more variable and less predictable.  Viruses 
belonging to all subtypes (H1–H16) of a less virulent nature can cause low pathogenic avian 
influenza (LPAI), a localized infection resulting in a mild disease consisting primarily of 
respiratory disease, depression, and egg production issues.  Researchers have concluded that 
HPAI viruses emerge from H5 and H7 LPAI by mutation or recombination after viruses have 
moved to poultry, however such mutation is unpredictable.  Thus, not only are HPAI control 
strategies important, but LPAI outbreaks of the H5 and H7 subtypes in domestic populations 
must also be controlled effectively because they are potential precursors to HPAI (Capua & 
Marangon, 2007). 
Strains of AI viruses change continuously, which is typically referred to as antigenic drift 
and can cause one virus to result in a number of variants.  Incubation can last from a few hours to 
week.  Shedding can begin within one to two days after infection.  Backyard flocks can serve as 
disease reservoirs and can contribute to disease transmission.  The AI virus can be shed in feces 
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or respiratory secretions and transmitted via fecal-oral or aerosol methods.  Vaccination can 
reduce virus shedding and decrease susceptibility of the vaccinated population to infection 
(NAHEMS, 2011e). 
Vaccines can be inactivated, whole virus vaccines or recombinant vectored vaccines 
based on the H subtype.  A vaccine with heterologous N subtype antibodies can be effective if 
the H subtype matches the outbreak strain.  Otherwise, H and N subtype vaccines are not cross 
protective with other H and N subtype disease strains (NAHEMS, 2011e).  
 Previous use of vaccination 
There have been 32 HPAI outbreaks since 1959, and 27 have been eradicated by 
stamping out without vaccination (Swayne, Spackman, & Pantin-Jackwood, 2013).  The largest 
outbreak has been the H5N1 HPAI outbreak that began in China and spread to more than 60 
countries or regions.  While in many regions within this outbreak stamping out was successful, 
vaccination was used as an additional control strategy to reduce the clinical infection and help 
rural economies.  Vaccine has been used to help control HPAI in the countries of Mexico, 
Pakistan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, China, Russia, Egypt, the Netherlands, France, and Vietnam.  
LPAI outbreaks that occurred before 2006 were not previously listed with OIE.  LPAI became an 
OIE-listed disease because of its potential to mutate into an HPAI virus, as experienced in the 
US, Mexico, Italy, Chile, and Canada.  Vaccines have been used in outbreaks of H5 and H7 
LPAI in the US, Italy, Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador (Swayne, Pavade, Hamilton, Vallat, 
& Miyagishima, 2011).   
Mexico first used vaccine against H5N2 HPAI in 1995, which lead to disease eradication 
and nationwide freedom from HPAI in December 1995.  The H5N2 LPAI virus that served as its 
precursor continued, and vaccine is still used as a part of the LPAI control program.  The second 
use of HPAI vaccine was in Pakistan against H7N3 later in 1995.  The H5N1 HPAI virus 
initiating in China in 1996 was first detected outside the country in 2001 in Vietnam, led to large 
outbreaks in Indonesia and Korea in 2003, spread to an estimated 63 countries, and accounts for 
the greatest historical use of HPAI vaccine.  Overall, from 2002 to 2010, 113 billion doses of 
HPAI vaccine were used in 15 countries.  Approximately 10 billion doses were used to fight 
LPAI in six countries with the biggest users in order of doses being Mexico, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Italy (Swayne et al., 2011).   
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An outbreak of AI H7N3 in the Los Altos region of the Mexican state of Jalisco in 2012 
was brought under control through the use of vaccination.  The outbreak occurred in the 
country’s primary egg production state that is home to 55% of the egg supply and more than 60 
million layers.  More than 22 million hens were lost in Jalisco leading to a loss of 15% of 
Mexico’s egg production.  Cooperative efforts between government, industry, and academia led 
to rapid disease identification and vaccine production.  Once the seed virus was ready, four 
laboratories, one government, and three private companies produced vaccines and had 90 million 
doses available within a month (each bird requires two doses).  Significant funds were 
contributed by the Mexican Poultry Association for vaccine production startup costs.  The 
vaccine was only approved for the Los Altos region, which was also quarantined, and the 
vaccination response was seen as temporary.  The region would not be declared disease free until 
the last vaccinated layer ended egg production and was culled (Wright, 2012).   
Vaccination programs for HPAI were also effective in outbreaks in Italy and Southeast 
Asia (Egbendewe-Mondozo, Elbakidze, McCarl, Ward, & Cary, 2013).  Starting in 1997, a 
number of H5 and H7 LPAI outbreaks occurred in areas of Italy with high poultry concentration.  
An HPAI outbreak emerged after the LPAI version circulated for 9 months in 1998.  Initially all 
infected farms were depopulated, and vaccination programs were put in place over the following 
decade.  In one case in Italy, however, an H7 virus spread extensively regardless of the use of 
vaccine (NAHEMS, 2011e).  In Italy, development of a Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated 
Animals (DIVA) vaccination allowed for the use of a vaccination protocol without mass 
preemptive depopulation in eradicating two epidemics of LPAI (H7N1 and H7N3) in 2007 - 
2008.  It was used successfully with other restrictive measures and intense monitoring (Capua & 
Marangon, 2007).   
In some parts of Asia and the Middle East, vaccination is a traditional part of disease 
control programs.  Hong Kong has been dealing with HPAI since the 1990s.  While success in 
other countries has varied and H5N1 viruses are endemic in a number of countries with poultry 
vaccination programs, Hong Kong has successfully eradicated numerous H5N1 HPAI outbreaks 
using stamping out with or without vaccination (NAHEMS, 2011e).  In one case in Hong Kong, 
a DIVA strategy was used to stop the spread of HPAI to neighboring farms (Capua & Marangon, 
2007).   
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China has used vaccination as a part of their official H5N1 control strategy since 2003 
and mandatory vaccination of domestic poultry began in 2005.  H5N1 HPAI continues to 
circulate in China.  In Vietnam, vaccination reduced the reported number of AI outbreaks and 
human cases, but both continue at a less significant rate.  Vaccination in Indonesia and Egypt has 
been less successful.  The intensive surveillance and biosecurity necessary for a successful 
vaccination program may not be feasible in countries without the necessary resources and 
infrastructure to maintain these aspects of disease control (NAHEMS, 2011e).   
In the US, AI vaccine has been used for years in some LPAI outbreaks (Breytenbach, 
2007), but not in all cases.  Vaccination has not been used in the US against HPAI because 
stamping out has proved effective (Capua & Alexander, 2008; NAHEMS, 2011c).  Vaccine was 
used successfully to combat LPAI in Minnesota and Utah turkey farms in the 1990s, in 
California as a part of a voluntary control program in 2002, and in Connecticut in at a large 
commercial layer operation in 2003.  In the Connecticut case, the projected benefit-cost ratio of 
vaccination to mass depopulation was 10:1, not including the business and social costs of 
depopulating 3.5 million layers.  While the USDA approved vaccine usage, approval would have 
been withdrawn if trade restrictions were imposed.  An inactivated H5 vaccine is licensed in the 
US for emergency vaccination purposes, but vaccines are expensive and do not offer cross 
protection between the 16 serotypes of AI (CFSPH, 2013c). 
 Economic and epidemiological research 
In a survey of countries that had previously reported an AI outbreak but not used AI 
vaccines and would not plan to in future outbreaks, 24% indicated they do not use vaccination as 
a control measure because stamping out has been effective at eradication, 22% indicated 
vaccination does not prevent infection and creates clinically silent shedders, 17% mentioned the 
difficulty of differentiating naturally infected birds from vaccinated birds, 16% identified high 
costs of vaccine and vaccination, and 14% mentioned trade restrictions.  When the countries that 
have vaccinated were surveyed on why they had used or planned to use vaccination, 29% 
indicated stamping out was not an adequate control measure, 24% mentioned the widespread 
nature of the outbreaks, 13% noted the high risk of disease spread, and 9% indicated the 
importance of protecting valuable birds (Swayne et al., 2011).  
In a companion study to research on FMD and CSF completed by Wageningen UR, the 
Netherlands research team evaluated the impact of control strategies on HPAI.  The EU minimal 
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control strategy requires the depopulation of infected farms, regulation of transport, 
implementation of protection and surveillance zones, and tracing of dangerous contacts.  An 
epidemiological model is used to compare the EU control strategy and four alternative response 
strategies, including preemptive culling in 1-, 3-, and 10-km rings around infected farms and 
emergency vaccination within 3 km.  Culling and vaccination capacity, premature slaughter on 
broiler farms, combination approaches, vaccination coverage, and hobby farm strategy were also 
considered.  The EU strategy was not predicted to be effective at halting an HPAI outbreak in 
densely or moderately populated areas, but was estimated to be sufficient in sparsely populated 
areas.  Although projected to lead to more infected farms, preemptive culling was estimated to 
reduce the epidemic duration.  Emergency vaccination was expected to minimize the epidemic’s 
effects but does not shorten it.  If culling capacity is limited to 20 farms per day, infected farms 
could be culled within one day of detection of infection.  But, expanding the radius for 
preemptive culling from 3 to 10 km was predicted to be ineffective due to the same limit on 
culling capacity.  Preemptive culling in an inner ring combined with vaccination strategies in an 
outer ring was estimated to be no more effective than culling only (Backer et al., 2011). 
Economic analysis included costs related to compensation for culled poultry and welfare 
slaughter, depopulation, tracing, screening, vaccination, surveillance, and monitoring vaccination 
efficacy.  Culling around infected farms within 1 or 3 km is estimated to be optimal for 
eradicating HPAI from an economic perspective.  Vaccination within 3 km led to estimated 
lower costs than the EU minimal strategy or culling within 10 km, but it was predicted to lead to 
larger and longer disease outbreaks.  Backer et al. (2011) determined the optimal policy choice 
for responding to HPAI is between preemptive culling and vaccination.  The decision has large 
financial and economic implications and socioethical consequences because the choice is 
between accepting larger animal death loss versus extended trade restrictions. 
Epidemiological models and ex-ante economic analysis can also be used to help develop 
contingency plans for responding to an HPAI outbreak.  The goals of a study by Longworth, 
Mourits, and Saatkamp (2012a & 2012b) was to provide an economic rationale for 
epidemiological models, a transparent description of the parameters in a spatially based 
epidemiological model for analyzing HPAI control strategies in the Netherlands, and a 
discussion on the validity and future use of the model.  The model is intended to provide science-
based information to decision makers to help them make rational and informed choices for 
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disease control.  Overall financial and economic effects included direct costs (disease control, 
culling, compensation, vaccination, surveillance, and organizational costs), direct consequential 
costs (originated from derived control measures, production losses, restocking loss, and business 
loss), indirect consequential costs (market distortion and price effects), and aftermath costs (price 
changes due to massive restocking, production under capacity, and attempting to regain market 
share) (Longworth et al., 2012a). 
InterSpread Plus (ISP), a spatially based stochastic and dynamic simulation model, was 
the modeling framework used to evaluate eight HPAI disease control strategies in three regions 
(high-, medium-, and low-density poultry regions) of the Netherlands.  In addition to costs, the 
model looked at the number of infected premises and the duration of the outbreak.  The baseline 
strategy was based on the EU strategy including depopulation of infected farms, 0-3-km 
protection zones and 0-10-km surveillance zone around infected farms, tracing of contacts, 
screening within the protection zone, and movement restrictions on live poultry, eggs, manure, 
and persons.  Additional strategies considered were a 72-hr movement standstill, preemptive 
culling within 1 km, preemptive culling within 2 km, vaccination within 3 km, vaccination 
within 10 km, and preemptive culling within 1 km combined with vaccination outside the 
depopulation zone and within 3 km.  In addition, a preventive vaccination strategy is applied to 
high-density and medium-density areas not affected by HPAI with preemptive culling within the 
infected areas.  Results indicated the baseline EU minimal strategy was not the best option.  
Preemptive culling within 2 km was estimated to outperform culling within 1 km on disease 
spread, duration, and economics.  Both combinations of culling and vaccination were predicted 
to result in lower economic costs, shorter duration of disease, and fewer infected farms than the 
vaccination-only scenarios.  When comparing the two combination strategies with the 2-km 
culling strategy, the culling strategy provides better estimated results.  In high-density and 
medium-density areas, the combination of vaccination and depopulation was predicted to be 
competitive with culling only.  In low-density areas, preemptive culling only was the preferred 
option based on the estimated outcomes.  However, in any of these cases, if depopulation 
capacity needs could not be met, costs were predicted to increase and it would likely be less than 
optimal.  In addition, the images and actions of culling would potentially result in socioethical 
concerns, but it does result in fewer estimated farms being depopulated.  It also predicted to 
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result in fewer trade distortions.  Authors are also working on efforts to mitigate the economic 
impact by lowering indirect consequential and aftermath costs (Longworth et al., 2012b). 
The economic effectiveness of vaccination in responding to HPAI was evaluated by 
simulating an outbreak in the Texas poultry sector.  AI strains are classified as low pathogenic 
and highly pathogenic, which includes H5 and H7 subtypes.  Current U.S. guidelines for dealing 
with HPAI depend on flock sampling, movement controls, and depopulation, but the OIE has 
also suggested vaccination as a possible response.  Vaccination may reduce the number of birds 
depopulated and slow disease spread.  Vaccine using dead microorganisms is preferred to those 
containing live virus.  An integrated model was developed allowing for simultaneous 
consideration of economic and epidemic factors.  The goals of the research were to help 
producers and policymakers develop response plans (Egbendewe-Mondozo et al., 2013). 
Two control strategies were compared, one based on traditional guidelines and one 
including vaccination.  Low, medium, and high flock density were examined and the model 
included chicken, egg, and turkey product markets with broiler, small layer, large layer, turkey, 
and barnyard flock production facilities.  The findings indicate vaccination is most effective in 
high-density regions and its effectiveness declines as flock density decreases.  In high-density 
regions, the length of the outbreak was estimated to be reduced from 43 days to 34 days with 
vaccination.  Vaccination created fewer predicted benefits in low- and medium-density regions.  
While the estimated reduction in duration of the outbreak reduced projected costs when 
vaccination was used, the actual cost of vaccination and relevant administrative costs was 
predicted to offset the savings.  The policymakers’ risk aversion is critical to determining the 
best response strategy in a situation.  Traditional response methods were preferred in high-
density regions if a policymaker was more risk neutral.  In other cases, for a policymaker with a 
higher aversion to risk, vaccination was preferred.  Researchers determined flock density and the 
risk preferences of decision makers are key to determining if vaccination should be used.  They 
noted the lack of quantitative information about policymakers’ risk preferences affects their 
ability to make specific policy suggestions.  The study only examined the poultry sector, but 
effects would also be seen in commodity markets, tourism, restaurants, and other industries 
impacted by poultry production (Egbendewe-Mondozo et al., 2013).   
Sims (2013) considered various AI intervention strategies with a focus on stamping out 
and vaccination.  The use of multifaceted response approaches in the past makes it challenging to 
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conclude a causative effect from a single response measure.  The same measures may be applied 
in one situation successfully but may be applied in other regions where AI becomes endemic.  It 
is also unlikely any single measure will prove successful in controlling an AI outbreak.  The 
manner in which the measure is applied can also be a critical factor.  A whole chain approach 
was also recommended, meaning that how birds are raised and sold may strongly influence the 
duration and severity of disease outbreaks (Sims, 2013).  
 Considerations and challenges 
Emergency vaccination for AI is now considered by some a viable option to stop disease 
spread (Capua & Marangon, 2007).  Vaccination in poultry increases resistance to viruses, 
protects against clinical signs and potentially death, reduces shedding levels, improves 
transmission dynamics, protects against changing virus, and can be used in combination with 
depopulation to help control AI (Benson et al., 2009; Berg et al., 2008).  AI viruses may still 
result in infection and disease replication without clinical signs (Capua & Alexander, 2008).  
Vaccination is not effective as the only control measure, but can be powerful if used with other 
control measures such as culling and biosecurity protocols (Alphin et al., 2010; Capua & 
Marangon, 2007; Sims, 2013).   
Vaccination of poultry can help reduce the risk of transmission to humans by decreasing 
the quantity of circulating virus.  Vaccine can also be used to protect valuable birds or those with 
high risk of infection.  Emergency vaccination plans need to be in place before an outbreak 
occurs.  Some studies indicate emergency vaccination has limited benefits or would not be 
necessary to stop disease spread, but how the vaccination program is managed will make a 
critical difference.  The most critical factors are timing, quality, number of doses applied, 
concurrent diseases, species, and if vaccination actually occurs.  Biosecurity, communication, 
movement control, and disinfection protocols can all be important as well (Sims, 2013). 
Vaccination can provide an alternative to mass depopulation and disposal in an AI 
outbreak.  The effectiveness of a disease control program incorporating vaccination depends on 
variables such as density of poultry flocks, level of biosecurity, industry integration, and 
characteristics of the virus strain.  Vaccine availability, capability to administer quickly and 
adequately, and other practical and logistical concerns must be considered when determining if 
vaccination should be used.  Compartmentalization rather than zoning may work better in an AI 
outbreak because the size and dimension of the vaccination zone will be impacted by 
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transmission rate, disease spread during the high-risk period, and functional interconnections 
between zones (Capua & Marangon, 2007). 
There are limitations related to the use of vaccination in AI disease control.  It will not 
totally prevent infection, so infection could be masked and birds could spread the disease without 
showing disease symptoms potentially resulting in a longer outbreak.  Vaccination may create a 
false sense of security and create a lax application of biosecurity measures leading to greater 
disease spread if infection does exist.  The influenza virus can mutate rapidly and it is possible 
vaccination may actually promote mutation (Berg et al., 2008). 
Another concern is the time it takes for immunity to develop.  It takes a minimum of 7 to 
10 days for the onset of an immune response, and more than two weeks may be required before 
vaccinated poultry have protective antibody levels.  Decisions must be made quickly and 
vaccines must be immediately available (Capua & Marangon, 2007). 
An AI vaccination system may need to include the capability to detect field exposure 
within the vaccinated flock in order to be effective.  When conventional inactivated vaccines are 
used, the testing of unvaccinated sentinels can serve the purpose of detecting field exposure but 
such a process is likely to be impractical.  Other systems are in development that can detect if a 
vaccinated bird has been exposed to a field virus through the creation of certain antibodies.  A 
DIVA vaccine for LPAI H7 subtypes has proved successful in eradication and allows detection 
of field exposure.  Antibodies amongst subtypes (e.g. H7) are cross-protective and can be used to 
ensure against clinical infection, create disease resistance, and reduce shedding from one 
variation to the other (i.e. a vaccine containing H7N1 can be used against H7N3) (Capua & 
Marangon, 2007). 
Recombinant vaccines have been developed that protect chickens against exotic 
Newcastle disease (END) and AI.  In addition, one allows differentiation between vaccinated and 
naturally infected animals (CIDRAP, 2006).  An egg-injected vaccine for AI has been developed 
that could potentially reduce the spread of HPAI in large poultry operations.  It provides a high-
degree of protection if the strain has been determined and used in formulation (Hoerr, 2007). 
While new vaccines and vaccine types are under development, future research and 
development of next generation vaccines and field studies needs expanded.  Cost-effective and 
efficient AI vaccines are needed that can be applied in emergency mass depopulation efforts 
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through methods such as spray or drinking water and that provide strong local immunity (Berg et 
al., 2008). 
Prophylactic vaccination is an innovative concept that could be used to create a level of 
protective immunity that can be boosted if a field virus or emergency situation occurs.  Such an 
approach could allow for fewer animals to be depopulated, limit disease spread in an emergency, 
improve animal welfare, and reduce the severity of economic losses from an emergency disease 
situation.  It does not have to be considered permanent state but could be used in regions with 
higher density poultry production that are more at risk for an AI outbreak (Capua & Marangon, 
2007). 
Regardless of the successes that have occurred in controlling AI, legislative and scientific 
uncertainties over issues such as time until onset of immunity, vaccine efficacy, and ability to 
differentiate vaccinated birds from naturally infected birds make governments reluctant to 
consider vaccination, primarily because of the international trade implications (Capua & 
Marangon, 2007).  In the case of LPAI, concerns also exist over the vaccine’s ability to mask 
disease symptoms and hide an early warning of a mutation to HPAI (Breytenbach, 2007).  Most 
vaccine failures are a result of the vaccination plan and process (Swayne et al., 2013).  Cause and 
effect relationships between control measures and disease control are immersed in uncertainty 
and subject to knowledge gaps making it difficult to understand the effectiveness of vaccination 
in AI disease control (Sims, 2013).  Vaccination may best be seen as a strategy to help maximize 
the effectiveness of other control measures, rather than as an exclusive method of disease control 
(Capua & Alexander, 2008). 
 Classical swine fever vaccination 
Vaccination has had limited use as a control measure with classical swine fever (CSF) but 
has the potential to decrease virus circulation and reduce the economic and epidemiological 
impact of the disease outbreak.  Vaccine may be used in a vaccinate-to-live, vaccinate-to-kill, or 
a vaccinate-to-slaughter approach.  Vaccination can be applied in a number of manners, 
prophylactic (routine), emergency (protective or suppressive), targeted, ring, barrier, or blanket 
vaccination.   
  
350 
 
 Disease characteristics 
CSF is a small-enveloped, single-stranded RNA virus.  There is only one serotype, but 
variability has been shown to exist.  All species of domestic, feral, and wild pigs are susceptible.  
Viral shedding can occur before clinical signs appear and continue through the course of clinical 
and subclinical disease.  Transmission can occur by oral or oronasal routes through direct and 
indirect contact; saliva, lacrimal secretion, blood, urine, feces, and semen; feeding uncooked 
contaminated garbage; genital transmission or artificial insemination; fomites; and airborne 
passage.  Incubation lasts from 2-14 days, depending on disease virulence, infection route, and 
dosage.  CSF virus can survive in the environment and in pork products for months, adding to its 
ease of transmissibility (NAHEMS, 2012b). 
While CSF was eradicated in the US in 1976 and is not present in Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia, and many regions of western and central Europe, it remains endemic in many other 
regions of the world (NAHEMS, 2012b).   
There is no inactivated whole virus vaccines deemed effective or available for use.  Live 
attenuated virus and modified live virus vaccines are the most typical vaccines for CSF 
vaccination.  Live-attenuated virus vaccines do not allow for differentiation of vaccinated 
animals from naturally infected animals, but a modified-marker vaccine creates antibodies that 
are distinguishable.  Because there is only one serotype, vaccine matching is not required 
(NAHEMS, 2012b). 
 Previous use of vaccination 
In outbreaks in the Netherlands, England, and Belgium, vaccination was not used, but has 
been used in Brazil, Bulgaria, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Romania, and the US (NAHEMS, 2012b). 
Prior to 1990, vaccine was used extensively in Brazil.  At that time, the country was 
divided into different regions based on presence of CSF.  In the region where CSF was endemic, 
vaccine was mandatory, and vaccine was prohibited in the CSF-free areas.  By 1998, due to 
success of the disease control program, vaccine was prohibited throughout Brazil.  Brazil was 
and is currently divided into two regions, one free of CSF and one where CSF was endemic.  
Between 2001 and 2009, a number of CSF outbreaks occurred and they were contained by 
disinfection, quarantine, and stamping-out.  These measures were not effective at controlling 
outbreaks in 2009 and vaccine was approved for use in the CSF-endemic region.  Approximately 
90,000 pigs were vaccinated (NAHEMS, 2012b). 
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In Bulgaria, CSF was identified in 2000.  Emergency vaccination was approved in 2006 
with the intent to eradicate CSF.  In 2008, a vaccination program including wild boar was 
initiated, but in 2009, CSF was still found in the wild boar population.  Germany experienced a 
large number of CSF outbreaks in the 1990s and the EC approved the use of vaccines in 2002.  
The Netherlands had been CSF free for 10 years before an outbreak occurred in 1997.  Over the 
next year, 11 million pigs were destroyed and vaccination was not used.  In Romania, from 
1974-2001, vaccination was mandatory.  Vaccination was prohibited beginning in 2002 and 38 
cases were diagnosed that year.  In the following year, the number of cases continuously 
increased.  After 1,393 cases were identified in 2006, Romania received approval to vaccinate 
and the vaccination program began the following year.  In 2009, four million pigs were 
vaccinated.  Vaccination was discontinued in 2010 except for the vaccination of wild boar within 
20 km of the borders.  In Great Britain, vaccine can be used in coordination with other control 
measures such as stamping out and disinfection, but the decision was made not to use vaccine in 
a 2000 CSF outbreak and 75,000 pigs were culled (NAHEMS, 2012b). 
A CSF outbreak occurred in Israel during 2009 in domestic pig and wild boar 
populations.  Vaccination was not used in 2009 although it was considered an acceptable 
alternative for disease control, 500 doses were used in 2010.  In Korea, CSF was first diagnosed 
in 1908 and became endemic by 1947.  Cases decreased starting in 1967 due to the use of 
vaccine, but full eradication strategy was not initiated until 1996.  The strategy involved 
increasing vaccine usage and culling of infected animals with the intent of decreasing the number 
of outbreaks, followed by implementing mandatory vaccination, and resulting in CSF-free status 
without vaccination.  In 2001, disease-free status was achieved and vaccination was prohibited.  
In 2002, CSF was again diagnosed, eventually resulting in the implementation of a national 
vaccination policy (NAHEMS, 2012b).  Mexico was divided into three regions in 1996, a CSF-
free zone and an eradication region where vaccination was prohibited and an infected area where 
vaccination was mandatory.  The first outbreak in the eradication zone since the regionalization 
occurred in 1998, and a marker vaccine was used to prevent disease spread.  Researchers found it 
to be successful in reducing clinical signs and limiting new outbreaks.  An outbreak occurred in 
1999 in the disease-free region and was eradicated with quarantine, stamping-out, and movement 
controls; vaccine was not used.  CSF outbreaks occurred regularly in the eradication and infected 
zones by 2000, and vaccination was used in disease control.  The country was then divided into 
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two zones, disease free and endemic.  From 2002-2004, Mexico had 15 outbreaks, two in 2005, 
zero in 2006-2008, four in 2009, and none in 2010-2011.  In 2009, animals were destroyed and 
vaccination was not used (NAHEMS, 2012b). 
In the US, vaccines were used to control CSF in the late 1800s and continued to be used 
in the 1900s.  Safer vaccines became available in the 1950s leading to the prohibition of the use 
of virulent hog cholera virus in 29 states by 1959.  An eradication program was approved in 
1961.  Vaccine usage began to be phased out in 1969 when the USDA prohibited interstate 
movement of CSF modified live virus vaccine with the goals of the elimination of all vaccine 
usage by 1970.  Quarantine and depopulation were used more aggressively and by 1975 all states 
reported to be in the final program phase of protection against reinfection.  In 1978, the US was 
declared CSF free (NAHEMS, 2012b). 
 Economic and epidemiological research 
Mangen, Nielen, and Burrell (2002) used four inter-linked models and a spreadsheet to 
model epidemiological and economic consequences of a CSF outbreak and control strategies in 
the Netherlands with a focus on livestock population density.  InterCSF, a spatial, dynamic 
stochastic epidemiological model, was used to estimate daily disease spread and incorporate 
various disease control measures.  EpiPigFlow, a deterministic farm-level model, aggregated 
daily production figures.  EpiCosts, a sector-level, partial-equilibrium model estimated market 
and trade effects.  DUPIMA, a deterministic farm-level model, was used to calculate control 
costs based on response measures implemented.  The spreadsheet was used to calculate 
economic welfare changes (Mangen et al., 2002; Mangen, Burrell, & Mourits, 2004). 
Sparsely and densely livestock populated areas were compared under four control 
strategies and two trade assumptions.  The EU directive of stamping out infected herds, tracing 
all contacts, and imposing quarantines was the baseline control measure.  The other three control 
measures compared were preventive depopulation within 750-1,000 m of the infect herd, the 
addition of emergency vaccination-to-cull, and emergency vaccination-to-live with intra-
community trade allowed after quarantines expired.  The EU control baseline was assessed to be 
enough of a control measure if outbreak began in a sparsely populated area but additional 
measures were found to be necessary if the outbreak began in densely populated area.  The 
economic impact of preemptive culling compared to emergency vaccination depended on 
whether the trade ban was applied to only quarantine zones or the whole country.  If trade 
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continues outside the quarantine zone, then emergency vaccination-to-live was estimated to be 
the most economically successful but increases risk of larger disease spread and greater 
economic losses if trade ban is comprehensive.  Therefore, the researchers concluded preventive 
slaughter was the most economically rational if CSF occurred in a densely populated area 
(Mangen et al., 2002). 
Mangen et al. (2004) used the same suite of models to discuss disease control measure 
selection based on the epidemiological and economic effects of the 1997-98 CSF outbreak in the 
Netherlands.  Researchers assumed policymakers used multicriterion approaches to make disease 
control policy decisions with an emphasis on epidemiological indicators, public expenditures, 
producers’ costs, and economy-wide welfare impacts.  Thus, they attempted to quantify and 
integrate all decision factors to allow for the comparison of different control strategies (Mangen 
et al., 2004). 
Backer, Hagenaars, van Roermund, and de Jong (2009) studied the Dutch contingency 
plan policy preference of emergency vaccination over mass depopulation in a CSF outbreak.  A 
stochastic model incorporating within-herd dynamics based on virus transmission and the effect 
of marker vaccination on individual animals was used for strategy comparison.  This individual- 
level model was then combined with farm-level and national level models.  This multilevel 
approach allowed for evaluating the effect of vaccination of individual animals on a national 
epidemic in regard to control strategies.  The EU minimal strategy of restricted zones, 72-hr 
livestock transportation standstill, culling of infected herds, and contact tracing was compared to 
preemptive culling within 1 km and emergency marker vaccination in rings with radii of 1 km, 2 
km, and 5 km (Backer, Hagenaars, et al., 2009). 
The number of herds infected, culled, and vaccinated and the duration of the outbreak 
influenced the socioeconomic effect of an outbreak.  The animal welfare perspective was also 
influenced by the duration of the outbreak and the number of infected herds.  All models 
assumed vaccinated meat could be sold within the EU according to EC requirements.  The EU 
minimal strategy was the least effective and resulted in the largest and longest disease outbreaks.  
When comparing depopulation and vaccination within 1 km only, preemptive culling is more 
effective.  When vaccination was extended to 2 km, results were similar to culling within 1 km.  
From an epidemiological perspective, the 5-km vaccination strategy resulted in the smallest and 
shortest outbreak.  Vaccination allowed for fewer animals to be destroyed.  The duration of the 
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epidemic from first detection on infection to substantiation of disease absence through screening 
was the most critical factor to animal welfare and economics.  When considering welfare and 
economics, overall results showed that vaccination was the preferred control strategy with a 
sufficient ring radius to minimize outbreak duration (Backer, Hagenaars, et al., 2009). 
Mourits, von Asseldonk, and Huirne (2010) used multicriteria decision making to 
compare contagious animal disease control strategies in the EU with specific focus on 
epidemiology, economics, and social ethics.  The goal of EU animal disease control strategy is to 
achieve “a high level of animal health and animal welfare without compromising the functioning 
of the internal market” (Mourits et al., 2010, p. 203).   
While the analysis was intended for use with numerous diseases, they specifically 
analyzed control strategies related to CSF.  The EU compulsory measures of depopulation and 
disposal of pigs in a defined zone, surveillance zones, and movement restrictions served as a 
baseline.  Alternatives considered included preemptive slaughter within a predefined radius, 
suppressive vaccination (vaccination-to-kill) within a predefined radius, and protective 
vaccination (vaccination-to-live) within a predefined radius.  Strategies were applied in six 
regions defined by herd density, average herd size, piglet production per sow, revenue prices, 
feed prices, and production costs (Mourits et al., 2010).   
The epidemiological indicators included in the analysis were duration of the epidemic, 
number of infected herds, size of the infected region, number of animals destroyed, and number 
of herds destroyed.  The economic indicators considered were direct costs and farm losses, 
consequential revenue losses due to idle production in the region, losses in related industries 
such as slaughterhouses and processing plants, organization and control costs, exports within the 
EU, and exports outside of the EU.  The social-ethical indicators identified were efficacy, social 
and psychological impact, macroeconomic impact in export interests, impact on related 
commerce and commercially interested parties, animal health, and animal welfare.  To establish 
the decision context, European chief veterinary officers were asked to identify the most 
important criteria.  The individual animal health officials differed in their opinions of most 
important criteria to affect decision making on control strategies.  They found the 
epidemiological criteria to be most important with an average relative weight of 52%.  The 
economic and social-ethical criteria received weights of 30% and 18%, respectively.  The two 
most important epidemiological factors were duration of the epidemic and number of infected 
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herds.  Consequential farm losses and export restrictions were considered the two most important 
economic factors, and efficacy and socioeconomic impact were considered the two most 
important social-ethical indicators.  In the survey of officials, some factors were eliminated 
because of their low rankings, including number of non-farm animals destroyed, consequential 
farm losses outside the affected region, losses to non-related industries such as tourism, tax payer 
contribution to solution, tourism social-ethical impacts, health and welfare of non-farm animals, 
human health impacts, consistent government policy, impact on animals’ natural lifecycle, and 
exclusion of animals products from human consumption.  Researchers also assumed a risk-
averse approach (Mourits et al., 2010).   
The EU baseline was not sufficient in disease control for high-density regions in the 
epidemiological model and was not considered in further analysis.  In these regions, suppressive 
vaccination was the dominant strategy from an economic perspective.  In low- and medium- 
density regions, the EU baseline was the best economic alternative.  In regard to the social-
ethical perspective, protective vaccination was the dominant strategy in four regions and the EU 
baseline was dominant in the other two.  In four of the six regions, protective vaccination was the 
preferred control method, while the EU baseline and preemptive culling were each preferred in 
one region.  When considering total dominance over all factors, the EU baseline strategy was 
preferred in three regions, all of which had average herd sizes of more than 900 head and had 
moderate population density.  In the remaining moderately dense region, protective vaccination 
was the dominant control strategy.  Preemptive slaughter was the preferred strategy in the two 
high density exporting regions, with protective vaccination a close second.  Because vaccinated 
animals were required to be culled, suppressive vaccination always dominated from an 
epidemiological view due to low scores on number of destroyed herds and animals, and it was 
the least successful strategy in overall dominance for all regions.  These results indicated strong 
consideration needs to be given to region-specific control strategies (Mourits et al., 2010). 
 Policy Considerations and Implications 
“Complex decisions made under time pressure and uncertainty” such as the decision to 
vaccinate must be based on sound evidence (NZFMG, 2011, p. 32).  The benefits and limitations 
of vaccination programs must be clearly understood by policy and decision makers.  Previous 
cases where vaccination was unnecessary, such as the 2007 U.K. FMD outbreak, or cases where 
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vaccination did not result in the desired outcome, such as the 2010 Japan FMD outbreak, provide 
lessons for decision makers.  In New Zealand, industry and government are working together to 
draft a revised FMD vaccination policy based on evidence available (NZFMG, 2011).  
Analysis based on sound science and lessons from recent outbreaks will be critical as 
decision makers utilize decision making criteria and analytical tools to develop animal disease 
policy (Hagerman et al., 2012).  Better decision-support tools are critical to making response 
decisions (Paton et al., 2009).  Logical decision processes that consider the scientific, economic, 
political, and practical considerations unique to individual outbreaks are necessary.  Decisions 
cannot be entirely science based, and the goal should be to eliminate the disease and the negative 
economic impacts (DeHaven, 2003).  “The decision to use, or not to use, a vaccine in the face of 
a foreign animal disease outbreak can be complex and have far-reaching socio-economic 
consequences.  Incorrect decisions or delays occurring during the actual outbreak can be costly” 
(DeHaven, 2003, p. 282). 
Decision makers must determine how important it is to stop disease spread immediately 
and the most cost-effective method for stopping disease spread.  The industry’s ability to return 
to disease-free status will likely drive these considerations (DeOtte & DeOtte, 2009).  
“…government policies on how to respond to FMD are not related in any way to the seriousness 
of the illness in an animal or herd; they do not depend on animal health, welfare, pain or 
suffering.  They are purely financial…” (Breeze, 2004, p. 253). 
The decision to invest in vaccination and implement vaccination protocols needs to 
happen in the planning stages to create the least economic disruption (McLeod & Rushton, 
2007).  Adequate vaccine stocks along with criteria for vaccine usage and dispersal must already 
exist if vaccination is to be considered as a response mechanism in an FAD outbreak (Hugh-
Jones & Brown, 2006). 
Before deciding to vaccinate, a number of factors should be considered including, but not 
limited to: 
 Technical feasibility of vaccination; 
 Funding availability of full-scale vaccination program; 
 Accessibility of a safe, well-matched, sufficiently potent vaccine; 
 Number of times vaccine will need administered; 
 Adequate supply of the vaccine identified for full-scale deployment; 
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 Availability of DIVA tests; 
 Logistics of vaccine administration;  
 Adequate number of trained personnel; and  
 Resources and technology needed for related activities, including identification, 
traceability, movement permitting, and serological surveillance (NAHEMS, 
2011d). 
The epidemiology of the outbreak, such as the disease and disease strain, the length of 
time since outbreak began, geographic disease distribution, species, number of animals affected, 
geographic and environmental impacts on disease spread, and wildlife and feral populations at 
risk have to be taken into consideration.  Pros and cons of vaccination should be weighed 
accordingly, including trade and export impacts, market shocks due to shifts in consumer 
confidence, marketability of products from vaccinated animals, existence of genetically 
irreplaceable stock, vulnerability of endangered species, extent of outbreak, disruption of tourism 
and other activities, impact on local economies, and “types of stakeholders affected (e.g. small-
scale operators with limited safety nets vs. large-scale operators)” (NAHEMS, 2011d, p. 60).  
Virus identification needs to be initiated within the first 24 hr of the outbreak even if the decision 
has not yet been made to vaccinate (Zack, 2013).  
The scientific and technical considerations related to vaccination will not be the only 
issues considered when deciding to use vaccination as a response strategy.  “Political and 
economic decisions that take into account matters beyond technical advice on disease control can 
also influence the selection of control measures…” (Sims, 2013, p. 16). 
It is clear animal disease control will be costly in actual expenses, livestock culled, and 
welfare loss.  Risk management evaluation can play an important role in policy development.  
Multiple metrics need to be considered because it is possible one metric may suggest one policy 
while examination of another metric may support a contradictory approach (Hagerman et al., 
2012). 
No control measure is perfect, so any successful disease control strategy must involve 
multiple components.  These choices depend on the epidemiological situation, access to financial 
resources, and the need to recover disease-free status for trade purposes.  For a country that is 
disease-free and does not practice routine vaccination, the primary strategy should be the 
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elimination of disease and interruption of contact between infected and susceptible animals 
allowing for a quick return to disease-free status (Leon, 2012). 
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Chapter 5 - The Role and Methods of Policy Analysis  
Policymakers have the responsibility to reach conclusions and act on behalf of society 
based on the information available and the best assumptions at the time when faced with 
decisions (Doering, 1994). 
If there is no conflict, disagreement, or controversy, there is no public policy decision to 
be made.  Public policy issues can be characterized as involving problems that require group 
decisions and are influenced by value judgments, being of broad interest and concern, dealing 
with controversial matters, and tending to be identified as problems by decision makers 
(Barrows, 1983; Beaulieu, 2000; Flinchbaugh, 1988).  
Policymakers are often faced with difficult choices among several alternatives to solve a 
policy problem.  Rarely is the choice between action and inaction.  Alternatives need to be 
narrowed and ranked.  The goal of policy analysis is to help decision makers make policy 
choices effectively, ethically, and intelligently.  A policy choice is one with an outcome critical 
enough it deserves debate and analysis.  In turn, policy analysis allows for the use of reason and 
evidence to compare policy alternatives, evaluate tradeoffs, and select the best policy choice 
(Bingham & Ethridge, 1982; McRae & Wilde, 1979).   
Government policy depends on leadership, organization, and analysis.  Structured policy 
analysis is designed to reduce uncertainty about the consequences of alternatives and provide 
data to facilitate and guide decision makers’ processes and choices (Quigley & Scotchmer, 
1989).  “Policy analysis is an integrative and adaptive process with respect to available 
knowledge and data” (Farrell, 1976, p. 768).  Lynn (1999) referred to policy analysis as the 
“craft of governance” based on “intuition, argument, and ethical promptings” (p. 411).   
Decision making is about achieving set objectives through the allocation of resources, 
and decision analysis methods are designed to provide decision makers with structure as they 
evaluate alternatives, uncertainties, and outcomes.  A decision maker’s approach to risk will 
likely influence their decision process as well (Spradlin, 1997).   
Any decision making process requires consideration of tradeoffs.  Public policy tradeoffs 
are challenging and require continuous evaluation.  Policymakers must evaluate choices, 
implement the optimal selection, and then use new information, values, and goals to tweak 
policy approaches (Lindblom, 1959; Maness, 2007).  As Earl Butz (1989) noted, “The very 
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essence of democratic government is a trade-off among competing interests to reach consensus 
in legislation or in regulation to maximize the common good” (p. 1195).  Any decision support 
tool needs to provide guidance on how to make tradeoffs when benefits for one group of 
stakeholders conflict with benefits for another group (Holland, 2005). 
Policy choices cannot be based on singular discipline science alone; they must include 
ethical or philosophical consideration as well as intuitive and nonscientific knowledge.  Policy 
deserving of analysis typically falls into a realm of action and, instead of drawing from just one 
discipline, combines several disciplines.  Typically, values will be in conflict and tradeoffs must 
occur for a resolution.  Consequences need to be considered in determining the policy’s 
effectiveness.  Imagination plays a role in policy analysis, because new ideas or solutions may be 
possible.  However, at the same time, practicality of what can be accomplished in a political 
environment is also necessary.  It may also be necessary to distinguish between desirability (the 
most preferred option) and political feasibility (what can be enacted).  The value of the policy is 
the combination of both.  At times, desirability and feasibility may be in conflict.  Analysis must 
look at all that is possible compared to what is practical.  Creativity and political feasibility may 
be contradictory, but are both required for policy analysis (McRae & Wilde, 1979).   
Public policy is governmental decision making between choices, levels, combinations, 
and potentially controversial alternatives with a focus on finding the optimal solution that 
maximizes benefits and minimizes costs (maximizing net benefits).  This concept is approached 
differently depending on if the alternatives have a logical order.  If the alternatives do not have 
an inherent order, policy making is also influenced by the existence or lack of contingent 
probabilities.  In the case of no probabilities, policy goals need to be weighted relative to each 
other to develop a comparison and make an optimal selection between alternatives (Nagel & 
Neef, 1978).   
Policymakers often see themselves as decision makers, but few make decisions 
completely independently.  They use decision processes comprised of rational choices based on 
evidence, compromise, and balance between competing resources (Trostle, Bronfman, & Langer, 
1999).  Public policy is intended to improve efficiency or equity as a result of the decision 
process.  An efficient policy decision maximizes benefits over costs, while equitable policy 
focuses on equal distribution of benefits (NCEDR, 2002).  Analysis provides the organization of 
knowledge in an orderly manner allowing for the clarification of options (Trostle et al., 1999).  
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Knowledge and capability are critical.  Effective policy must consider both (Premashthira, 2012; 
Paton et al., 2009). 
Analysis of a policy decision dealing with a complex problem is critical to quality 
decisions, which is influenced by the process of how the decision is made in addition to the 
outcome itself.  Quality decisions start with defining the appropriate frame and solving the right 
problem, identifying all alternatives by being creative, having all possible information, knowing 
the highest ranked values, using logical reasoning, and committing to action (Shachter, 2008b). 
 Attributes of Decision Makers and Decision Making 
Decision makers formulate questions and seek the necessary information to make timely, 
quality decisions in a process matching their personal preferences and style.  They must balance 
the desire to make decisions in the best public interest with the need to find consensus among 
conflicting options within the given time frame and limited resources available.  Information can 
either be pushed on policymakers or pulled in by them.  Decision makers typically fall in three 
categories: those who gather information from lots of sources but apply selective filters to avoid 
information overload, those who place tight filters on incoming information and are largely 
influenced by experience and instinct, and those who immerse themselves in all available 
information and data in order to be as well informed as possible.  The style of decisions makers 
can vary as some are slow learners and others quicker and more intuitive, some are deliberate in 
their decision process and others more volatile or dynamic decision makers, and some are more 
rational and others more irrational decision makers (Teitelbaum, 2005).   
Decision makers are required to make decisions when critical information, time, and 
resources are unknown or constrained (Hagerman et al., 2012).  It is unlikely a decision maker 
will have time to personally collect and assimilate data, and they are often forced to make 
decisions under significant uncertainty.  It is also unlikely they can devote all of their time to any 
single issue so decisions are always competing with other issues also deserving consideration.  
Time constraints and resources are almost always limited which affects the decision makers’ 
access to complete and timely information.  Their goal is often to reduce uncertainty, and 
information can serve that purpose.  Successful policymakers link knowledge with action in 
order to select the best policy, but this becomes increasingly difficult as the complexity of the 
issue increases (Teitelbaum, 2005). 
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Complex decisions can be analyzed by considering eight elements: problem, objectives, 
alternative courses of action, consequences, tradeoffs between conflicting objectives, 
uncertainty, risk tolerance, and linked decisions with influential factors (Hammond, Keeney, & 
Raiffa, 1999).  Decision makers attempt to simplify complex decisions.  Alex Mintz (2004) 
assumes they use a two-stage, poliheuristic decision process.  Poliheuristic theory defines 
“domestic politics as ‘the essence of decision’” (p. 7).  In the first stage, policymakers reject 
unacceptable alternatives and narrow the policy choices by using cognitive shortcuts, and in the 
second stage, they select the choice that maximizes benefits and minimizes costs from amongst 
the remaining alternatives. 
 Methods of Policy Making 
Policymaking is a political process based on political power and legal authority exercised 
by executive, legislative, and judicial entities at local, state, national, and international levels and 
made in the context of political interaction (Dunn, 2012; Holland, 2005).   
Charles Lindblom (1959), in his well-known paper “The Science of ‘Muddling 
Through,’” described two methods of policy formulation and decision.  He referred to the 
method he considered the most frequently taught and discussed as the Rational-Comprehensive 
Method or the Root method.  This method involves five steps: clarification of values or 
objectives distinct from and a prerequisite to analysis of policy choices, formulation of policy 
through a means-end analysis where ends are identified and means to achieve said ends is 
pursued, policy is tested to determine whether it is the most appropriate means to desired ends, 
all relevant and important factors are analyzed, and theory serves as a critical foundation for 
analysis.  It is also called the Root method because analysis starts anew each time from the 
ground up.  The second method he described is the Successive Limited Comparison or the 
Branch approach.  The method consists of five steps: value goals and analysis are intertwined 
and not distinct from each other; no distinction is made between means and ends so means-end 
analysis is limited; policy is tested by various analysts agreeing on policy choices; analysis is 
limited because some possible outcomes, policy alternatives, and affected values are neglected; 
and a succession of comparisons between policy choices eliminates dependence on theory.  It is 
called the Branch approach because it builds on the current situation step-by-step in small 
degrees (Lindblom, 1959).   
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While the Root method is familiar, easy to understand, and often seen as the best method, 
it is difficult to apply in complex policy decisions.  So, policymakers often have to use the 
Branch approach which is far less studied in public policy analysis.  The definition of values as 
described in the Root method is highly challenging because a complex problem will have many 
critical, conflicting values or objectives and stakeholders and decision makers are unlikely to be 
able to agree on how they are ranked.  Even if an overarching objective can be agreed to, the 
subobjectives may be controversial among stakeholders or contradictory with each other.  When 
it is not possible to rank values or objectives, policymakers must move forward to make policy 
decisions with different combinations of values.  Therefore, evaluation and analysis are 
intertwined as policies to achieve objectives and the actual objectives and values are selected 
simultaneously.  This approach can potentially allow agreement to exist on the right policy even 
if disagreement occurred on values selection.  The Root method calls for a comprehensive 
inclusion of all important factors, but that is likely not feasible with a complex policy issue 
because human intellectual capacity and available information are both limited, so the process 
must be simplified.  The Branch method simplifies complex problems by studying only the 
marginal and incremental differences between policy alternatives from each other and status quo.  
While excluding important factors is not ideal, it may be necessary to evaluate the alternatives.  
In the Branch method, policy is not made all at once, but is a successive approximation of 
desired objectives that adjusts through incremental policy change as objectives adjust.  The 
difference between these two methods is the difference between theory and practice.  The 
difference explains why theorists do not think policymakers (practitioners) take their advice and 
why policymakers do not find theoretical problem solving useful in their decision process 
(Lindblom, 1959). 
House (1993) summarized, based on the work of Mary Ellen Wolfe, five models of 
policy making.  Their findings are included in Table 5-1.  
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Table 5-1 Five Models of Policy Making  
Model Focus Use Limitations 
Kings and kingmakers Power lies with the 
influencers 
Describes the role of 
leaders and reveals 
hidden powerbrokers 
who influence public 
policy 
May overstate role of 
influencers, 
underestimates roles of 
groups and 
multidimensional aspects 
of policy development, 
powerbrokers hard to 
identify 
Clusters Iron Triangle Power lies with groups Describes central role of 
organized groups and 
allows for 
incrementalism 
May overstate group role 
and understate role of 
public officials and 
institution, may overlook 
environmental factors 
Rational-comprehensive Decisions are made 
rationally and 
comprehensively 
Describes a rational, 
scientific decision 
making process 
May be unrealistic, may 
overlook role of groups 
and influencers, 
exaggerates the time, 
resources, and 
information available to 
the decision maker 
Muddling through Decisions are made 
incrementally 
Highlights how officials 
make decisions 
May overlook role of 
influencers, systematic 
stages in the process, and 
possibility of innovative 
policy changes 
Stages in the decision 
making process 
Regularly occurring steps 
in the policy making 
process 
Describes the process or 
system, multiple decision 
points, and fragmentation 
of power 
May overlook changes in 
social and political 
environment, actual 
content in the process 
may be overlooked 
Note. Adapted from House (1993). 
 
 History of Policy Analysis 
At the turn of the 20
th
 century, the progressive movement focused on reforming 
American government to be more focused on public interest and less influenced by big business 
and corrupt political machines.  The goal was to make government more business-like and utilize 
scientific methods and techniques in the policy process.  Progressives attempted to deal with the 
social, economic, and political impact of science’s expanding role in society (Nelson, 1987).  
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Woodrow Wilson, a progressive, defined policy as divided into two categories, politics (general 
policy and social values choices) and administration (administrative and instrumental decisions).  
Progressives believed scientific advancement would lead to objective administrative policy and 
technical decisions instead of subjective political choices (Leman & Nelson, 1981; Nelson, 
1987).  
As administrative discretion became more prominent in the 1920s and 1930s and 
administrators started to take on policy making authority, the role of the policy analyst began to 
emerge and the concept of policy analysis was founded.  Starting at that point and leading into 
the 1960s, “these efforts evolved into a movement to institute analytically grounded, decision-
oriented policy analysis, planning, and program evaluation as routine functions of the public 
executive and as instruments of political leadership” (Lynn, 1999, p. 413).   
The progressive approach was basically eliminated from the policy process after World 
War II because the government failed to meet the progressive ideal and policy was driven by 
interest group competition and political bargaining.  In 1959, Lindblom published his works 
describing policy making as the “science of muddling through” and John Kenneth Galbraith in 
1956 called politics a system of “countervailing powers” (Nelson, 1987, p. 55).  By the late 
1960s, analysts and economists argued that values influenced all parts of the decision process 
and expert independence from politics was not typically maintained (Nelson, 1987).  Analysts, 
such as Dwight Waldo and Laurence Tribe, argued science and politics could not be divided, 
value judgments were inherent in the analysis, and analysis is influenced by the values of their 
sponsoring entity (Leman & Nelson, 1981). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, a link was forged between policy analysis and policy 
making.  If policymakers needed assistance, they would turn to analysts for support and 
information.  This positivist knowledge-for-action approach focused on the brokerage of research 
to those charged with making decisions.  The number of policy analysts grew significantly 
during this time.  As Aaron Wildavsky noted, policy analysts became bilingual, skilled in the 
languages of science and policy, and “spoke truth to power” in a language policymakers could 
understand (qtd. in Lynn, 1999, p. 413).  This movement drew substantial criticism from those 
who argued that analysis overemphasized assumptions, neglected reality, and ignored the need to 
balance interests of stakeholders.  Critics in the 1980s and 1990s continued to express frustration 
with the popularity of policy analysis and argued analysts were trying to make decisions for 
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policymakers.  Charles Lindblom, as an example, called for more cooperative inquiry providing 
information to policymakers such as critiques and synthesis of issues but not an optimal solution 
to the question (Lynn, 1999).  Others have argued that policy analysis is more a craft than a 
science, and analysts are more craftsman than scientists.  Intuition, judgment, entrepreneurship, 
interpretative skills, and ability to provide a big picture approach are just as important, if not 
more so, than rigor, technical skills, and large amounts of data and information (Lynn, 1999; 
Nelson, 1987).  
Controversy and discourse continue to exist about the role of policy analysis and the 
training provided to policy analysts.  Those scholars referred to as postpositivists have argued 
policy analysis has become too focused on ineffectual advice, has an elitist approach, and is 
blind to political realities.  While some with this attitude would take a drastic approach of 
dismantling all policy analysis and the institutions that provide it, a more moderate view calls for 
a more qualitative and participatory approach to policy analysis that is integrated with the 
democratic process.  They do not believe facts and values can be considered independently and 
see the positivist attitude that policy is fact based alone as outdated and ineffective.  Peter 
deLeon noted that values, ideology, and beliefs are all necessary parts of the policy analysis 
process.  This thought process remains one that traditional policy analysts do not consider 
worthy of their concern (Lynn, 1999). 
According to Lynn (1999), policy analysis should continue to improve public policy by 
providing information to policymakers while remaining uninfluenced by interest in the outcome 
and adding to the policy discourse while respecting the democratic process and exhibiting 
intellectual integrity.  Policy analysis will remain both pragmatic and crafty (Lynn, 1999).  
 Defining Policy Analysis 
Policy analysis is the use of reason and evidence to identify and evaluate policy choices 
from among multiple alternatives with the intent to address a policy problem by creating, 
estimating, and communicating relevant knowledge (Dunn, 2012; McRae & Wilde, 1979).  The 
goal of policy analysis should be to improve policymaking by providing information useful to 
the policy process and to assist decision makers in choosing a course of action from complex 
alternatives under uncertain conditions (Dunn, 2012).  
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According to Knutson, Penn, Flinchbaugh, and Outlaw (2007) there are four questions 
that need to be addressed in any policy analysis.  
 What is? 
 What can be? 
 What will be? 
 What should be? 
Policy analysis should provide the answers to the first three questions with objective 
statements of facts that identify the situation, address alternatives, and forecast potential 
consequences.  It is then the policymakers’ decision based on the information provided and their 
value judgments about what should be (Knutson et al., 2007).  
Policy analysis includes the definition of common elements: 
 Problem to be addressed,  
 Criterion for choice,  
 Alternatives, models, and decisions to made,  
 Political feasibility, and 
 Cycle of analysis (McRae & Wilde, 1979). 
Analysis begins with a clear statement of the problem being analyzed.  Different 
stakeholders may have different definitions of the problem, so a careful examination of the true 
issue is necessary to define or redefine the problem and keep it targeted (McRae & Wilde, 1979).  
Accurate problem identification and structuring is critical because the biggest factor leading to 
policy failure is due to the wrong problem being addressed.  Problems need to be addressed from 
multiple perspectives because different decision makers have different preferences and values.  
Dunn’s integrated framework is a problem centered policy analysis where the problem serves as 
the focus and policy actions, outcomes, and performance are all evaluated relative to the central 
problem (Dunn, 2012).  The goals, objectives, and expectations of all stakeholders must be 
considered in problem and alternative identification, and the limitations on time and scope must 
be taken into account (Dunn, 2012; McRae & Wilde, 1979). 
The goal of policy analysis can be seen as taking the steps necessary to choose the best 
policy.  However, different stakeholders may have different views of best.  Different people have 
different values and disvalues, as well as varied priorities and views on what is important.  
Analysis must create an overarching values criterion and identify opportunities for tradeoffs.  
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Most people are concerned with the ends or goals beyond the policy and want to know if 
different alternatives produce certain results.  People may support the same policy approach for 
completely different reasons, and significant effort may be necessary to get people to agree on 
the deductive criteria (McRae & Wilde, 1979).  McRae and Wilde (1979) refer to these as ethical 
criteria and note they must be clear, consistent, and general enough to compare amongst 
alternatives.  It is not effective to just list criteria in order of priority, which is often referred to as 
the naïve priorities method.  This approach is unclear, lacks precision, and provides no 
measurement of the intervals between the priorities (McRae & Wilde, 1979).   
Policy analysis provides a framework for a structured review of dealing with policy 
complexities (NCEDR, 2002).  Policy analysis and education is more of an art than a science 
(Adams & Hairston, 1995; Flinchbaugh, 2003).  It is about “creating policies from a shifting 
palette of social, political, legal, economic, and environmental concerns” (Adams & Hairston, 
1995, p.1). 
Policy analysis should be focused on establishing fact and destroying myth while 
respecting values (Flinchbaugh, 2003).  Once a problem is identified and defined, facts, myths, 
and values become interwoven within the policy process.  Facts are the result of observation, 
discovery, research, and statistics.  Myths, widely held incorrect beliefs, are treated as fact unless 
disproved by facts.  Values reflect each person’s principles, beliefs, and priorities.  It is the 
interaction of these three areas that shapes policy and the policy development process.  In the 
analysis process, alternative policy approaches are identified, analyzed, and documented, and 
then the political process creates a policy solution (Knutson et al., 2007).  A graphical 
representation of this relationship can be seen in Figure 5-1. 
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Tools can be used to merge analysis, planning, and budgetary allocation and can 
complement the advocacy process (Lynn, 1999).  
Techniques designed to address the comparison of policy alternatives must: 
 Compare advantages and disadvantages when alternatives affect a multitude of 
widely different concerns,  
 Incorporate long-term impacts,  
 Assess the impact of uncertainty regarding possible outcomes, and 
 Assess social distribution of costs and benefits (Bingham & Ethridge, 1982). 
When considering different alternatives, it is common to ask which criteria make people 
better or worse off.  Economists use the concept of welfare economics to calculate social welfare 
of different alternatives.  One approach is to pursue a utilitarian solution to create the greatest 
good for the greatest number.  Another approach is to compare the status quo to various 
alternatives in search of the Pareto optimal solution where no additional change can be made 
without harming someone else in the process (McRae & Wilde, 1979).  A potential Pareto 
improvement indicates those who benefit from the policy change gain more than those who lose 
from the policy change and could technically choose to compensate the losers in the scenario.  
This results in an overall gain in social welfare (NCEDR, 2002; Shachter, 2008a).  The Kaldor-
Hicks criteria offer another possible approach and solution where total gains must exceed total 
Figure 5-1 How public policy decisions are made (Flinchbaugh, 2003, p. 2). 
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losses.  This asserts a policy is efficient and that overall welfare would be at its maximum if 
those who are better off have enough gain to hypothetically compensate those who suffered 
losses (even if the compensation does not actually occur) (McRae & Wilde, 1979). 
The decision making process follows four steps: identify the real world problem, model 
potential alternatives, analyze the results, and implement a solution.  The context of the situation 
largely influences the appropriate decision strategy and is determined by the level of uncertainty, 
the ability to quantify costs and benefits, number of criteria, and the number of participants who 
have decision making power.  A strategic conflict can arise when different decision makers 
addressing the same situation have different preferences or priorities.  Most analysis suits the 
single objective and single decision maker context, but multiple objective and multiple decision 
maker situations may be better suited with different analytical approaches, such as game theory 
(Xin, 2006).   
 Types of Analysis 
 Traditional versus interpretive analysis 
The traditional view of policy analysis identifies decision making as a rational choice 
where decision makers establish goals and select policy alternatives that maximize utility and 
systematic thinking solves problems.  This approach assumes public interest is defined by 
aggregating individual interests and that the marketplace satisfies preferences.  Analysis is seen 
as a useful problem solving tool reducing uncertainty and providing an objective, ideally 
conclusive solution.  The public is seen as inattentive and politically unsophisticated, and their 
interests can best be explained by experts.  The process itself is built on incremental change 
achieved in linear stages.  Simply put, traditional policy analysis sees it as a tool for problem 
solving and selecting between competing policies (Shulock, 1999).  
The interpretative view approaches policy analysis as having ambiguous goals with 
uncertain means and decisions focused on process and organization rather that projecting 
consequences.  It provides a retrospective rationality and assumes debate and discourse along 
with a collective social struggle over issue interpretations that lead to learning.  Information is 
inherently inconclusive, reflects values, and creates a framework for understanding issues.  The 
determination of cause and effect is not a goal.  Citizens are believed to be attentive and capable 
of engaging with policymakers.  The process is nonlinear and dynamic.  The politics of ideas 
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lead to a constant battle over agenda, interpretation of issues, and jurisdiction.  Interpretative 
policy analysis is an instrument of the democratic process used by policymakers, special 
interests, and citizens to define issues, determine goals, justify actions, and symbolize rational 
decision making (Shulock, 1999). 
Dan Durning and public policy specialists have called for a blend of analysis that calls for 
greater participation of analysts with those affected by policy and sees information sharing and 
policy advice as a joint responsibility of stakeholders and analysts (Shulock, 1999).  However, 
Shulock (1999) believes significant overhaul of the policy process is unnecessary.  It already 
involves discourse, blends ideas into political thought, and influences policy outcomes.  The 
problem lies with policymakers, analysts, and the public who need to have an accurate view of 
what policy analysis can be.  “Policy analysis has changed, right along with the policy process, 
to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen 
preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political 
environment” (Shulock, 1999, p. 240).  Policy analysis can contribute to informed discourse, 
provide ideas, and raise the level of the debate, but it cannot provide ready-made, 
comprehensive, conclusive solutions to policy problems (Shulock, 1999).  
 Normative versus positive approach 
Policy can be analyzed from a positive or descriptive approach in which the reasons 
behind policy changes are evaluated and future policy changes are predicted.  Normative analysis 
refers to a proactive analysis of how policy should be reformed (Scrimgeour & Pasour, 1996) or 
“defining what we ought to do” (Cahn, 2002, p. 6).  An empirical policy approach is focused on 
identification of facts and a valuative approach addresses the worth or value of alternatives.  
While normative process is designed to solve a problem, a descriptive approach such as 
empirical or valuative is designed to create an understanding of the problem (Dunn, 2012).  The 
normative process is typically how policy analysts want decisions to be made rather than in a 
traditional political process.  Such policy development methods allow for transparency and 
defensibility (Shachter, 2008b).  Without transparency in the policy development process, 
stakeholders are unlikely to understand, support, or have confidence in the policy decision or its 
anticipated outcomes (Giovannini, 2007).  
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 Prospective and retrospective analysis 
Dunn (2012) identifies three forms of policy analysis.  Prospective analysis addresses 
policy choice prior to implementation and attempts to predict what will happen.  Retrospective 
policy analysis instead evaluates policy decisions after implementation.  Dunn proposes an 
integrated framework that is multidisciplinary in nature and combines a retrospective and 
prospective approach to analyze the consequences of policy alternatives (Dunn, 2012). 
 Political philosophy versus procedural policy 
Erven Long (1953) examined agricultural policy debates and discussed the differential 
between underlying philosophies driving policy direction versus day-to-day policy decisions.  
Goals to be addressed, values to be served, and basic policy assumptions held by involved parties 
need to be considered when identifying the appropriate philosophical approach to a policy 
question.  The clarity of the philosophy behind policy is critical to accurate guidance of daily 
procedural policy decisions.  To serve a purpose and have meaning, policy analysis must start 
with an understanding of the philosophical questions at hand and appraise all options and their 
aligned consequences while avoiding drastic simplifications and generalizations related to the 
overarching philosophical approach (Long, 1953).  
 Additional Influences on Policy Decisions 
A number of additional factors may influence policy decisions and how they are made.  A 
few of those factors are discussed in the following sections. 
 Role of stakeholders, special interests, and the public 
Analysis depends on appropriately specifying the question.  Stakeholders need to be 
engaged in planning, execution, and evaluation and their objectives need to be considered in the 
development of evaluation methods and frameworks.  Identifying the objectives of multiple 
stakeholders becomes more important as the goals of one stakeholder group conflicts with the 
goals of others (Rushton, Thornton, & Otte, 1999). 
Any policy process involving different interests will be challenging because all interests 
will be affected in a positive or negative manner.  Representatives of those special interests will 
desire to influence the decision process and policy development.  Negotiation, maneuvering, 
bargaining, and compromise will be necessary to reach an acceptable outcome (Pielke, 2002). 
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The public should play an active role in risk assessment and be engaged in the policy 
development and decision making process.  In addition, risk communication needs to be a two-
way channel and related strategies need to be incorporated into the policy development process 
(Hueston, 2007).   
 Public risk 
When evaluating policy choices, risk assessment and public reaction to risk play a factor.  
However, it is more difficult to evaluate public risks than private risks because public risks are 
broadly distributed, remote, and outside an individual’s control and understanding.  These types 
of risks are typically underestimated and consequences are usually misjudged.  Incentives for 
individual or group action tend to be minimal.  This is especially true in the case of a low-
probability, high-consequence risk.  Even though economic incentives might exist, it is less 
likely action will be taken such as the case with many collective action situations (May, 2001). 
 Self-interest 
The behavior of any decision maker is still influenced by traditional individual 
motivations.  Public choice theory is based on the concept, although not exclusively, that all 
individuals and their actions within a political process are affected by self-interest and wealth 
maximization.  A broader approach includes the idea of the economic man as one that extends 
self-interest to include concern over the welfare of others.  If decision makers are acting in this 
manner, then what is, is efficient should apply and all decisions should be the best policy choices 
under the exiting circumstances.  However, the political and regulatory process is not perfectly 
coordinated and such balance is rarely automatically achieved.  Uncertainty abounds and 
information is limited so even when policymakers want to act in the best interest of everyone 
involved, the consequences of policy alternatives is often unclear (Scrimgeour & Pasour, 1996). 
 Tools for Analysis 
To select a policy alternative, decision makers need to consider society’s preferences, 
determine how to weigh the diversity of opinions represented, forecast the impact of policy 
alternatives, and select the best choice.  Even if they had a clear understanding of preferences, 
comparing alternatives requires time and capabilities that decision makers typically do not have.  
In addition, by the time a decision is made, societal preferences may have changed.  Tools have 
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been designed to assist policymakers based on the impact of policy choices, related time frames, 
budgetary impacts, and the role of public involvement (Maness, 2007). 
Any tool used for economic analysis or other methods of alternative policy evaluation 
need to consider costs, benefits, and distribution of costs and benefits while taking into account 
the role of voters and public opinion, interest groups, agency bureaucrats, politicians, and the 
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory framework in which polices are developed (Scrimgeour 
& Pasour, 1996).  The choice for a model is often a balance of getting the desired output and 
application of a feasible model based on data, time, risk, space, resources, and capabilities (Rich, 
Miller, & Winter-Nelson, 2005a; Rich, Winter-Nelson, & Miller, 2005b). 
Analysis provides an advantageous, systematic approach to policy decisions.  It allows 
results to be reproduced, reasoning to be checked, assumptions to be identified, key factual 
issues and interpretations to be isolated, and the debate to be focused (Quigley & Scotchmer, 
1989).  In some cases, analysts see their role as providing information to the decision maker in 
order to help them make a decision.  As described by Longworth et al. (2012a), analysis tools are 
designed “to provide decision-makers with science-based information to enable them to make 
informed and rational choices between decision alternatives” (p. 2).  In contrast, some public 
policy specialists identify their role as actually providing the solution to the decision maker.  
“Decision tools are utilized to model and analyze the problem to find a suitable solution to solve 
the problem” (Xin, 2006, p. 1).   
Models, which are simplified representatives of or substitutes for more complex real-
world systems, can serve as a useful resource to decision makers.  They are often intended to 
study how a scenario will develop in response to various interventions and explain system 
behavior to non-experts.  The complexity can vary from a simple deterministic mathematical 
model to a spatially explicit stochastic simulation.  A deterministic model describes average 
effects and uses average data throughout the system and is designed to gain understanding and 
improve knowledge.  Stochastic models are based on a variable range of data, behaviors, and 
patterns and provide a range of effects with confidence intervals (Garner et al., 2007; Green & 
Medley, 2002; Taylor, 2003). 
It is as much an art as a science to determine the appropriate level of complexity in a 
model.  The addition of more factors may add to the complexity without improving the model’s 
resourcefulness.  Additional parameters should not be included if evidence is not clear it will 
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improve the model’s predictive capabilities (Garner et al., 2007; Green & Medley, 2002; Taylor, 
2003).  The decision of what to include in the model can be considered subjective and is 
influenced by knowledge and data (Taylor, 2003).  The appropriate model depends on the 
situation, the level of data available, ability to quantify the critical elements, and a spatial or non-
spatial approach.  Models need to be fitted to the specific purpose, verified, and validated 
(Garner et al., 2007).  The validity, accuracy, availability, and completeness of data will 
determine if the model can be effective.  Few models are universal, and most are developed for a 
targeted purpose and may not be transferable to other situations (Taylor, 2003).  They serve as 
just one tool and should not be used independently from additional information, experimental 
studies, and relevant data (Garner et al., 2007).   
There are a number of different policy tools that can be applied to policy analysis.  A 
sampling of those methods is described in the following sections. 
 Quantitative approaches 
Quantitative analysis allows for a clear comparison of alternatives.  Complex policy 
decisions incorporate measurement, time, uncertainty, and distribution.   
 Cost-benefit analysis 
The most common systematic policy analytic tool is cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
(Bingham & Ethridge, 1982; McRae & Wilde, 1979; Quigley & Scotchmer, 1989).  Advantages 
and disadvantages of different alternatives is the basis of all assessments, and values are 
estimated representing the costs and benefits of society.  CBA frameworks are typically designed 
to help society determine the acceptability of alternatives.  Costs and benefits can be economic, 
environmental, social, or biological.  However, the definition of these costs and benefits is not 
always straightforward, data requirements are significant, and the quantification and valuation in 
economic terms can be difficult (Rushton et al., 1999).   
CBA estimates all costs and benefits, is consistent, and works effectively when all criteria 
can be assigned a monetary estimate.  This method does not always meet the moral values of all 
parties if agreement does not exist on the appropriate values to assign.  Multiple iterations may 
be required to create consensus on the monetary values.  Those who do not agree with the 
methods or values are not likely to support the policy recommendations.  The controversy over 
CBA is typically linked to a discussion of equity and fairness, although the monetary weighting 
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is, in itself, an exercise in value assessment.  McRae and Wilde (1979) note CBA is a clear and 
consistent system used extensively in policy analysis, and analysts and decision makers need to 
understand the reasoning even if they disagree with the assumptions (Bingham & Ethridge, 
1982). 
CBA allows the decision maker to determine potential Pareto optimal solutions and 
understand magnitude of gains and losses (NCEDR, 2002).  The process attempts to 
operationalize and measure all gains and losses and assumes society is better off if benefits 
outweigh the costs.  It is typically difficult to measure all social costs and benefits, but careful 
analysis can compensate for imperfect measurement of social values.  Each alternative is 
compared to the status quo and the choice of no action.  Opportunity cost is used to quantify the 
values forgone by the selection of each alternative (Bingham & Ethridge, 1982; McRae & Wilde, 
1979).   
CBA measures economic efficiency, but some situations may require more than an 
assessment of efficiency and it cannot measure the multidimensional issues such as ethical, 
equity, and social issues.  CBA can inform public policy, but it is one-dimensional and cannot 
make the decisions (NCEDR, 2002).  Although CBA has been applied to agriculture and natural 
resource issues for decades, a consensus does not exist on monetary valuation methods, data is 
limited, valuations from one scenario are typically not transferrable to another, and valuations 
are often not accepted by public or policymakers (Stoorvogel, Antle, Crissman, & Bowen, 2001).  
CBA is only capable of estimating the effects of an isolated impact and does not explicitly model 
linkages across scales or sectors.  One variation on CBA is partial budgeting which assesses only 
additional or marginal costs and benefits (Rushton et al., 1999).  A policy analysis matrix 
(PAM), which is a system of partial budgets identifying costs and revenues by market segment, 
can be used with a CBA to evaluate linkages between sectors.  If spillovers into other sectors are 
extensive or changes are expected in land or labor markets due to impacts from a demand shock, 
then CBA and PAM are likely not appropriate.  Price effects are also typically not included in a 
traditional CBA analysis (Rich et al., 2005b).  Regardless, Quigley and Scotchmer (1989) argue 
that all public decisions should be made using some variation of CBA.   
 Input-output tables 
An input-output (I-O) table can specify economic transactions through the flow of inputs 
and outputs between sectors of the economy and model interregional flows of critical economic 
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linkages.  A social accounting matrix (SAM) can extend the results by adding factors related to 
production, institution, capital, and rest-of-world (ROW) impacts.  Individual commodities on 
the domestic level can also be assessed.  A SAM can also show flows of incomes and spending 
to and from different household and income groups, government income from taxes, and public 
expenditures.  Savings and investments across the economy can be shown with a capital account 
and a ROW account will indicate the economy-wide global influences.  Exogenous shocks on 
sector performance can be analyzed using an I-O table in conjunction with an SAM with the use 
of multipliers.  A CBA can be used to generate short-run costs as an input into an I-O model.  
While an I-O can be a useful tool for policy analysis, limitations exist.  Production assumes no 
substitution between inputs and constant returns to scale, specifications known as Leontief 
technology.  It also assumes fixed prices and perfectly elastic supply while all changes are due to 
demand shifts, and they are not designed for medium- or long-term impact analysis (Rich et al., 
2005b).   
 Partial equilibrium model 
Functional supply and demand relationships for specific commodities at a set time and 
place can be defined in a partial equilibrium model.  Market-wide impacts of a shock on prices, 
quantities, and welfare is measured, and models can be single sector or multimarket, which 
creates linkages and identifies impacts between related markets.  The data required to develop a 
full functioning model is substantial.  Partial equilibrium models can be used in conjunction with 
a CBA (Rich et al., 2005b). 
 Computable general equilibrium models 
A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model represents the entire economy and can 
measure impacts across sectors, types of households, and different employment groups.  The 
strengths of I/O models and multimarket partial equilibrium models can be combined in a CGE 
model.  Price changes, reallocation of labor and capital, and long-term impacts can be evaluated.  
Such a thorough model, however, is highly complex, expensive to develop, and is challenging to 
interpret.  They are often aggregated in such a way as to simplify the construction while 
providing less useful results if specific questions need to be addressed.  CGE models can be 
combined with a CBA to provide more specific results (Rich et al., 2005b). 
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 Optimization mathematical programming  
Dynamic optimization models can be used to minimize negative costs or maximize 
positive outcomes when comparing multiple alternatives and allowing dynamic situational 
changes (Kobayashi et al., 2007b).  All possible activities are considered while resource use and 
production are constrained within the model.  The intent is to identify an optimal solution that 
maximizes the given objective.  Accurate data is necessary for effective and trustworthy model 
optimization.  Shadow prices, the incremental change due to a change in the constraint, can also 
be generated to aid the evaluation process.  The focus can be on a single goal or multiple 
priorities which leads to multicriteria decision making (Rushton et al., 1999).  
Linear programming is designed to find an optimal solution through maximization or 
minimization and can better deal with long-term impacts than CBA.  It does not allow for price 
effects to be modeled and does not consider inter-sector linkages, but does allow for evaluation 
of changes in behavior (Rich et al., 2005a).  Dynamic programming focuses on the identification 
of an optimal solution through a sequence of decisions.  Policymakers do not usually have a 
simple objective function, so dynamic programming analysis is designed to deal with multiple 
and sometimes competing objectives.  Multiple objective programming can be useful to decision 
makers because numerous what-if scenarios can be compared and compromise can be found 
between objectives.  These methods can face technical limitations and depend on the correct 
specification of the problem and specific objectives (Rushton et al., 1999). 
 Economic surplus 
Economic effects of change can be evaluated with an economic surplus method based on 
a production function applied to study the effect of changes on supply functions.  The steps 
include determining expected technological changes, evaluating the impact of those changes on 
the supply curve, estimating the supply shift and its associated new market equilibrium, and 
measuring the resulting changes in welfare.  Substantial data is required and concerns exist about 
the need for value judgments and the relevance of results to policy concerns (Rushton et al., 
1999). 
 Simulation modeling  
A simulation model is a mathematical, computer-based tool that simulates real world 
occurrences based on input data.  It is highly effective for dynamic relationships with multiple 
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subsystems and interactions.  Simulation models offer significant flexibility and can be 
structured in multiple ways.  Simulation is a suitable alternative when experimentation is not 
feasible, but it can be costly and time consuming.  Limited available data requires the 
simplification of assumptions, which compromises the model’s integrity, validity, and purposeful 
use (Rushton et al., 1999).  Simulation models can aid decision makers though development and 
comparison of policy alternatives.  If there are multiple levels and alternatives to evaluate, the 
options and scenarios that need to be considered may be difficult to model and compare and a 
more efficient process may be required (Kobayashi et al., 2007b). 
 Risk analysis 
When uncertainty exists, risk analysis can be a helpful decision making tool.  For each 
policy alternative, numerical values of the probabilities and consequences are estimated and used 
to compare impacts of each alternative.  Risk is communicated to stakeholders and decision 
makers.  Evaluations are typically quantitative, but could also be developed in a qualitatively.  
Risk analysis can be seen as “technically sound and socially responsible” (Giovannini, 2007, p. 
257) when used to support decision making at all levels and has been increasingly used for 
studying issues related to food safety, national security, natural disasters, and international trade 
and health (Giovannini, 2007).  
When alternatives are considered under uncertainty, their outcome may not be as 
expected.  The decision maker’s risk tolerance is influenced by their risk attitude and the scale of 
the risk.  The risk attitude of the decision maker will determine how they interpret results from 
analysis and will influence their policy decision.  A decision maker who is risk neutral will focus 
on expected values of policy choices and select a policy alternative with an average lower cost, 
while a risk-averse decision maker will focus on minimizing the chance of negative 
consequences.  A risk-seeking decision maker will be influenced by the upside of the 
consequences.  This knowledge may impact a researcher’s process of sharing data and 
information (Hueston, 2007; Ge, Mourits, Kristensen, & Huirne, 2008).   
When a policy choice is made ex ante with high uncertainty, the risk of underreacting or 
overreacting exists.  The decision maker’s risk attitude will play a critical role in the selection of 
policy alternatives in static analysis.  If predicted risk can change over time, a risk-averse choice 
may become a risk-taking choice if the situation changes from pessimistic to optimistic (Ge et 
al., 2010). 
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If the decision maker understands the probability distribution and uses it in the decision 
process, their risk preferences will be expressed related to distribution of adverse consequences.  
Risk-neutral and risk-averse decision making can be represented by the breakeven risk aversion 
coefficient (BRAC).  BRAC analysis, typically with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), 
can identify the risk aversion coefficient where the decision makers preferences changes from 
one alternative to another (Hagerman et al., 2012). 
There are four components of risk analysis, including hazard identification, risk 
assessment, risk management, and risk communication.  One component within risk management 
is option evaluation, which can be used to identify, select, and evaluate the efficacy and 
feasibility of alternative strategies to reduce adverse consequences.  It serves as a bridge between 
risk assessment and risk management (Giovannini, 2007).   
Risk assessment is used to evaluate the related quantitative estimates and the role risk 
plays in decision making.  Typically, the components of a risk are defined quantitatively with the 
intent to compare alternatives across predetermined criteria.  Risk assessment can also be 
semiquantitative or qualitative depending on the situation being assessed.  Results can serve as 
decision support for policymakers.  Risk assessment has been used more recently for 
environmental policy analysis.  The use of risk assessment in decision making in this area 
indicates a positivist perspective in which risks to the environment and public health can be 
compared with feasibility, cost, resource availability, etc.  The precautionary perspective 
emphasizes the need to give more consideration to uncertainties and can be further influenced if 
the public does not trust the information being used or the decision process (Cowell, Fairman, & 
Lofstedt, 2002).   
While it can be considered objective and scientific, some concerns do exist with risk 
assessment as a stand-alone decision tool.  A few of those concerns include the role values may 
play in the process, the sense of certainty created by the quantitative results when uncertainties 
exist, the difficulty non-experts have interpreting results, the delays in action created by 
uncertainty, and the challenges of obtaining necessary data (Cowell et al., 2002). 
 Expected utility theory 
Expected utility theory can be used for analyzing policies involving risk.  Utility 
functions are used to quantify preferences.  Biases in probability judgment can occur due to 
conjunction fallacy (e.g. if it plausible, it is probable), optimism (it will not happen to me), and 
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availability (versus frequency).  Judgments may also be incorrect when risks from low 
probability events are ignored.  Mental accounting, reframing, endowment effects, reluctance to 
make tradeoffs, inclusion of additional attributes, regret theory, ambiguity, status quo bias, 
emotional dimensions of risk, intertemporal risks, and other aspects of prospect theory can 
influence judgments and violate expected utility.  Contingent weighting, lexicographic choice, 
and threshold comparison are rules that can be applied to simplify expected utility theory.  
Traditional policy tools designed to deal with low probability risks, such as economic incentives, 
compensation, benefit sharing, regulations, and standards, interfere with public choice and 
expected utility.  Risk and uncertainty continue to influence choice and must be considered in the 
decision process (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989). 
 Robust decision making 
Robust decision making (RDM) runs models on a large number of varying sets of 
assumptions to determine how policies perform in different settings.  RDM avoids the predict-
then-act framework by completing multiple runs of the analysis backwards starting with the plan 
under consideration.  The process starts with policymakers defining the goals, uncertainties, and 
choices under consideration, and then computer models generate a large database of runs 
indicating the performance of the policy in the future.  Analysts can provide results in statistical 
and visualized forms to decision makers to help them see how their plans will perform under 
certain conditions and scenarios.  The scenarios are used to identify ways to address 
vulnerabilities and options are evaluated using tradeoff analysis.  RDM combines the best 
features of scenario analysis and probabilistic risk analysis.  Two ways RDM has been used are 
with water management decisions and terrorism insurance.  RDM uses a deliberation with 
analysis approach and is intended to improve decision making under deep uncertainty (RAND, 
2013).  It allows a change in the question being answered from “what will the future bring?” to 
“what steps can we take today to most assuredly shape the future to our liking?” (RAND, 2013, 
p.5).  
 Predictive analysis 
There are an increasing number of policy issues requiring social change and innovation.  
Policy analysis needs to account for these characteristics and be able to compare alternatives.  
One approach is predictive analysis.  Statistics, modeling, and data analysis are used to evaluate 
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current and historical facts to predict future or unknown events.  By capturing historical 
relationships, risks can be assessed to guide decision making and models can forecast results of 
decisions (McRae & Wilde, 1979). 
 Sensitivity analysis 
Because economic decision processes are rarely precise, it is typical to evaluate changes 
in specific estimates on expected values using sensitivity analysis.  All values are held constant 
except for the factor being considered (Rushton et al., 1999).  
 Qualitative approaches 
 Alternatives-consequences approach 
J. Carroll Bottum and J. Byron (Heavy) Kohlmeyer, agricultural policy economists at 
Purdue University, developed the alternatives-consequences approach to public policy education 
in the 1930s.  This approach is considered a milestone in public policy analysis, empowers 
education in the face of controversy rather than prescription or advocacy, is still applicable 
today, and is comprised of five steps:  
 Define the issue as a problem to be solved, 
 Develop and list the alternative solutions, 
 State the consequences of each alternative, 
 Educate and interact, and 
 Move on to work on something else, leaving to policymakers to make the decision 
(Barrows, 1983; Barrows, 1993; Bottum, 1975; Flinchbaugh, 2003; House, 1993). 
The alternatives-consequence approach creates a framework for linking research and 
problem-solving processes to real-world problems, requires equal consideration of multiple 
alternatives, involves interaction with stakeholders and decision makers, and creates an 
opportunity for rational consideration of policy choices by decision makers (Barrows, 1983; 
House, 1993).  Philosophically, it is about teaching people how to think rather than thinking for 
them.  The choice itself is left to the political process (Barrows, 1983).  This approach is 
significantly different from analysis completed by “penning pithy policy prescriptions from the 
safety of one’s office” (House, 1993, p. 28).  
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Listing consequences and allowing for application of quantitative weights to each one 
works well when alternatives are specific (McRae & Wilde, 1979).  Assessing consequences 
rather than pros and cons is important to maintain objectivity (Adams & Hairston, 1995).  
Objectivity is essential but should be seen as a goal to reach for and not an absolute condition.  
Pure objectivity is impossible, but working to be objective is not.  The alternatives-consequences 
approach provides a tool for objective analysis of the problem, alternatives, and consequences 
(Barrows, 1983; Flinchbaugh, 2003; House, 1993).  
An alternative model, which can be referred to as the Consequences-Alternatives Model, 
is based on the idea that all stakeholders are interested in the same consequence or goal and the 
analysis then focuses on helping determine which policy alternative best meets that goal 
(Barrows, 1983; Barrows, 1993). 
 Value contribution method 
The Value Contribution (VC) method begins with the prioritization of objectives.  
Confusion may exist over which objectives are higher priorities, so the VC method calls for the 
specification of objectives and priorities before alternatives are identified.  If goals are agreed 
upon initially, it is more likely policymakers will select a policy approach that best meets those 
priorities.  Priorities can be set through numeric scaling or ranking.  Objectives may need to be 
disaggregated in order to prioritize and then aggregated again for policymaker consideration 
(Campbell & Nichols, 1977).  
The value contribution method is based on the concept that the policy objectives need to 
be prioritized for alternatives to be compared.  Priorities need to reflect community needs and the 
expected benefit of each alternative.  By setting priorities, decisions can be made about which 
objectives can be detailed in action plans, alternatives, and consequences.  The value 
contribution method is based on identifying desired objectives to be prioritized, goals to be 
achieved by meeting objectives, the relative value contribution of different objectives in reaching 
the same goal, the relative worth or value of desired achievements, and the gap between current 
and desired levels of achievement of each objective.  The priority of an objective is the product 
of its value when fully achieved times the discrepancy gap between current and desired levels of 
achievement.  The value contribution method provides a rational, objective approach to combine 
subjective value judgments (Campbell & Nichols, 1977). 
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 Cost-benefit analysis qualitative framework 
In some cases, costs and benefits related to policy alternatives may be a challenge to 
quantify, place in a certain range, or reduce into one CBA due to limits on available data.  In 
those cases, a comparative matrix may be useful in the decision process when comparing 
alternatives.  Implicit tradeoffs between costs and benefits for one stakeholder may create an 
externality for another.  Thus, the outcome of a CBA or economic analysis may be necessary but 
insufficient in evaluating the impact of policy alternatives and the actual overall societal effect.  
A combination of economic analysis and qualitative assessments can be used to address this 
shortcoming.  A finite list of policy alternatives must first be identified and explained in detail, 
and costs and benefits related to each of these choices should be identified for each stakeholder 
with the current situation as a baseline.  A qualitative framework may consist of a table with 
color coding to indicate increased benefit/decreased cost, increased cost/decreased benefit, 
neutral offset of cost and benefit, and economic analysis results indicating impacts on costs and 
benefits.  This process can be further improved by creating scenario frameworks allowing for 
better long-term planning and more accurate conclusions on outputs and parameters (Bitko, 
2007). 
 Cost-effectiveness 
There are issues deserving of analysis in which the costs and benefits are not well suited 
for monetary evaluation.  In some cases, it is not possible to measure all benefits so analysis 
must come with qualifications.  One alternative to the benefit-cost ratio is the cost-effectiveness 
ratio where beneficial outcomes are compared to the costs.  Cost-effectiveness ratios serve as 
tests of efficiency and systematic comparisons of positive and negative effects of specified 
alternatives.  Cost effectiveness does not require that all outcomes be valued in the same unit and 
allows alternatives to be ranked in terms of magnitude (Bingham & Ethridge, 1982; McRae & 
Wilde, 1979).   
Cost-effectiveness analysis is based on the idea there is a specific desirable outcome or 
benefit to achieve and multiple alternative pathways.  The analysis is designed to be comparative 
and identify the cheapest or most efficient choice to achieve the desired benefit.  A cost-
effectiveness approach allows costs to be compared while maximizing benefits that are measured 
by some scale of measurement other than monetary value.  It still allows for optimization by 
focusing on benefits gained at the most effective cost.  It is possible the least expensive option is 
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not the best policy choice and other social and political factors need to be considered (Sewell & 
Marczak, 2008; Shachter, 2008a). 
All cost analysis tools face limitations because they can be overly simplistic, there is no 
standard way to assign monetary values to some qualitative factors, market costs do not always 
reflect actual social costs, some costs or values may be more or less important than others, and 
there may be multiple competing goals requiring prioritization (Sewell & Marczak, 2008). 
 Decision analysis 
Decision analysis is most concerned with uncertainty where desirable outcomes are well 
established, but it is unclear which alternative best delivers those outcomes.  In these cases, 
probabilities of each outcome must be estimated (Bingham & Ethridge, 1982; McRae & Wilde, 
1979).  The evaluation is based on events the decision maker can control, the probability of 
certain events, and the value of outcomes.  By identifying policy alternatives and assessing 
values and probabilities to potential outcomes, complex problems and related actions can be 
evaluated.  It typically involves the construction of pay-off tables or decision trees.  The decision 
trees provide the advantage of chronologically depicting events and outlining sequential 
decisions (Rushton et al., 1999).  Decision analysis and CBA are often used jointly.  When 
alternatives have more than one possible outcome, a CBA can be used to assess the relative value 
of each and decision analysis may be used to determine which alternative is best (Bingham & 
Ethridge, 1982; McRae & Wilde, 1979). 
 Multicriteria decision making analysis 
Multicriteria analysis attempts to provide support to decision makers when there are 
multiple conflicting criteria and a finite set of policy alternatives.  Objectives are defined, criteria 
are arranged, alternatives are selected, and consequences (direct measurements of alternatives in 
meeting criteria) are measured.  The goal is to identify the conflicts and find a compromise 
solution.  Results can select the best alternative, sort alternatives into homogenous groups, rank 
alternatives from best to worst, or describe the impact of each alternative (Xin, 2006).  
Multicriteria decision making evaluates alternatives on their ability to meet predetermined 
objectives using measurable criteria.  It allows for complex problems to be broken down into 
manageable components for consideration, requires active stakeholder participation, and 
emphasizes the stakeholders’ opinions in the establishment of objectives and criteria and the 
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associated weighting of relative importance (Mourits et al., 2010).  The general steps in 
multicriteria decision making are: “(1) establishment of decision context, (2) identification of 
alternatives to be appraised, (3) identification of criteria, (4) scoring of alternatives, (5) 
weighting of criteria, (6) calculation of overall value, (7) examination of results by ranking 
alternatives, and (8) performance of sensitivity analysis” (Mourits et al., 2010, p. 202). 
One form of multicriteria analysis is strategic policy analysis involving multiple decision 
makers who have different goals and the ability to influence the potential outcomes through their 
decisions.  Non-cooperative game theory is one model alternative based on economics and 
Bayesian decision analysis.  However, timing of actions is critical in the modeling process which 
is often difficult to determine.  Utilities are also difficult to measure and mixed strategies are 
problematic to interpret.  Another option for analyzing strategic conflicts is the graph model for 
conflict resolution.  This process analyzes the decision in terms of decision makers, states, 
transitions, options, and preferences to identify possible resolutions based on certain stability 
definitions.  Other models include multi-attribute utility theory, outranking, metagame analysis, 
conflict analysis, and theory of moves (Xin, 2006). 
Another form of multicriteria decision analysis is the analytic hierarchy process which 
includes consideration of both quantitative and qualitative factors in a mathematical decision 
making model.  Complex decisions are reduced to one-on-one comparisons, and then results are 
synthesized.  A hierarchy structure is developed based on a criteria-subcriteria-alternatives 
framework.  Single properties of alternatives are compared allowing the decision makers to use 
clear rationale to make the best selection.  The analytic network process replaces hierarchies with 
networks and allows for interactions within and between clusters of decision elements.  This 
method is especially applicable when risk and uncertainty exist (Xin, 2006). 
The multilevel hierarchic Markov decision process (MLHMP) is a dynamic multistage 
decision making model.  It is designed to create a connection between the static approaches of 
decision making typically seen in research with the dynamic decisions made in reality.  It builds 
on the real options approach, which is based on irreversible choices under uncertainty.  It allows 
for flexibility in decision making by keeping options open in the face of uncertainty.  Real 
options theory has been used primarily with investment decisions and flexibility and allows for 
options thinking in any complex situation.  Real options theory focuses on the logic of strategic 
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opportunism.  Investments in different time frames and returns to policy alternatives can be 
compared (Ge et al., 2008).   
MLHMP stacks Markov decisions into a hierarchical structure based on levels of 
decisions modeled.  The process can be used to model and optimize decisions in a situation 
framed in uncertainty, and is suitable for strategic, tactical, and operational decisions in systems 
with long-term impacts.  States, actions, decision stages, and time horizons are defined at every 
hierarchical level, and an optimal action in each state is determined.  The decision model 
“formulates the scientific form of the decision problem” (Ge et al., 2010, p. 168) based on data 
provided to select an optimal strategy.  The optimization of the MLHMP model results in 
optimal policy choices being identified with decision rules for each state at each stage in the 
decision process.  The model offers distinct advantages in the structure, formulation, and 
solutions of complex decision problems consisting of interdependent decisions across time 
frames and can be useful in practical decision making.  The perceived complexity of the 
multilevel, multistage process can be seen as a disadvantage.  User-friendly look-up tables or 
policy guidelines with respect to application of policy choices could simplify the process and 
make it more relevant (Ge et al., 2010). 
 Tradeoff analysis 
Tradeoff analysis is based on knowing what is being managed for and if those things are 
being achieved.  To determine these questions, criteria and indicators must be identified.  Criteria 
need to be strategic, operational, scientific, and reflect values and critical considerations of 
stakeholders.  Indicators are tactical and should be measureable, operable, credible, and relevant 
to criteria.  They must determine if criteria are being met and progress is being made.  
Multicriteria tradeoff analysis may use experts to rank criteria to narrow the potential list to one 
that is manageable for consideration.  While this approach is highly transparent and simple, 
concerns may exist over expert reliability and priorities especially when facing complex 
situations.  Several methods have been developed to determine stakeholder values and 
preferences through different weighting techniques (Maness, 2007).  When ranking alternatives, 
it is also a challenge to develop one common unit of analysis and determine what weighting to 
use (Stoorvogel et al., 2001).  Once preferences are determined, multiobjective linear 
programming and goal programming can be used to model planning choices using a multicriteria 
approach (Maness, 2007).  Tradeoffs can also be characterized between different objectives 
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based on the concept of Pareto optimality where no further improvement can be made without 
causing harm elsewhere (NCEDR, 2002; Sekine, Campos-Nanez, Harrald, & Abeledo, 2006).  
Tradeoff analysis has been used in agricultural and environmental policy analysis with decision 
tools integrating disciplinary data at the field scale using GIS, agronomic production models, 
econometric models, and environmental process models.  The use of a tradeoff assessment 
allows for the design and organization of multidisciplinary research with competing objectives.  
Public stakeholders, policymakers, and scientists identify critical concerns.  Simulations are used 
to aggregate outcomes from the modeling tools and thus to analyze economic, environmental, 
and public health tradeoffs (Antle, Stoorvogel, Crissman, & Bowen, 2000; Stoorvogel et al., 
2001).  
 Feasibility analysis 
Any policy decision needs to consider the feasibility of policy alternatives to determine if 
the options can be implemented.  In dealing with a foreign animal disease (FAD), a number of 
policy alternatives may be considered that are simply not viable.  Feasibility should be evaluated 
in at least four areas: 
 Administrative (Operational) Feasibility.  Can the alternative actually be 
implemented and used?   
 Technical Feasibility.  Are the resources and technology available? 
 Economic Feasibility.  What are the costs and who pays? Are the benefits worth 
the costs?  
 Political Feasibility.  Does the political will exist to implement the policy 
alternative? 
Any policy alternative that is not feasible in any of these areas is unlikely to ever be 
implemented or considered a successful alternative.  Feasibility should be addressed early in the 
analysis process and can be provided to decision makers in the form of a feasibility analysis 
matrix (Giorgini, 2003).   
 Fault tree analysis 
Fault trees are a logical and hierarchical risk assessment tool used to identify pathways 
from an undesirable incident leading to an undesired final event, such as ineffective animal 
disease control, by identifying all combination of consequences and causes interconnected to 
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intermediate events along the pathways.  Researchers in Switzerland and Japan identified a need 
for new epidemiological tools to complete a risk assessment of disease control responses and 
developed a general FMD fault tree to help decision makers find more effective disease control 
activities and identify optimal strategies.  They identified a lack of rapid, effective, and complete 
FAD control as the final failure and looked at cause-effect relationships of response strategies 
and legislative changes occurring after an initial FMD outbreak.  The situation worsened within 
the tree if inaccurate epidemiological assumptions were made, ineffective communication 
occurred between stakeholders, or inadequate policies were implemented.  Examples included 
overestimating culling capacity, insufficient information about number of animals to be 
vaccinated, poor vaccine quality, and overestimation of the amount of disposal resources 
available.  A total of seven intermediate and 68 basic events were built into the fault tree.  
Different events were not weighted or prioritized.  The fault tree can be used for retrospective 
analysis to determine what led to a negative outcome, the basis of review and update of existing 
contingency plans, and prospective development of an event map for use in an actual event.  
Probabilities of each event and priorities on each branch would add to the usefulness of the fault 
tree and allow for a qualitative and quantitative assessment of control strategies (Isoda, 
Kadohira, Sekiguchi, Schuppers, & Stark, 2013).  
 Limitations of policy analysis 
Political scientists have struggled with remaining relevant to decision makers and many 
have come to the realization that analysis remains only one factor in the policy decision process.  
Costs of analysis, lack of practical application, poor predictive theory, and a failure to address 
political doctrine are downfalls of political science work.  New frameworks of policy analysis 
continue to be considered but fail to meet the needs of policymakers who do not trust that results 
can be accurate, useful, and actionable (Miller, 1989). 
 Limited usefulness to decision makers 
Regardless of the amount of effort and progress accomplished in the field of policy 
analysis, there are substantial indications that policymakers do not often use policy analysis for 
making policy decisions or for choosing amongst alternatives (Shulock, 1999).  Policymakers are 
typically not provided the breadth and depth of information they need to make decisions and 
justify political action with traditional policy analysis tools.  Analysis focused on economic 
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efficiency as sole justification is seen by some decision makers as inadequate.  While economic 
efficiency is critical to overall social value, it may not include all relevant information necessary 
for policy evaluation (Holland, 2005).  Some decision makers see quantitative methods and tools 
as counterproductive or as distractions when dealing with fast-paced, transformative, and 
challenging policy decisions.  They know it is possible predictions will be wrong, so they are 
likely to ignore analytical help (RAND, 2013).   
While some discussion of policy analysis and its decreased use by decision makers calls 
for changes in analysis and a new approach to evaluation, others have laid the problem on 
policymakers and changes in the political process and do not believe analysis needs to be 
adapted.  In addition, experience is often valued as more important than research (Trostle et al., 
1999).  As Shulock notes, today’s policy world “favors anecdotes over substance, pessimism 
over the incrementalist’s optimism, passion over reason, and media sound bites over reasoned 
political discourse” (1999, p. 239).   
A report from the House of Commons Environment Sub-Committee notes that 
policymakers should avoid the use of computer models as prescriptive answers and not allow 
results to be developed in an isolated technocratic process and then used to force a decision on 
skeptical stakeholders (Cowell et al., 2002).  “A model constitutes a theory, and a predictive 
model is therefore only a theoretical projection” (Kitching, Thrusfield, et al., 2006, p. 298).  No 
simulation, regardless of its complexity, is exactly like real life (Kao, 2002).  
As originally noted by George Box, models are typically wrong, but some may be useful 
in the decision process (Green & Medley, 2002; Taylor, 2003).  While Green & Medley (2002) 
considered how wrong a model must be before it is no longer useful and how useful it must be to 
advise policy, Taylor (2003) wondered how valid it must be to be useful to decision makers.  It 
may be more important to determine if the model is useful and if policymakers can be confident 
in its results because of its relationship to real systems and real decision processes than to 
determine its validity.  It may be more important to validate the use of a model rather than the 
model itself (Taylor, 2003).   
 Data and time limitations 
While models are intended to reduce uncertainty, decrease risk, maximize credibility, and 
create confidence for the end user, quantity and quality data limitations are one of the greatest 
challenges to the ability of policy analysis tools to meet those expectations.  As Longworth et al. 
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noted, “the risk of garbage in garbage out exists, and uncertainty can never be ruled out 
completely” (Longworth et al., 2012b, p. 3).   
Tools or models need quality data and useful results to serve a purpose in the decision 
making process; specifically, the model’s ability to reliably predict the outcomes of policy 
alternatives to assist policymakers.  Even if the model accurately reflects the impact of policy 
choices, the results are only as good as the original data.  As Heller noted, analysis provides “a 
marvelous array of pretend tools which would perform wonders if ever a set of facts should turn 
up in the right form” (Farrell, 1976, p. 791). 
One of the greatest challenges in dealing with policy is timing.  If a choice needs to be 
made and useful information does not exist, lacks quality, contradicts other information, or is 
insufficient, the policymaker still must make a decision.  Therefore, scientists must think ahead 
and determine what policymakers will need, learn how to deal with uncertainty, and have 
relevant information available (Meffe & Viederman, 1995).  Policy researchers, such as 
congressional aides, have indicated that for information to be useful in policy development it 
must be available on demand as important issues surface.  Timely delivery of information 
addressing policy questions is critical for the information to be helpful (Boone, Tucker, & 
McClaskey, 2002); “The burden, unfortunately, is on scientists to provide relevant, timely, and 
meaningful information to policymakers” (Meffe & Viederman, 1995, p. 328).   
 Political realities 
The decision styles of policymakers are different from the type of evidence and 
information provided by analysis.  In the most basic comparison, it comes down to reason versus 
politics.  A rational approach indicates decisions are made from purposeful and logical 
deliberation while the political model indicates decisions are made by debating alternatives with 
no more emphasis placed on scientific evidence than previous experience.  A third model, 
intuitional approach, is not based on processing information, but is based on feel, instinct, and 
ideology.  Often intuition becomes the primary source of influence over the decision maker when 
policy analysis tools appear to be no more credible or reliable than gut feeling (Miller, 1989).  In 
addition, policy analysis needs to pay attention to political feasibility in the evaluation process 
(Szostak, 2005).   
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 Low-probability, high consequence events 
For policy analysis to serve its purpose, it is necessary to accurately define the objectives, 
outcomes, and values of stakeholders from the beginning.  This can be exceptionally challenging 
in low probability, high consequence events with a wide range of impacted stakeholders (Cowell 
et al., 2002).  In these cases, there is generally disagreement on the probabilities and potential 
consequences, which leads to unrealistic expectations and misunderstandings about risk.  Most 
analysis tools assume stable understanding and risk preference of the situation, which makes it 
more difficult to apply them to low probability-high consequence events.  If the probabilities of 
risks are not estimated effectively and there is incomplete information, a classic market failure 
can occur as does with externalities and public goods (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989).   
 More questions than answers 
Policy analysis is frequently based on scenarios with assumptions which makes results 
seem meaningless and typically creates as many questions as answers.  These shortcomings in 
policy analysis make the role of the decision makers more difficult rather than simpler (Miller, 
1989).  While traditionalists see analysis as a tool to help decision makers select from policy 
alternatives, others see it as a contribution to the discussion and not a problem-solving tool 
(Shulock, 1999).  Conflicting, imperfect information and demands from multiple perspectives 
surround policymakers.  They want answers, not more problems or questions (Meffe & 
Viederman, 1995).  Policy analysis may be more effective at showing the challenge of selected 
problems and the difficulty in making a decision than simplifying the decision process (Lynn, 
1999).  Scientists and economists can be seen as “better at asking the right question than finding 
the right answer” (Leman & Nelson, 1981, p. 99).  Policymakers often expect rapid, unequivocal 
research that leads to clear, final answers and do not want the predictable response of “more 
research is needed” (Trostle et al., 1999, p. 103) 
 Communication and influence 
If the work of policy analysts and educators is going to prove useful, it must reach 
decision makers and serve a purpose when it does so.  The Kings-Kingmakers model, depicted in 
Figure 5-2, has been considered most useful by some policy analysts and educators in reaching 
policymakers but requires analysts and educators “to get out of the ivory tower and ‘break 
bread’” (Flinchbaugh, 2003, p. 2).  The order of influence as depicted in the triangle indicates the 
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importance of a small group of influential individuals and organizations, known as kingmakers 
that operate behind the policy stage to influence policy decisions.  Kings are typically visible 
leaders and elected officials.  Actives represent civically-engaged individuals and interested 
individuals that stay informed on relevant topics.  The apathetic groups represent those not 
engaged.  All levels of influence need to be considered in the policy development process 
(Knutson et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 5-2 Community influence triangle. (Flinchbaugh, 2003, p. 2). 
 Only one part of the process 
Policy analysis is a social science and it cannot achieve the rigor of other scientific areas.  
While the application of science to policy leads to data collection, the rigorous evaluation of 
alternatives, and defined reasons for action, it does not account for values, human interests, and 
political context which are necessary in the policy making process (Lynn, 1999).  Political 
analysis is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end of improving how policies are made 
(Bottum, 1975; Lynn, 1999).   
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As Tildesley et al. (2007) noted in defense of their model, “our model will be of value as 
a decision tool, it should only ever be used – as with any model – as one of the various sources of 
information available to policy makers” (p. E13). 
While models are seen as invaluable decision support, they “cannot provide complete and 
unequivocal answers to a decision making problem” (Taylor, 2003, p. 6).  They can be used to 
explore options and issues, but decision making criteria will be based on factors not covered in a 
model.  Decision makers need to understand model results will likely be imprecise and depend 
on assumptions made to deal with uncertainties.  They are not an end in themselves, but help 
provide greater understanding (Taylor, 2003). 
The greatest gain from mathematical models is the understanding that is created (Green 
& Medley, 2002).  “Many modelers live with the mantra that all models are incomplete, are 
partial representations of reality, are therefore wrong in some (possibly important) respects, are 
largely about ideas, understanding and integration of complexity, are but one of the tools in the 
scientific armory, and last and essential, if they are to be applied on practical matters, they must 
first be shown to be better than existing ways of solving those problems” (Thornley & France, 
2009, p. 140).   
 Need for a framework 
Models must be used with caution in the decision process.  Policymakers cannot depend 
on models and should be prepared to consider model results as one factor in the decision process.  
“Decision makers require some sort of framework within which model results can be combined 
with other quantitative and qualitative criteria to guide the decision” (Taylor, 2003, p. 81). 
Policymakers and the public need to understand the problem, identify the alternatives, 
and weigh the consequences.  Long- and short-term impacts, public and private costs and 
benefits, and clarification of who pays and who loses must be considered (Bottum, 1975).  Policy 
analysis needs to provide evaluation of the means and ends of a policy choice with an equitable 
consideration of the means that make it possible for an end to be achieved as well as the end 
itself (Holland, 2005).  A decision-making framework is needed that is designed by competent 
scholars to incorporate this information, other relevant research from multiple disciplines, and 
the bits and pieces that make up policy information and analysis (Bottum, 1975).   
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 Science, Economics, Research, and Policy 
Policy is influenced by many forces, including scientific and economic research.  
Informed choices, rational policy selection, and considered decisions result from the bridging of 
research and policy.  When research is not considered, policy is more heavily influenced by 
vested interests.  However, scientists and economists providing research information to 
policymakers could also be considered vested interests.  Research can influence policy with three 
approaches: 
 Rational approach (knowledge driven and problem solving), 
 Strategic approach (political and tactical), and 
 Enlightenment or diffusion approach (interactive and intellectual) (Trostle et al., 
1999). 
 Challenges 
The application of scientific information to policy decisions is not often successful.  
Often the scientific information is provided in a manner or volume difficult for the policymaker 
to comprehend, is not available, or deals with only one or a few of the scientific, economic, legal, 
or social issues being considered (Adams & Hairston, 1995).  The problems related to 
influencing policy with research are well-known, yet potential solutions are rare.  Unrealistic 
expectations, a lack of definitional clarity, and poor comprehension are challenges related to 
linking research with policy.  Guidance provided to policymakers should be less focused on 
policy content variables and more on the decision makers’ identities and qualities (motivation, 
agendas, leadership strengths, experience, training, prestige, and power), the processes of change 
and application (communication, interest group influence, actions, and outcomes), and the 
context of policy development (political and economic stability, level of centralization, and roles 
of government branches) (Trostle et al., 1999).  
Many policymakers do not have scientific backgrounds or expertise, but are faced with 
science-related policy issues.  Scientists need to provide accurate information to help decision 
makers consider policy alternatives while understanding science alone may not determine the 
decision (Nath, 2008).  In the case of agricultural economics where alternatives are typically 
weighed in terms of consequences, research can serve as an analytic, educational, or decision 
making resource (Butz, 1989).  Science gets translated into risk and risk gets translated into some 
396 
 
type of policy action.  Scientists need to develop sound risk-based scientific models to guide 
policy development (Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, 2006).   
 Risk attitude 
A decision maker’s risk attitude will influence policy decisions (Spradlin, 1997).  Risk 
cannot typically be eliminated by a policy choice, but policy choice can attempt to lower risk at 
the least cost.  Policymakers must blend science and reality to make a value judgment on 
acceptable levels of risk for the given scenario (Adams & Hairston, 1995).  A more risk averse 
decision maker will attempt to reduce potential negative outcomes in all cases, but a more risk 
neutral decision maker will likely consider the approach that averages the lowest negative 
outcome.  A risk-taking policy approach may focus on the strategy that leads to the most positive 
outcome even if it is less probable (Bergevoet et al., 2009).  Risk serves as the basis for decision 
making in regard to preventative and preparatory measures (Rushton & Upton, 2006) and 
determining the acceptable level of risk is political judgment to be made by the decision maker 
(Giovannini, 2007).   
 Science and policy relationship 
In 1921, Charles Merriam called for the cross-fertilization of science and politics, but 
attempts to blend the disciplines did not really get attention by analysts until the 1950s and 1960s 
(McCool, 1995).   
Science has traditionally been politicized in public policy debates.  Political advocates, 
legal experts, and special interest representatives increasingly use alleged scientific facts and 
acclaimed scientists to argue for their opinion or positions.  The contribution of science to sound 
policy development has been diminished and is in danger of being compromised (Pielke, 2002); 
“The connection between science and policy is nothing less than the connection between science 
and society itself” (Lynn, 1999, p. 423).  
There is an increasingly tense relationship and conflict between science and policy.  
Scientific problem solving is empirical, rational, and methods are highly prescribed.  Policy 
making is normative, assumes multiple interests, is not empirically justified, and is embedded in 
an irrational system.  Often policy is developed with little scientific or technical expertise but 
significant influence from special interest.  On the other hand, regulations and rules are often 
developed by bureaucrats and agency administrators who access scientific and technical 
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information but engage the public on a limited basis.  Policymakers often have science advisors, 
staff scientists work with agency decision makers, and science advisory panels may review 
policies and regulations and provide feedback.  While these methods create discussion between 
scientists and decision makers, no framework exists that equally integrates “science based 
rationalism and interest based democracy” (Cahn, 2002, p. 7). 
Science is made up of many scientific subgroups and in itself is not monolithic.  Many 
scientists believe “science alone provides a sufficient basis for decision-making, in that a 
problem is identified, various hypotheses are tested, remedial policies suggested and 
implemented – then the situation improves” (Pielke, 2002, p. 367).  However, this approach 
ignores political reality and may, in fact, lead science to being more political rather than making 
policy more scientific (Pielke, 2002).  Instead of scientific data driving policy and perhaps not 
asking the correct questions, there is a need for “policy-driven science” (Breeze, 2006, p. 273) 
where policymakers develop visionary goals and scientific tools are applied to meet those goals 
(Breeze, 2006). 
Researchers cannot complete scientific work and assume someone is using the 
information to make good decisions.  If results do not lead to effective policy, it accomplishes 
very little; “The challenge is for science to inform policy to change individual and institutional 
behavior” (Meffe & Viederman, 1995). 
It is important to understand “…how essential a close collaboration and a mutual 
understanding and agreement between scientists and policymakers are.  An open, progressive 
policy making process stimulates research and science in developing targeted, risk-based and 
cost-efficient survey methodologies” (Reist, Jemmi, & Stark, 2012, p. 182).  The development of 
strong working relationships between policymakers, industry leadership, implementing agencies, 
technical experts, and researchers early in the process allows for a better understanding of 
knowledge gaps, the development of solutions that best meet existing needs, and their more 
rapid, effective implementation of policy choices (Reist et al., 2012).   
The attempt to combine science, policy, and advocacy can be described as a shared 
interest iron triangle with policymakers, special interests, and scientists in each corner.  In this 
relationship, science is a traditional tool of debate and political maneuvering.  Thus, a clear 
definition needs to exist between political analysis and political advocacy.  Advocacy tends to try 
to limit policy alternatives to one or very few choices, while analysis provides a range of 
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alternatives and choices defined with associated consequences determined by scientific research.  
Advocates will continue to use science to support their arguments, and scientists must understand 
the repercussions of letting advocacy blend with scientific information until neither can stand 
alone.  Scientists need to determine how to provide input in a usable format through independent 
authorities to expand policy alternatives.  The goals of such efforts should be to reduce political 
stalemates and create a more realistic understanding of the role science can play in policy 
development (Pielke, 2002); “Policy efficacy can be improved to the extent the paradigmatic 
conflict between science based assessment and interest based policy making can be resolved” 
(Cahn, 2002, p.3). 
Scientists want public policy to be scientifically rational, but do not believe it to be.  
While there is great opportunity for science to influence policy, the process itself is not 
scientifically rational.  Scientists have experienced culture shock when exposed to the policy 
process and are surprised by the pace of activity, number of issues being considered 
simultaneously, and the reality that decisions must be made with incomplete information 
(Doering, 1994). 
“In an ideal world, biologists would experiment, observe, tell policymakers what to do, 
and it would be done.  But our world is far from ideal, and policy-making does not work that 
way” (Meffe & Viederman, 1995, p. 328).  In order to have influence on public policy, scientists 
must understand it is a political process balancing different players and different goals.  Instead 
of complaining about the political process, scientists need to adjust to the existing system.  
Scientists are also citizens and have every right and responsibility to influence policy.  The 
science-policy relationship will never be symmetric because policymakers will continue to make 
decisions without scientific input.  Scientists must incorporate broader information from multiple 
perspectives to better influence policy.  Science is only one potential input into the policy 
process, and scientists must listen to policymakers if they expect the opposite to occur.  They 
must also go where policymakers are – they are not readers of journals and they do not attend 
research conferences.  Scientists must provide information policymakers want and need, not 
what interests them (Meffe & Viederman, 1995).   
Education, science, and politics all serve different social purposes in public policy.  
Education is about developing the decision maker and requires interaction between learners, 
leaders, content, and context.  Science is about developing the information and differentiating 
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myth from fact.  Politics is about developing public policy potentially through communication, 
compromise, and agreement.  As Larry Libby noted, when referring to public policy analysis and 
education, “Our goal is to facilitate orderly change, minimize conflict, and generally inform 
people.  It is not our goal to preserve farmland, preserve farmers, preserve wetlands, increase the 
supply of cheap housing or expand the tax base.  We may vote on these issues at some point, but 
continued credibility as analysts and educators requires that we merely catalyze a decision 
process” (House, 1993, p. 29, Libby, 1991, p. 107-108).  
 Economic considerations 
Economists want their work to influence public policy, but do not often think about how 
their work can do so effectively.  They typically see themselves as distinct from politics, values, 
subjectivity, and normative elements.  If they limit themselves to this role, they can become 
irrelevant and excluded from the policy process.  They are advocates for efficiency, which is in 
itself a value-laden objective, and cannot be purely objective because economics, like other 
sciences, imposes its own premises and paradigms (Nelson, 1987).  Policy is about choosing 
between competing values and economic analysis fails to help decision makers select between 
them.  Equity may be seen as more important than efficiency and values may need to be 
weighted to reconcile with policymakers’ preferences (Leman & Nelson, 1981).  “While all 
disciplines of a university may contribute research results necessary to policy formulation, 
economics is the pivotal discipline” (Bottum, 1975, p. 764). 
Some stakeholders in policy debates see economists as the enemy.  Environmentalists are 
offended by the concept of a cost-benefit analysis of an environmental policy issue (Nelson, 
1987); “Within the field, policy analysts trained as political scientists have jousted with policy 
analysts trained as economists” (Lynn, 1999, p. 411). 
In some cases, natural resource and environmental professionals do not believe natural 
resource and water issues are a good fit for economic analysis because they are so politically 
charged.  The Bureau of Land Management has noted because it is “morally, ethically, and 
professionally right to institute management practices that stop erosion, grow better vegetation, 
and improve rangeland condition and trend.  We should not have to economically justify these 
management practices” (Leman & Nelson, 1981, p. 98).  Economists can serve a valuable role in 
policy debates and, like other scientists, provide a different view or perspective to policy 
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selection.  If economists will consider values and understand political priorities, many believe 
economists can provide guidance to policymakers on technical and scientific matters and help 
make the process more efficient and effective.  Once economists define the impacts of policy 
alternatives, policymakers can weigh the options against values and priorities (Nelson, 1987).  
Theories related to natural resource issues can be directly related to animal health issues. 
 Rulemaking 
Cahn (2002) called for a model of science-based policy where decisions are influenced 
by stakeholder debate but limited to predetermined alternatives constrained by scientific and 
economic efficacy.  While most research on policy analysis and influence on decision making 
have been done related to legislative bodies or head executive positions, little exists related to 
administrative-level policy influence which is where a majority of day-to-day policy decisions 
are made.  This model extends beyond negotiated rulemaking where consensus decisions are 
reviewed by a scientific panel to a process of bringing a consensus-based stakeholder group and 
a science advisory panel together to create a better policy that is based on technical expertise and 
science-based evaluation (Cahn, 2002).  
 Communication between policymakers and scientists 
Clear communication between policymakers and researchers is critical because the 
vocabulary of each is often different and understanding may be lost.  If each player wants to be 
seen as the most influential contributor to the decision, “mutual intellectual disdain” may exist 
(Trostle et al., 1999, p. 107).  While research is only one input in decision making, it can serve a 
critical role in the policy process with effective communication and collaboration between 
policymakers and researchers.  When policy formulation and research process can overlap and 
not be limited to functioning independently, opportunities exist to make better policy decisions 
(Trostle et al., 1999). 
 Values and policy 
A general belief exists among some scientists that research should be value free.  
However, policymaking is about maximizing a set goal and the selection of the factor being 
optimized incorporates value judgments.  Policy optimization is based on achieving goals, and 
goals represent and result from underlying values.  Policymakers, like researchers, need to be 
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objective and value free in execution and keep their personal values from influencing the 
evaluation and decision process.  Policy analysis also needs to be sensitive to account for 
changes in optimal policy choices when goals change (Nagel & Neef, 1978). 
Policy analysis includes economics, statistical inference, political science, social 
psychology, and sociology.  The language used is not neutral and serves as an indicator of 
values.  Analysis is about resource scarcity, opportunity cost, validity, stakeholders, 
organizational culture, goal displacement, cognitive dissonance, and efficiency (Lynn, 1999).  
Policy analysis tends to ignore ethical considerations and public policy programs tend to fail at 
teaching future analysts how to incorporate value decisions (Szostak, 2005).  Science is 
influenced by ethical and methodological value judgments (Kuhn, 1977).  Scientific analysis is 
often in conflict with values-driven choices (Coates, Heid, & Munger, 1994); “There is little 
sense in yearning for a bygone era when science was construed as ‘value-free’” (Pielke, 2002, p. 
368).   
Values influence what individuals believe ought to be or should be and determine how 
they view problems and the policy strategies that can address those problems (Beaulieu, 2000).  
Science cannot independently determine the best policy choice because it cannot provide a value 
judgment that prioritizes goals or interests of one stakeholder over another.  But values may 
drive what areas researchers choose to work on or develop expertise in and providing 
information even if intended to be unbiased can shift the political balance on the given issue.  
Even an objective, unbiased, non-advocacy approach to public policy analysis or education likely 
is not politically neutral (Barrows, 1983).  
Ethical analysis is typically described in three broad terms: consequentialism (evaluate 
acts in regard to their consequences), deontological (evaluate in regard to rules), and virtue or 
process-based approach (in regard to a set of virtues).  Intuition and tradition can also be used as 
ethical evaluations.  Ideologies within politics can also be aligned with ethical analysis methods: 
pragmatic liberals are consequentialists, classical liberals are deontological, socialists focus on 
virtue, populists align with intuition, and conservatives value tradition (Szostak, 2005).   
Some scientists see any involvement in policy as advocacy, a conflict with their 
commitment to scientific objectivity and a violation of the public’s trust.  All analysis is 
subjective because values influence objectives, model selection, data sources, etc.  Meffe and 
Viederman (1995) argue values are constantly present even if they are not explicitly expressed or 
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admitted.  Values and biases become clear and focused in the policy process and by the 
individuals involved (Meffe & Viederman, 1995).  
 Agricultural Policy 
Agriculture policy stems from the industry’s social, political, and economic 
interdependence, diversity, and irreversible role in international affairs and must be considered as 
an integral part of national and global policy arenas.  As the effect of agricultural policy has 
expanded, the potential conflicts have grown between traditional agricultural and food interests 
and special interest areas such as environmental protection, urban development, food safety, and 
international trade policy.  As the government role in agriculture is defined, questions arise about 
who loses and who gains, the impact on societal welfare, the measurement of net costs and 
benefits, and compensation for policy losers.  All of these concerns and conflicts lead to an 
evaluation of policy tradeoffs within a complex political, social, and economic policy matrix.  
Societal goals and priorities must be at the center of the analysis, not just a consideration of the 
impact on the agriculture.  While agriculture policy analysis in narrowly defined areas is well 
recognized, the evaluation of long-term, complex, controversial agriculture policy issues is more 
challenging (Farrell, 1976). 
 Application to agriculture and animal health emergencies 
Protecting animal health is strongly related to food safety and is critical to “public health, 
consumer confidence, and profitability of animal agriculture” (Goodwin, Clark, Thilmany, & 
Hamm, 2006, p. 189).  Animal health and food safety are components of national security and 
central to the national economy.  As public goods, they require public intervention and 
collaborative industry approaches rather than individual farmer and rancher actions; “The 
challenge is to develop and implement policies that most effectively protect a safe and secure 
food supply and a competitive livestock and poultry sector in North America, given increasing 
concentration and intensification of animal agriculture” (Goodwin et al., 2006, p. 190).   
Policies and efforts supporting animal disease research, surveillance system development, 
animal identification and tracking, and vaccine research can help reduce the impact of an animal 
disease outbreak.  Implementation gaps, poor communication, and ineffective information 
sharing exist among federal and state agencies and organizations with responsibilities for food 
safety and animal health (Goodwin et al., 2006).  This is especially true in dealing with an FAD 
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outbreak; “Decision making on highly contagious livestock disease control is a multi-stakeholder 
and multi-criteria process, usually focused on a variety of decision alternatives” (Longworth et 
al., 2012b, p. 13). 
The same characteristics that make environmental policy complex can also be applied to 
agriculture emergency decision making, including “incomplete information, uncertainty, 
systemwide change, trans-frontier impacts, current causes that have far reaching future effects, 
irreversibilities, and possibilities of catastrophic change” (NCEDR, 2002, p. 1).  
In regard to developing policy to address intentional and emergency threats against 
agriculture, the 4Rs approach applies: reduction of the threat and its impact, readiness of 
operational systems and capabilities to deal with an emergency, response to the emergency, and 
recovery efforts following the incident.  The values the policy and response system is designed to 
protect must be clearly identified as well as the expectations, responsibilities, procedures, and 
decision making process (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [MAF], 2008).  When 
policymakers select control strategies, they must reflect animal health, economic, and social 
concerns, and can be categorized as epidemiological effectiveness, economic efficiency, and 
social welfare (Ge et al., 2008).  There is a need for more research on the management issues of 
an animal disease outbreak and a better understanding of policy alternatives faced by animal 
health officials (Pritchett, Thilmany, & Johnson, 2005). 
 Complexities of dealing with FAD 
In FAD response policy, threats and risks need to be assessed, prevention contingency 
plans and strategies need to be developed, surveillance methods need to be improved, gaps in 
regulatory powers need to be addressed, cooperative efforts need to be established, and 
coordination and decision making needs to be improved to make a rapid, effective response 
possible (Texas Agricultural and Natural Resources Summit Initiative, 2002); “A major 
challenge of FMD prevention in the US is to design an appropriate prevention and control plan 
which effectively partners capable officials with livestock stakeholders” (Premashthira, 2012, p. 
8).  
Developing optimal animal disease control strategies is a complex problem.  
Policymakers must make choices with limited information amidst a dynamic process where 
optimal solutions change as circumstances evolve (Kobayashi et al., 2007b).  Policymakers may 
be tempted to act rashly or hastily when complete information is unavailable.  They may not 
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understand that within an animal health framework there will always be information they do not 
know.  The chaos and complexity of animal health disease decision making represents a fairly 
new understanding that full truth cannot always be achieved in scientific arenas.  The potential 
volume of information makes full knowledge impractical and may more likely create noise rather 
than provide strategic signals for action.  Complex policy issues indicate that while patterns may 
appear and be identified, they cannot be consistently predicted in a complex domain.  In a 
chaotic domain, cause and effect cannot be easily identified.  In these cases, predictive strategies 
do not lead to effective responses (Ackerman, 2006). 
Control and eradication costs, along with production losses, have been the focus of most 
impact assessments of animal disease emergencies.  Future analysis needs to consider assessing 
changes of national and international trade regulations due to the response of domestic and 
global consumers.  In addition, the management of an animal health disaster will require control 
measures influenced by environmental protection issues, food supply and safety concerns, and 
international trade rules (Rushton & Upton, 2006). 
 Policy processes and decisions regarding the threat of a disease outbreak need to balance 
the adequate preparation without exaggerating the chances and impacts of the threat.  A policy 
built on paranoia or overreaction, especially if an intentional disease introduction is involved, 
will create greater security concerns.  Developing measures that address intentional and 
unintentional disease outbreaks will help deter terrorists and criminals while assuring farmers, 
ranchers, and consumers that the industry and agency is prepared without appearing to be fear-
mongering (Lawson, 2000; Pearson, 2006). 
While decision making is often discussed in literature, minimal discussion has been 
devoted to how decisions are actually made in dealing with an animal disease outbreak.  Multiple 
decisions over a period of time will influence the end result of the outbreak, and this decision 
making process is not limited to a single step at a set time (Ge et al., 2008).  Decision makers 
need to consider a number of issues, including export markets, American confidence in the food 
supply, reassurance of the human health threat/non-threat, indemnity costs, costs of control 
strategies (vaccination, depopulation, and disposal), psychological impacts of animal destruction, 
and cleaning and disinfection costs (DeOtte & DeOtte, 2009). 
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 Making a decision and selecting a strategy 
Many times decisions related to animal health, especially at the national level, have been 
influenced by gut feelings, common sense, political pressure, and the effective lobbying of 
special interests.  However, there is an increased desire for policy decisions to be more 
transparent, accountable, and based on a structured framework for priority assessment.  
Developing frameworks is exceptionally challenging due to the number and variety of animal 
disease problems.  There are also multiple control options for FADs and multiple methods for 
applying those options which results in decision criteria that are constantly changing instead of 
quantifiable absolutes (Perry et al., 2001).   
In many cases, in an animal disease emergency, the economic value of avoidable losses is 
a more appropriate comparison than total losses when evaluating control strategies.  A number of 
economic models have been used to quantify the total value of losses related to animal disease or 
the value of avoidable losses related to a specific control strategy.  With significant effort, more 
epidemiological information about production and disease spread has been translated into 
economic functions.  It is unlikely a single framework for animal disease priority assessment can 
be defined and implemented, so decision makers will likely be limited to well-defined disease 
constraints, control strategy alternatives, and other decision criteria determined necessary by the 
decision maker (Perry et al., 2001).   
Some of the factors that will determine the effectiveness of a control strategy will differ 
in each outbreak, so a response policy cannot be static.  A generic explanation of the economic 
impact of any one response is unlikely to be accurate in all cases.  In each scenario, the benefits 
of one response strategy may be distributed to one group of stakeholders while others carry the 
costs (Giovannini, 2007; Horst et al., 1999).  In addition, the distribution of costs and benefits 
from disease response will likely be influenced by “political ideologies and choices” (Horst et 
al., 1999, p. 376).   
Perry et al. (2001) identified four steps for selecting an animal disease control strategy 
that is appropriate, technically feasible, and economically efficient as: 
 Scenario development – construction of a framework identifying realistic control 
alternatives and their associated consequences, 
 Quantification of alternative strategies – accurate quantification of components and 
costs of each control alternative and their associated outcomes,  
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 Development of decision criteria – key criteria on which the strategy will be 
evaluated, and 
 Ex post evaluation of the decision making process – assessment of how the scenarios, 
data, analysis, and information prepared were used by the decision makers (Perry et 
al., 2001). 
Each of these steps has its own challenges.  Scenario development requires the best 
information on disease incidence and spread, impacts of control strategies, logistics, resource 
availability, and that national policies and aspirations are considered and all alternatives 
evaluated be deemed realistic in the light of this information.  Eradication strategies need to be 
given special consideration as control alternatives.  The quantification of alternatives creates a 
significant challenge as inadequate data typically make it difficult to provide decision makers 
with high quality, credible information.  There is little information on decision criteria.  
Biological efficacy and economic criteria, such as benefit-cost ratio, net present value, and 
internal rate of return, are the most commonly discussed criteria.  However, a number of other 
issues such as effect on employment, distribution of benefits, impact on other sectors, public 
health, etc., need to be considered and may make a tool such as CBA based on economic 
indicators alone useless.  The tools and information need to be appropriate for the policymaker to 
use in making decisions, but typically the usefulness of tools is not evaluated (Perry et al., 2001).   
In the UK, Deirdre Hutton (2002) called for a new approach to government decision 
making in dealing with an animal disease emergency that restores consumer confidence, keeps 
leaders from hiding behind scientific advisors, and includes consumer interests in public policy 
making.  Consumers should be engaged in framing the scientific questions, scientists should 
remain independent, and decision makers must apply political value judgments to the 
uncertainties and risks highlighted in scientific analysis.  In general, decision making needs to be 
more open and transparent, the public must be continuously involved in the policy process, the 
precautionary principle should be used judiciously, and social and economic factors need to be 
considered in addition to scientific concerns (Hutton, 2002). 
In another assessment of FMD control strategies in the UK, researchers at the University 
of Reading developed a decision analysis tool made up of four matrices, a flow chart, and a 
spreadsheet.  Four initial matrices were developed related to epidemic characteristics and ability 
to control the disease (virus type, species impacted, disease confinement, and likely speed of 
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control), export issues for different livestock and livestock products (stability, competitiveness, 
value, related jobs, trade balance, and national market), livestock systems demographics and 
relationships (numbers, density, breed, systems, slaughter, and links to other sectors), and 
importance of livestock sector to the rural economy, jobs, business environment, and community 
stability.  These four information matrices were then combined into one overall control strategy 
matrix designed to assess the control strategies and their impact on the epidemic, exports, jobs, 
and the rural economy.  A flow chart is then implemented that incorporates information from the 
four initial matrices and the control strategy matrix along with results from economic and 
epidemiological models.  A spreadsheet model is then used to calculate direct costs of different 
control and eradication strategies.  The goal was to develop a more flexible decision analysis tool 
that can be modified to meet the needs of specific users in specific scenarios (Rushton, Taylor, 
Wilsmore, Shaw, & James, 2002). 
Maness (2007) found in dealing with natural resource policy analysis that public beliefs 
and values must strongly influence policy decisions, the decision makers must be continuously 
educated, and no optimal solution typically exists with the information available.  There should 
be less focus on values and more on consensus of policy goals and use of continual evaluation of 
indicators. 
McReynolds (2013) noted the need for well-informed decisions to be made in 
determining the best disease control strategy.  In an FAD outbreak, conflicting interests from 
various stakeholders will complicate the decision maker’s job.  For example, in some cases, 
economic interests may be paramount while others may prioritize animal welfare over economics 
(Mourits et al., 2010).   
Animal health agencies cannot handle all components of a response; emergency 
management, logistics, economics, legal, and communications experts must all play a role.  The 
response must represent the whole of government and industry combined (Garner et al., 2002).  
Regulatory agencies with expertise in animal health, agriculture industry economics, and 
livestock production can be replaced if appropriate policy approaches are not implemented.  In 
the 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) 
(currently known as the Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs [DEFRA]) lost 
their authority over control strategy policy decisions to the Cabinet Office Briefing Room 
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(COBRA) which was advised by the Science Group and the Scientific Advisor to the 
Government (Kitching, Thrusfield, et al., 2006). 
Emergency animal disease dilemmas are not just scientific and technical issues; they are 
economic, political, and social issues.  Decisions on response strategies need to consider all these 
aspects.  As an example, long-term consumer confidence in the agriculture industry can be 
gained, maintained, or lost based on the response (Willis, Evans, Clifford, O’Neil, & Murray, 
2007).  
An FAD outbreak leaves a decision maker with a true dilemma; all choices lead to 
unattractive results.  In one case, a full stamping-out strategy leads to mass destruction and 
disposal with the intent to reduce the economic costs of the outbreak, and, in the second case, the 
response strategy may allow a larger disease spread and longer trade restrictions but reduces the 
need for animal destruction (Hueston, 2007).  
 Animal health policy framework needs 
The animal health policy framework must be flexible and include information from 
research, medical, public health, environmental, and policy experts.  The many decision makers 
with responsibilities in the animal health arena need to better define their roles and better 
coordinate their actions.  For disease response to be more effective current systems need to be 
restructured and a culture change is required.  Scientifically based mathematical, 
epidemiological, and risk analysis models can help identify optimal strategies and result in 
science-based decision making and policy.  However, the development and collection of high-
quality scientific and economic data is necessary for models to be effective and accurate 
(Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, 2006).   
In developing an analysis framework, it first needs to be determined if the focus is on the 
disease itself or the control of the disease.  If the question to be answered is about control 
strategies, the responses considered should be socially acceptable and technically feasible.  It is 
also important to understand from whose perspective the analysis is being completed and at what 
level.  It is likely that a compromise will need to be made in the selection of method between an 
epidemiologically and economically thorough method with one the decision makers can 
understand.  Analysis of animal disease policy dilemmas needs to “inform decision making, and 
thus needs to be strongly focused on what is achievable, what is practical, and what is 
acceptable” (Rushton et al., 1999, p. 338). 
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Uncertainty needs to be integrated into policy strategies and responses rather than just 
assuming it can be minimized or eliminated.  A “…greater weight [needs] to be placed on robust, 
broad and holistic approaches to animal and public health instead of specific fixes to the 
particular threat (or disease) that is currently most prominent in the minds of public or policy-
makers” (Ackerman, 2006, p. 357).  Animal disease control policy is likely based on a 
compromise between large-scale disease response and logistic and economic feasibility (Garner 
et al., 2007; Tildesley et al., 2006).  “Decision makers are faced with many difficult choices with 
respect to the design of U.S. FMD control policy.  Thus, these decision makers will increasingly 
seek analytical tools and decision criteria based on sound science, as well as lessons learned from 
recent outbreaks” (Hagerman et al., 2012, p. 119). 
Decision makers need to identify clear goals.  To determine if a control strategy is 
successful, it is important to define success.  Depending on their perspective, stakeholders can 
define success as achieving disease-free status as quickly as possible, confining the disease to a 
defined and limited region, to minimize loss of the domestic animal population, to minimize 
financial costs, and to minimize resistance and criticism from the public or the agricultural 
industry (Tildesley et al., 2012). 
 Use of models in dealing with FAD 
Models can be a useful tool and play an important role in developing and evaluating 
control polices in an animal disease outbreak by inferring values of parameters and behavior that 
cannot be tested by experimental methods (Kao, 2002).  When used in animal disease situations, 
models are designed to represent the behavior of biological process and their consequences.  
Often the models are designed to gain better understanding of processes to make the model more 
realistic.  While a significant number of models have been developed, more complex quantitative 
theory will not necessarily overcome the limited knowledge of the biological processes and 
cause-effect relationships (Pfeiffer, 2004).  Models are often static, short-run, or non-spatial, but 
animal disease and livestock production cycles evolve across time, space, and risk level (Rich & 
Winter-Nelson, 2007).  Typically, epidemiological models are used in regard to animal disease 
outbreaks to predict duration, prevalence, and focus of the epidemic or identify potential control 
measures (Kitching, Hutber, & Thrusfield, 2005).  Scientists need to be cautious with 
interpretation and outputs if models are used in dealing with or preparing for an actual disease 
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outbreak because then they are no longer theoretical and will actually affect the livelihood of 
individuals, industries, and national economies (Pfeiffer, 2004). 
Modeling what-if scenarios can help identify strategies that reduce the number of animals 
to be destroyed or other negative consequences.  It is most helpful when used retrospectively to 
analyze previous outbreaks and determine response strategies, resource use, and risk assessments 
before an outbreak.  Decision makers can use model results to help identify and evaluate control 
strategy options and to gain insight into policy choices, such as when emergency vaccination 
becomes economically viable in a scenario.  Models should never be used in isolation when 
dealing with an animal disease outbreak, and all assumptions made and limitations encountered 
in modeling should be disclosed.  While models can be a useful tool in supporting policy 
development, they receive little attention and have little influence outside the scientific arena.  
The primary concern about model use relates to the actual complexity of reality compared to 
model simplicity (Garner et al., 2007; Ward et al., 2009).   
 U.K. FMD example 
The use of models for predictive purposes to guide tactical decisions during an outbreak 
needs to be cautioned based on recent experiences with model use in the 2001 U.K. FMD 
outbreak.  This situation created controversy about the validity of models and the role they can 
play in dealing with an animal disease outbreak (Garner et al., 2007; Kao, 2002; Kitching, 
Thrusfield, et al., 2006; Ward et al., 2009).  Since modeling was used during the U.K. FMD 
outbreak to help guide the decision making process, its role has been scrutinized (Thornley & 
France, 2009) and created significant disagreement between modelers and veterinarians (Pfeiffer, 
2004).  Models were developed in the midst of the disease outbreak and used to make policy 
decisions in meetings with the Science Group, specifically to implement the contiguous culling 
policy (Kitching, 2004; Taylor, 2003).  Multiple mathematical models were used, ranging from 
computationally complex but conceptually straightforward models to mathematically simple 
models that were conceptually challenging and abstract.  Deterministic differential equation, 
stochastic spatial, and more detailed Monte Carlo simulation (InterSpread) models were used 
(Kao, 2002).  It is believed to be the first time mathematical models were used to make decisions 
on FMD control (Green & Medley, 2002).  The use of models was not called for in contingency 
plans, and their use was in an ad hoc manner (Kitching, Thrusfield, et al., 2006).  For example, 
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Ferguson et al. (2001) published model results during the outbreak and concluded, “…extensive 
culling is sadly the only option for controlling the current British epidemic” (p. 1160). 
Anderson (2002) noted little information was available on how the decision to implement 
the contiguous culling policy was made.  Past event analysis indicated such an approach may not 
have been necessary.  This indicates the models were either invalid or used inappropriately.  At 
the time, animal health officials argued the models were wrong, and some have argued 
policymakers were influenced by the scientific and mathematical truth of a model when little 
other evidence was available to them at the time (Taylor, 2003).  Kao (2002) did not find value 
in attempts to identify quantitative prediction estimates of alternative policy responses, and the 
use of models as a tactical advice resource has also been questioned (Green & Medley, 2002; 
Taylor, 2003).  Better methods are needed to guide decisions in future outbreaks (Taylor, 2003); 
“The perception is that on this occasion modelling failed to deliver the goods, and indeed, misled 
the decision takers into less-than-optimal decisions, causing much consequent distress.  
Nevertheless, it would be a pity if this perceived failure contributed to a more general skepticism 
about the value of models, whether of global climate, of ecosystems, and of animal and human 
disease” (Thornley & France, 2009, p. 139).   
In a U.K. FMD post-outbreak study, the Royal Society (2002) still found quantitative 
models to be an essential tool for the development and evaluation of control strategies as a part 
of contingency planning.  Substantial data needs to be collected and made available to 
researchers if models are to be useful.  They will have limited predictive value, but are more 
dependable with sufficient data in dealing with livestock disease than human disease.  The 
pragmatic value of models can be evaluated by the ability to measure the effectiveness of control 
measures and estimate outbreak costs (Royal Society, 2002).   
In the 2007 FMD outbreak in the UK, models were used only as a tool to predict disease 
spread.  In place of the cost-benefit model approach to advise policymakers, a more qualitative 
method was used.  Expert opinion from the livestock and meat industry, risk assessment 
information, and research on economic and trade impacts of different control strategies were 
provided to the DEFRA Animal Disease Policy Group who then used the qualitative concepts to 
make response decisions.  They tended to place greater emphasis in their discussion on disease 
control and seemed to have a limited understanding of trade and economic impacts.  Some have 
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called for the use of a more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis tool rather than a more 
qualitative approach (Anderson, 2008). 
DEFRA emphasized scientific input in updating their contingency plans after the 2001 
FMD outbreak.  One of the key lessons learned had been to use science as a basis for policy 
decisions, and, in 2007, scientific guidance was critical to the decision process.  But, their typical 
response was basically “‘we are following the science’” (Anderson, 2008, p. 84).  If the public 
and industry are to be confident science is driving policy decisions, greater openness and 
transparency are required (Anderson, 2008).   
 Future use of models 
Taylor (2003) concluded models can be used for retrospective evaluation of disease 
outbreaks and response strategies, resource planning by exploring resource needs for strategies in 
hypothetical situations, contingency planning by comparing response strategies in hypothetical 
situations, training through use of virtual models and realistic scenarios, surveillance targeting to 
identify priority targets based on risk assessment, and tactical decision support on a limited basis.  
They can also be used to evaluate effectiveness of control and surveillance strategies (Garner et 
al., 2007).   
Models are best used in the absence of animal disease crises in conjunction with 
retrospective evaluation of actual disease outbreaks and hypothetical scenario modeling to 
develop a priori response guidelines for decision makers.  During an outbreak, predictive 
modeling should be limited to monitoring and making minor strategy adjustments and should 
defer to veterinary intelligence to influence tactical decisions (Kitching, Thrusfield, et al., 2006; 
Taylor, 2003). 
Green and Medley (2002) note results from modeling FMD control strategies are not 
“hampered by logistic, economic, or political considerations” (p. 203).  Quantitative data may 
not be relevant but the knowledge can help decision makers.  For example, results may indicate 
the radius of the cull zone needs to be wider than the radius of infection spread.  Results can be 
more helpful when costs are considered or efforts are made to optimize outcomes based on 
control strategy.  For example, nearly all models indicate the faster the disease is brought under 
control regardless of strategy the less costly the outbreak will be and a delay of just a few days 
can substantially increase costs, thus indicating preparation is worth the expense.  These results 
provide insight for policymakers to minimize transmission quickly and reliably by reducing the 
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number of susceptible animals (vaccination, culling, or quarantine/stop movement) and removing 
infectious animals (culling or quarantine) (Green & Medley, 2002). 
Keeling (2005) identified three primary roles for modeling in animal disease response 
policy development.  Models can be used: 
 As a predictive tool based on current situations and available information, 
 To extrapolate probable dynamics for one scenario based on the known dynamics 
from another set of parameters, and 
 To test outbreak scenarios and control strategies for a simulated animal disease 
outbreak (Keeling, 2005). 
The types of models used in animal health include qualitative and quantitative risk 
models that consider the introduction of disease to animal populations through risk pathways, 
analytical models that explore relationships between disease incidence and risk factors, disease 
spread models, population dynamic models, economic models, and specialized disease models 
(Taylor, 2003).  
 Economic models 
Typically, economic questions arise regarding the impacts of animal disease.  Questions 
surround the costs to farmers, ranchers, and government; price changes and the effect on farmers, 
ranchers, and consumers; international trade; national welfare; and employment in the agriculture 
and related sectors.  The priorities placed on these issues will influence the types of models that 
should be considered for analysis (Rich et al., 2005a).  To assess the economic impact of animal 
disease, analysis must provide the ability to compare and measure results from alternatives 
(Rushton et al., 1999).  To weigh disease prevention and control strategies, policymakers need an 
accurate analysis of losses (Pritchett et al., 2005).  The economic models used to study animal 
disease outbreaks differ by the type and impact of disease, including disease spread 
characteristics, species affected, impact on markets, or policy strategies.  Common models 
include CBA, I/O analysis, CGE models, linear programming, partial equilibrium models, and 
multimarket models.  Traditionally, impacts on government, production, markets and prices, 
food security, human health, environment, employment, and financial cost are examined 
(Hagerman et al., 2012; Pritchett et al., 2005; Rich et al., 2005a; Rich et al., 2005b). 
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Economics is about decision making.  When applied to animal health, the framework is 
designed to optimize animal health management decisions.  Economics can provide a rational 
basis for resource allocation and policy development in responding to an animal disease outbreak 
emergency (Garner et al., 2002).  Decision makers need a complete understanding of the 
economic consequences of an FAD to determine effective policy.  Most decision makers do not 
understand the impacts on consumers and producers, who bears the costs, and who wins and who 
loses.  The accurate costs of implementing control strategies need to be available and considered 
along with welfare impact in selecting optimal disease control strategies, and policymakers 
should consider the point where marginal benefit equals marginal cost (Nogueira et al., 2011).   
Economic analysis tools have become more important in animal disease prevention, 
control, management, and recovery, and economic-based decision criteria are likely to be 
considered a priority by policymakers (Schoenbaum & Disney, 2003).  There is an increased 
appreciation of the importance and value of economic analysis as a tool to influence animal 
disease control policy, and CBA serves as a common analytical framework (Barasa et al., 2008; 
Rushton et al., 1999).  Such a quantitative approach assumes public policymakers and private 
decision managers need to understand the possible outcomes of disease control options in 
monetary terms (Barasa et al., 2008). 
CBA has been used a number of times for evaluating the impact of FAD and the potential 
control strategies.  Researchers have frequently combined CBA with epidemiological models of 
disease spread.  It is highly effective at estimating disease impact on a farm or herd, but not as 
effective when scaled up to determine regional or national effects.  In addition, CBA also has 
limitations in estimating impacts across the economy or in long-term impact analysis.  In some 
cases, the shortcomings of CBA can be addressed by combining it with additional analysis tools.  
Partial equilibrium models allow for shifts in supply and demand from a disease outbreak to be 
modeled and have been used to measure consumer and producer surplus from FAD response 
strategies.  The combination of CBA and partial equilibrium can provide better modeling of price 
impacts, but the scope of analysis of links between agricultural and nonagricultural economic 
sectors is limited (Rich et al., 2005b).  Multimarket models are used extensively in agricultural 
and environmental policy and could be used to assess national or aggregate disease impacts.  I/O 
models can be used to analyze exogenous disease shocks on industry sectors and to evaluate the 
impacts of changes in demand due to data from an epidemiological model or exogenous shock.  
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Price changes cannot be assessed in an I/O model, so these models are less useful for estimating 
long-term effects of a disease outbreak (Rich et al., 2005a).  CGE models have been used to 
assess FMD mitigation strategies and the impact of FMD outbreaks, but epidemiological factors 
have been provided exogenously rather than in conjunction with an epidemiological model as 
typically used with CBA, I/O, and partial equilibrium models (Rich et al., 2005b).  They can 
provide policymakers insight into broad, national impacts of an FAD outbreak on income, trade, 
employment, and all economic sectors.  However, limited data, poor information about 
immediate impacts, and obscure results may reduce the usefulness to policymakers (Rich et al., 
2005a).  The primary use of CGE models has been on measuring the economic impact of the 
disease rather than in analysis of response strategy (Rich et al., 2005b).  The dynamic nature of 
livestock inventories and production cycles is not addressed in I/O, partial equilibrium, and CGE 
models, and it takes longer to reach new market equilibrium than the year typically modeled in 
an I/O model (Zhao et al., 2006).   
In the case of an animal disease emergency, disease incidence is not predictable.  Partial 
budgeting tends to be a better economic analysis tool than CBA.  Decision analysis may be more 
appropriate than CBA and partial budgeting (Rushton et al., 1999).  Risk plays a critical role in 
disease modeling.  After the hazard and its characteristics are identified, epidemiological risk 
pathways for disease are modeled to determine predicted disease spread (Taylor, 2003).  
Giovannini (2007) noted risk analysis can be a valuable method for analyzing various control 
options in response to an animal disease emergency by quantifying their effectiveness and 
addressing the uncertainties.  Although it has not been used extensively in animal disease 
control, it can be superior to other methods that have been used frequently such as CBA 
(Giovannini, 2007).   
Decision analysis is considered by some to be the most suitable method to support 
decision making in an animal disease outbreak (Morris, 1999).  Optimization techniques could 
be used to minimize disease spread, length of the outbreak, or economic loss from the disease 
incident.  Farmer and rancher behavior changes can be considered and longer term impacts can 
be evaluated (Rich et al., 2005a).  
Because a decision regarding the control strategy in an animal disease emergency is 
highly complex and requires making tradeoffs between multiple objectives, a multicriteria 
decision making model can be an effective tool in the decision process by providing structure to 
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the discussion, identifying conflicting objectives and related judgments regarding tradeoffs to the 
attention of policymakers, developing a shared understanding and sense of purpose, and building 
agreement (Mourits et al., 2010). 
There are a number of factors influencing decision making related to the implementation 
of animal disease control strategies (Perry et al., 2001).  Policymakers benefit from the most 
comprehensive assessment that weighs losses against costs of disease mitigation (Pritchett et al., 
2005).  The distribution of losses, policy costs, and benefits is an important part of the 
information for policymakers (Paarlberg, Lee, & Seitzinger, 2003). 
 Epidemiological models 
As quantitative epidemiology has been developed and disease modeling has improved, 
epidemiology has moved beyond providing technical data on disease life cycles and control 
strategies to disease scenario analysis, including economic impacts and consequences of animal 
disease and policy responses.  An assumption exists that improved data and epidemiological 
analysis will serve as key decision support resource and result in better animal disease control 
policy development (Taylor, 2003).  Spatial disease models allow for knowledge about infected 
hosts and movement patterns to be combined with quantitative factors related to infection and 
transmission to develop predictions about disease spread and to compare control strategies.  
Results can create visual mapping that conveys credibility beyond what the model can justify and 
may cause overconfidence in the decision makers (Riley, 2007).   
Epidemiological models can be designed with different attributes and for different 
purposes.  Analytical models are simple models designed to provide insight into epidemic data 
and disease observations.  Predictive models project the speed and duration of the disease 
outbreak.  Strategic evaluative models simulate a disease outbreak and can be used to compare 
control strategies.  Economic models can also estimate the costs associated with the outbreak.  
Simulation models can assist decision makers in dealing with the complexity of a disease 
outbreak (Kostova-Vassilevska, 2004). 
Epidemic models are typically based on dividing the host population into six classes: 
susceptible animals that are healthy but can be infected, latent animals that are infected but not 
infectious, subclinical animals that are infectious but not symptomatic, clinical animals that are 
symptomatic and infectious, recovered animals that have survived infection and are immune 
(either temporarily or permanently), and dead animals removed from susceptible categories 
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(Kostova-Vassilevska, 2004).  Individual animal disease, on-farm epidemic, and inter-farm 
transmission factors are all influential in model development.  Individual animal disease factors 
include species factors and in-host pathogen dynamics, such as strain variability, immunity 
factors, vaccine efficacy, and length of incubation, subclinical, and infectious periods.  Examples 
of on-farm indirect and direct transmission factors are number of animals, species, transmission 
rates between individual animals, average number of susceptible contacts, and farm management 
practices.  Transmission between herds and farms includes frequency and magnitude of direct 
contacts between farms, sale yards, and other collection points, as well as indirect contacts 
between locations such as vehicle and personnel travel, deliveries, road networks, weather, and 
geographical factors (Kostova-Vassilevska, 2004). 
Control responses can be evaluated by changing the immunity status of animals within a 
baseline epidemic model.  Variables can include the time delays of implementing control 
strategies, effectiveness of control strategies, or limitations on resources needed to implement 
strategies.  As control responses are applied at various levels and simulations are run, the most 
effective responses can be identified by comparing gains and losses from each control measure 
and an optimal strategy for the affected region can be selected.  Results can be used to determine 
total cost of the epidemic which can be helpful to decision makers.  However, for a model to 
serve this role, substantial data that is typically unavailable is required.  This is a considerable 
limitation unless a control response is robust enough to be the optimal solution under any data 
situation (Kostova-Vassilevska, 2004).  This is not the case in regard to control strategies for an 
FAD outbreak. 
A state-transition model, the typical structure of an epidemiological disease model, 
defines the transition from a susceptible state to an infected state, referred to as infection rate in 
deterministic models and infection probability in stochastic models.  Models differ by the 
definition of infectious contacts and can be continuous or discrete.  Continuous models are 
usually deterministic and non-spatial, and discrete models can be deterministic or stochastic and 
spatial or non-spatial.  Models can be top down or bottom up.  Top-down models are typically 
deterministic, based on predetermined assumptions for transmission rates and other factors 
identified by prefitting the model to realistic data or values, and lead to results based on these 
assumptions.  A bottoms-up computational model is usually stochastic, divides the disease 
outbreak into several components, uses real data to develop attributes or parameters for actors 
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within the model, and reaches conclusions based on averaged simulation results (Kostova-
Vassilevska, 2004). 
Disease models can be intra-herd or on farm models or herd-based models designed to 
evaluate disease spread over many herds or farms.  These inter-herd models can be spatial or 
non-spatial.  Intra-herd models are too simplistic to provide reliable disease spread estimates 
because contact rates within a herd or on a farm do not exist.  Non-spatial herd-based models, 
such as the 2001 Keeling (2001) model, do not incorporate distances between farms and 
geographic locations and are too simplistic and of limited use because important disease 
transmission factors are ignored.  Spatially uniform herd-based models as developed by Garner 
and Lack, Durand and Mahul, and Schoenbaum and Disney ignore the typical complex spatial 
heterogeneity between herds and farms.  Spatially explicit models, such as the 2003 Bates, 
Thurmond, and Carpenter model or EpiMan developed by Sanson and Morris, include a number 
of disease transmission factors and realistic spatial distribution of farms and herds and are the 
best approach to measure disease transmission and assess control responses.  Realistically, no 
existing models as they are currently constructed are robust enough for disease prediction and 
control in the US.  An improved large-scale herd-based model including airborne transmission, 
road network, sensitivity analysis, and epidemic network information that provides high-speed 
computational efficiency is needed to address disease outbreak research in the US.  It needs to be 
open-ended and easily modified, utilize geographic information systems, and take into account 
all transmission factors.  If necessary data is available, a more complex, robust model can 
support decision makers and processes (Kostova-Vassilevska, 2004). 
The three most commonly used spatial simulation models for evaluating animal disease 
outbreaks – AusSpread (an Australian model), InterSpread Plus (a New Zealand Monte-Carlo 
model), and NAADSM (a Canadian and U.S. model) – were compared.  Regardless of different 
model building techniques, there appeared to be only a minimal number of statistically 
significant differences in outputs, small differences in results, overwhelmingly consistent results, 
and similar findings for decision makers (Garner et al., 2007). 
 Epidemiological and economic joint modeling 
Animal health epidemiology and economics can play a unique role in policy and strategy 
development.  The symbiotic partnership between the two disciplines provides a comparative 
advantage that offers additional opportunities (Perry et al., 2001).  The integration of 
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epidemiological data into economic models requires a multidisciplinary approach and can be 
challenging (Pritchett et al., 2005).  The three questions that can typically be addressed: 
 What disease comes first? (Priority), 
 Which disease control strategies should be implemented? (Decision making), and 
 What is the optimal method of intervention? (Disease control implementation) 
(Perry et al., 2001). 
Mathematical modeling can evaluate the potential impacts of animal disease emergencies 
and epidemiological models help identify animal contacts and probable disease spread (Le 
Menach et al., 2005).  Economic models may be paired with epidemiological models to combine 
disease spread predictions with potential economic impacts to help decision makers identify the 
best control strategies during a disease outbreak (Longworth et al., 2012a).  Decision makers can 
utilize simulation models to evaluate policy alternatives and incorporate risk and uncertainty.  
But these models are only as useful as the similarity between the actual outbreak and the 
scenarios previously simulated.  Policy evaluation continues to advance and move to the 
inclusion of more relevant information (Hagerman et al., 2012). 
In an animal disease outbreak, practical decision making is a “sequence of decisions 
based on a continual stream of information” (Ge et al., 2010, p. 167).  When final outcomes from 
epidemiological situations are used in static analysis, significant uncertainties found in chance 
events are taken as a given.  The use of static analysis is contradictory to the actual dynamic, 
multistage decision process and ignores the policymakers’ decision flexibility in an outbreak 
making it less reliable for guidance.  Being able to compare scale and timing of control strategies 
in analysis is more realistic and would be more useful to decision makers.  Without this 
flexibility, results create the risk of decision makers making a Type I error where underreaction 
occurs or a Type II error where overreaction occurs (Ge et al., 2010). 
Under uncertainty, there is no guarantee the best decision will result in the best outcome 
(Ge et al., 2008).  An epidemic-economic modeling approach provides the information necessary 
in a dynamic decision process and encompasses the continual uncertainty found in an animal 
disease outbreak.  When combined with a decision model, it allows for control policies to be 
chosen dynamically during an outbreak rather than being pre-defined, allowing for the existence 
of ongoing uncertainty and knowledge gained during the epidemic.  In any given state, the 
control strategies used will create costs within that state and influence future states.  
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Intertemporal tradeoffs are created as control strategies are selected at different times.  Economic 
and epidemiological models need to interact together within the analysis process rather than 
being built sequentially (Ge et al., 2010).   
A balanced strategy is essential to the best response, and Rushton and Upton (2006) 
conclude an economic decision tree analysis combined with an epidemiological model, along 
with a dynamic optimization model that identifies a unique solution, is the best tool to help 
identify a balanced strategy.  However, they further note the level of uncertainty and unknowns 
in an animal disease emergency make optimization nearly impossible and make the value of 
models as a decision-making tool questionable.  The value of the modeling lies in the process 
and not the solution (Rushton & Upton, 2006).  
There remains a need for better integration of epidemiological and economic models, 
more complete understanding of disease dynamics and their control options, expansion of farm-
level models to larger scale applications, and inclusion of factors such as environmental impacts 
and equity.  In addition, few decision makers refer to economic impact assessments in the policy 
deliberation process.  The use of wrong criteria, inappropriate scenarios, poor communication of 
outputs, and the decision makers’ lack of training in epidemiology and economics can lead to 
assessments being of little use to policymakers (Perry et al., 2001). 
 Limitations of model use in the policy process 
An animal disease emergency is a complex and dynamic problem.  Decision makers must 
select a course of action based on limited information and balance tradeoffs between cost and 
effectiveness of various control strategies.  Comprehensive measures may rapidly contain the 
disease but at high cost and consequence; conservative measures may allow the disease to spread 
and epidemic to extend, leading to larger costs in the long run even though it is less expensive in 
the short run.  The expected epidemic and economic impacts of alternative disease control 
strategies need to be provided to decision makers.  It is also critical to understand the dynamic 
nature of a disease outbreak.  The decision process must also be dynamic and the optimal 
decision will change from one moment to another (Kobayashi et al., 2007a; Kobayashi et al., 
2007b).  In addition, rational economic models typically assume perfect markets and perfect 
information, but decision makers have minimal information about the efficacy of control 
alternatives (Tomassen et al., 2002). 
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While simulation models may be the best tool for evaluating animal disease control 
methods, limited data on livestock contact and limited validation of existing models will impact 
their usefulness in decision making as the legitimacy of any model depends on the accuracy of its 
data (McReynolds, 2013).  The scarce availability of empirical data will make these decision 
processes difficult for decision makers because they will have limited information about the 
effect of control strategies on disease spread and economic consequences, and their selection of a 
less than optimal control strategy may lead to additional negative consequences (Mahul & 
Gohin, 1999).  Additional losses can be incurred if control measure implementation is delayed 
due to indecision or lack of preparation.  It is essential that decision makers have a decision 
structure in place before an outbreak because “…it is very important for animal health authorities 
to make the right decision immediately after the first diagnosis” (Tomassen et al., 2002).   
One goal of policy analysis is to maximize social welfare by making decisions and 
allocating resources that optimizes social well-being.  This is exceptionally difficult in 
agriculture-related policy evaluation because limitations exist on the ability to accurately 
determine the value society places on non-market natural resource and agriculture-related goods.  
These are complex decisions with a number of interrelated factors.  It is difficult to define the 
public and how different opinions should be weighted.  Gauging public preference is highly 
challenging.  Even if reliable individual preferences could be collected, they cannot be combined 
in a way that accurately reflects society and community preferences developed through 
discussion and consensus, which are more valuable.  Preferences and values are constantly 
evolving and developing and may change with how the question is posed.  Analysis must attempt 
to deal with multiple value dimensions and measurements; deal with uncertainty about 
consequences; address unfamiliar evaluation contexts; balance time, effort, and accuracy; 
incorporate feelings and emotions; and adapt over time as values change (Maness, 2007).  
Most policy simulation analysis assumes the decision maker maintains the decision made 
at the beginning of the disease outbreak for the entirety of the outbreak.  This approach is 
unlikely to be realistic.  In an actual disease outbreak, constant monitoring of the disease and the 
applied control strategies will lead to changes in policy and strategies.  Decision makers would 
need to be able to predetermine the information they would need at any moment in the process to 
have the tools they need as the outbreak continued in a dynamic decision situation (Bergevoet et 
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al., 2009).  Ge noted in 2008, “The epidemic can only be understood backwards, but it must be 
controlled forward” (Ge et al., 2008, p. 3). 
If models are to be used to impact policy decisions, research principles dictate that 
models need to be validated.  Validation is done by testing the model against real-life data other 
than that which was used to create the model (Green & Medley, 2002).  However, in dealing 
with animal disease, validation is difficult and may be nearly impossible because every FAD 
outbreak is different.  Predictive models can serve a purpose in animal disease control policy as 
long as decision makers understand the assumptions made and the limitations included 
(Kitching, 2004). 
An increased focus on the value of mathematical modeling has perhaps created a false 
confidence in their value, an illusion of certainty, a misperception of their importance, and a 
risky dependence on their outcomes, while drawing attention from the realities of animal disease 
control.  Reliance on models that may be inappropriately constructed, based on poor or 
incomplete data, or cannot be validated is an abuse of mathematical modeling (Kitching, Hutber, 
et al., 2005; Kitching, Thrusfield, et al., 2006).   
 Need for Multidisciplinary Approach 
Analysis with a singularity approach fails to incorporate the complexity of agricultural 
and animal disease related policy.  Evaluation methods “must be multidisciplinary, involving 
technical as well as economic relations and other social sciences” (Farrell, 1976, p. 790).   
Peter deLeon noted public policy was originally “grounded in the ideal of ‘the integration 
of knowledge across disciplines’” (Szostak, 2005, p. 853).  A number of disciplines should 
influence policy formulation and no single discipline should dominate the decision process 
(Butz, 1989).  Often policy-related scientific advice is provided by specialists with expertise in 
limited areas, such as only economics or animal health, and limited understanding about policy.  
This leaves the policymaker to assess the multidisciplinary impacts of their decision (Adams & 
Hairston, 1995).  Scientists desiring to influence policy must develop an issue-driven approach 
rather than a discipline-driven approach.  The focus should be on the problem and not a singular 
discipline.  Disciplinary barriers must be eliminated and cooperation needs to occur across 
disciplines (Meffe & Viederman, 1995).  
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“Economics must blend with political reality, sociology, philosophy, and international 
diplomacy…The economist seeks to increase efficiency of resource utilization and to maximize 
returns; the politician tends to seek what is expedient, often from a short-time point of view; the 
sociologist stresses answers that focus on human values; the philosopher is concerned with what 
is thought to be good; and the international diplomat places a high priority on strengthening 
security in a peaceful environment” (Butz, 1989, p. 1995).   
It is unlikely multiple individual disciplines can approach a problem independently and 
result in a uniform response.  Blending individual inputs into a comprehensive approach is a 
challenging task because the objectives and methods vary amongst disciplines.  Individual 
discipline should address policy questions independently and then blending can occur at the 
policy formulation level.  Economists specifically should provide decision makers with policy 
alternatives and their consequences that can be assessed against the political, sociological, 
philosophical, and international goals.  According to Butz (1989), applied economic work 
deserves greater recognition and should focus less on complicated formulas and esoteric theory 
and more on usable tools to address practical and societal problems.  Simple data can be more 
influential on a policymaker than sophisticated econometrics, mathematical formulas, and 
empirical analyses they find difficult to understand.  Tools must be easy to understand and 
persuasive (Nelson, 1987).  Many require practitioners to have specialized training just to 
complete the analysis (Rich et al., 2005a).  Policy-focused economists need to be aware the 
individuals they are attempting to educate or influence are typically not students of economics 
(Leman & Nelson, 1981).  Collaborative approaches cannot be constrained to economic analysis 
alone (Maness, 2007).  Though economists can help bridge a gap between the research and 
decision process, the final choice remains with the policymaker (Butz, 1989). 
For a decision maker to address a real world, complex policy issue, it is critical to look 
beyond a single discipline and provide multiple perspectives and comprehensive thinking in 
policy development.  A number of different terms are used to describe multiple discipline 
research and analysis, but even those terms are often defined differently.   
 Interdisciplinary – the interactive synthesis or combination of two or more fields of 
study, disciplines, or professions that results in a new, comprehensive view. 
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 Cross-disciplinary – a coordinated effort incorporating two or more disciplines 
focused on finding a middle ground and viewing one discipline from the perspective 
of another. 
 Multidisciplinary – an additive versus integrative approach using or relating to 
several disciplines at once. 
 Transdisciplinary – a holistic approach designed to transcend boundaries of 
conventional disciplines (Choi & Pak, 2006; Gould, 2001; Salmons & Wilson, 2007). 
Interdisciplinary research creates an interchange between multiple disciplines allowing 
for a problem to be addressed and understood from a variety of perspectives.  It requires a team 
approach or an individual trained in multiple disciplines.  This approach weaves together 
knowledge, approaches, and methods from several disciplines creating new solutions to a 
common problem.  In addition to problem solving, the goal is also to create new knowledge, 
methods, and disciplines.  Research is integrated across all disciplines into a coordinated whole 
rather than a compilation of research segments each focused on an individual discipline which is 
common in multidisciplinary research.  While few problems are disciplinary in nature, an 
interdisciplinary approach is still challenging and requires merging of disparate approaches and 
thought processes (Choi & Pak, 2006; Gould, 2001; Salmons & Wilson, 2007). 
Multidisciplinary research utilizes knowledge from multiple disciplines but remains 
within the boundaries of the individual disciplines.  The disciplines themselves are not 
integrated; instead research results are used in a systematic additive or linear approach (Choi & 
Pak, 2006). 
Transdisciplinary research goes beyond interdisciplinary research by cutting across 
disciplines through the use of a unified conceptual framework to solve a common problem.  This 
integrative approach is designed to deconstruct academic, institutional, disciplinary, stakeholder, 
and government silos in order to address policy dilemmas in a holistic manner.  It includes 
multiple levels of stakeholders, extends discipline-based concepts and approaches, and focuses 
research through a unified lens.  Conflicts can arise in the selection of conceptual frameworks 
and analysis methods.  Problem solving must be prioritized over discipline-specific territory 
protection.  Participants must also display a cooperative personality and interpersonal qualities.  
Such a collaborative approach going beyond disciplinary boundaries is critical to dealing with 
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complex health problems related to human-animal-environmental interfaces, such as emergency 
animal disease issues (Min, Allen-Scott, & Buntain, 2013). 
While each of the multiple discipline approaches differ by definition and the policy 
recommendations included in Chapter 6 are more transdisciplinary in nature, for the purpose of 
this dissertation, the term multidisciplinary is used to represent all aspects of multiple discipline 
analysis.   
To address policy issues related to animal disease emergencies, multidisciplinary 
collaboration amongst economists, animal health professionals, and others is needed due to the 
complexity of the issues and the analysis process (Rich et al., 2005a).   
Knowledge about consumer and producer behavior is critical to effective use of economic 
and epidemiological models used for decision making in animal disease emergencies.  Social and 
political conditions need to be considered in addition to traditional quantitative approaches.  
Animal health planning decision teams need individuals who are grounded in more than one 
disciplinary area to address multidisciplinary, cross-cutting policy, and economic concerns 
(McLeod & Rushton, 2007); “Experience from the global Rinderpest eradication programme 
highlights that effective disease control is a multifactorial process” (Shirley et al., 2011, p 116).  
Control strategies, such as vaccination and effective diagnostics, combined with political will 
and ownership by leadership of the disease situation form the pillars of disease control.  The 
Global Rinderpest Eradication Program was successful because it included effective vaccine, 
reliable diagnostics, epidemiological-based targeted control, and global will to control disease 
(Shirley et al., 2011). 
 Other Considerations 
 Dynamic nature  
An animal disease emergency is a complex and dynamic problem.  Decision makers must 
select a course of action based on limited information and balance tradeoffs between cost and 
effectiveness of various control strategies.  Comprehensive measures may rapidly contain the 
disease but at high cost and consequence; conservative measures may allow the disease to spread 
and epidemic to extend leading to larger costs in the long run even though it is less expensive in 
the short run.  The expected epidemic and economic impacts of alternative disease control 
strategies need to be provided to decision makers.  It is also critical to understand the dynamic 
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nature of a disease outbreak.  The decision process must also be dynamic and the optimal 
decision will change (Kobayashi et al., 2007a; Kobayashi et al., 2007b).  
 Economic impacts 
The economic impact of animal diseases can be categorized as production effects, price 
and market effects, trade impacts, food security and nutrition effects, environment and public 
health impacts, and financial costs.  In general, identification of effects is simple, but 
quantification of those effects is more challenging and typically involves multiperiod multiplier 
effects (Pritchett et al., 2005). 
Animal diseases are considered an invasive species and can be modeled as renewable 
resources where an invasive species is introduced and alternative mitigation strategies can be 
examined.  Bioeconomic frameworks integrating dynamic economic-epidemiological effects can 
be used to analyze invasive species in the livestock sector.  Implementation decisions regarding 
invasive species policy is always about weighing gains and losses (Zhao et al., 2006). 
If consumers’ preferences are influenced by an animal disease outbreak, a negative 
demand shock is likely to occur; the shock could be temporary or permanent, be distributed 
across meat products equally or disproportionally, and be combined with increased purchases at 
lower prices in determining the change in consumer welfare (Pritchett et al., 2005).  
An FAD outbreak will result in a decrease in animal productivity, a reduction in meat 
supply, and a probable decline in the demand for meat and meat products (Pritchett et al., 2005).  
Estimating changes in revenue and expenditures is not sufficient; researchers as well as 
policymakers need to also be concerned with economic welfare changes (Paarlberg, Lee, & 
Seitzinger, 2005).  Welfare effects need to be broken down to determine how different industry 
groups and subgroups are impacted.  For example, farmers and ranchers affected by the disease 
will suffer greater costs than those not directly impacted by the outbreak.  Or, with consumers, 
those who forego consumption of meat from susceptible livestock will be impacted differently 
than those who continue to consume products.  The same authors found some farmers and 
ranchers could gain from an outbreak if export losses and price increases are not considered 
(Paarlberg et al., 2003).   
Understanding the economic impact is important when policy decisions are being made 
regarding such issues as control strategies, trade impacts, interventions, and compensation.  The 
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assumptions made regarding types and magnitude of shocks as well as parameter values and 
modeling of sector interactions all largely influence the model outcomes and are critical to 
understanding when results are interpreted (Paarlberg et al., 2005). 
 Externalities and public goods 
Freedom from animal disease can be considered a public good, or, said another way, an 
animal disease outbreak is a public bad that requires government intervention and decision 
making (Ge et al., 2010).  A public good is typically considered something that is both non-
excludable and non-rival meaning that individual participants cannot be effectively excluded 
from use and where access by one individual does not reduce availability to others.   
In addition, FADs create externalities.  If one player acts or fails to act, others may suffer 
or benefit from their action.  In the case of an outbreak, if one state, region, or nation does not 
protect the livestock industry in their area, others will experience negative effects.  However, the 
opposite is true if a government chooses to protect their industry and a positive externality is 
created because they are less likely to become infected and transmit the disease to other regions.  
The presence of a positive externality reduces others’ incentives to protect their livestock 
industry, can create economic free-riders, and could create a regional tragedy of the commons 
effect.  In the case of an externality, public investment and policy making is necessary (Knight-
Jones & Rushton, 2013). 
 Investment 
Proper preparation for an animal disease outbreak is expensive and requires significant 
long-term investment.  Government decision makers and industry leaders must determine if this 
long-term investment is worth it based on the benefits received in the case of an outbreak 
(Swallow, 2012).  When considering investing in disease control programs, policymakers must 
weigh expenditures versus investment in other projects and programs.  Impact assessment must 
compare these alternatives as well as the general economic, social, and environmental 
implications.  The selected method of analysis must consider the appropriate point of view and 
compromise between methods that address disease control and the livestock system while being 
useful to policymakers (Rushton et al., 1999).   
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 International cooperation 
Vallat and Mallet (2006) identified the need for a global approach to FAD threats due to 
the global economic and social impacts these diseases can have especially on developing 
countries.   
Disease mitigation policy decisions are complex and challenging, and investment is 
required in ex-ante preventative measures and ex-post response strategies.  Decisions are 
national due to the externality and public good implications.  However, animal disease is actually 
a transnational and global public good and therefore international cooperation in contingency 
planning would be beneficial.  In a game theory framework, a single government agency is 
assumed to maximize the country’s social welfare by selecting investment at a certain level in 
the presence of an FAD, and the framework is applied across heterogeneous countries.  The 
decisions of trading partners and spatially adjacent countries influence the probability of disease 
outbreaks in other countries due to spatial spillovers.  Preventative efforts in neighboring 
countries lower disease probability for the entire region.  However when neighboring countries 
increase investment in preventative measures, the incentives to invest decline in other countries.  
Therefore, regional cooperation is critical to optimal disease prevention and control strategies 
(Steele, Perevodchikov, & Marsh, 2012). 
 Active versus passive insurance 
To determine the best strategy to respond to an animal health emergency in a developed 
country, leaders must decide whether to focus on investment in active measures to reduce the 
probability of a major animal disease outbreak or to take a more passive approach with 
investment focused on a reactive strategy.  Active insurance methods in dealing with an animal 
disease are those designed to reduce the disease threat, including border protection protocols, 
wildlife disease control strategy, surveillance measures with associated database technology, 
cooperative efforts to work with endemic countries to reduce chance of disease spread, 
established and exercised response strategies (logistics and technical aspects of management and 
control, socioeconomic impacts, and transparent communication), and financial investment in 
control, eradication, and prevention strategies (vaccine development, improvement of 
epidemiological and economic models, etc.).  Passive insurance methods include the 
development of contingency funds to be used in responding to the impact of an FAD, such as 
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insurance policies, government emergency reserves, and industry-organized funds, and the 
establishment of vaccine banks.  The use of effective active strategies will reduce the required 
level of passive insurance responses (Rushton & Upton, 2006).   
 Role of leaders 
In dealing with an animal disease outbreak, or more specifically an agroterrorism attack, 
leaders must go beyond well-chosen words and judicious use of force.  The temptation will exist 
to focus only on critical management and scientific issues related to disease response (Schoch-
Spana, 2004); “Neglect of civic, social, economic, and ethical-moral dimensions may ultimately 
jeopardize technical efforts to stem the health crisis as well as damage processes of economic 
and psychological recovery” (Schoch-Spana, 2004, p. 26).  Decision makers will struggle with 
the inability to anticipate and plan for every contingency, pervasive uncertainty about the event 
itself and response strategies, limited resources, practical challenges of stopping disease spread, 
the impulse to avoid decisions or blame others, and the possibility of far-reaching, unpredictable, 
rapid, and long-lasting impacts.  Leaders must focus on stopping disease spread, stabilizing the 
economy while minimizing commerce disruption, reducing fear and concern, using resources 
effectively, working amongst multiple jurisdictions, maintaining credibility when making 
decisions with limited information, and restoring social bonds and confidence of farmers, 
ranchers, and consumers.  Decision makers must pursue these principles while creating a 
transparent and open atmosphere (Schoch-Spana, 2004). 
For a decision maker to support and implement animal disease policy, they must first 
have the necessary political will which is a direct reflection of political priorities.  Historically, 
political will has not always been strong enough to deal with an animal disease outbreak and 
policy decisions were not implemented effectively.  Information and data showing the 
importance of effective policy decisions in controlling animal disease in comparison to other 
factors will be critical to the existence of the necessary political will.  Eradication costs are 
expenses to the agriculture industry and government entities and are calculated as costs in 
determining the disease impact; they are actually transaction costs transferring money to other 
industries.  Thus, a complete analysis has to determine if investment in agriculture or the 
industries to which the transfer has occurred is a better investment.  This information may 
430 
 
influence political will in regard to where the investment best serves the entire economy (Heath, 
2006; Heath, 2008). 
Politicians have to decide what policy choice creates the least harm and the greatest 
economic benefit.  A tipping point is reached when the transaction costs are greater than the 
opportunity costs of disease control strategies.  Political will and the support policymakers have 
for the animal agriculture industry can also be influenced by the role agriculture plays as an 
economic driver, employer, and contributor to national revenue.  If decisions are made in a 
politically charged environment, decision makers will be less likely to adhere to a long-term 
vision and decisions may be more discriminatory, such as by siding with interest groups with 
more direct access to decision makers.  Holistic long-term analysis determining true costs of 
disease control and which stakeholders benefit and which ones lose can be helpful and credible 
to policymakers (Heath, 2006; Heath, 2008). 
 Public knowledge and consumer confidence 
The public’s general knowledge about FAD and their potential impact is limited.  
Although FMD is rarely transmissible to humans, consumers in other countries have reacted 
negatively to the disease and reduced consumption of meat from susceptible species.  U.S. 
consumption patterns show consumers have reduced or eliminated consumption of certain 
products due to perceived risks such as bovine somatotropin (BST) and genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs).  Many consumers do not know the difference between FMD and BSE and 
associate human health risks from BSE with FMD (Paarlberg et al., 2003). 
As Hutton (2002) notes, lack of knowledge and information are the greatest contributors 
to decline in consumer confidence.  Shifts in consumer demand have been projected due to 
animal disease outbreaks (McCauley, Aula, New, Sundquist, & Miller, 1979; Schoenbaum & 
Disney, 2003).  In one economic study, researchers found consumer education with accurate 
information about the impact of FMD on human health would significantly reduce outbreak 
costs.  They assumed a 10% reduction in consumer demand for beef, pork, lamb, and mutton 
resulting in a loss of $7 billion in U.S. farm revenue (Paarlberg et al., 2005).   
It is interesting to note a number of references are made to the impact of FMD on human 
health and consistency is often lacking.  Mathews and Buzby (2001) acknowledged consumption 
of meat from infected animals is safe for human consumption, but that consuming milk or dairy 
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products from infected animals could infect humans (Nogueira et al., 2011).  Paarlberg et al. 
(2002) commented that the risk of disease transmission to humans via consumption of red meat 
and dairy products is negligible.  An editorial in the British Medical Journal published during the 
2001 U.K. FMD outbreak called FMD “a zoonosis, a disease transmissible to humans, but it 
crosses the species barrier with difficulty and with little effect” (Prempeh et al., 2001, p. 565).  
Ryan and Glarum (2008) note that while FMD is not considered a public health issue that over 
40 cases have been identified since 1921.  Human infection is rare and disease impacts are 
typically mild (Mathews & Buzby, 2001; Ryan & Glarum, 2008), and typically result from 
consuming unpasteurized milk, contact with the airborne virus, or direct contact with infected 
animals (Mathews & Buzby, 2001).   
Contradictory information being shared with the public and a lack of clarity regarding the 
impact on human health could cause great concern and make the impact of an outbreak worse. 
 Example of an FAD Response Decision Tool – New Zealand 
The New Zealand government has indicated, in regard to all biosecurity policy, that cost 
and benefit considerations will include all sectors of society and values to be protected, including 
the environment, public health and well-being, economic stability, and protection of cultural 
values.  The principles of their biosecurity decision making process are to follow legal and 
international standards, analyze the issue before identifying solutions, allow decisions to be made 
by those best placed to make them, consult with all stakeholders, and be timely, well-informed, 
consistent, and transparent.  Decisions are designed for benefits to outweigh costs and to improve 
the economic, social/cultural, health, and environmental values within the country.  Options need 
to be evaluated on strategic fit, net benefit, feasibility, available resources, and the opportunities 
for and barriers to success.  Uncertainty should not lead to inaction, and intervention is more 
critical when irreversibility exists.  Risks and opportunities need to be effectively managed and 
outcome-based solutions are preferred over prescription-based responses.  It is expected that 
decisions will be made promptly, take into account available information, and be based on 
multidisciplinary scientific advice (MAF, 2008).  
Based on these principles, the New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries (formerly 
known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) has adopted a “structured and consistent 
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approach to decision making” for dealing with pest and disease response to be used in 
conjunction with appropriate tools and policies (Dunn et al., 2010, p. 4).   
 
Figure 5-3 New Zealand Decision Framework: Steps and Principles (MAF, 2008, p. 
40). 
 
In testing their decision process, they found the strategy developed by high-level officials 
was focused on eradication and trade reinstatement.  In addition, too many decisions were made 
at the headquarters-level versus in the field and, therefore, technical decisions took too long to 
implement.  In general, there was a lack of urgency in making and implementing decisions 
(Helstrom, 2012).  As noted in their evaluation, “URGENCY should be engraved on the 
foreheads of everyone involved” (Helstrom, 2012, p. 1). 
The approach attempts to balance environmental, social, and economic concerns and 
involves stakeholder input.  The response system divides strategic decision making and 
leadership from the actual response manager who receives direction from the strategic leadership 
team.  The intent is to ensure decisions made remain objective and focused on big-picture 
response goals (Dunn et al., 2010).  Risk-based decision making serves as the basis for the 
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decision making system, which includes a “sequence of simple steps driving the decision-making 
process, facilitating consistency and acceptance of decisions” (Dunn et al., 2010, p. 5).   
 Summary and Next Steps 
A number of models and analytical tools have been used for policy analysis.  Specifically 
in the area of animal health emergencies, economic and epidemiology models have been used to 
study the impact of control strategies in dealing with an animal disease outbreak.  While in many 
cases these models can provide information to policymakers, they do not typically provide 
everything the decision maker desires.  The modeling process creates greater understanding and 
can add important knowledge, but cannot provide the actual guidance a policymaker needs or the 
answer to a policy question.  Models are also limited by available data, time constraints, and 
number of factors the model can handle.  Many times decision makers are not trained to 
understand analysis and do not find the results applicable to their decision processes.  There are 
also a number of social, political, and ethical issues that are difficult to encompass in a model or 
analysis tool.  The complexities of FAD policy complicate analysis efforts, which are further 
complicated because animal disease outbreaks are low-probability, high-consequence events.  
Further tools and policy frameworks are needed to provide an interface between existing policy 
analysis and decision makers.   
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Chapter 6 - Policy Considerations and Implications 
Policies and programs dealing with food and agricultural security need to be given our 
utmost consideration.  Effective policy must balance economic, political, social, and scientific 
criteria.  Policymakers need better information with which to make decisions, and the 
agricultural industry needs to be more effective at providing that information.  A 
multidisciplinary policy approach to food and agricultural security should consider all critical 
factors, including animal health, disease control, animal welfare, public health, environmental 
impact, regulatory issues, logistical issues, geography, physical security, economics, trade, 
public perception, risk communication, social and psychological impacts, emergency 
management, history, and political realities.  The challenge comes in attempting to analyze 
policy and provide policy recommendations that treat these issues interdependently, rather than 
independently.   
 Structure of Policy Analysis and Problem Identification 
A number of policy analysis tools have been defined in Chapter 5 in order to provide 
insight into the field of policy analysis and the number and types of disciplines engaged in policy 
evaluation and providing advice to decision makers.  However, few of these tools actually 
provide information in a format that meets the needs of decision makers and helps them make 
better policy decisions.  The policy analyst should not be identifying the pros and cons or 
offering a policy recommendation.  The role of policy analysis should be to improve policy 
making by providing decision makers with a framework that defines the problem, identifies 
alternatives, acknowledges issues to be considered, analyzes tradeoffs, and compares potential 
consequences.  This is similar to identification of ends, ways, and means as defined in strategic 
mission analysis.  Policy analysis should not be focused on determination of the best policy, but 
instead should provide the policymaker the information needed for them to make the decision.  
Policymaking is always about tradeoffs and the policy analysis needs to provide an objective 
review of facts and myths and allow the decision maker to apply values to make the final 
decision.  And, as noted by agricultural policy economist Dr. Barry Flinchbaugh, “politics will 
always trump science” (personal communication). 
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It is also important to note that term combinations such as pros and cons, costs and 
benefits, and advantages and disadvantages are used constantly in policy analysis, but can be 
misleading because a cost to one might be a benefit to another, a pro to one is a con to another, 
and an advantage to one is a disadvantage to another.   
For each of the three foreign animal disease (FAD) policy issues discussed in this 
dissertation, the analysis will identify the problem, summarize related issues and symptoms, 
identify alternatives, compare consequences in different formats, and provide a tool that can be 
used by policymakers to guide their decision process.  For the purposes of this dissertation, 
policy analysis will be applied to FAD response in Kansas with a specific focus on foot and 
mouth disease (FMD). 
 Agriculture in Kansas 
Agriculture is the largest economic driver in Kansas, valued at more than $33 billion.  In 
2012, agriculture accounted for approximately 19% of the state’s GDP and directly employed 
427,000 people, approximately 17% of the Kansas labor force and representing nearly one in five 
jobs in Kansas.  The state utilizes more than 90% of its land for agricultural purposes.  There are 
65,500 farms in Kansas, which generate more than $17 billion in agricultural output annually.  
Livestock receipts increased 18% in 2012 and accounted for 56% of all agriculture receipts.  In 
2011, Kansas ranked 7
th
 in agricultural exports and exported nearly $5.3 billion in agricultural 
products.  Kansas is ranked first in wheat milling and wheat production, second in sorghum 
production, third in cattle production and beef processing, 10
th
 in hog production, 16
th
 in milk 
production (and currently first in milk production percentage increase), and 23
rd
 in sheep 
production.  Nearly 19% of cattle slaughtered in the US, 17% of cattle and calves on feed, and 
11% of red meat production in commercial slaughter plants occur in Kansas (Kansas Department 
of Agriculture [KDA], 2013).  Lee et al. (2011) estimated the economic impact of an FMD 
outbreak on individual states in a state-specific outbreak in other states.  They found Kansas, 
along with Texas, Iowa, and Nebraska, to have the largest economic losses regardless of the 
location of the outbreak. 
The size, scope, and scale of the state’s agriculture industry make Kansas not only 
vulnerable to an accidental or intentional agricultural emergency, but also make the state’s 
response critical to the state, national, and global economy. 
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 Kansas Response Plan 
The Kansas Response Plan (KRP) Food and Agriculture Incident Annex is the primary 
policy document that directs the actions of Kansas governmental agencies in the case of a food or 
agriculture incident, including an FAD.  The KRP Food and Agriculture Incident Annex outlines 
the responsibilities related to incident identification; incident management; communication and 
coordination; assessment, control, and containment; and recovery related to an agriculture 
emergency.  Three appendices accompany the annex; one each focused on food, plant health, and 
livestock emergencies.  In addition, there is a specific response plan for highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) and one is in development for FMD.  The KRP includes parallel emergency 
support functions (ESF) parallel to the ESFs in the National Response Framework (NRF).  
ESF#11 supports Agriculture and Natural Resources (Kansas Response Plan [KRP], 2013).   
The KRP Food and Agriculture Incident Annex addresses specific organizational 
structures, authorities, roles, and responsibilities related to the emergency response to a threat to 
the health of our livestock industry.  The Livestock Emergency Appendix of the KRP Food and 
Agriculture Index identifies the Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA), under the direction of 
the animal health commissioner, as the statutory authority with responsibility to direct all aspects 
of animal disease control, including investigation, surveillance, movement control, diagnostics, 
biosecurity, depopulation, vaccination, disposal, cleaning, disinfection, and recovery.  The KRP 
notes the likelihood that “extraordinary response measures may be required to effectively control 
the expansion of highly infectious diseases, including quarantine, movement control, and animal 
disposal measures” (KRP, 2013, p. 379).   
The KDA will use an incident command system to manage the response and recovery 
activities.  The Kansas Animal Health Commissioner will serve as the incident commander under 
unified command and is responsible for the coordination of all state activities related to 
monitoring, permitting, quarantining, confiscation, disposal, and disinfections.  The 
Commissioner will establish an incident command structure to work in conjunction with county 
ICS and USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).  USDA Veterinary 
Services (VS) will direct national response efforts and the assistant distant director (formerly 
referred to as the area veterinarian in charge) will serve as a joint incident commander with the 
animal health commissioner.  Under new USDA VS organization, this position for Kansas is 
located in Nebraska.  The concept of joint operational control under unified command between 
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state and federal officials make animal disease emergency management protocols atypical to 
traditional disaster and emergency response.  In addition, response direction will come from the 
state level down to the local which is opposite the typical authority hierarchy where emergency 
response decisions start at the local level (KRP, 2013).   
To minimize the impact on the agriculture industry, the KRP recognizes the need for 
cooperation between all local, state, and federal agencies to control and eradicate FAD.  The 
USDA is a key player because only they can declare the existence of an FAD.  Regardless if an 
FAD begins in another state and threatens to spread to Kansas, if an FAD does spread to Kansas, 
or if Kansas is home to the index case (first confirmed case), the KRP will be activated.  The 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will consider an FAD a terrorist event until or 
unless proven otherwise and the FBI will initiate an investigation in conjunction with disease 
response (KRP, 2013).   
The emergency authorities of the KDA have far-reaching implications in disaster 
response and recovery operations.  The authority to order the confiscation and disposal of any 
infected or exposed animals is given to the Animal Health Commissioner by Kansas’ law.  A 
Governor’s Disaster Declaration is expected in the case of an FAD outbreak.  Under such a 
declaration, the Adjutant General (TAG) can suspend any regulatory statute if adherence to the 
statute will prevent, hinder, or delay disaster response (KRP, 2007; KRP, 2013).  If the USDA 
Secretary declares an extraordinary emergency, they may use Federal authorities to take over 
disease response within a state if the affected state is unable or selects not to take appropriate 
action to control and eradicate the disease (DHS, 2013b).   
In addition to the KDA Division of Animal Health and USDA APHIS, several other state 
officials and agencies as well as volunteer organizations have responsibilities related to an 
animal disease emergency response.  Those agencies and officials include the Governor, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, Kansas Department of Emergency Management (KDEM), the Adjutant 
General, other KDA programs and divisions (Dairy, Meat and Poultry, etc.), state laboratories, 
Kansas Highway Patrol, Kansas Department of Transportation, Kansas Department of Health 
and Environment (KDHE), Kansas State Fire Marshal Office, trade associations, private farmers, 
ranchers, agribusinesses, livestock markets, Kansas Veterinary Response Corps, Kansas State 
University College of Veterinary Medicine, K-State Research and Extension, and Kansas 
Department of Wildlife, Parks, and Tourism (KRP, 2013). 
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KDEM is directed by the TAG, who is also responsible for homeland security activities.  
KDEM and TAG will implement all decisions related to emergency management and homeland 
security.  They will direct the cooperation and assistance of state and local agencies and 
designate agency support of each emergency support function.  The Governor has the power to 
make, amend, and rescind orders and regulations, including those that can be directly related to 
mass depopulation and disposal efforts.  The Secretary of Agriculture serves as the policy leader 
in the policy group based at area command (KRP, 2013). 
 Euthanasia and Depopulation 
In any FMD outbreak, there will be a need for mass depopulation with the scale of the 
effort determined by the policy approach.  At a minimum, diseased and exposed animals as well 
as susceptible animals within the infected zone of a minimum of a 3-km (approximately 1.86 mi) 
radius from the infected premises will be depopulated.  Depending on the circumstances, all 
susceptible animals within the entire control area with a minimum radius of 10 km 
(approximately 6.2 mi) may need to be depopulated.  
The actual size of the infected zone, buffer zone, and control area will be determined by 
factors such as patterns of livestock movements, livestock population and concentrations, 
weather and prevailing winds, geographic factors and terrain, distribution and movement of 
susceptible wildlife, and disease characteristics.  Once zones are established, decisions will need 
to be made regarding the disease response.   
Two primary policy questions will need to be addressed: 
 What method(s) of mass depopulation will be utilized? 
 In addition to the infected zone, where and when will mass depopulation be 
utilized as a method of disease control or for welfare purposes? 
Policy decisions need to balance scientific, economic, political, and ethical issues with 
specific attention paid to the biological and geophysical factors leading to disease spread.  In 
method selection, a number of consequences will be under consideration: 
 Animal disease control.  How does the need to stop and mitigate disease spread 
influence method selection?  How is appropriate depopulation method impacted 
by disease virulence and risk of disease spread?  Can appropriate biosecurity 
measures be followed?  Can tissues be salvaged if necessary? 
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 Animal welfare.  How does the euthanasia method impact animal welfare?  Can 
animals be appropriately restrained?  Will loss of consciousness and death be 
induced with minimal pain and distress?  Can animal stress and excitement be 
reduced with proper handling?  Can animal handling be minimized?  Is the 
method reliable and irreversible?  Is unconsciousness induced in a timely fashion? 
 Species.  How do the species, number, age, and health status of animals to be 
depopulated influence method selection and order of depopulation? 
 Transportation.  Can animals be euthanized on site or is transportation of live 
animals to another location necessary? Once animals are depopulated, where do 
they need to be transported for disposal? Can depopulation and disposal occur at 
the same location? 
 Housing and location.  How do the housing and husbandry practices influence 
appropriate methods?  Is the farm or ranch easily accessible? Where are the 
animals located and how does their location influence method selection? 
 Disposal.  How will the depopulated animals be disposed? Can carcasses be easily 
and safely moved for disposal? Does the disposal method influence the choice of 
depopulation method or vice versa? 
 Economic and cost considerations.  Are there economic considerations to be 
considered when selecting the method of depopulation?  How many steps are 
required (economy of manipulation)? 
 Environmental.  Are there environmental factors that influence the method 
selection? 
 Weather.  How do weather conditions influence the decision? 
 Public relations.  How will the public react to the decision to depopulate, the 
number of animals depopulated, and the method? How will the decision be 
communicated to the public?  
 Public health.  Does the method of depopulation impact public health?  Is the 
public health impact influenced by the depopulation and disposal method 
combination? 
 Aesthetic acceptability.  Is the method aesthetically acceptable? 
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 Availability of technology.  Are the tools and technology accessible and 
available?  Can equipment be properly maintained in good working order? 
 Resources and personnel.  Are the necessary resources available in sufficient 
quantities? Are personnel adequately trained and are there sufficient numbers of 
adequately trained personnel to implement depopulation?  
 Worker safety.  Is the method selected safe for depopulation personnel to 
implement?  Are established protocols safe for workers? 
 Emotional and psychological toll.  How does the method impact producers, 
personnel, and observers?  Can the emotional and psychological toll be 
minimized? 
 Safety of other animals.  How closely located are other domestic or wild animals? 
How does predator and scavenger safety influence method selection?  Can birds 
or other animals access the carcasses and carry the disease to other locations? 
 Compatibility and consumer safety.  Is the method selected compatible with 
animal use and purpose?  If food products are going to enter food chain, how is 
the method selected influenced? 
 Legal and regulatory requirements.  What are the legal and regulatory 
requirements in the jurisdiction? 
 Kansas Response Plan – euthanasia 
In the KRP Food and Agriculture Annex Livestock Emergency Appendix, euthanasia is 
covered by 56 words in three sentences.  “Animals will be treated humanely from the time they 
are identified as presumptive or confirmed positive until they are euthanized.  Euthanasia must 
be performed as rapidly and humanely as possible by chemical or mechanical means.  Response 
efforts will encompass depopulation of non-domesticated animals that are susceptible or possible 
carriers of the FAD (e.g. deer, elk, etc.)” (KRP, 2013, p. 389). 
Animal health officials have indicated the only alternatives to be considered are those 
methods considered as acceptable or acceptable with conditions as noted in the AVMA and 
NAHEMS guidelines and discussed in Chapter 2.  The acceptable methods are listed in Table 6-1 
for those species susceptible to FMD.  
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Table 6-1 Acceptable Alternative Methods of Euthanasia 
Animal Acceptable Acceptable with Conditions 
Cattle Intravenous barbiturates Penetrating captive bolt, gunshot  
Hogs Injected barbiturates CO2, CO, N2, Ar, gunshot, 
electrocution, nonpenetrating captive 
bolt, manually applied blunt force 
trauma 
Sheep Injected barbiturates Gunshot, penetrating captive bolt 
Note: AVMA (2013a).    
 
In making a policy decision about the appropriate euthanasia method to be used, the list 
of factors will first be prioritized and balanced with each other.  If animal welfare is a top or high 
priority, then the methods listed as acceptable or acceptable with conditions are the only methods 
that may be considered.  Then, according to Kansas animal health officials, the next factor to be 
considered will be the availability and accessibility of resources.  They do not believe state 
officials would be able to access enough barbiturates to use a chemical method of euthanasia, 
leaving, in the case of cattle, penetrating captive bolt and gunshot.  Again, access to technology 
may limit use of captive bolt, resulting in the use of gunshot.  This falls in line with the long 
believed approach that any answer to FMD will result in a “shoot ‘em and bury ‘em” response.  
However, such an approach fails to acknowledge many of the other factors previously listed.  
The resulting policy decision may then be as much about how to implement the policy decision 
as actually making the decision.  A decision tree in Figure 6-1 illustrates these policy 
considerations. 
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The decision tree begins by asking the question “Is animal welfare the priority?”  If the 
answer is yes, the decision tree limits the choices to AVMA acceptable and acceptable with 
conditions methods with dependence on species involved.  While other methods such as toxins 
supplied in the feed supply may be feasible, they are not considered acceptable.  Decisions are 
then based on availability of resources beginning with chemical methods for all species, followed 
by penetrating captive bolt and gunshot for cattle and gas, non-penetrating captive bolt, and 
gunshot for swine.  
 Summary 
The selection of a euthanasia method will be limited to just a few choices as long as 
animal welfare is considered a priority.  If at any time animal welfare is no longer considered a 
priority, the selection of euthanasia methods will be more complex.  The larger, more 
overarching policy question relates to the decision of vaccination versus euthanasia and 
depopulation, or even more simply to moving as many animals as possible into the traditional 
slaughter process rather than destroying them.  Kansas animal health officials have indicated the 
Figure 6-1 Euthanasia decision tree 
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first response is likely to be to move as many animals as possible into the slaughter and 
processing system, with or without vaccination and regardless of harvest readiness.  Discussions 
with packers and processers are paramount to pre-establishing contracts and cooperative plans.  
Further discussion over vaccination versus a depopulation and disposal approach will be covered 
in the vaccination section. 
 Carcass Disposal 
There are numerous factors that will impact large-scale carcass disposal policy decisions.  
It is necessary to identify the factors to be considered.  The goal of any carcass disposal policy is 
to effectively and efficiently dispose of all infected and exposed carcasses in a timely manner.  
As noted by the Center for Food Security and Public Health (2012), the method of carcass 
disposal utilized needs to take into account a number of factors, including animal species, 
number of animals to be disposed, pathogen and its ability to spread, environmental issues, 
public health issues, and existing regulations.  Numerous additional objectives will also be 
considered. 
One of the first factors to be highlighted is the cause of death.  If death is due to a 
contagious disease, then finding a biosecure solution is critical.  For many stakeholders, 
biosecurity concerns often outweigh nearly all other concerns when a highly contagious disease 
is involved.  In those cases, public exposure needs to be limited, transportation needs to be 
minimized and performed in a manner that will ensure containment of the infectious agent, and 
biosecurity measures are a priority.  If deaths are due to a natural disaster, then emphasis could 
be placed on an environmentally friendly solution.  Each method has a different impact on the 
environment and creates different lasting impacts.  The USDA VS provides a list of 
environmental decisions to be made, and encourages decision makers to consider impacts on 
groundwater, wildlife, air quality, surface water, climate, public health, solid waste, cultural 
resources, utilities and vegetation.  It is critical that greater consistencies exist in state regulations 
such as approved disposal methods and the mechanisms to waive those regulations.   
The scale (numbers of carcasses) and scope (species) of the death loss are also important 
factors.  Certain technologies can handle only limited numbers and may not be efficient enough 
in the case of a major emergency.  Some disposal methods are more acceptable with cattle than 
poultry and vice versa.  Logistical issues regarding location of the carcasses, spread of the animal 
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deaths, and proximity to facilities and resources (e.g., fuel) becomes of critical consideration as 
well.  The solution for one state may differ from another because of the location of large animal 
numbers and the distance to major population centers.  This may also be true within state borders 
due to regional and geographic differences.  Public health may likely be considered as the 
overriding factor in determining the most appropriate method of disposal by some policymakers.  
One factor often discussed in the decision process is the economic impact of the disposal method 
and the direct and indirect costs, including those related to direct disposal, transportation, 
facilities and equipment, energy requirements, environmental impact, and social costs.   
Any final regulatory policy that provides emergency response personnel and animal 
health officials with decision-making guidelines will include consideration of the following 
criteria: 
 Disease/biosecurity risk – Cause of death loss and diseases involved.  Is the disposal 
method used in the policy considered biosecure?  Depending on the disease agent, 
biosecurity concerns are paramount.  Disposal policy will account for different disease 
agents and the limitation those diseases place on disposal method alternatives (Technical 
Feasibility). 
 Scale of death loss.  Is the disposal method used in the policy acceptable for different size 
disposal efforts?  Is it timely?  The number of animals to be disposed will greatly impact 
the direct and indirect costs of all disposal methods.  The scale of the loss will also 
impact the expediency of the disposal process (Technical and Administrative Feasibility). 
 Site and facility availability.  Are sites and facilities required for the disposal method 
easily accessible?  Access to disposal sites and equipment in different areas of the state 
will be a part of disposal policy.  This is especially important when considering methods 
that require a fixed facility technology, such as rendering (Technical and Administrative 
Feasibility). 
 Fuel and resources.  Are the fuel and resources required for the disposal method easily 
accessible?  The accessibility to the fuel and resources needed for disposal will be 
considered.  For example, the amount of fuel necessary for incineration may eliminate 
burning as a viable option (Technical Feasibility).  
 Environment – Water table, soil types and environmental life cycles.  Is the approved 
disposal method environmentally friendly?  The level of the water table, type of soil, and 
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other environmental factors will be a part of the policy consideration process.  If the 
water table is high, a method, such as burial, may not be environmentally sound 
(Technical and Political Feasibility). 
 Transportation options and distance to disposal sites.  Does the disposal method require 
transportation?  If so, is it limited or extensive travel?  Policy will consider on-site versus 
off-site disposal options and consider the accessibility and viability of transportation to 
the disposal locations if done off-site (Technical and Administrative Feasibility). 
 Costs and economic impacts.  Is the disposal method approved in the policy economically 
efficient?  The short-term and long term costs and economic impacts will play a role in 
analyzing the effectiveness of alternative policies (Economic Feasibility). 
 Proximity to population centers and public health.  Is the disposal method approved in the 
policy safe for the public?  Public health will be of serious concern.  If the disease agent 
is zoonotic, then public health is especially critical.  However, any large-scale disposal 
effort may impact public health and create negative externalities especially problematic 
near population centers (Technical and Political Feasibility). 
 Species involved.  Can the approved disposal method be used for multiple species?  
Simply put, any policy will consider species.  It clearly takes a different approach to 
dispose of chickens than it does cattle (Technical Feasibility). 
 Public perception.  Will the public find the approved disposal method acceptable?  The 
perception of the general public plays a key role.  Public opinion and support for the 
policy (or lack of support) greatly influences political feasibility.  It also may determine 
the level of general economic impact (Political and Economic Feasibility). 
 Interagency cooperation.  Do current agency structures and regulations make this disposal 
policy feasible?  Any policy will carefully identify the roles of different agencies and the 
process by which decisions will be made (Administrative and Political Feasibility). 
 Kansas Response Plan – carcass disposal 
Eradication of any FAD will require rapid and effective carcass disposal.  K.S.A. 47-
1219 outlines the responsibilities of the KDA Division of Animal Health regarding carcass 
disposal.  It specifically indicates burial; incineration; disposal plant, substation, rendering plant, 
or place of transfer licensed by the commissioner; or options adopted in rules and regulations 
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adopted by KDHE (K.S.A., 2013a).  While there are no Kansas Administrative Regulations 
related to livestock carcass disposal, the KDHE Bureau of Waste Management (BWM) has 
published technical guidance document SW-2001-G1 Disposal Options for Large Quantities of 
Dead Animals which details specific guidance for the disposal of large quantities of dead animals 
(defined as six or more animal units) (Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of 
Waste Management [KDHE BWM], 2011).  
Animal units are defined in Kansas Statutes in the confined animal feeding operations 
section.  Six animal units is equivalent to six head of beef cattle weighing more than 700 lbs, 12 
head of beef cattle weighing 700 lbs or less, 5 head of mature dairy cattle, 3 horses, 60 sheep or 
lambs, 15 pigs weighing more than 55 lbs, 60 pigs weighing 55 lbs or less, 334 turkeys, 600 
laying hens or broilers, or 30 ducks (K.S.A., 2013b). 
K.S.A. 65-3407c allows for permit exemptions to dispose of whole unprocessed livestock 
carcasses on property at, adjacent, or near the location of the animals’ deaths assuming death was 
due to a natural disaster or has created an emergency situation.  Such disposal efforts still require 
minimizing the threat to human health and the environment, written permission from the 
landowner and appropriate local government authorities, and KDHE authorization (K.S.A., 
2013b). 
The statutory options for disposal as listed in order of preference in the KDHE BWM 
technical guidance are rendering, composting, municipal solid waste landfill, burial on site, and 
incineration or open burning.  Composting moved to second most preferred option from fourth 
on the preference list when the technical guidance was published in 2011; composting was 
previously considered as an option for only small animals but is listed currently as an option for 
large animals as well.  The KDHE BWM technical guidance document on carcass disposal 
acknowledges rendering and landfill use will be challenging when very large quantities of dead 
animals as a result of infectious disease require disposal because of the need for transportation 
and large capacities (KDHE BWM, 2011).   
While these disposal methods differ from those listed in Kansas statute, they are the 
same, but listed in a different order, as the appropriate disposal methods listed in the KRP Food 
and Agricultural Incident Annex.  The KRP states that the preferred method of disposal of 
carcasses, milk, and feedstuff is on-site burial or composting.  Composting was added in the 
2012 revision of the KRP as only burial was listed as a preferred option in the 2007 Kansas 
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Response Plan and the 2003 Kansas Emergency Plan.  Preselection of sites is encouraged when 
feasible (Kansas Emergency Plan [KEP], 2003; KRP, 2007; KRP, 2013).  In 2007, the FMD 
operational guidelines contained in appendix 5 of the KRP described burial as “generally easier, 
quicker, using fewer resources, and less polluting than other methods” (KRP, 2007, p. 36).  The 
only other method considered acceptable was burning.  The plan did note the commissioner 
could approve rendering, composting, and alkaline hydrolysis if burning and burial did not meet 
the disposal needs (KRP, 2007). 
In a personal interview with KDHE BWM officials, it was noted the decision to move 
composting up on the priority list was a made at the Bureau level and was based on the desire to 
put fewer carcasses in the ground, reduce the potential risk of nitrate contamination, and to 
minimize waste.  Because composting has been shown to be effective at killing FMD and would 
reduce protein waste, it was made a higher priority option.  The decision did not follow any 
prescribed framework, was not written down, and was not considered at any levels above the 
Bureau.  However, it was also acknowledged that due to the speed with which animal health 
officials may respond to a disease outbreak that burial will likely be the first method used to 
dispose of everything although that is not the preference of KDHE personnel.  Composting will 
be done only after disease response has calmed down.  KDHE BWM officials believe the only 
realistic options for significant carcass disposal operations are burial and composting.  It is 
unlikely that any other method will actually be used as the capacity does not exist for 
incineration, renderers do not want to take potentially diseased carcasses, and landfills do not 
have necessary interest or capacity (personal communication). 
Numerous factors will influence the feasibility of using a disposal site.  Sites will be 
chosen (preferably prior to an outbreak) by a joint effort between KDHE BWM and KDA using 
the best available information.  KDHE Bureau of Air (BOA) will provide guidance if burning is 
used.  Geographic Information Systems (GIS) will be used to map and track quarantine areas as 
well as decontamination and disposal zones.  GIS has been used to pre-identify burial sites in 
some locations.  The KRP states that consideration will be given to human and animal health 
hazards as well as environmental impacts.  Long-term monitoring of the disposal area will also 
be considered (KRP, 2013). 
KDHE will provide technical advice and has final approval authority on carcass disposal 
locations.  They are responsible for analyzing the sites’ impact on ground water and air pollution 
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and providing technical advice to disposal teams regarding environmental regulations.  KDHE 
will identify and approve all regulated disposal and treatment activities (KRP, 2013). 
The only method selection tool included in the technical guidance is a table indicating the 
concerns to be considered when choosing a disposal method.  
Table 6-2 KDHE BWM TGD SW-2001-G1: Disposal Options for Large Quantities of Dead 
Animals 
Area of concern 
Method 
Burial 
Incineration or 
open burning Rendering Composting 
Surface water X,K  X,R X,K 
Groundwater X,K   X,K 
Air X X,R,K X,R X 
Wildlife X    
Public safety 
and worker 
health 
X X X  
Solid waste X,K X  X,K 
Vegetation X X   
Cultural and 
historical 
X X   
Utilities X X   
Climate X X  X 
X- denotes applicability 
R- denotes all Federal, State, and local discharge permit requirements to be satisfied in 
order to mitigate or eliminate any impacts 
K- denotes KDHE has specific regulations to be met 
Note. Adapted from KDHE BWM (2011, p. 2). 
 
The cost of all animal euthanasia and disposal of animal carcasses will be paid for by the 
State of Kansas (K.S.A. 47-626).  Euthanasia and disposal operations are linked.  If euthanasia 
gets ahead of the ability to dispose of the carcasses, there will be biosecurity, animal welfare, and 
pest management issues (KRP, 2013). 
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As discussed, the KRP policy sets burial as the disposal method of choice.  The goal of 
this section is to compare that policy to other disposal alternatives.  First, the method of disposal 
is compared to other technologies in the areas of cost effectiveness.  Secondly, a matrix 
evaluation system is used to analyze the disposal policy included in the KRP.  Third, a weighting 
strategy is applied to the matrix analysis to compare the impact of differing priorities on the end 
result. 
 Cost effectiveness  
The first method of analysis is a consideration of cost effectiveness.  Cost-effectiveness 
analysis finds the policy that meets the goals and objectives at the least cost.  Because public 
funds are limited, this method appears to be the most logical and potentially the most useful to 
the KDA Division of Animal Health.  To compare costs, the costs described earlier are 
summarized in the following subsection.  While this approach is not as comprehensive as cost-
benefit analysis, not all associated costs can be monetized in a consistent manner and it is 
difficult to define benefits related to any aspect of emergency carcass disposal. 
While numerous cost examples are available in the literature and have been highlighted 
in Chapter 3, few reliable cost estimates exist for large-scale, emergency disposal.  In the case of 
an FAD outbreak or natural disaster, total actual costs are unknown.  Both fixed and variable 
costs are simply approximations developed from a small number of experiences and routine 
disposal estimates.  In addition, little to no attention has been paid to indirect costs of these 
technologies.  The impact on the environment, land values, public opinion, and general economic 
factors will be evaluated as well.  This type of economic analysis is critical to any decision 
making process.  
The available numbers do provide the opportunity to compare expected fixed and 
variable costs per ton of carcasses; however, these comparisons should be considered with 
caution because these estimates are the result of an extensive literature review which utilized 
numerous different sources; the data available from these various sources are based on a variety 
of assumptions, including differing circumstances, cause of death, scale of disposal efforts, 
species, dates, and geographical locations; and these various sources do not consistently 
incorporate capital, transportation, labor, or input costs into the estimates.  Despite these 
limitations, Table 6-3 summarizes the cost information identified in the literature.  Because of 
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the minimal cost data available on novel technologies, these innovations are not included in the 
table. 
The table highlights the following information: the range of cost estimates cited in 
previous studies and experiences; comparative representation of cost indicators for capital, 
transport, labor and input costs ($ - low, $$ - intermediate, $$$ - high, $$$$ - very high); 
comparative representation of indirect cost indicators, including environment/public health and 
public perception; an example of other indirect cost considerations; and an indication of the 
existence of valuable or beneficial byproducts.  Figure 6-2 reflects the high and low cost 
estimates as well as the most likely representative estimate.  The representative estimate was 
derived by analyzing the data and weighting the average costs found in the literature. 
The only portions of the costs that can be considered in a cost-effectiveness comparison 
are the direct costs.  To compare cost effectiveness for the State of Kansas, these numbers are to 
be converted into potential disposal costs in the case of an FMD outbreak.  The values have been 
extrapolated by using the Kansas inventory of livestock and the percentage loss of the U.K. 
livestock inventory in their FMD outbreak.  These figures were used to calculate the proportional 
Kansas livestock inventory loss which was then multiplied by the average market weight of each 
species, resulting in a total tonnage of carcasses for disposal (Table 6-4).  This figure – 295, 
218.5 tons of carcasses – was then multiplied by the representative costs figures per method as 
indicated in Table 6-3.  These costs are shared in Table 6-4.  These figures are conservative, 
because the highly concentrated structure of the Kansas cattle industry would likely result in a 
higher percentage loss than occurred in the U.K. 
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Table 6-3 Summary of Technology Costs 
Technology 
Cost 
Ranges Direct Cost Indicators Indirect Cost Indicators  
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Burial (on- and 
off-site) 
$15-200 $ $ $$$ $ $$$ $$$$ Land use and 
values,  
predator activity 
 
Landfill usage $10-500 $$ $$$ $ $ $$ $$$ Municipal costs, 
management costs 
 
Open burning $200-
725 
$ $ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$$ Disposal of ash, 
permit fees 
 
Fixed-facility 
incineration 
$35-
2000 
$$ $$$ $$ $ $$ $$$ Disposal of ash, 
permit fees 
 
Air-curtain 
incineration 
$140-
510 
$$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$$ Disposal of ash, 
permit fees 
 
Bin- and in-
vessel 
composting 
$6-230 $$ $ $$$ $$ $ $$ Land use, time 
efficiency 
√ 
Windrow 
composting 
$10-105 $ $ $$$ $$ $ $$ Land use, time 
efficiency, predator 
activity 
√ 
Rendering $40-460 $$ $$$ $ $ $ $$ Biosecurity risk √ 
Fermentation $65-650 $$
$$ 
$ $$ $ $ $ Time efficiency √ 
Anaerobic 
digestion 
$25-125 $$
$$ 
$ $$ $ $ $ Time efficiency √ 
Alkaline 
hydrolysis 
$40-320 $$
$ 
$ $ $ $ $ Disposal of 
effluent 
 
a. These estimates are the result of an extensive literature review summarized in Chapter 3 which utilized 
numerous sources.  The data available is based on a variety of assumptions, including differing circumstances, 
cause of death, scale of disposal efforts, species, dates, and geographical locations.  In addition, different cost 
estimates do not consistently incorporate capital, transportation, labor or input costs.  
b. Includes capital costs directly associated with carcass disposal only.  
c. Transportation costs depend on the location of the technology.  These indicators assume minimal 
transportation for more likely available technologies. 
d. The cost factors are indicated by $- low, $$ - intermediate, $$$ - high, $$$$ - very high). 
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Figure 6-2 Summary of Technology Costs. 
 
Table 6-4 Estimate of Kansas Inventory Loss and Carcass Tons to be Disposed in an FMD 
Outbreak 
Species 
% of U.K. 
inventory 
killed 
2013 Kansas 
inventory
a
 
Estimated Kansas  
inventory loss 
Avg. market 
weight 
Pounds to be 
disposed 
Cattle  7.2 5,850,000 421,200 1,250 526,500,000 
Sheep 6.5 65,000 4,225 125 528,125 
Hogs 13.4 1,820,000 243,880 260 63,408,800 
Total Tons of Carcasses to be Disposed 295,218.5 
Note. 
a
Kansas Farm Facts, Kansas Department of Agriculture (2013). 
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Table 6-5 Cost of Disposal by Method for a Kansas FMD outbreak. 
Disposal Methods Representative Cost per Ton 
Cost for Disposal (in millions of 
dollars) 
Windrow composting 75 22.14 
Burial 100 29.52 
Landfill usage 120 35.43 
Anaerobic digestion 130 38.38 
Bin and in-vessel composting 150 44.28 
Alkaline hydrolysis 180 53.14 
Rendering 210 62.00 
Fermentation 250 73.80 
Air-curtain incineration 325 95.95 
Open burning 450 132.85 
Fixed-facility incineration 600 177.13 
Note: Carcass disposal cost is based on the tons calculate din Table 6-4 based on inventory percentage lost in 2001 
U.K. FMD outbreak. 
 
When analyzing each alternative method compared to burial with a cost-effectiveness 
approach, burial is the second most cost-effective method.  Windrow composting proves to be 
the most cost-effective method.  Landfill usage is the third most cost-effective method.  Another 
important aspect to note is that burning was considered the next most preferred method of 
disposal in the previous KRP.  The cost-effectiveness comparison indicates all forms of burning 
and incineration are the least cost effective. 
 County scenario 
In order to get a more realistic assessment of the number of animals that would need 
destroyed if FMD was present in southwest Kansas where cattle operations are more highly 
concentrated, an eight-county region is used to determine potential costs of carcass disposal.  
Haskell County has the largest cattle inventory with 395,000 head in 2012.  Haskell County and 
the seven adjacent counties were used to create an eight-county region with 1.366 million cattle 
as of January 1, 2013 (KDA, 2013). 
In the Pendell et al. (2007) study of an FMD outbreak in southwest Kansas, it was 
estimated 6.3% of cattle would need to be destroyed in the case of an index case at a cow-calf 
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operation, 20.35% would be depopulated if the outbreak started at one medium-sized feedlot, and 
84% of animals would be destroyed if FMD was introduced simultaneously at five feedlots.  
These numbers are still relatively conservative because they are based on a 1.5-mi infected zone 
rather than the 3-km zone (1.86 mi) called for in the KRP and the assumption that no animals are 
destroyed outside the infected zones.  These percentages were applied to the eight-county region 
to estimate the minimum number of cattle to be destroyed in Table 6-6. 
 
Table 6-6 Cost-effectiveness of Disposal in Eight County Region in Southwest Kansas 
County 
Cattle 
inventory 
Minimum number of cattle destroyed by scenario 
Cow-calf 
scenario (6.3%) 
Single feedlot 
scenario (20.35%) 
Five feedlot 
scenario (84%) 
Haskell 395,000 24,885 80,383 331,800 
Finney 240,000 15,120 48,840 201,600 
Gray 230,000 14,490 46,805 193,200 
Meade 59,000 3,717 12,007 49,560 
Seward 120,000 7,560 24,420 100,800 
Stevens 41,000 2,583 8,344 34,440 
Grant 210,000 13,230 42,735 176,400 
Kearny 71,000 4,473 14,449 59,640 
Total Head 1,366,000 86,058 277,983 1,147,440 
Converted to Tons  53,786 173,739 717,150 
Burial Cost  $5,378,600 $17,373,900 $71,715,000 
Landfill Cost  $6,454,320 $20,848,680 $86,058,000 
Composting Cost  $4,033,950 $13,030,425 $53,786,250 
Burning Cost  $24,203,700 $78,182,550 $322,717,500 
Note: Percentage of cattle destroyed based on estimates from Pendell et al., 2007 and costs based on 
representative costs identified in Table 6-3. 
 
The representative costs developed from the literature review were applied, thus 
indicating composting as the most cost-effective alternative with burial and landfill the next two 
cost-effective methods.  Burning remains a high cost alternative and does not take into account 
the limited fuel resources in the region.  Composting with these numbers of animals would be 
challenging due to the amount of composting materials required and the fact that on-site 
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composting at feedlot locations would significantly limit their ability to continue or commence 
business activity.  There are limited landfills in the regions averaging less than one small landfill 
per county, each being able to take no more than 1-5 carcasses per day.  There are three larger 
landfills in southwest Kansas located in Finney, Ford, and Seward counties, but no single landfill 
could handle any more than 50-100 carcasses per day.  On a side note, while landfills in eastern 
Kansas are larger, it is unlikely they would accept carcasses according to KDHE BWM officials.  
If burial were the carcass disposal method used and burial pits were 6 ft deep, 3073.5 sq ft 
(18,441 cu ft), 1,945,881 sq ft (11,675,286 cu ft), and 8,032,080 sq ft (48,192,480 cu ft) would 
be required for each scenario in Table 6-6, respectively.  In the last scenario, this is equivalent to 
a hole the size of 1338 football fields dug 6 ft deep or a trench that is 25 ft wide, 6 feet deep, and 
321,283.2 ft or 60.85 mi long. 
The cost-effectiveness comparison does provide the type of cost data most decision 
makers are interested in considering.  However, this method clearly has limitations.  These 
results, combined with information in Table 6-3, do provide additional insight.  For example, 
when comparing burial to windrow composting, Table 6-3 indicates composting requires more 
inputs but results in fewer negative externalities related to the environment and public 
perception.  Other policy evaluation methods may also be utilized that incorporate more than 
economic feasibility. 
 Matrix scorecard analysis 
Economic efficiency should not serve alone in selecting the best carcass disposal policy.  
Decision makers need additional information about each disposal technology to select the best 
policy.  Conflicting objectives and differing priorities on each of the policy criteria and 
considerations make the evaluation process even more difficult.  To one individual, 
environmental impact is the highest priority; to another, it may be cost; and, to a third person, it 
may be disease control.  Multicriteria decision making analysis allows for this type of 
comparison.   
In this case, a matrix scorecard system is used to allow all criteria to be considered for 
each policy alternative.  The carcass disposal criteria identified earlier in this chapter are listed in 
Table 6-7 along with each disposal technology.  A scale of 1 – 4 is used to indicate the ability of 
each specific technology to meet the policy criteria.  The scale is as follows: 4 – meets the 
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criteria well, 3 – somewhat meets the criteria, 2 – fairly meets the criteria, and 1 – poorly meets 
the criteria.  The far right column indicates the total score, with a high number indicating the best 
policy.  These scores are based on the information collected for this dissertation.  To develop this 
scorecard into a final policy tool, specialists could be used to assign these scores based on the 
specific situation before the policy maker applies the weightings developed in Table 6-8.  
 
Table 6-7 Disposal Technology Matrix Scorecard. 
Disposal 
Technologies 
Disposal Technology Policy Criteria 
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Burial (on- 
and off-site) 
3 3 3 4 2 4 4 2 4 1 3 33 
Landfill 
usage 
3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 37 
Open burning 3 3 2 1 2 4 1 2 3 1 3 25 
Fixed-facility 
incineration 
4 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 3 26 
Air-curtain 
incineration 
3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 25 
Bin- and in-
vessel 
composting 
3 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 30 
Windrow 
composting 
3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 35 
Rendering 1 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 2 26 
Fermentation 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 4 3 4 2 30 
Anaerobic 
digestion 
4 1 1 3 4 1 3 4 3 4 2 30 
Alkaline 
hydrolysis 
4 1 1 3 4 1 2 4 3 4 2 29 
The scale is as follows: 4 – meets the criteria well, 3 – somewhat meets the criteria, 2 – fairly meets the 
criteria, and 1 – poorly meets the criteria.   
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Based on this comparison, landfill usage is the top policy choice followed by windrow 
composting and burial.  This analysis allows decision makers to look at multiple policy 
alternatives and compare them to their selected criteria.  Again, burning was last on the list of 
technologies.  Local factors will have an influence in scoring criteria.  For example, in southwest 
Kansas, landfill space is not available to meet potential disposal needs regardless of its ability to 
successfully meet other criteria. 
The two biggest problems with this method of analysis are that it is dependent on the 
subjectivity of the analyst and implies that each criterion is equally important.  A criteria 
weighting system would make this analysis even more useful, but would require agreement on 
the weightings of the criteria by decision makers.   
In order to make the analysis a better tool for policymakers allowing them to use 
available information but leaving the decision in their hands, the first step would be to ask the 
decision makers to apply a weight to each criteria.  A weighing or priority system that allowed 
the most flexibility to the decision maker is likely to be more useful.   
For example, instead of simply ranking the criteria from most to least important, decision 
makers could be asked to take 100 points and distribute them according to their priorities for 
each criteria.  If there is one decision maker, then his/her priorities would direct policy.  If there 
are multiple leaders involved in the policy decision, the weighting could be done as a group or 
individually and then aggregated. 
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Table 6-8 Weighting of Disposal Method 
Disposal Method Criteria 
Weight and priority of each criterion 
Instructions: You have 100 points to distribute amongst the 
criteria.  Please assign points based on the priority you place 
on each criterion in selecting a disposal method.  The total 
points allocated must equal 100 points. 
Disease and biosecurity risk  
Scale and expediency  
Site and facility accessibility  
Fuel and resources  
Environment  
Transportation  
Cost and economics  
Public health  
Species applicability  
Public perception  
Regulatory compliance and 
interagency cooperation 
 
Total points assigned Must sum to 100 
 
A completed example weighing each disposal method is seen below.  This example 
included four decision makers involved in the policy decision: one animal health official, one 
health and environment official, one budget official, and one elected official.  The intent is 
simply to illustrate how different officials may have different priorities but assumes each has an 
understanding of the critical nature of carcass disposal policy decisions in the face of an animal 
disease outbreak.  The priorities exhibited in Table 6-9 are based solely on personal impressions 
of what issues are of the greatest concern to each type of decision maker developed through the 
literature review, research, exercise activities, and personal conversations. 
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Table 6-9 An Example Weighting of Disposal Method 
Disposal Method Criteria 
Weight and priority of each criterion 
Instructions: You have 100 points to distribute amongst the 
criteria.  Please assign points based on the priority you place on 
each criterion in selecting a disposal method.  The total points 
allocated must equal 100 points. 
Decision Maker 
Animal 
Health 
Health and 
Environment Budget Elected Average 
Disease and biosecurity 
risk 15 10 10 15 12.5 
Scale and expediency 10 5 10 10 8.75 
Site and facility 
accessibility 10 10 10 5 8.75 
Fuel and resources 7 10 10 5 8 
Environment 5 15 5 5 7.5 
Transportation 10 5 5 5 6.25 
Cost and economics 5 5 20 15 11.25 
Public health 15 15 10 15 13.75 
Species applicability 10 5 5 5 6.25 
Public perception 3 5 5 15 7 
Regulatory compliance 
and interagency 
cooperation 10 15 10 5 10 
Total points assigned 
(Must sum to 100) 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 6-10 Disposal Technology Matrix Scorecard with Weighting Applied 
Disposal 
Technologies 
Disposal Technology Policy Criteria 
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Weight % 12.5 8.75 8.75 8 7.5 6.25 11.25 13.75 6.25 7 10  
Burial (on- 
and off-site) 3 3 3 4 2 4 4 2 4 1 3 2.97 
Landfill 
usage 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 3.41 
Open burning 3 3 2 1 2 4 1 2 3 1 3 2.24 
Fixed-facility 
incineration 4 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 3 2.44 
Air-curtain 
incineration 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2.29 
Bin- and in-
vessel 
composting 3 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 2.76 
Windrow 
composting 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 3.19 
Rendering 1 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 2 2.26 
Fermentation 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 4 3 4 2 2.81 
Anaerobic 
digestion 4 1 1 3 4 1 3 4 3 4 2 2.83 
Alkaline 
hydrolysis 4 1 1 3 4 1 2 4 3 4 2 2.72 
The scale is as follows: 4 – meets the criteria well, 3 – somewhat meets the criteria, 2 – fairly meets the criteria, and 
1 – poorly meets the criteria.   
 
In Table 6-10, weightings were applied based on Table 6-9 and different criteria were 
compared for each disposal technology.  Landfill usage followed by windrow composting and 
then burial were the top three methods based on the hypothesized weights and scores.  
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 Summary 
The KRP addresses carcass disposal and indicates KDA, KDHE, and USDA APHIS have 
worked well together in establishing a process and procedures.  Effective means of carcass 
disposal are essential in the case of an animal disease emergency, and a state policy that provides 
guidance in that area is recommended. 
Strategies for timely, efficient, and effective disposal require significant planning and 
preparation.  While significant work has gone into developing the state emergency disposal 
policy, further evaluation of disposal technologies may need to occur.  The KRP identifies burial 
and composting as preferred disposal methods.  Burial, composting, and landfill usage appear to 
be the most effective tools in the analysis provided but may not be logistically feasible.   
The KRP may be more effective if it detailed different policies for different situations.  
The “one size fits all approach” may be a problem if burial is not a feasible option.  This could 
be the case if a large-scale death loss occurred in a geographic location with high water tables or 
if the disease in question eliminates burial as an option.  Any disposal policy should utilize 
multiple disposal methods, allowing for each region of the state to adapt to the methods that best 
meet their needs and to respond to the specific disease agents and species involved.   
Decision makers need to understand all disposal alternatives and be prepared to utilize 
them when necessary.  Development of new or more efficient technologies, changes in laws or 
regulations, or shifts in market conditions may influence the decision as well.  Further 
consideration should be given to expanding the list of preferred disposal methods, and decision 
makers may need to reconsider their preferred method policy. 
 Vaccination 
Stamping out has been considered the primary U.S. policy approach to FMD for decades.  
Lessons learned from FMD outbreaks in other countries and emergency exercises completed in 
the US have led to a revolutionary change in thinking about FMD vaccination.  Animal health 
officials have concluded stamping out may simply not be a feasible option, but also acknowledge 
that vaccination is not an “easy button” or “silver bullet”.  At a December 2013 FMD emergency 
exercise with representatives from multiple federal agencies and state officials from Kansas, 
Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska, it was markedly apparent that the vaccination infrastructure and 
decision process is not in place to meet the needs anticipated in a major FMD outbreak.  Kansas 
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animal health officials concluded states will find themselves fighting each other for vaccine and 
it is unlikely to be provided in a sufficient, timely manner.  However, vaccination-to-slaughter 
remains the goal of Kansas animal health officials and eradicating the disease is considered 
paramount to economic and trade impacts.  These policy considerations need further 
consideration and a framework has been created to provide decision makers with insight into this 
challenging policy dilemma. 
 Kansas Response Plan – vaccination 
The Kansas Response Plan Food and Agriculture Incident Annex notes vaccination can 
be used in a number of different situations in the case of FAD.  USDA APHIS will control 
access and permission to use vaccines, because of their implications in international trade.  The 
Kansas Department of Agriculture Division of Animal Health could seek the approval to use 
vaccines if a highly infectious disease cannot be contained by euthanasia of exposed and infected 
animals.  Then, ring vaccination could be used to vaccinate susceptible, non-exposed animals 
that would form a barrier to slow the progression of the disease spread.  Vaccines may also be 
used to protect large numbers of susceptible animals in a feedlot, dry lot dairy, or swine 
confinement facility.  These vaccinated animals would be slaughtered after the disease is 
contained and enter the food chain.  Vaccination in these cases would avoid mass euthanasia and 
preserve meat for human consumption (KRP, 2013).  
 Framework analysis 
The Alternatives-Consequences approach is applied to vaccination versus depopulation 
policy decision in the following framework analysis.  A number of factors related to the specific 
outbreak will influence the specific consequences of each alternative, such as speed of disease 
spread, size of outbreak, species involved, and number of jurisdictions involved.  The framework 
in Table 6-11 is designed to provide a conceptual framework comparing alternatives and 
consequences.  This conceptual framework can provide a basis for policy decisions, but to be 
more useful and effective, details related to the specific outbreak would need to be completed 
and provided to decision makers within hours of disease notification.  To provide additional 
resources to decision makers, results from previous economic and epidemiological models as 
shared in Chapter 4 can also be provided.  
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To add to the usefulness of the framework, a weighting mechanism can be added to allow 
decision makers to more clearly prioritize the consequences of each policy alternative.  Two 
components can be added, one to quantify the ability of each alternative to meet the goals of each 
consequence area and the second to value the importance of that area of consideration.  The first 
method of quantification would be dependent on expert input to the policymakers on the 
consequences of each policy alternative.  For example, an epidemiologist can provide 
information on the ability of each policy alternative to stop disease spread given the disease 
outbreak scenario and an economist can provide details on the economic and trade impact for the 
given region based on the disease outbreak.  Then, the policymakers need to decide which 
factors they value the most and provide an appropriate weight reflecting their policy priorities.  
Feasibility may be considered initially, because there is no point becoming dependent on a policy 
solution that is simply not feasible to implement.  In Table 6-12, “expert” scoring is 
hypothesized for a large scale, rapidly spreading FMD outbreak based on general interpretation 
of previous economic and epidemiological work and a scale of 1 – 4 is used to indicate the 
ability for each policy alternative to meet the criteria.  The scale is as follows: 4 – meets the 
criteria well, 3 – somewhat meets the criteria, 2 – fairly meets the criteria, and 1 – poorly meets 
the criteria.  While specialists can be used to finalize criteria scoring before the tools is provided 
to the generalist or policy maker to apply weighting, the examples provided were based on the 
general factors described in Table 6-11.  In addition, value weighting is applied based on a total 
scoring system of 100 points.  The example values are estimated to be those of an animal health 
official.  
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Table 6-11 Consequences of Vaccination Alternatives 
Policy 
Alternatives 
Consequences to be considered 
Animal Health Economic Political Consumer Reaction Industry Reaction Feasibility 
Top priority 
within each area 
of consideration 
Eliminate 
disease, reduce 
number of 
infected and 
susceptible 
animals 
Minimize 
economic impact 
and time to 
economic 
recovery 
Minimize social 
and political 
disruption 
Maintain consumer 
support for industry 
Gain and maintain 
industry support for 
response and business 
continuity 
Viable implementation 
Stamping out, no 
vaccination 
Low speed of 
disease spread 
Low animal 
population 
density 
Limited animal 
movement 
Animal welfare 
concerns 
Trade is reinstated 
no less than 3 
months after last 
diseased animal is 
depopulated 
Cost of control 
strategy 
Impact on 
domestic demand 
Impact on related 
sectors 
Influence of 
stakeholders 
Influence of 
activist groups 
International 
reaction 
Media coverage 
Public reaction to 
animal depopulation, 
especially of 
apparently healthy 
animals 
General response to 
disease outbreak 
Reaction to 
depopulation of 
apparently healthy 
animals 
Consideration of 
genetic preservation 
Compensation factors 
Feasibility of 
stamping out 
Stamping out 
modified with 
vaccination-to-
kill/cull 
High speed of 
disease spread 
High animal 
population 
density 
Extensive animal 
movement 
Animal welfare 
concerns 
Trade is reinstated 
no less than 3 
months after last 
vaccinated animal 
is depopulated 
Cost of control 
strategy  
Impact on 
domestic demand 
Impact on related 
sectors 
Influence of 
stakeholders 
Influence of 
activist groups 
International 
reaction 
Media coverage 
Public reaction to 
animal depopulation, 
especially of 
apparently healthy 
animals 
General response to 
disease outbreak 
Reaction to 
depopulation of 
apparently healthy 
animals 
Consideration of 
genetic preservation 
Compensation factors 
Availability and 
accessibility of 
vaccines 
Feasibility of 
stamping out 
Stamping out 
modified with 
vaccination-to-
slaughter 
High speed of 
disease spread 
High animal 
population 
density 
Trade is reinstated 
no less than 3 
months after last 
vaccinated animal 
is slaughtered 
Influence of 
stakeholders 
Influence of 
activist groups 
International 
Consumer acceptance 
of vaccinated product 
Consumer demand 
for labeled products 
Consumer confidence 
Meat industry reaction 
to potential consumer 
desire for labeled 
product 
Meat industry concerns 
Availability and 
accessibility of 
vaccines Feasibility of 
stamping out  
Processing plant 
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Policy 
Alternatives 
Consequences to be considered 
Animal Health Economic Political Consumer Reaction Industry Reaction Feasibility 
Extensive animal 
movement 
Animal welfare 
concerns 
Cost of control 
strategy  
Impact on 
domestic demand 
Impact on related 
sectors 
reaction 
Media coverage 
in entire meat supply about overall impact on 
demand 
willingness to accept 
vaccinated animals 
Stamping out 
modified with 
vaccination-to-
live 
High speed of 
disease spread 
High animal 
population 
density 
Extensive animal 
movement 
Animal welfare 
concerns 
Trade is reinstated 
no less than 6 
months after last 
diseased animal is 
depopulated or 
last animal was 
vaccinated 
Cost of control 
strategy 
Impact on 
domestic demand 
Impact on related 
sectors 
Influence of 
stakeholders 
Influence of 
activist groups 
International 
reaction 
Media coverage 
Consumer acceptance 
of vaccinated product 
Consumer demand 
for labeled products 
Consumer confidence 
in entire meat supply 
Meat industry reaction 
to potential consumer 
desire for labeled 
product 
Meat industry concerns 
about overall impact on 
demand 
Availability and 
accessibility of 
vaccines 
Feasibility of 
stamping out 
Vaccination-to-
live, no stamping 
out 
Extremely high 
speed of disease 
spread 
Extremely high 
animal 
population 
density 
Extensive and 
unknown animal 
movement 
Trade is reinstated 
no less than 12 
months after last 
diseased animal 
was identified or 
last animal was 
vaccinated 
Cost of control 
strategy 
Impact on 
domestic demand 
Impact on related 
sectors 
Influence of 
stakeholders 
Influence of 
activist groups 
International 
reaction 
Media coverage 
Consumer acceptance 
of vaccinated product 
Consumer demand 
for labeled products 
Consumer confidence 
in entire meat supply 
Meat industry reaction 
to potential consumer 
desire for labeled 
product 
Meat industry concerns 
about overall impact on 
demand 
Availability and 
accessibility of 
vaccines 
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Table 6-12 Vaccination Versus Stamping Out Weighted by Animal Health Official 
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Feasibility 
Viable 
implementation 
If Yes – 
proceed  
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Animal 
health 
Eliminate 
disease, reduce 
number of 
infected and 
susceptible 
animals 
50% 2 3 3 2 2 
Economic 
Minimize 
economic 
impact and time 
to economic 
recovery 
10% 3 2 3 2 1 
Political 
Minimize 
social and 
political 
disruption 
5% 2 1 2 1 2 
Consumer 
reaction 
Maintain 
consumer 
support for 
industry 
10% 2 1 1 1 2 
Industry 
reaction 
Gain and 
maintain 
industry 
support for 
response and 
business 
continuity 
25% 2 1 2 2 1 
TOTAL SCORE 100% 2.10 2.35 2.5 1.85 1.65 
A scale of 1 – 4 is used to indicate the ability for each policy alternative to meet the criteria.  The scale is as 
follows: 4 – meets the criteria well, 3 – somewhat meets the criteria, 2 – fairly meets the criteria, and 1 – poorly 
meets the criteria.   
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According to the factors and weighted values in Table 6-12, if animal health and disease 
control is the priority and assuming all policy alternatives are feasible, vaccination-to-slaughter 
scores the highest with vaccination-to-kill/cull second and stamping out ranking third.  However, 
if weights were shifted to reflect priorities placing a higher value on economic and political 
impact, results will differ as seen in Table 6-13 where stamping out is the preferred policy 
alternative. 
 Qualitative cost-benefit assessment 
Another method of comparing policy alternatives and consequences can be provided to 
policymakers in a qualitative cost-benefit analysis.  The goal is to provide policy makers a tool 
that explains the cost and benefit impact of the consequences faced by different stakeholders.  A 
cost to one stakeholder may be a benefit to another, so tradeoffs can be compared.  A qualitative 
assessment allows for alternatives that cannot be sufficiently quantified in a traditional cost-
benefit analysis to be compared.  When quantitative information is available from economic or 
epidemiological models, it can be used to help complete the assessment.  The policymakers can 
then assess the impact of each consequence and make a policy decision.  A sample qualitative 
cost-benefit assessment is provided in Table 6-13 that highlights a few of the potential 
consequences of FMD control strategies on different groups of stakeholders with different 
interests that would allow decision makers to compare the consequences of each alternative.   
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Table 6-13 Vaccination Versus Stamping Out Weighted by Official Focused on Economic and 
Political Impact 
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Feasibility 
Viable 
implementation 
If Yes – 
proceed  
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Is this 
approach 
feasible? 
Animal 
health 
Eliminate 
disease, reduce 
number of 
infected and 
susceptible 
animals 
15% 2 3 3 2 2 
Economic 
Minimize 
economic 
impact and time 
to economic 
recovery 
30% 3 2 3 2 1 
Political 
Minimize 
social and 
political 
disruption 
20% 2 1 2 1 2 
Consumer 
reaction 
Maintain 
consumer 
support for 
industry 
20% 2 1 1 1 2 
Industry 
reaction 
Gain and 
maintain 
industry 
support for 
response and 
business 
continuity 
15% 2 1 2 2 1 
TOTAL SCORE 100% 2.30 1.60 2.25 1.60 1.55 
A scale of 1 - 4 is used to indicate the ability for each policy alternative to meet the criteria.  The scale is as 
follows: 4 – meets the criteria well, 3 – somewhat meets the criteria, 2 – fairly meets the criteria, and 1 – poorly 
meets the criteria.  
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Table 6-14 Qualitative Cost-Benefit Assessment of FMD Control Strategies 
Policy 
Alternatives 
Agriculture Industry Consumers and General Public Government and Public Sector 
Livestock producers 
who own infected 
and susceptible 
animals 
Livestock 
producers and 
processers 
impacted by trade 
Public concerned 
about animal 
welfare and food 
safety 
Consumers who 
purchase meat 
products 
Direct and 
indirect costs 
Ability to address 
animal disease 
control 
Stamping out, 
no vaccination 
More animals 
depopulated 
Compensation will 
be provided for 
depopulated animals 
Fastest return to 
normal trade  
See large number 
of animals killed 
and disposed 
including those 
that are not 
diseased 
Initial reduction in 
meat supply may 
increase prices if 
excessive numbers 
of animals are 
depopulated 
Trade restrictions 
will eventually lead 
to price declines 
and increases in 
domestic consumer 
welfare 
Large number of 
animals 
depopulated and 
disposed will 
lead to high 
government 
costs, including 
producer 
compensation 
May lead to fastest 
disease eradication 
depending on 
circumstances 
Stamping out 
modified with 
vaccination-to-
kill/cull 
Likely the most 
number of animals 
depopulated 
Compensation will 
be provided for 
depopulated animals 
Next to the fastest 
return to normal 
trade 
See large number 
of animals killed 
and disposed 
including those 
that are have been 
vaccinated 
Trade restrictions 
will lead to price 
declines and 
increases in 
domestic consumer 
welfare 
Likely the high 
cost alternative 
when 
considering 
vaccination, 
depopulation, 
disposal, and 
compensation 
Will likely result in 
a median duration of 
disease outbreak 
Stamping out 
modified with 
vaccination-to-
slaughter 
Fewer animals 
depopulated and 
most still move into 
food chain 
Compensation will 
be provided for only 
depopulated animals 
Median time to 
return to trade 
See fewer animals 
killed and disposed 
Vaccinated 
products enter the 
food chain 
Trade restrictions 
will lead to price 
declines and 
increases in 
domestic consumer 
welfare 
Lower cost 
alternative as 
fewer animals 
culled and 
disposed and 
less need for 
compensation 
Will likely result in 
a median duration of 
disease outbreak 
Stamping out Next to least number Next to slowest Fewer animals Trade restrictions Lower cost May extend duration 
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Policy 
Alternatives 
Agriculture Industry Consumers and General Public Government and Public Sector 
Livestock producers 
who own infected 
and susceptible 
animals 
Livestock 
producers and 
processers 
impacted by trade 
Public concerned 
about animal 
welfare and food 
safety 
Consumers who 
purchase meat 
products 
Direct and 
indirect costs 
Ability to address 
animal disease 
control 
modified with 
vaccination-to-
live 
of animals 
depopulated  
Normal slaughter 
channels 
Compensation will 
be provided for 
depopulated animals 
return to trade killed and disposed 
Vaccination saves 
animals lives 
Vaccinated 
animals enter the 
food chain 
will lead to price 
declines and 
increases in 
domestic consumer 
welfare 
alternative as 
fewer animals 
culled and 
disposed and 
less need for 
compensation 
of disease outbreak 
Vaccination-to-
live, no 
stamping out 
Least number of 
animals depopulated 
Normal slaughter 
channels 
Slowest return to 
normal trade 
No animals killed 
and disposed 
Vaccinated and 
previous disease 
animals enter the 
food chain 
Trade restrictions 
will lead to price 
declines and 
increases in 
domestic consumer 
welfare 
No costs for 
disposal, 
depopulation, 
and 
compensation 
but high costs 
for vaccination 
May lead to longest 
outbreak duration 
Each cell is shaded to represent the qualitative cost/ benefit, advantage/disadvantage impact of each listed consequence for each policy alternative.  The key is 
shown below. 
Key 
Increased benefits/ 
reduced costs 
Changes in costs 
and benefits 
counter each other 
Decreased 
benefits/increased 
costs 
Unable to 
determine impact 
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 Summary 
The decision to vaccinate in the case of an FMD outbreak is complex and multifaceted.  
Policymakers will need to be well-informed on the disease outbreak scenario and have a clear 
understanding of the potential consequences of their decisions.  However, the most telling factor 
will be the value the policymakers place on the various consequences of each policy alternative.  
Also of concern is the feasibility of all policy alternatives.  While stamping out has been 
identified by some animal health officials as infeasible, questions over the how and when 
vaccination will be available also makes all vaccination protocols potentially unreliable as well.  
In a 2013 FMD emergency exercise when vaccination was being discussed, it became clear that 
there would not be enough vaccine to serve the four states participating in the exercise and that 
no vaccine would be available for 14-21 days.  In addition, a comment was made by a 
veterinarian in response to a comment made by an economist that “this is why we do not want 
economists making decisions” and another comment followed later in the discussion that 
“doctors of veterinary medicine will be making the important decisions” (personal 
communication).  In general, across state and federal levels, there appears to be a lack of 
understanding of how policy decisions are made or that all decision makers in an animal health 
emergency answer to elected officials who may value or prioritize policy consequences 
differently.  Better policy analysis tools and a significantly better understanding of the impact of 
vaccination policy alternatives are needed.  Basic frameworks as presented here can begin to 
open the door to more effective policy making in an emergency disease situation. 
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Chapter 7 - Summary, Conclusions, and Future Considerations 
The U.S. agriculture industry is diverse and dynamic, plays a vital role in the Nation’s 
economy, and serves as a critical component in providing the global food supply.  Agriculture 
has and always will be susceptible to threats such as pests, disease, and weather, but it is also 
threatened by intentional acts of agroterrorism.  The crop and livestock industry are both 
vulnerable to deliberate attacks in addition to the natural risks they face every day.  History 
indicates that threats against the food system have always existed, and while attacks have not 
been frequent, they continue to be a feasible alternative for those wanting to inflict damage with 
limited risk to the perpetrator and high consequence for the target.  These low-probability but 
high-consequence risks need to be taken seriously by industry and policymakers in order to 
ensure appropriate preventive and response policies are in place. 
One specific area of concern is foreign animal diseases (FAD) and the danger these 
diseases create for the U.S. livestock industry.  Regardless of whether a disease outbreak is 
intentional or accidental, it could devastate animal agriculture and the food infrastructure and 
have a long-lasting impact on state, national, and global economies.  The highly concentrated 
nature of the livestock industry, open access production in sparsely populated areas, and the 
simplicity of some forms of attack make agriculture vulnerable to disease outbreaks.  A number 
of diseases can be considered of greater concern including classical swine fever, bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy, avian influenza, chronic wasting disease, exotic Newcastle disease, 
and swine influenza.  One of the most economically devastating diseases that raise fear and 
anxiety in the livestock industry is foot and mouth disease (FMD). 
A number of administrative, regulatory, and legislative actions have been implemented at 
state and federal levels designed to protect the agriculture industry and to prevent, prepare for, 
and respond to an accidental or intentional introduction of an FAD.  However, the consistency, 
clarity, and long-term commitment of these policy approaches remains in question.  Controversy 
exists in some cases over roles, responsibilities, and statutory authorities between agencies and 
between state and federal governments and the practicality of some policy decisions. 
Effective policy decisions require a multidisciplinary approach that consider and balance 
science, economics, social factors, and political realities.  Relative to an FAD these 
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considerations need to include animal health, disease control, animal welfare, environmental 
impact, consumer reaction, ethical concerns, regulatory impact, logistics, social and 
psychological impacts, physical security, geography, public health, economics, trade impacts, 
industry response, and political realities.  A significant number of policy analysis tools exist and 
have been applied to animal emergency scenarios but few actually address the complexity of 
these policy dilemmas and provide information to policymakers in a format designed to help 
them make better policy decisions.  Policy analysis should not be focused on the identification of 
the best solution, but should instead provide decision makers with a clear understanding of the 
policy problem, issues of concern, policy alternatives to consider, consequences to compare, and 
a framework with which to make a strategic decision.   
Three FAD policy dilemmas that deserve further discussion, consideration, and a 
multidisciplinary approach are mass euthanasia and depopulation, carcass disposal, and 
vaccination.  While these policies are important in dealing with numerous FADs, significant 
concerns exist in FMD policy decisions on these issues.   
Mass euthanasia and depopulation are necessary to stop disease spread and may be 
necessary to deal with animal welfare issues.  Decision makers will need to determine when and 
where mass euthanasia and depopulation approaches will be implemented and what methods of 
euthanasia will be used.  Economic, animal health, social and other factors will play a role in the 
decision process.  In selecting appropriate methods, policymakers need to first select the highest 
valued priority.  If it is animal welfare, the methods to be considered are limited.  If another 
priority is valued higher such as speed of disease control, other methods may prove more 
successful.  A decision tree can serve as a guidance tool for the policy decision. 
Carcass disposal during an FMD outbreak is a complex and challenging policy dilemma 
influenced by a number of factors including biosecurity risk, scale of death loss, site and facility 
availability, fuel and resources, environmental impact, transportation requirements, costs, 
economic impacts, public health, species, public perception, and interagency and 
intergovernmental cooperation.  Cost-effectiveness analysis and a multicriteria decision matrix 
are developed for policy analysis.  The decision matrix requires policymakers to rank their policy 
outcome priorities to help determine the best policy solution. 
Vaccination has become the most significant policy dilemma facing decision makers in 
an FMD outbreak.  While vaccination was not considered a realistic alternative just a few years 
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ago, opinions have shifted and it is now seen as the preferred policy response by many 
government officials.  However, policymakers need to be provided information on the full 
impacts of the vaccination policy alternatives before a decision is made.  A framework is 
provided based on the alternatives-consequences approach that requires policymakers to consider 
all facts and multidisciplinary impacts before making a decision.  A weighted version of the 
framework is provided to reflect policymakers’ values and priorities.  One of the remaining 
questions regarding the vaccination versus mass depopulation decision is the feasibility of all of 
the policy alternatives.   
Recently, at an FMD emergency exercise with participants from multiple federal agencies 
and four Midwestern states, it was apparent vaccination protocols for distribution are not in place 
and it is unlikely vaccination would be provided to states quickly enough to serve as a disease 
control tool.  Yet, vaccination was still deemed to be preferred over mass depopulation.  It was 
also apparent in this discussion that decisions were solely focused on animal health, and other 
factors such as economics, were considered inferior.  This way of thinking seems to lack an 
understanding of the political reality that elected and appointed officials will expect policy 
decisions to be made that weigh all concerns and balance all potential impacts.  If those 
delegated the decision making responsibility do not meet these expectations, it is likely the 
decisions will be made by those without the necessary expertise.  Thus, policy development 
needs to take a more multidisciplinary approach and better policy tools are needed to help 
decision makers determine the best policy choices.  The approaches in this dissertation are 
designed to serve as a next step in the policy development process. 
As policymakers look to the future, a number of additional questions need to be 
considered.  Animal disease response tools such as stop- and permitted-movement controls, 
surveillance, disease diagnostics, vaccination priorities, new vaccine technology, and especially 
animal identification and traceability need further review in addition to euthanasia, disposal, and 
vaccination protocols.  Communication and cooperation need to be improved between state and 
federal authorities, executive and legislative branches, and government, private industry, and the 
public.  Ex ante investment, indemnity insurance for livestock emergencies, producer 
compensation policies, business continuity plans, and herd rebuilding options need to be 
evaluated.  Plans should be developed for addressing the existing shortage of large animal 
veterinarians trained in FAD diagnostics and response.   
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The impact of an FAD outbreak and various policy responses on domestic consumer 
demand and confidence in the food supply along with long-term impact on trade reputation and 
ability to regain lost market share deserve further analysis.  Regionalization for trade purposes 
and acceptability of zoning in other countries should be explored, and the U.S. reactions to 
international disease outbreaks need to be strategically assessed.  Consideration may also need to 
be given to broader more overarching global FMD policy questions, such as global eradication or 
international acceptance of vaccination as a normal, non-emergency protocol.  While initially 
concepts like these seem too controversial for realistic consideration, they deserve to be 
discussed in light of the complexity, potential, and high consequences of FMD outbreaks in 
currently FMD-free exporting countries. 
Agricultural biosecurity and defense policy is challenging, complex, and shrouded in 
uncertainty.  Decision making will be dynamic in nature and must adjust for limited information 
and timing.  A holistic approach is needed that addresses science, economics, political realities, 
and social factors.  Priorities need to be identified and policy tools developed that accurately 
reflect those priorities.  Multidisciplinary factors may be considered in the decision making 
process, and policymakers need to be provided the appropriate facts and framework with which 
to make policy decisions.  The policy issues, consideration, and tools described in this 
dissertation can provide a start to improving the policy-making process in dealing with a threat to 
the agriculture industry. 
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Appendix A - OIE Listed Diseases 
Multiple species diseases 
 Anthrax 
 Aujeszky's disease 
 Bluetongue 
 Brucellosis (Brucella abortus)  
 Brucellosis (Brucella melitensis)  
 Brucellosis (Brucella suis)  
 Crimean Congo haemorrhagic 
fever  
 Echinococcosis/hydatidosis 
 Epizootic haemorrhagic disease 
 Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern)  
 Foot and mouth disease  
 Heartwater  
 Japanese encephalitis  
 New world screwworm 
(Cochliomyia hominivorax)  
 Old world screwworm (Chrysomya 
bezziana)  
 Paratuberculosis  
 Q fever  
 Rabies 
 Rift Valley fever 
 Rinderpest 
 Surra (Trypanosoma evansi)  
 Trichinellosis 
 Tularemia 
 Vesicular stomatitis 
 West Nile fever 
Cattle diseases 
 Bovine anaplasmosis 
 Bovine babesiosis 
 Bovine genital campylobacteriosis 
 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy  
 Bovine tuberculosis 
 Bovine viral diarrhoea 
 Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia  
 Enzootic bovine leukosis 
 Haemorrhagic septicaemia 
 Infectious bovine 
rhinotracheitis/infectious pustular vulvovagi
nitis 
 Lumpy skin disease 
 Theileriosis 
 Trichomonosis 
 Trypanosomosis (tsetse-transmitted) 
Sheep and goat diseases 
 Caprine arthritis/encephalitis 
 Contagious agalactia 
 Contagious caprine 
pleuropneumonia 
 Enzootic abortion of ewes (ovine 
chlamydiosis) 
 Maedi-visna 
 Nairobi sheep disease 
 Ovine epididymitis (Brucella ovis) 
 Peste des petits ruminants 
Equine diseases 
 African horse sickness 
 Contagious equine metritis 
 Dourine 
 Equine encephalomyelitis (Western) 
 Equine infectious anaemia 
 Equine influenza 
 Equine piroplasmosis 
 Equine rhinopneumonitis 
 Equine viral arteritis 
 Glanders 
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 Salmonellosis (S. abortusovis) 
 Scrapie 
 Sheep pox and goat pox 
 Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis 
Swine diseases 
 African swine fever 
 Classical swine fever 
 Nipah virus encephalitis  
 Porcine cysticercosis 
 Porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome 
 Swine vesicular disease 
 Transmissible gastroenteritis 
Avian diseases 
 Avian chlamydiosis 
 Avian infectious bronchitis  
 Avian infectious laryngotracheitis 
 Avian mycoplasmosis (M. gallisepticum) 
 Avian mycoplasmosis (M. synoviae) 
 Duck virus hepatitis  
 Fowl typhoid 
 Highly pathogenic avian influenza and low 
pathogenic avian influenza in poultry as per 
Chapter 10.4. of the Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code 
 Infectious bursal disease (Gumboro disease) 
 Newcastle disease 
 Pullorum disease 
 Turkey rhinotracheitis 
Lagomorph diseases 
 Myxomatosis 
 Rabbit haemorrhagic disease 
Bee diseases 
 Acarapisosis of honey bees 
 American foulbrood of honey bees 
 European foulbrood of honey bees 
 Small hive beetle infestation (Aethina 
tumida)  
 Tropilaelaps infestation of honey bees 
 Varroosis of honey bees 
Fish diseases 
 Epizootic haematopoietic necrosis 
 Epizootic ulcerative syndrome 
 Infection with Gyrodactylus salaris 
 Infectious haematopoietic necrosis 
 Infectious salmon anaemia  
 Koi herpesvirus disease 
 Red sea bream iridoviral disease 
 Spring viraemia of carp 
 Viral haemorrhagic septicaemia 
  
Mollusc diseases 
 Infection with abalone herpes-like virus 
 Infection with Bonamia exitiosa 
 Infection with Bonamia ostreae 
 Infection with Marteilia refringens 
 Infection with Perkinsus marinus 
 Infection with Perkinsus olseni 
 Infection with Xenohaliotis californiensis 
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Crustacean diseases 
 Crayfish plague (Aphanomyces 
astaci) 
 Infectious hypodermal and 
haematopoietic necrosis 
 Infectious myonecrosis 
 Necrotising hepatopancreatitis 
 Taura syndrome  
 White spot disease  
 White tail disease  
 Yellowhead disease  
  
Amphibians 
 Infection with Batrachochytrium 
dendrobatidis  
 Infection with ranavirus  
Other diseases 
 Camelpox  
 Leishmaniosis  
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Appendix B - List of Acronyms 
AABP American Association of Bovine Practitioners 
AASP American Association of Swine Practitioners 
AAZV American Association of Zoo Veterinarians 
AERO Animal Emergency Response Organization 
AI avian influenza 
ALF Animal Liberation Front 
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
ARS Agriculture Research Service 
ASF African Swine fever 
AUSVET Australian Veterinary Plan 
AVMA American Veterinary Medicine Association 
BOA Bureau of Air 
BRAC breakeven risk aversion 
BSE bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
BSL biosafety level 
BST bovine somatotropin 
BWM Bureau of Waste Management 
CAFO confined animal feeding operation 
CARA constant absolute risk aversion 
CAST Council for Agriculture Science and Technology 
CATRC Counter Agro Terrorism Research Center 
CBA cost-benefit analysis 
CBO Congressional Budget Office 
CBPP contagious bovine pleuropneumonia 
CDC Center for Disease Control 
CDFA California Department of Food and Agriculture 
CDP Center for Domestic Preparedness 
CEEZAD Center of Excellence for Emerging and Zoonotic Animal Diseases 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CFSPH Center for Food Safety and Public Health 
CGE computable general equilibrium 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CIDRAP Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy 
CIKR critical infrastructure and key resources 
COBRA Cabinet Office Briefing Room 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CSF classical swine fever 
CVB Center for Veterinary Biologics 
CVO chief veterinary officer 
CWD chronic wasting disease 
DAW Department of Animal Welfare (UK) 
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency 
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DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (UK) 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DIVA differentiated from infected animals 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOI Department of the Interior 
EADW Emergency Animal Disposal Workgroup 
EC European Commission 
EHD epizootic hemorrhagic disease 
ELF Earth Liberation Front 
END exotic Newcastle disease 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
ERS Economic Research Service 
ESF Emergency Support Function 
EU European Union 
FA food and agricultural  
FAD foreign animal disease 
FADD Foreign Animal Disease diagnostician 
FADPReP Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan 
FADT Foreign Animal Disease Threats 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN 
FASCC Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council 
FAWC Farm Animal Welfare Council 
FAZD Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
FDI first day incidence 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FFADDR 
Federal Food and Agriculture Decontamination and Disposal Roles and 
Responsibilities 
FFI first fortnight incidence 
FMD foot and mouth disease 
FR Federal Register 
FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service 
FSMA Food Safety and Modernization Act 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GIS geographic information system 
GMO genetically modified organisms 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza 
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
ICS Incident Command System 
IICAB Institute for International Cooperation in Animal Biologics 
I-O input-output 
ISP InterSpread Plus 
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ITC International Trade Commission 
KDA Kansas Department of Agriculture 
KDEM Kansas Department of Emergency Management 
KDHE Kansas Department of Health and Environment 
KRP Kansas Response Plan 
KSA Kansas Statutes Annotated 
LFD lateral flow devices 
LPAI low pathogenic avian influenza 
LWDS livestock welfare disposal scheme 
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods 
MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (NZ) 
MAK modified atmosphere killing 
MaTCh matrix, tree, and checklist 
MBM meat and bone meal 
MIIS Monterey Institute of International Studies 
MLC Meat and Livestock Commission 
MLHMP multilevel hierarchic Markov decision process 
NAADSM North America Disease Spread Model 
NAFMDVB North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank 
NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System 
NAO National Audit Office (UK) 
NASDA National Association of State Departments of Agriculture 
NASS National Agricultural Statistics Service 
NBAF National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility 
NCAHEM National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management 
NCEDR National Center for Environmental Decision Making Research 
NCFPD National Center for Food Protection and Defense 
NFU National Farmers Union 
NIAA National Institute on Animal Agriculture 
NIMS National Incident Management System 
NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
NRC National Research Council 
NRF National Response Framework 
NROS Natural Resources Conservation Service 
NRP National Response Plan 
NSC National Security Council 
NSTC National Science and Technology Council 
NVS National Veterinary Stockpile 
NZFMG 
New Zealand Combined Government and Industries FMD Preparedness Working 
Group 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OIE Office International des Epizooties 
OLPC Ontario Livestock and Poultry Council 
PAM policy analysis matrix 
PCR polymerase chain reaction 
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PD protective dose 
PETA People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
PIADC Plum Island Animal Disease Center 
PPD Presidential Policy Directive 
PPR peste des petits ruminant 
PTSD posttraumatic stress disorder 
RDM robust decision making 
ROW rest of world 
RPA Rural Payments Agency 
RSPCA Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
RVF Rift Valley fever 
SAM social accounting matrix 
SAT South African territories 
SART state animal response team 
SI swine influenza 
SPPA Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism 
SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 
SVC Scientific Veterinary Commission 
SVS State Veterinary Service 
TAD Targeted Advanced Development 
TAG Adjutant General 
TSE transmissible spongiform encephalopathy 
TXAHC Texas Animal Health Commission 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UPC United Poultry Concerns 
US United States 
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
USAHA U.S. Animal Health Association 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
USGS U.S. Geological Survey 
VC values contribution 
vCJD variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease 
VS Veterinary Service 
WARRP Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program 
WASK Welfare of Animals Regulations 
WHO World Health Organization 
WMD weapon of mass destruction 
WR Waste Reduction, Inc. 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
